

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE 1975

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PREFACE

This is the ninth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine*, which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to put on record the attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel) and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East, as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1974 to the middle of 1975; the second half of 1975 will be covered in the annual reports for 1976. The closing session of the General Assembly's debate on the question of Palestine has also been included in the United Nations section.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of policy regarding the area or as a record of the events of the year. US diplomatic activity culminating in the Sinai interim agreement is given particular attention, as are the differing attitudes towards the agreement both during its preparation and after its conclusion. The growing isolation of Israel in the United Nations, the developing discussion in the Palestine resistance as regards policy options and the repercussions of growing Arab economic influence are all reflected in the selection. In connection with the Lebanese crisis only documents relevant to relations between Lebanon and the Palestinians have been included.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and the Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in and influence on events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the Conference of Islamic States and the OAU.

The majority of documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection *Arab Documents on Palestine* published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies.

International and Arab World section documents are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of “early”, “mid” or “late” added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization’s internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word “excerpt (s)” after the title of the document.

The term “joint communiqué” has been used loosely and does not necessarily imply that the document concerned is a joint communiqué in the diplomatic sense.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English the editors have, as far as possible, used English translations published by journals or agencies of the country of origin. In such instances the footnote simply states “English text” with no reference to the original language. In cases where unofficial English translations have been used they have, when possible, been checked with the original. Other material has been translated especially for this volume.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume familiar Arabic names appear in a form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Abbreviations (e.g. PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the Palestine Research Centre and the UN Information Centre in Beirut for their cooperation.

LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their publisher when relevant and not obvious, and their place and frequency of publication.

<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Al Hamishmar</i> (Mapam)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Amal</i> (Phalangist Party)	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>American Journal of International Law</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i> (Palestine Liberation Army)	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	twice a month
<i>L'Arche</i>	Paris	monthly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Australia Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Canberra	monthly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>al-Balagh</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Beirut al-Masa</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jidda	daily
<i>al-Bina'</i> (Parti Populaire Syrien)	Beirut	irregular
<i>Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i> (Office of Information, Federal Government)	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	twice a month

<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i>	Ottawa	irregular
<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i> (Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress)	London	6 times a year
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i> (World Council of Churches)	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i> (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Ohio State University)	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>The Daily Star</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Davar</i> (Histadrut)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>Dis Politika/Foreign Policy</i>	Ankara	quarterly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	twice a month
<i>L'Express</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli	daily
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> (Council on Foreign Affairs)	New York	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Indian Council for World Affairs)	New Delhi	monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>The Guardian Weekly</i>	Manchester	weekly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i> (PFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hatsofeh</i> (National Religious Party)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hawadith</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Hurriya</i> (Communist Action Organization; DFLP)	Beirut	weekly

<i>Ila al-Amam</i> (PFLP-GC)	Beirut	weekly
<i>International Affairs</i> (All Union Society)	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>International Perspectives</i> (Ministry of External Affairs)	Ottawa	6 times a year
<i>Israel at Peace</i> (Communist Party of Israel-MAKI)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i> (World Zionist Organization)	Jerusalem	twice a month
<i>Israel Magazine</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>al-Ittihad</i> (Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i> (US Communist Party)	New York	6 times a year
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i> (Labor Zionist Alliance)	New York	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i> (Institute for Palestine Studies)	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bath	weekly
<i>Knesset Records</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Kristeligt Dagblad</i>	Copenhagen	daily
<i>The Listener</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	weekly
<i>Maariv</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Middle East International</i> (Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding)	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Journal</i> (Middle East Institute)	Washington, D.C.	quarterly

<i>Monday Morning</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>al-Montada</i> (Ecumenical Secretariat for Youth and Students in the Middle East)	Beirut	irregular
<i>Moscow News</i> (Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i> (B'nai B'rith)	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>National News Agency Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Information, Lebanon)	Beirut	daily
<i>Near East Report</i> (America-Israel Public Affairs Committee)	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>New Outlook</i> (Jewish-Arab Institute)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek—international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Orient</i> (Deutsches Orient-Institut)	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>L'Orient-Le Jour</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Pakistan Horizon</i> (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs)	Karachi	quarterly
<i>Palestine Digest</i> (Arab League Office)	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France :</i> <i>Textes et documents</i> (Foreign Ministry, France)	Paris	twice a year
<i>Quick</i>	Munich	weekly

<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	twice a month
<i>Revista de Politica Internacional</i>	Madrid	quarterly
<i>Revue Romaine d'Etudes Internationales</i>	Bucharest	quarterly
<i>Rose al-Yusuf</i>	Cairo	weekly
<i>Sabah al-Khayr</i> (Parti Populaire Syrien)	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Safir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>San Francisco Examiner</i>	San Francisco	daily
<i>al-Sayyad</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>Shu'un Filastiniya</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	monthly
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Soviet News</i> (Embassy of the USSR)	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Summary of World Broadcasts</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	daily
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i> (Central Office of Information, UK)	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i> (International Institute for Strategic Studies)	London	6 times a year
<i>al-Talai</i> (Saiqa)	Damascus	weekly
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Time—international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>UD-informasjon</i> (Foreign Ministry, Norway)	Oslo	irregular
<i>L'Unité</i> (Socialist Party)	Paris	daily
<i>al-Usub al-Arabi</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>U.S. News and World Report</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>USSR and Third World</i> (Central Asian Research Centre)	London	8 times a year
<i>Wafa</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	daily

*World Marxist Review Information
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United Nations

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

1

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: Question relating to the Middle East¹

August 2, 1975

A. Status of the cease-fire

1. EGYPT-ISRAEL SECTOR

(a) OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

In progress reports on UNEF, dated 18 June, 23 July and 30 August 1974 (S/11248/Add. 5, 6 and 7), the Secretary-General indicated that the military situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained calm and that the Force's activities remained the manning, patrolling and control of the zone of disengagement and inspections of the Egyptian and Israeli areas of limited armaments and forces. The repatriation of the Irish contingent and the transfer to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 1,050 men, by 18 June 1974, had brought about some changes in the composition and deployment of UNEF, whose strength was 5,247 men on 27 August.

(b) EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF UNEF

Report of the Secretary-General

As the mandate of UNEF was to expire in October 1974, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 12 October a report (S/11536) covering the period from 2 April to 12 October 1974, and providing a comprehensive picture of the activities of the Force in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973) of 25 and 27 October 1973 and extended by its resolution 346 (1974) of 8 April 1974.

After describing the composition and deployment of the Force, as well as its accommodations and logistics, the Secretary-General outlined the activities of UNEF for the period under review. Those activities included, as before, supervision of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces² in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference, with every effort being made to ensure the independent functioning of the Force in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council; assistance to the parties in implementing agreements; humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross; the transfer of civilians; and the search for mortal remains.

On the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents, the Secretary-General reaffirmed his position that UNEF had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, contingents of which served on an equal basis under the Commander of the Force, and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents.

Regarding the financial aspects of UNEF, the Secretary-General indicated that, in the course of consultations on the question of reimbursement, the troop-contributing countries had put forward an agreed proposal for the reimbursement of all contributing Governments on an equal basis at the rate of \$500 per man per month, with a proposed supplement of \$150 per man per month for a strictly limited number of specialist personnel. On the basis of that formula, it was necessary to seek additional authority and financial provision from the General Assembly to cover the requirements of the period ending on 24 October 1974, in the amount of \$23.6 million. At the same rate of obligations and reimbursement ceiling, the estimated cost for a further six-month period would be \$40 million, for an over-all strength of 5,750.

Having reviewed those aspects of the Force's activities, the Secretary-General then cautioned that, in spite of the prevailing quiet in the Egypt-

¹ Part One, Chapter I of *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1974—15 June 1975, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1* (UN doc. A/10001), pp. 3–12.

² Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

Israel sector, the over-all situation in the Middle East would remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems were unresolved. The continued operation of UNEF was essential not only to maintain the existing quiet in the sector but also to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. Consequently, he recommended once again that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months. Having made that recommendation, he remarked that the reduction of the Force to 4,500 men as a result of the withdrawal of two contingents and the transfer of other units to UNDOF had not entailed any major difficulties and that, under the circumstances, he did not anticipate a need for any increase in its strength.

Consideration by the Security Council

On 23 October, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNEF (S/11536) and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 362 (1974) by which the Council, after having examined the report, decided that the mandate of UNEF should be extended for an additional six-month period, that is, until 24 April 1975, in order to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; commended UNEF and those Governments supplying contingents to it for their contribution towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; expressed its confidence that the Force would be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy; and reaffirmed that UNEF must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel sector of operations without differentiation regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents, as stated in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to that end.

*Subsequent progress report of the
Secretary-General on UNEF*

In a further progress report on UNEF, dated 18 January (S/11536/Add. 1), the Secretary-General indicated that the military situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained calm and that the Force had continued to carry out its tasks

in pursuance of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18 January 1974 and in accordance with the mandate laid down by the Security Council.

Among the developments he mentioned were the withdrawal of the Panamanian contingent on 25 November 1974 and the death of three members of the Canadian contingent killed in a motor car accident on 24 December 1974.

Also during the period, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNEF officers had arranged the transfer in the buffer zone under United Nations supervision of 5,497 persons to and from Egyptian and Israeli-occupied territory under the family reunification and student exchange programmes.

(c) FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE
OF UNEF

In conjunction with the expiration of the mandate of UNEF, the Secretary-General issued a report (S/11670) in which he gave a detailed account of the Force's activities for the period from 13 October 1974 to 12 April 1975. He pointed out in particular that the functions and guidelines of UNEF had remained unchanged and that during that period the Force had continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it with the co-operation of the parties. He indicated, however, that there still existed a problem with regard to the freedom of movement of certain contingents.

The Secretary-General again observed that, pending the conclusion of an over-all settlement of the Middle East problem, the situation in the area as a whole would remain fundamentally unstable. Whether it was possible to maintain the prevailing quiet would depend on the prospects of achieving further progress in the search for a just and lasting settlement of the problem, as called for by the Security Council. In the circumstances, the continued presence of UNEF was essential not only to maintain the existing quiet in the sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Consequently, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council should extend the mandate of UNEF. In that connexion, he pointed out that, while Egypt had indicated that it would not object to the renewal of the mandate of the Force for an additional period of three months ending 24

July 1975, Israel had stated that it favoured its renewal for a period of no less than six months.

Consideration by the Security Council

On 17 April 1975, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNEF (S/11670) and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating in the vote, adopted resolution 368 (1975) by which the Council called upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973); decided that the mandate of UNEF should be extended for an additional three-month period ending 24 July 1975; and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

2. ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR

(a) OPERATIONS OF UNDOF

In his progress reports on UNDOF, dated 18 June, 27 June, 30 July and 25 October (S/11310/Add. 1, 2, 3 and 4), the Secretary-General indicated that the Force had, on 25 June, completed the process of disengagement of forces between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the time-table agreed to between the parties in Geneva. Since the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces³ the military situation between the two sides had remained calm. However, during its last phase, the disengagement process had been marred by the death of four Austrian soldiers who had been killed when their car had run over a mine on a road close to Mount Hermon. In this connexion, the Secretary-General stated that intensive measures had been taken by UNDOF, with the co-operation of the parties, to protect its soldiers from mine explosions, and that he had instructed UNDOF to examine any additional measures which might be taken to minimize the likelihood of such incidents. The Secretary-General further reported that on 9 August a United Nations aircraft, flying from Ismailia to Damascus in the established air corridor, had crashed as a result of anti-aircraft fire north-east of the village of Ad Dimas and that all nine Canadians aboard had been killed.

(b) EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF UNDOF

Report of the Secretary-General

As the six-month mandate of UNDOF was to expire in November 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on the operations of the Force from its inception on 3 June 1974 until 26 November (S/11563).

After recalling the terms of reference of the Force, as outlined in the Agreement on Disengagement and its Protocol, and describing its establishment and composition, the Secretary-General indicated that discussions were under way by United Nations officials in New York and by officials of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic with the purpose of concluding agreements on the status of the Force that would help to ensure its independent functioning in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Since its establishment, the Force, with the assistance of both parties, had overcome a number of difficulties in order to be in a position to carry out its tasks effectively. However, regarding the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of some personnel of the Force, he had taken the position that UNDOF must function as an integrated and efficient military unit with the freedom of movement specified in the Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement, that its contingents must serve on an equal basis under the command of the Interim Force Commander, and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of various contingents. As in the case of UNEF, the matter was being actively pursued.

Activities of the Force during the period under review included assistance in controlling the process of disengagement until its completion on schedule on 27 June, supervision of the area of separation and inspection of the areas of limitation of armaments and forces, in accordance with the Agreement and its Protocol. The Secretary-General noted, in this regard, that the continued existence of large and uncleared minefields within the area of separation constituted an ever present hazard for UNDOF troops and had hampered the return to the area of the civilian population as called for by the Agreements on disengagement. As no progress had been made in the negotiations to enable a large mine-clearing operation to be carried out, he believed that efforts should be continued, with the full cooperation of the parties, in order to resolve the problem at an early date.

³ Doc. 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

Regarding the financial aspects of UNDOF, the Secretary-General referred to his report to the General Assembly (A/9822) in which he had indicated that the share of UNEF costs attributable to UNDOF should be about \$7.6 million.

Having reviewed those aspects of UNDOF's activities, the Secretary-General then observed that, since the conclusion of the Agreement on Disengagement and the establishment of UNDOF, the situation in the Golan Heights had been quiet. Unlike previous peacekeeping forces, UNDOF had been set up for the purpose of supervising a specific agreement, in accordance with the stipulations agreed to by the parties. It was specifically stated in the Agreement on Disengagement that it was not a peace agreement, but a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973. Despite the present quiet, the Secretary-General cautioned that the situation would remain fundamentally unstable and potentially explosive so long as progress towards a settlement of the underlying problems was not achieved. The continued operation of UNDOF was essential not only to maintain the present quiet in the area, but also to assist in further efforts towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Consequently, he recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months.

Consideration by the Security Council

On 29 November, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/11563), and with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 363 (1974) by which the Council, after having considered the report, expressed concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area; reaffirmed that the two agreements on disengagement of forces were only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973); decided to call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately that resolution, and to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months, and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

Subsequent communications and reports concerning UNDOF

On 10 January, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11595) in which he recalled that the Peruvian Government had indicated its intention to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF during the first half of 1975, and referred to the letter dated 18 December 1974 addressed to him by the Secretary-General regarding the question of the replacement of the Peruvian contingent and the release of Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos from his assignment as Interim Commander of UNDOF as from 15 December 1974. The President of the Council indicated that, on 8 January, after consultations with all members of the Security Council, he had informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the intention of the Government of Peru to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF and that it would await a communication from him concerning which Latin American country would be able to replace that contingent. On the same day, the President of the Council also informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's agreement to release General Briceno and had no objection to having Colonel Hannes Philipp of Austria, Chief of Staff of UNDOF, carry out General Briceno's functions on a temporary basis. The Council was awaiting the Secretary-General's proposal to settle the question of the appointment of a Commander of UNDOF. The note indicated that the Chinese delegation dissociated itself from both matters.

In a further progress report on UNDOF dated 21 January 1975 (S/11563/Add. 1), the Secretary-General indicated that the Force had continued to supervise the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces and the Protocol to that Agreement in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions. At that time, the strength of the Force was 1,202 men.

Regarding the freedom of movement of the Force's personnel, the Secretary-General stated that some progress could be reported on the question and that arrangements had been worked out to enable all personnel of UNDOF to enjoy the freedom of movement essential for the performance of their task. The Secretary-General added that he would continue to seek more general acceptance of the principle of freedom of movement.

(c) COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PARTIES
REGARDING THE AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT

Between late July and November, the Secretary-General received several communications from Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding violations of the Agreement on Disengagement.

The Syrian Arab Republic made various charges of violations of the Agreement by Israel (A/9567-S/11395, A/9571-S/11414, A/9672-S/11451, A/9678-S/11482 and A/9682-S/11503), including flights over the line of separation by Israeli forces aircraft, the crossing of Line A by Israeli military personnel firing on farmers working in the buffer zone and the abduction and detention of Syrian civilians. The Syrian Arab Republic also charged Israel with maintaining an excess number of tanks in the 10-kilometre zone (A/9880-S/11561), and requested the intervention of the Secretary-General to stop Israel from committing further violations of the Agreement. Israel consistently denied the Syrian charges and, in turn, charged the Syrian Arab Republic with systematically violating the Agreement (A/9572-S/11427, A/9674-S/11452, S/11497, A/9685-S/11512, A/9805-S/11538 and A/9889-S/11564).

(d) FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE
OF UNDOF

Report of the Secretary-General

On 21 May, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report on UNDOF (S/11694) giving an account of its activities during the period from 28 November 1974 to 21 May 1975. The Secretary-General stated that during that period the functions and guidelines of UNDOF as well as the tasks assigned to it remained unchanged and that UNDOF had been able, with the co-operation of the parties, to discharge the tasks entrusted to it. The cease-fire had been maintained with no significant violations and UNDOF had continued to supervise the area of separation in accordance with its mandate.

As in previous reports on the Force, the Secretary-General provided details about its deployment, rotation, accommodations and logistics. With regard to its freedom of movement, he felt that the steps taken in order to resolve that question had fallen short of what was required, but he indicated that the efforts were continuing in order

to secure full acceptance of this principle. He also reported that no progress had been made in the negotiations regarding the mine-clearing operations, although the Syrian authorities and teams from UNDOF had carried out mine-clearing work in some areas.

Concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, the Secretary-General stated that he had lost no opportunity to contribute to the efforts made on several levels to advance the implementation of that resolution. He recalled, in particular, that one of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs had been sent to the area to make contact with all the Governments concerned, as well as with the senior officers and officials of the United Nations operations in the area. The Secretary-General, however, observed that in view of the current series of high-level meetings among those concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, it would be premature to comment further on that matter at the present time. He further observed that, although both parties had continued generally to comply with the Agreement on Disengagement and there had been no significant violations or casualties, the present quiet was a precarious one. The Disengagement Agreement, he added, was not a peace agreement, but only a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). Until further progress could be made in that direction, the situation in the sector, and in the Middle East as a whole, would remain unstable and potentially dangerous. Therefore, the continued presence of UNDOF at the present crucial time was essential not only to maintain quiet in the sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace. For that reason, he recommended that the Security Council should extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months. He pointed out that both the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel had indicated their agreement to such an extension.

Consideration by the Security Council

On 28 May 1975, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/11694) and, with two members (China

and Iraq) not participating in the vote, adopted resolution 369 (1975) of 28 May 1974 by which the Council, after having considered the report and having expressed concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area, decided (a) to call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately resolution 338 (1973), (b) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months and (c) to request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

3. ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

During the period between mid-June and the end of December 1974, the cease-fire situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was the subject of reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/11057 and addenda). These reports showed that, during the second half of 1974, the situation in the sector was marked by frequent incidents, including overflights by Israeli forces aircraft, air attacks against Lebanon, firing incidents across the Armistice Demarcation Line and violations of Lebanese territorial waters by Israeli warships. Israeli forces personnel continued to occupy daily, during daylight hours, positions located on Lebanese territory.

The reports also contained complaints received by UNTSO from the Lebanese authorities concerning violations of the cease-fire by Israeli forces. Some of those incidents were also the subject of communication to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council by both Israel and Lebanon.

On 17 June, Lebanon called the attention of the Security Council to the continuing acts of aggression committed by Israel, including daily violation of Lebanese air space and shelling of towns and villages, causing death and destruction among the civilian population. It was pointed out that Israel's purpose, in perpetrating those acts, was to victimize Lebanon for acting as host to 300,000 Palestinian refugees on its soil and finding in that country a scapegoat for acts committed by Palestinians operating within Israel (S/11320).

Israel replied that, under an agreement concluded in Cairo in 1969 between the Government

of Lebanon and the terrorist organizations, Lebanon had allowed these organizations to use its territory for carrying out their murder missions into Israel (S/11321 and S/11324).

On 25 June, Israel charged that on the previous night three terrorists, who had come by boat from Lebanon, had attacked a house in the coastal town of Nahariya. In a subsequent clash with Israeli security forces, the three intruders had been killed (S/11326).

By a letter dated 10 July (S/11331), Israel informed the Secretary-General that units of its naval forces had sunk about 10 boats in each of the harbours of Tyre, Sidon and Ras a-Shakh in southern Lebanon and that the Israeli commandos had left behind leaflets warning the population that they should not let terrorists operate from their fishing harbours. After recalling the agreement that existed between Lebanon and the terrorist groups regarding their freedom to operate in that country, Israel expressed its determination to end Arab terror warfare against its civilians and reiterated its position that Lebanon was responsible for shirking its duty to liquidate terror operations in its territory.

On the same day, Lebanon complained by letter (S/11332) that Israeli naval forces had on 8 and 9 July attacked three ports in southern Lebanon, destroying 39 boats. Coming in the aftermath of the murderous assault of Israel on the Palestinian camps between 18 and 20 June, which left 73 persons killed and 159 wounded, those unprovoked attacks, Lebanon warned, could only serve to revive the cycle of violence and hamper the efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the area.

In letters dated 4 and 27 September and 15 November, Israel called attention to the increase in acts of terrorism committed against its territory, including attacks launched from Lebanon by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Organization between 28 September and 7 November. Israel reiterated its charges that Lebanon was responsible for the consequence of the situation and affirmed its intention to take appropriate measures to defend its citizens (A/9680-S/11487, A/9687-S/11520 and A/9859-S/11558).

On 21 November and 13 December, Lebanon charged Israel with continuing its State-organized terrorism against Lebanon, and gave a list of new Israeli acts of aggression (S/11560 and S/11572).

During December 1974 and January 1975, Israel

addressed to the Secretary-General several letters regarding the continuous activities of the terrorist organizations and their unabated attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory. Israel stated that such attacks had resulted in several casualties within the Israeli civilian population and that many of the terrorists who participated in those attacks had also been killed in clashes with Israeli security forces (A/9895-S/11566, A/9912-S/11567, A/9945-S/11570, A/9985-S/11577, A/9995-S/11589, A/10038-S/11601).

During the period between January and mid-June 1975, the reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/11663 and Add. 1-4) indicated that the military activity in the sector had remained at a low level. The reports also contained complaints by Lebanon regarding firing incidents across the border, violations of air space and penetration into Lebanese territory by Israeli forces. On 14 May 1975, Lebanon, in a letter to the Secretary-General (A/10085-S/11688), charged Israel with violations of its air space and territorial waters, and with the kidnapping of several Lebanese civilians. Israel replied (A/10086-S/11690) that in the preceding five weeks more than 30 acts of aggression had been committed against Israel and its citizens by terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory and that Israel had been compelled to take defensive measures.

On 15 June, Israel charged (A/10118-S/11726) that infiltrators coming from Lebanon had seized a house in the village of Yuval in Upper Galilee. In the ensuing exchange of fire with Israeli soldiers, two occupants of the house had been killed and three wounded. The four terrorists had also been killed. In a letter dated 16 June, Israel drew attention (A/10120-S/11728) to the continuing attacks against Israeli localities by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Organization operating from positions in Lebanon. Israel charged once again that the Palestinian organizations were in control of parts of Lebanon and held that country responsible for the possible consequences, since Israel had the right and duty to protect its citizens and territory.

On the same day, Lebanon complained (A/10119-S/11727) that Israeli war planes had attacked the village of Kfar Chouba with bombs and missiles, killing one person and wounding three others. The

Israeli forces had also fired 17 shells at the town of Nabatiyé, wounding seven persons. Lebanon protested against those attacks which, it said, violated the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and were in defiance of Security Council resolutions.

Also on the same day, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported increased ground and air activity in the eastern part of the sector, including attacks by Israeli aircraft on targets inside Lebanese territory. He also confirmed the complaints submitted by Lebanon about Israeli aircraft attacks on the village of Kfar Chouba, which had caused material damage (S/11663/Add. 5).

B. Search for a peaceful settlement

The item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" was included in the draft agenda of the twenty-ninth session in accordance with a decision taken by the General Assembly on 16 September 1974. On 18 December 1974, the Assembly approved, without objection, a procedure proposed by the President whereby the twenty-ninth session would not be declared closed. The President informed the Assembly that extensive consultations had indicated that, owing to recent developments in the Middle East, there was a general sentiment not to take up the item at that time and that the best course to follow would be to resume the session if circumstances should so warrant. Therefore, should the President believe, after consultations with Member States and with the Secretary-General, that conditions would be favourable for the consideration of the item, the session would be resumed at a date established by means of subsequent consultations.

The General Assembly did not consider the item again during the period under review.

C. Question of Palestine

The item was included in the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly at the request of 56 Member States (A/9742 and Add. 1-4). In an explanatory memorandum attached to the request, the sponsors of the item stated that, although the General Assembly had been continuously seized with the question of Palestine since 1947, it had not, at any time, considered as a separate item the fundamental issues involved

in that question, namely, the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. In recent years, however, the General Assembly, as well as the international community, had recognized and reaffirmed those rights. It was therefore deemed incumbent upon the Assembly to consider the question of Palestine in its true and proper form.

On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3210 (XXIX) in which it invited the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in its deliberations on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.

The General Assembly resumed consideration of the item in a series of 12 meetings, held between 13 and 22 November.⁴

On 14 November, the General Assembly upheld a formal proposal made by its President under rules 35 and 72 of the rules of procedure to the effect that, without prejudice to the provisions of those rules regarding the exercise of the right of reply, the right to speak in the debate on the item should be limited to a single intervention. In connexion with that decision, the representative of Israel complained, in a letter of the same date (A/9856), that he had been prevented from freely expressing the views of his Government. He therefore requested that a statement which he had intended to make be circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

On 22 November 1974, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions under the item.

By resolution 3236 (XXIX), the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty; reaffirmed also their inalienable right to return to their homes and properties from which they had been displaced and uprooted, and called for their return; emphasized that full respect for and the realization of these rights were indispensable for the resolution of the question of Palestine; recognized that the Palestinian people was a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East; further recognized the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations: appealed to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter; requested the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine, and to report to the Assembly at its thirtieth session; and decided to include the item in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

By resolution 3237 (XXIX), the General Assembly invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate, in the capacity of observer, in the sessions and the work of the Assembly and of all international conferences convened under its auspices; and requested the Secretary-General to take necessary steps for the implementation of the resolution.

D. *Question of Jerusalem*

On 22 July, Egypt called the attention of the Secretary-General to plans by the Israeli occupation authorities to connect all Arab villages and quarters within the municipality of Jerusalem with the Israeli telephone network, and stated that the plans were in violation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the status of Jerusalem (A/9564-S/11360). In a reply dated 26 July, Israel stated that telephone connexions were being provided for those Arab localities at the express desire of their inhabitants (A/9566-S/11386).

By a letter dated 24 February 1975 (A/10051-S/11639), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Yemen, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group at the United Nations, transmitted to the Secretary-General the resolutions adopted by the Moslem-Christian Meeting on Jerusalem, held at Cairo on 16 January 1975. Those resolutions, *inter alia*, condemned Israeli measures aimed at changing the character of the Holy City and denounced the confiscation of Arab lands, as well as the excavations and destruction of cultural properties around the Holy Shrine. In view of Israel's non-compliance with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions regarding Jerusalem, the Security Council was called upon to impose appropriate sanctions against Israel under Chapter

⁴ For excerpts see docs. 9–18 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

VII of the Charter. Furthermore, the General Assembly was requested to suspend the membership of Israel in the United Nations until the resolutions relating to Jerusalem were implemented.

On 16 December, the Permanent Representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement made by the Foreign Minister of that country saluting Archbishop Capucci as a living example of the struggle against repression, aggression and terrorism and denouncing his sentencing by Israel (A/9986-S/11578).⁵

In a letter dated 19 December (A/9991), the Chargé d'affaires of Morocco, on behalf of the Arab Group at the United Nations, stated that the sentencing of Archbishop Capucci had caused great concern in the entire world and requested the Secretary-General to intercede on his behalf and try to bring about his immediate release. He also requested that the matter be referred to the Commission on Human Rights at its thirty-first session and to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. In a letter dated 6 January 1975 (A/9997), the Syrian Arab Republic called the attention of the Secretary-General to a declaration issued by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a declaration issued by the leaders of the Christian, Jewish and Moslem communities in that country protesting against the sentencing of Archbishop Capucci and appealing to the international community to take prompt action for his release.

Israel replied on 18 and 23 December 1974 (A/9989-S/11581; A/9993) and 10 January 1975 (A/9999) that Archbishop Capucci had abused his office by engaging in the smuggling of large quantities of arms and sabotage material on behalf of Arab terrorist organizations, and had been found guilty by the District Court of Jerusalem. As to the charges made in that regard by Egypt, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic, they were an attempt to exploit the affair for reasons of propaganda and to incite religious passions.

E. *Situation in occupied territories*

On 1 July 1974, the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted the text of an article (A/9561-S/11327)

written by an Israeli woman lawyer and published in *The Times* of London of 17 June regarding conditions affecting the human rights of the population in the occupied territories. The Syrian Arab Republic said that the article demonstrated the failure of Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and, therefore, requested that it be transmitted to the Committee on Human Rights and to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

Israel replied that the above-mentioned letter and the article annexed to it merely reiterated standard Arab propaganda distortions regarding the situation in the Israeli-administered territories and, in turn, included in its letter an article published in *The Times* of 5 July by the editor of the *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* and Chairman of the Israel national section of Amnesty International (A/9563-S/11333).

On 9 July, the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted excerpts from an interview published in the magazine *Newsweek*, in which the Prime Minister of Israel had stated that Israel would never give up the Golan Heights (A/9562-S/11330).

During the period from July to October 1974, the Secretary-General received a number of communications relating to the destruction of the city of Quneitra and other Syrian villages in the Golan Heights. In a letter dated 30 July (A/9568-S/11396), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that during the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement the Israeli forces, before withdrawing, had deliberately destroyed Syrian villages, including the city of Quneitra, in violation of international law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The Syrian Arab Republic also transmitted a report from the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums charging that Israel had destroyed and pillaged cultural property, including religious and historical buildings, and requested its submission to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/9683-S/11506). On 12 September, the representative of Lebanon transmitted, on behalf of the Arab Group, the

⁵ For the Capucci affair see docs. 146, 192, 275, 276, 285 and 296 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

"Quneitra Appeal", adopted on 5 September in Cairo by the Council of the League of Arab States, regarding the destruction of Quneitra by the Israeli forces and addressed to world public opinion and international organizations (A/9684-S/11507). By a letter dated 13 September, Algeria transmitted, on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, the text of a declaration in which the Group condemned the destruction by the Israeli forces of the city of Quneitra and the village of Rafid, in violation of international law and international conventions (S/11508).

In reply to those letters, Israel stated that it was a matter of common knowledge that the damage caused to front-line localities, including the town of Quneitra, was the direct result of acts of aggression carried out by the Syrian Arab Republic in various periods since 1967, culminating in its war against Israel in 1973. It stated that the claim that Quneitra had been destroyed on the eve of its evacuation by the Israeli forces was nothing but a propaganda fabrication (A/9570-S/11408 and A/9686-S/11516).

The report submitted by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and the action taken thereon by the Assembly, as well as the action taken by the Commission on Human Rights relating to the question of the violation of human rights in occupied territories, are dealt with in the section of the present report concerning human rights questions (see part three, chap. I, sect. D. 2).⁶

F. Assistance to Palestine refugees

APPEAL BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In a letter dated 11 February 1974 the Secretary-General, after having been informed by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East of the financial plight of the Agency and its budget deficit of \$12 million, made an appeal to States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies to give immediate consideration to this matter and respond generously and speedily.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF UNRWA

On 5 September 1974, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA submitted his annual report for the period 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974.⁷ The report reviewed the Agency's programmes and the efforts it had made for the relief, health, education and training of the Palestine refugees. It gave an account of the political and economic environment in which the Agency's operations were carried on and stressed once more the financial difficulties of the Agency.

With respect to UNRWA's operations during the year under review, the Commissioner-General pointed out that, although they were affected in various ways by the war of October 1973 and its aftermath, there had not been as widespread a displacement of population as occurred in 1967. In Lebanon, during the hostilities of 1973 on the Syrian front, frequent Israeli overflights caused fear among refugees and led to the absence of children from schools, the interruption of other services and the temporary evacuation of the Nabatiyé camp. In May and June 1974, the Israeli raids resulted in heavy loss of life, extensive damage to refugee shelters and UNRWA's installations in some of the refugee camps. In Syria, during the same period, 8 refugees were killed and 37 injured. Also as a result of the war, the completion of construction on contract had been seriously delayed owing to a lack of building materials and the sharp rise in their prices. In east Jordan, the Agency had continued to co-operate closely with the Government of Jordan in caring for the refugees and displaced persons. On the West Bank, during the period under review, consumer prices had risen by over 40 per cent, causing great difficulties for the refugees and the Agency. In Gaza, the Agency had continued to press the Israeli authorities for action regarding the provision of housing for those shown by the joint survey conducted in the first half of 1973 to be inadequately housed. In the meantime, demolition of shelters by the Israeli authorities continued at Rafah Camp, in pursuance of their programme of road construction.

With respect to the financial condition of UNRWA, the Commissioner-General pointed out that the Agency was faced with an estimated deficit of \$39 million which could not be adequately

⁶ Not included here; for the report see doc. 6 in *ibid*.

⁷ The introduction to the report is printed as doc. 3 in *ibid*.

accommodated by traditional methods and sources of financing. If the Agency were to play a constructive role, it required the firm assurance of much greater financial support.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 17 September 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a report (A/9740)⁸ in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, concerning the displaced persons in the Israeli-occupied territories, by which the Assembly had called upon Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants, to desist from all measures that obstruct their return, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories, and to take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation. In reply to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of that resolution, Israel stated that, despite conditions prevailing in the occupied territories, it had continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967. As to the measures taken by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip, they were designed to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the area. The report also included further developments as received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, according to which there had been further demolition of shelters in the Gaza area. Some of the refugees affected by that action had been provided with alternative accommodation, but most remained inadequately housed.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

By a note dated 4 October 1974, the Secretary-General circulated a report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/9789),⁹ prepared in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3089 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, by which the Commission was requested to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 con-

cerning the repatriation or compensation of Palestine refugees. In its report, which covered the period from 30 September 1973 to 29 September 1974, the Commission stated that, despite encouragement provided by the efforts which had been made towards a Middle East settlement, the circumstances governing the possibilities opened to it had remained essentially unchanged. The Commission expressed the hope that recent developments would permit it to carry forward its work vigorously, and added that it remained determined to do so.

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP

The Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East submitted its report (A/9815) in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973. The report emphasized the Agency's critical financial position, particularly in the light of the anticipated deficit of more than \$39 million. The Working Group expressed the opinion that any reductions in the services of the Agency could have serious implications and would be most regrettable. It further expressed the belief that the continuation of UNRWA's present minimal services was absolutely dependent on a sharp increase in the level of contributions from Member States and that it was therefore essential that Governments, particularly those which had not contributed in the past or had so far contributed inadequately, be willing to reconsider seriously their position and contribute generously.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 17 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions on this item.

In resolution 3330 (XXIX), the General Assembly commended the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for its work and requested it to continue its efforts in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of UNRWA for a further period of one year.

In resolution 3331 A (XXIX), the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly

⁸ Doc. 4 in *ibid.*

⁹ Doc. 5 in *ibid.*

resolution 194 (III), and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards that end and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1975; called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report; and decided to extend until 30 June 1978 the mandate of UNRWA.

In resolution 3331 B (XXIX), the General Assembly decided that the expenses for salary of the international staff of UNRWA, which would otherwise be a charge on voluntary contributions, with effect from 1 January 1975, be financed by the regular budget of the United Nations for the duration of the Agency's mandate.

In resolution 3331 C (XXIX), the General Assembly endorsed the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities.

In resolution 3331 D (XXIX), the General Assembly called upon Israel immediately to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants; to desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories; to take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation, and to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters. The Assembly deplored Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and called upon Israel immediately to desist from such attacks.

OTHER MATTERS

In January 1975, the representative of Israel addressed two communications concerning two incidents at the Paris Orly Airport involving aircraft of El Al Israeli Airlines (A/10037-S/11600 and A/10039-S/11602). On 11 September, the representative of Israel charged the Syrian Arab Republic with serious breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, committed against Israeli

prisoners in the course of the Yom Kippur War and during the period of their captivity in Syria (A/9681-S/11502). In a communication dated 9 October, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted a statement made by his Government concerning the treatment of Syrian prisoners of war during their captivity in Israel and added that his Government had submitted in that respect an official complaint to the International Committee of the Red Cross (A/9689-S/11533).

ACTIVITIES OF UNRWA

On 1 April 1975, there were 1,618,783 refugees registered with UNRWA in all categories, of whom 829,087 received basic rations. Less than 36 per cent of the refugees were living in refugee camps, including 97,242 (together with about 44,079 displaced persons) in the emergency camps established in east Jordan and in the Syrian Arab Republic after June 1967. The inhabitants of these emergency camps and an even larger number of displaced refugees and other displaced persons living outside camps were still prevented by the Israeli authorities from returning to the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights.

The Agency entered the period 16 June 1974 to 15 June 1975 with a deficit of \$10.3 million for 1974 in a budget of \$82.2 million and the imminent threat of reductions in services to the Palestine refugees. Fortunately, additional contributions sufficient to eliminate the deficit were received at the end of June and it was possible to maintain services in full throughout 1974. The financial position for 1975 gave rise, however, to even greater anxiety, the deficit at the beginning of the year being no less than \$46 million in a budget that had risen to \$129.9 million because of increased commodity costs, local inflation and unfavourable exchange rates for the United States dollar against local Arab currencies. Additional contributions received or pledged and lower flour prices had reduced the deficit to \$32.3 million by the middle of April 1975, but its persistence at this level portended drastic reductions in services, including the highly valued education programme, unless adequate funds were assured within a matter of weeks.

Expenditure for the budget (calendar) year 1975 on the education programme—including the edu-

cation of children in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, of which there were approximately 287,000 in the 1974-1975 school year, vocational and teacher training in eight centres, and university scholarships—is estimated at \$ 53.8 million (42.5 per cent). Expenditure on medical and environmental health services in 1975 is estimated at about \$ 13.3 million (10.5 per cent), and basic rations, supplementary feeding for especially vulnerable groups of the refugee population and other relief programmes account for \$ 57.4 million (45 per cent.)

Questions arising from the large-scale demolition of refugee shelters by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip in 1971, notably inadequate rehousing, are dealt with in the Secretary-General's report (A/9740) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII) and in the Commissioner-General's report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975.

Detailed information on the activities of UNRWA from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975 will be found in the report of the Commissioner-General.

2

Report of the Security Council: The Situation in the Middle East¹⁰

November, 1975

A. Reports of the Secretary-General, consideration by the Security Council and communications received

1. THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE EGYPT-ISRAEL SECTOR

265. During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued to issue progress reports on the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and its operations in the area.

(a) Reports of the Secretary-General issued between 16 June and 12 October 1974

266. In a progress report issued on 18 June 1974 (S/11248/Add. 5), covering the period since his report of 13 May 1974, the Secretary-General

stated that the military situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained calm. He informed the Council of the repatriation of the Irish contingent of UNEF on 22 May and the deployment to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) of certain elements of UNEF, totalling approximately 1,050 troops and 235 vehicles of all types. As of 18 June, the strength of personnel in the UNEF area of operations, including headquarters staff, was 5,079 men. In addition, rear parties remaining in the UNEF area of operations as of the same date numbered 118 men. After indicating in detail the current deployment of contingents, the Secretary-General stated that the Force had continued to man, patrol and control the zone of disengagement and conduct weekly inspections of the Israeli and Egyptian areas of limited armaments and forces, as well as inspections of other areas agreed by the parties. Operations involving the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area had been conducted from 20 May to 31 May and recommenced on 12 June. Bodies thus recovered had been turned over to the parties with no major problem.

267. On 20 May, Israel had transferred to Egypt 26 civilian detainees and 27 family members, and on 3 June, 14 civilian detainees and 15 family members. In addition, under a family reunification programme, 139 persons had passed from Israel to Egypt on 21 May, and 73 from Egypt to Israel. The arrangements had been made through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and had taken place in the zone of disengagement under UNEF supervision.

268. In a further report dated 23 July (S/11248/Add. 6), the Secretary-General informed the Council that the strength of personnel in the UNEF area of operations, including headquarters staff, amounted to 5,527 men. As indicated in the previous report, the military situation had remained calm, and the Force had continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it, including the search operations for the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed, which had terminated on 18 June. The transfer to and from both Egypt and Israel had continued in July, with 13 civilian detainees transferred to Egypt, in addition to 169 persons who had crossed from Israeli-held territory to Egypt and 395 persons from Egypt to Israeli-held territory in a family reunification programme. During July also, 1,355

¹⁰ Part I, Chapter 3 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1974–15 June 1975, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 2* (UN doc. A/10002), pp. 27–40.

students had crossed from Egypt to their homes in Israeli-held territory. As before, those transfers had been arranged through ICRC and had taken place in the zone of disengagement.

269. In his report of 30 August (S/11248/Add. 7), the Secretary-General indicated that the military situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained stable. As originally agreed, the Nepalese contingent had been withdrawn but not replaced, with the Swedish battalion taking over responsibility for the extended Nepalese sector. On 27 August, the strength of personnel in the UNEF area of operations, including headquarters, totalled 5,247 men. Reviewing the activities of the Force, he reported that 3,148 students had crossed the zone of disengagement to their homes in Israeli-held territory during the period 10 July to 5 August. Furthermore, under family reunification programmes, 509 persons had crossed to the occupied territories during August, and 268 had crossed in the other direction under ICRC transfer arrangements and UNEF supervision.

270. The Secretary-General also reported that, on 9 August, a UNEF Buffalo aircraft had crashed in Syria while on flight in support of UNDOF, and nine members of the Canadian contingent had been killed. Boards of inquiry had been set up by the Canadian and Syrian authorities, as well as by the United Nations, to investigate the tragic incident.

(b) *Extension of the mandate of UNEF
until 25 April 1975*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated
12 October 1974*

271. In a report on UNEF covering the period from 2 April to 12 October (S/11536), submitted to the Security Council in connexion with the expiration of the mandate of the Force, the Secretary-General presented a comprehensive picture of the activities of the Force in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Security Council in resolutions 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, which had been extended by resolution 346 (1974) of 8 April 1974. He described the composition and deployment of the Force, its accommodation and logistics, its activities in pursuance of the functions and guidelines outlined in his report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev. 1), its

humanitarian activities and co-operation with ICRC and, finally, the financial aspects of UNEF.

272. As of 12 October, the strength of the Force was 4,491 men. The Nepalese contingent, which had relieved the Irish contingent, had repatriated during August and September, and its area of responsibility in the zone of disengagement had been assumed by the Swedish battalion. The functions and guidelines of UNEF had not changed, and the Force had continued to fulfil its tasks under the Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces, including carrying out inspections in the areas defined in the Agreement, with every effort being made to ensure its independent functioning in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

273. The Secretary-General pointed out that the problem of restriction of the freedom of movement of certain UNEF contingents still existed but that he continued to take the position that the Force must function as an integrated and efficient military unit, that its contingents must serve on an equal basis under the Commander of the Force and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents.

274. The Force Commander had continued his assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raised questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitation on armaments and forces. No significant incidents had been observed. In several cases there had been restriction of the Force's freedom of movement, and in each case official protests had been lodged.

275. With regard to humanitarian activities, the Secretary-General indicated that the Force had maintained close contact with the representatives of ICRC and had assisted in the negotiations conducted by the parties on humanitarian matters.

276. Under the family reunification and student exchange programmes, 2,363 persons had passed from Israel to Egypt and 7,097 from Egypt to Israel. The arrangements had been made through ICRC and had taken place in the zone of disengagement under UNEF supervision. Sixty-five other civilians had also been transferred to Egypt from Israel in the same zone.

277. Search operations for the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area had terminated on 1 July. Since then 13 bodies had been turned over to the parties.

278. Regarding the financial aspects, the Secretary-General indicated that, in the course of consultations on the question of reimbursement, the troop-contributing countries had put forward an agreed proposal for the reimbursement of all contributing Governments on an equal basis at the rate of \$500 per man per month, with a proposed supplement of \$150 per man per month for a strictly limited number of specialized personnel. On such a basis, it would be necessary to seek additional authority and financial provision from the General Assembly in the amount of approximately \$23.6 million¹¹ to cover the requirements of the period ending on 24 October 1974. On the basis of the same rate of obligations and reimbursement ceiling, the estimated cost for a further six-month period would be \$40 million, based on an over-all troop strength of 5,750, including 1,250 men in UNDOF.

279. Although the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector, with the exception of a few minor incidents, had remained quiet, largely because of the effective operation of UNEF, the Secretary-General observed that the situation in the Middle East would remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems were unsolved. He therefore considered that the operations of UNEF were essential to maintain the existing quiet and to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and he recommended once again that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months.

280. Pointing out that the total troop strength of UNEF had been reduced from the 7,000 figure originally proposed to about 4,500 as a result of the withdrawal of two contingents and the transfer of other units to UNDOF, he stated that he did not anticipate a need for any increase under existing circumstances. Moreover, every effort would be made to achieve further reductions, if that could be done without affecting the effectiveness of the Force.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1799th meeting
(23 October 1974)*

281. At its 1799th meeting on 23 October, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East;

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11536)."

282. The President announced that the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11542) which had been drawn up during intensive consultations among all the members of the Council, who had agreed that it should be put to the vote immediately after a statement by the Secretary-General. The draft resolution read as follows:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Recalling* its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973, 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973 and 346 (1974) of 8 April 1974,

"*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11536),

"*Noting* the opinion of the Secretary-General that 'although quiet now prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the over-all situation in the Middle East will remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems are unresolved',

"*Noting also* from the report of the Secretary-General that in the present circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

"1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force should be extended for an additional period of six months, that is, until 24 April 1975, in order to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

"2. *Commends* the United Nations Emergency Force and those Governments supplying contingents to it for their contribution towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

"3. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy;

"4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Emergency Force must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel sector of operations without differentiation regarding the United Nations status

¹¹ At its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly approved the amount of \$19.8 million as the actual amount of the additional expenditure for the first year of operation of the United Nations Emergency Force [General Assembly resolution 3211 B (XXIX)].

of the various contingents, as stated in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to that end.”

283. The Secretary-General then spoke on two matters dealt with in his report. He stated that the proposal of the troop-contributing countries for an equal reimbursement formula had been submitted informally to other Member States, some of which had expressed reservations. Referring to the relationship between the costs of UNEF and those attributable to UNDOF, he explained that the ultimate size and costs would depend on a decision to be taken by the Council in November with respect to UNDOF and that as the two Forces had certain common services, it was difficult to separate their budgets completely. He assured the Council that he would continue to exercise the strictest economy whenever possible consonant with efficient operation. Finally, he informed the Council that the Government of Panama had communicated to him its decision to withdraw its contingent from UNEF at the end of the year.

DECISION: *At the 1799th meeting, on 23 October 1974, the draft resolution (S/11542) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 362 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

284. Following the voting, the Council heard statements in explanation of vote by the representatives of China, Iraq, Kenya, France, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Austria, Costa Rica, Australia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mauritania, Indonesia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Peru and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon. The representatives of China and the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

(c) *Report of the Secretary-General dated
18 January 1975*

285. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 18 January 1975 (S/11536/Add. 1), the Secretary-General indicated that, since his previous report (S/11536), the military situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained stable and that the Force had continued to carry out its tasks effectively in pursuance of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18 January 1974¹² and in accordance

with the mandate laid down by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

286. The Panamanian contingent, he reported, had been withdrawn by 25 November and had not been replaced. The current total troop strength of the Force was 4,044 men, not including the elements assigned to the UNDOF area of operations from the Canadian and Polish logistic components. On 24 December 1974, three members of the Canadian contingent had been killed in a motor-car accident. During the period under review, the Force had continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it, and arrangements had been made by the representatives of ICRC and UNEF officers for the transfer of 4,188 persons from Israeli-occupied territory to Egypt, and 1,309 persons from Egypt to Israeli-occupied territory under the family reunification and student exchange programmes.

(d) *Extension of the mandate of UNEF until
24 July 1975*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated
12 April 1975*

287. In a report on UNEF covering the period from 13 October 1974 to 12 April 1975 (S/11670), submitted to the Security Council in connexion with the expiration of the mandate of the Force on 24 April 1975, the Secretary-General indicated that the troop strength of UNEF as of 12 April 1975 was 4,029 men, not including the Canadian and Polish logistic components detached to UNDOF, and described its deployment, rotation, accommodations and logistics. He stated that the activities, functions and guidelines of the Force, as well as the tasks assigned to it, had not changed and that the military situation in its area of operations had remained stable. The Force Commander, he reported, had continued to hold separate meetings with military representatives of both parties concerning its terms of reference and the inspections carried out in the areas of limited force and armaments. He pointed out that the problem of freedom of movement still existed with regard to certain contingents, despite his efforts and those of the Force Commander, and reiterated his opinion that the Force must function as an “integrated and efficient military unit”, that its contingents must serve on an equal basis under the command of the Force Commander and that no differentiation could be made regard-

¹² Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

ing the United Nations status of various contingents. With regard to the implementation of the Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces, he indicated that no significant incidents had been observed but that overflights of the zone of disengagement had been made by both parties and penetrations into that zone and the buffer zone had been limited and minor. There had been also several cases of restriction of UNEF freedom of movement, as well as shooting in the areas of UNEF outposts and patrols. In each case, official protests had been lodged. The Force, however, continued to make every effort to maintain the integrity of the buffer zone.

288. Concerning humanitarian activities, the Secretary-General reported that during the period under review, 5,684 persons had passed from Israeli-occupied territory to Egypt and 2,165 from Egypt to Israeli-occupied territory under the family reunification and student exchange programmes. On 4 April, the Egyptian authorities had handed over 39 dead bodies of Israeli soldiers under UNEF auspices. The occasional discovery of bodies in the UNEF area had continued, with the remains of 14 soldiers having been found and handed over to the parties.

289. Concerning the financial aspects, the Secretary-General indicated that it had been possible to keep the rate of obligations and expenditures of the Force within the level of the appropriations authorized by the General Assembly and that he would continue to exert his best efforts to ensure that the Force functioned as economically as possible without impairing its efficiency.

290. In summary, the Secretary-General observed that the situation in the UNEF area of observation had remained quiet, that both parties had co-operated with UNEF and that there had been no significant incidents. He noted, however, that the situation as a whole remained fundamentally unstable, pending the conclusion of an over-all settlement. Whether it would be possible to maintain the prevailing quiet would depend on the prospects of maintaining progress in the search for a just and lasting settlement of the problem as called for by the Security Council. The Secretary-General expressed the opinion that the continued presence of UNEF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector but to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the

Middle East and to assist if required in such efforts. In recommending, therefore, that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF, he pointed out that Egypt had indicated that, under the circumstances, it would not object to renewal of the mandate of the Force for an additional period of three months and that Israel had stated that it favoured a renewal period of no less than six months on the grounds that UNEF was an integral part of the Disengagement Agreement of 18 January 1974.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1821st meeting*
(17 April 1975)

291. At the 1821st meeting on 17 April, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11670).”
The President of the Security Council invited the representatives of Egypt and Israel, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

292. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11675) which, the President stated, had been prepared in intensive consultations among all the members of the Security Council. It read as follows:

[The draft was adopted as resolution 368 (1975); the text is in doc. 21 below—ed. note.]

293. As the members had agreed that the draft resolution should be put to the vote before statements were made, the Council proceeded to the voting.

DECISION: *At the 1821st meeting, on 17 April 1975, the draft resolution (S/11675) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 368 (1975). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

294. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of the USSR, the United States, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, China, Mauritania, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, Iraq, Guyana, the Byelorussian SSR, Costa Rica, the United Republic of Cameroon, the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of France and the representatives of Israel and Egypt. Statements in exercise of the right of reply were made by the representatives of the USSR, Israel, China and Egypt.

2. THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE IN THE ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR

(a) *Reports of the Secretary-General issued between 18 June and 25 October 1974*

295. In further progress reports on UNDOF issued on 18 June (S/11310/Add. 1), 27 June (S/11310/Add. 2), 30 July (S/11310/Add. 3) and 25 October (S/11310/Add. 4), the Secretary-General informed the Council that since the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement,¹³ the military situation between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic had remained very calm and the Force had continued to carry out the tasks entrusted to it in supervision of the Agreement. By 18 June, the transfer of the Austrian and Peruvian contingents from UNEF to UNDOF had been practically completed (S/11310/Add. 1), and the Force totalled 1,218 men. In his report of 27 June (S/11310/Add. 2), the Secretary-General indicated that, on 25 June, the Force had completed the process of disengagement of forces between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with the time-table agreed to between the parties in Geneva, and that, on the evening of the same day, Syrian administration had been established in the specified area, which included the towns of Quneitra and Rafid and part of Mount Hermon. Between 25 and 27 June, 500 Syrian soldiers equipped with mine-clearing tanks had carried out mine-clearing operations under the close supervision of UNDOF observers. Delineation and marking of agreed lines was proceeding satisfactorily, and both sides had extended full co-operation, which had enabled the process of disengagement to be completed smoothly. However, that process had been marred by a serious accident on 25 June which caused the death of four Austrian soldiers when their vehicle ran over a mine on a road close to Mount Hermon. In that connexion, the report added, intensive measures had been taken by UNDOF to protect its soldiers from mine explosions.

296. In his progress report dated 30 July (S/11310/Add. 3), the Secretary-General indicated that, as of 29 July, the strength of the Force was 1,191 men. The presence of large and uncleared minefields within the area of separation presented a continuing hazard to the troops, and mine-

clearing operations conducted by Syrian army units were far from complete. Negotiations were therefore under way for another large-scale mine-clearing operation in order to make the area safe for UNDOF personnel and for the civilian population. However, on 25 October (S/11310/Add. 4), he reported that there had been no progress in those negotiations. In the meantime, the Force's own small mine-clearing unit was fully engaged in mine-clearing operations in areas near UNDOF positions.

297. Reviewing the activities of the Force in his further progress report of 25 October (S/11310/Add. 4), the Secretary-General said that it had continued to implement the Agreement on Disengagement, carrying out regular bi-weekly as well as special inspections of the areas of limited armaments and forces, and receiving in the process the full co-operation of both parties. It had also received complaints from each party which had been investigated and reported to the party concerned. Furthermore, it had drawn the attention of the parties to violations it had itself observed, with a view to having corrective action taken. The task of marking the ground lines had been completed, but additional markers were being installed. On 29 July, an Austrian soldier had been seriously injured as a result of a mine accident on Mount Hermon and had been evacuated with the assistance of both parties. However, a helicopter which had been made available by the Syrian authorities to assist in his evacuation had crashed without causing injuries while attempting to land. The Interim Force Commander had convened a board of inquiry in connexion with the incident of 9 August in which a United Nations aircraft flying from Ismailia to Damascus had crashed as a result of anti-aircraft fire, killing all nine Canadians aboard. Efforts were being made in accordance with the Board's recommendations to work out procedures for avoiding the recurrence of such an incident.

298. In connexion with that crash, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, in a letter dated 9 August (S/11434), drew attention to a statement of the Syrian Civil Aviation Administration to the effect that during the course of an Israeli air force raid in southern Lebanon, when a formation had penetrated Syrian air space, contact had been lost with a United Nations plane in the same area. Subsequently, it had been discovered that the plane had crashed on Syrian

¹³ Doc. 115 in *ibid.*

territory, and Syrian rescue teams had rushed to the site. An investigation had been undertaken at once to determine the causes of the crash.

299. In a letter dated 12 August (S/11436), the representative of Israel protested Syria's effort to implicate Israel in the disaster for which Syria alone was responsible and declared that there had been no Israeli aerial activity in the area when the United Nations plane was shot down by Syrian armed forces.

300. In an addendum dated 9 July (S/11302/Add. 3) to his report on UNDOF of 6 June, the Secretary-General recalled that the map showing the different phases of disengagement had been signed on 5 June 1974 by the military representatives of Israel and Syria at the meeting of the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference. The parties had subsequently agreed to the publication of that map and disengagement plan, reproductions of which were attached to the addendum.

(b) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until
31 May 1975*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 27 November
1974*

301. As the six-month mandate of UNDOF was due to expire on 30 November 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on the operations of the Force from its inception 3 June until 26 November (S/11563). During that period, UNDOF had co-operated with the parties in controlling the process of separation and disengagement of forces, which had been completed on 27 June, and had since been supervising the area of separation and inspecting the areas of limitation of armaments and forces. By these activities, UNDOF had contributed to the stabilization of the cease-fire called for in resolution 338 (1973). On 26 November, the report stated, the Force consisted of 1,224 men. The Secretary-General had been informed by the Peruvian Government of its intention to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF during the first half of 1975.

302. In connexion with the functions and guidelines of UNDOF as outlined in the Agreement on Disengagement and its Protocol, the Secretary-General indicated that discussions were underway at United Nations Headquarters between United Nations officials and officials of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, respectively, for the purpose

of concluding agreements that would ensure the independent functioning of the Force in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Since its establishment, the Force, with the assistance of both parties, had overcome a number of difficulties in order to be in a position to carry out its tasks effectively. One remaining problem was that of restrictions on the freedom of movement and of some UNDOF personnel. On that matter, he had taken the position that UNDOF must function as an integrated and efficient military unit with the freedom of movement specified in the Protocol of the Disengagement Agreement, that its contingents must serve on an equal basis under the command of the Interim Force Commander and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of various contingents. As in the case of UNEF, the matter was being actively pursued.

303. Regarding the activities of the Force, he indicated that UNDOF had assisted in the process of disengagement of forces in accordance with the agreed time-table. By carrying out on 26 and 27 June the inspection of the zones of limited armaments and forces, as well as the 25-kilometre zone, the implementation of the disengagement had been completed on schedule.

304. During the period under review, with the exception of three shooting incidents, the cease-fire had been maintained. A number of overflights by unidentified aircraft had been observed in the area of separation, and in that regard, both parties had been requested to observe the maximum restraint. The Force had continued to supervise the areas of separation and limitation of armaments and forces as provided for in the Agreement. There had been no progress in the negotiations to enable a large mine-clearing operation to be carried out, a problem he considered it important to resolve at an early date, as the return of civilians to the area of separation was being hampered by the presence of uncleared mines.

305. In connexion with the financial aspects of the Force, the Secretary-General recalled that, in his report on UNEF of 12 October (S/11536), he had estimated the total cost for a further six-month period of operations to be in the order of \$40 million, and that, in annex II of his report of 30 October to the General Assembly (A/9822), he had indicated the UNDOF share of that total cost to be approximately \$7.6 million.

306. In conclusion, the Secretary-General ob-

served that, with the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement and the establishment of UNDOF, fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces had ended on 31 May and that, since then the situation in the Golan Heights had been quiet. Unlike previous peace-keeping forces, UNDOF had been set up for the purpose of supervising a specific Agreement, in accordance with the stipulations agreed to by the parties. It was specifically stated in the Agreement on Disengagement that it was not a peace agreement but a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). He then warned that the situation would remain fundamentally unstable and potentially explosive so long as progress towards a settlement of the underlying problems was not achieved. Therefore, he considered that the continued operation of UNDOF was essential not only to maintain the prevailing quiet in the area but to assist any further efforts towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Therefore, and in the light of discussions on the matter with the Governments concerned, he recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1809th meeting
(29 November 1974)*

307. At its 1809th meeting on 29 November, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East;

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11563)."

308. At their request, the President invited the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Secretary-General, in commenting on his report, stated that his recent visit to the area had left no doubt in his mind that all the Governments concerned were anxious to reach a settlement through negotiations. However, if progress were not made in the near future, tension would rise and the dangers of a new military confrontation would increase. The prolongation of the mandate of UNEF and, if the Council so decided, the extension of UNDOF were important factors in reducing tension in the area. However, those peace-keeping operations were not an end

in themselves, and an indeterminate period could not be expected for the achievement of a settlement. He considered it vital that the next six months be used for redoubled efforts to reach political solutions and to that end had discussed with the three Governments the main aspects of the future negotiating process and the implementation of resolution 338 (1973).

309. The representative of Peru then introduced a draft resolution (S/11565) sponsored by Austria, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru and the United Republic of Cameroon. The draft resolution read as follows:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11563),

"*Having noted* the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

"*Expressing Concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

"*Reaffirming* that the two agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

"*Decides:*

"(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

"(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

"(c) That the Secretary-General will submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973)."

DECISION: *At the 1809th meeting, on 29 November 1974, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/11565) by 13 votes to none as resolution 363 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

310. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, the USSR, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon, Austria, China, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, France, Iraq, Australia, the Byelorussian SSR, Kenya, Costa Rica and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United States.

(c) *Communications to the Council regarding the Agreement on Disengagement*

311. Between late July and November 1974, the Secretary-General received a number of communications from Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in which each charged that the other had violated the provisions of the Agreement on Disengagement while claiming its own strict observance thereof.

312. In a letter dated 30 July (S/11395), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that, on 19 June, a detachment of Israeli forces had seized three Syrian citizens and stated that the operation had been witnessed by UNDOF. The Syrian Government asked the Secretary-General to intervene for their release and declared that measures should be taken to stop further breaches of the Agreement. In a letter dated 1 August (S/11406), Israel stated that the three persons mentioned had been detained on 16 June, when the area was under Israeli control, because of their active involvement in terror activities against Israel.

313. In a letter dated 5 August (S/11414), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that the Israeli air force had carried out several reconnaissance flights over the line of separation in violation of the Agreement. In a reply dated 8 August (S/11427), Israel denied the Syrian charges, noting that the procedure for lodging such complaints with UNDOF had not been followed, and added that Israel scrupulously observed the provisions of the Agreement. In a further letter dated 16 August (S/11455), the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed that its charges of 5 August had been submitted to UNDOF in compliance with the Agreement and therefore it was clear that, in lodging its complaints, the Syrian Arab Republic had scrupulously observed the provisions of the Agreement on Disengagement.

314. In a letter dated 15 August (S/11451), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that, on 11 July, an Israeli patrol had crossed line A and ordered Syrian farm workers to evacuate the area. Furthermore, Israeli forces had established barriers, minefields, tank ditches and wire fences all along that line and were still occupying several posts east of the cease-fire line.

315. In a letter dated 16 August (S/11454), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that that morning Israeli forces had crossed the disengagement line and detained a Syrian citizen who was working as a civil guard. The incident, it added, had been

witnessed by UNDOF. The Syrian Government requested the Secretary-General's intervention to secure the immediate release of the Syrian citizen. In a reply dated 19 August (S/11460), Israel rejected the Syrian complaints of 15 and 16 August, stating that a Syrian army sergeant dressed in mufti had crossed the disengagement line and had been detained on the Israeli side. The same incident was again referred to in a letter of 3 September (S/11483) from the Syrian Arab Republic which claimed that because of the presence of his parent on that line, the person in question, driven by emotion, had stepped towards the other and that they had met in the area of separation. Israel replied on 6 September (S/11497) that the person detained was a sergeant-major in the Syrian army who had crossed the separation line and had been captured on the Israeli side.

316. In a letter dated 3 September (S/11482), the Syrian Arab Republic stated that, on 22 August, an Israeli patrol had opened fire towards Syrian farmers irrigating their lands in the buffer zone and that a complaint on the incident had been submitted to UNDOF. The complaint was rejected as without foundation in a letter dated 6 September (S/11497) from Israel.

317. In a letter dated 11 September (S/11503), the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its charges of violations by Israel of the Agreement on Disengagement in maintaining Israeli soldiers and vehicles in the areas between Lines A and A-1, the establishment of minefields, tank ditches and wire fences all along line A and the continued occupation by its forces of four posts east of the cease-fire line. Regarding Israel's allegations concerning artillery pieces, the Syrian Government stated that the number of pieces of artillery was identical to that stipulated in the Agreement and that mortars had not been mentioned in that Agreement. In a reply dated 16 September (S/11512), Israel again rejected the Syrian allegations and reiterated its claim that Syria was systematically, persistently and continuously violating the Agreement on Disengagement by maintaining artillery pieces over and above those permitted in the Agreement. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11534), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that, on 3 October, an Israeli bulldozer had crossed the Alpha line and started opening a road in the buffer zone under the protection of two armoured Israeli personnel carriers. In a reply dated 15 October (S/11583), Israel

described the Syrian letter as another attempt by the Syrian Arab Republic to divert attention, by means of distortions and falsifications, from its own systematic and continuing violations of the Agreement on Disengagement.

318. In a letter dated 26 November (S/11561) the Syrian Arab Republic charged that, contrary to the Agreement on Disengagement, Israel was still keeping 51 tanks in the 10-kilometre zone in excess of the 75 tanks agreed upon and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to have those tanks withdrawn. In a reply dated 28 November (S/11564), Israel said that there was no foundation to the Syrian charge, as Israel was scrupulously observing the Agreement and did not maintain in the areas of limitation any tanks or other armaments in excess of those provided for in the Agreement.

(d) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General issued between 10 January and 21 May 1975*

319. On 10 January 1975, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11595) in which, after recalling that the Secretary-General, in November 1974, had advised the Council of Peru's intention to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF during the first half of 1975, he stated that, on 18 December 1974, the Secretary-General had informed him that, at the request of the Government of Peru, he had agreed to release Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos from his assignment as Interim Force Commander as of 15 December 1974 and that it was his intention to appoint, with the consent of the Council, a general officer from an appropriate Latin American country to succeed General Briceño. In the meantime, he had asked the Chief of Staff of UNDOF, Colonel Hannes Philipp of Austria, to act as officer-in-charge. On 8 January, the President of the Council, after consulting its members, had informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the intention of the Government of Peru to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF and would await a communication from the Secretary-General concerning which Latin American country would be able to replace the Peruvian contingent. On the same day, the President had informed the Secretary-General, after consultations with the members, that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's agreement to release Gen-

eral Briceño and had no objection to having Colonel Hannes Philipp of Austria carry out General Briceño's functions on a temporary basis. The Council was awaiting the Secretary-General's proposal to settle the question of the appointment of a Commander of UNDOF. The note indicated that the Chinese delegation dissociated itself from both matters.

320. In a further progress report on UNDOF dated 21 January (S/11563/Add. 1), the Secretary-General indicated that the Force had continued to supervise the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces and the Protocol to that Agreement in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. On 20 January, the strength of the Force was 1,202 men. The Interim Force Commander, Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos, had relinquished his command on 15 December 1974 after having been recalled by his Government, and Colonel Hannes Philipp of Austria was the officer-in-charge of UNDOF until a new commander could be appointed.

321. In the same report, the Secretary-General said that some progress had been made regarding the issue of freedom of movement of the Force's personnel and that arrangements had been worked out to enable all personnel of UNDOF to enjoy the freedom of movement essential for the performance of their tasks. In accordance with its mandate the Force had continued to supervise the area of separation by means of static posts and mobile patrols. Unfortunately, there had been no progress in the clearing of the minefields in the area of separation, despite continuing efforts by General Siilasvuo with both parties. UNDOF had continued to receive complaints from the parties about failures to comply with the Agreement. The complaints had been investigated and the results reported to the party concerned, and the Force had continued to draw attention to violations it had itself observed. There had been a marked decrease in the number of overflights in the area of separation, and the Secretary-General expressed the hope that that trend would continue.

(e) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 30 November 1975*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General of 21 May 1975*

322. As the mandate of UNDOF was due to expire on 31 May, the Secretary-General issued a report on the Force on 21 May (S/11694) in order

to provide the Security Council with an account of its activities during the period from 28 November 1974 to 21 May 1975. During that period, with the co-operation of both parties the Force had continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it and had been able to contribute to the maintenance of the cease-fire. As of 10 May, the strength of the Force totalled 1,198 men. After having discussed the deployment of the Force, its rotation, accommodations and logistics, the Secretary-General pointed out that its functions and guidelines had not changed, that it maintained close contact with the parties and that the Commander of UNEF had continued, as requested, to take part in high-level contacts concerning the functioning of the Force. With regard to the freedom of movement of the Force contingents, he indicated that arrangements worked out for that purpose fell short of what was required but that efforts were continuing to secure full acceptance of that principle.

323. As noted in previous reports, the continued existence of uncleared minefields within the area of separation constituted an ever present hazard to both UNDOF troops and the civilian population. He noted with regret that no progress had been made in the negotiations in that respect but that mine-clearing work in some areas had been carried out both by Syrian civilian authorities and by UNDOF mine-clearing teams.

324. The Force had continued to investigate complaints by the parties of alleged violations of the agreements and to draw the attention of the parties to violations it had itself observed, with a view to having corrective action taken. With regard to the financial aspects, the Secretary-General indicated that it had been thus far possible to keep the rate of obligations and expenditure of the Force within the level of the appropriations and authorizations provided by the General Assembly and expressed his belief that the cost for the contemplated extension would remain within that level of authorization.

325. The Secretary-General also reported that efforts had been made on several levels to advance the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and that in his contacts with the parties and with other Governments he had lost no opportunity to contribute to that process. Furthermore, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs had been sent to the area to make contact with all the Govern-

ments concerned, as well as with the senior officers and officials of the United Nations operations in the area. The Secretary-General observed that in view of the current series of high-level meetings among those concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, it would be premature for him to comment further on the matter at that time.

326. In his concluding observations, the Secretary-General indicated that both parties had continued generally to comply with the Agreement on Disengagement. However, he cautioned that the prevailing quiet was a precarious one and reiterated that the Agreement on Disengagement was not a peace agreement but only a step towards a just and lasting peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). Until further progress could be made in that direction, the situation in the sector, and in the Middle East as a whole, would remain unstable and potentially dangerous. Therefore, the continued presence of UNDOF in the sector was essential not only to maintain quiet but to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace. After indicating that he had been in contact with the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel, he stated that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had agreed to an extension of the mandate for a further period of six months and that the Government of Israel was also in favour of an extension for the same period. Therefore, he recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1822nd meeting
(28 May 1975)*

327. At the 1822nd meeting on 28 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11694).”

328. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11700) which the President stated had been prepared in the course of consultations among all the members of the Security Council. It read as follows:

[The draft resolution was adopted as resolution 369 (1975); the text is in doc. 22 below—ed. note.]

329. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon during consultations, the Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

DECISION: At the 1822nd meeting, on 28 May 1975, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/11700) by 13 votes to none as resolution 369 (1975). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.

330. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of China, the United States, Japan, the United Republic of Cameroon, the United Kingdom, Italy, Iraq, Sweden, Mauritania, the USSR, Costa Rica, France, the Byelorussian SSR, the United Republic of Tanzania and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Guyana.

3. THE SITUATION IN THE ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

(a) *Reports of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization*

331. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of reports on the status of the ceasefire in the sector submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General. From 15 June 1974 to 3 March 1975, the reports of the Chief of Staff covered developments a week at a time, assessing the rising or falling level of frequency of incidents, the number of incidents of firing across or of crossings of the armistice demarcation line, as reported by the UNTSO observation posts, the complaints submitted by the parties and the results of UNTSO investigations. Those weekly reports were issued in addenda to document S/11057, as were separate reports on individual incidents and complaints by the parties, when warranted.

332. The reports received between mid-June and 9 July (S/11057/Add. 515-523) indicated ground and air activity consisting of mortar and artillery fire by Israeli forces across the armistice demarcation line, flights by Israeli jet aircraft over the territory of Lebanon, as well as attacks with bombs and rockets against targets, including refugee camps, inside Lebanon.

333. In the report dated 24 June (S/11057/Add. 521), covering the period 17-23 June, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that the level of incidents had markedly increased on 18 and 20 June but had diminished as from the following

day. He added, however, that the tension in the area had remained high during the period covered by that progress report.

334. In the reports issued later in July (S/11057/Add. 524-528), the Chief of Staff indicated that the number of incidents in the sector had increased and the area remained tense. The incidents had involved mainly firing across the armistice demarcation line by Israeli forces and, occasionally, an exchange of fire between Israeli and unidentified forces. There had been also cases of crossing violations by Israel forces personnel, which had continued daily to occupy positions on the Lebanese side of the armistice demarcation line during daylight hours.

335. In a report dated 9 July (S/11057/Add. 524), it was indicated that three unidentified warships had been observed firing flares and naval guns at Lebanese territory. In complaints contained in that report, Lebanon charged that, on the night of 8/9 July, Israel marine forces had penetrated Lebanese territorial water at three ports, destroying several Lebanese fishing boats and injuring one Lebanese.

336. In a report dated 19 July (S/11057/Add. 526), it was indicated that UNTSO military officers investigating a Lebanese complaint of 18 July concerning a penetration by Israel forces had confirmed the destruction of three houses in the village and had heard testimony of witnesses as to the abduction by those forces of the owners of two of the houses.

337. The reports of the Chief of Staff during the month of August (S/11057/Add. 529-536) indicated that from 29 July to 11 August the level of incidents decreased slightly but the area remained tense following air attacks in Lebanon on 7 and 9 August. From 12 to 18 August, the number of ground incidents increased, owing to a greater number of Israeli machine-gun firings across the armistice demarcation line, but air activity decreased significantly, and the area was less tense. From 19 to 25 August, though ground activity decreased, overflights had increased, but there was generally less tension. From 26 August to 1 September, the number of ground incidents increased slightly, but tension remained low.

338. According to the reports submitted during the month of September (S/11057/Add. 537-543), activity in the western sector increased between 1 and 4 September, and tension in the area continued

high through 8 September, owing to Israeli mortar and machine-gun fire and overflights by jet aircraft and helicopters. From 9 to 15 September, ground activity decreased slightly and overflights remained at the same level, but tension increased following attacks by Israeli jets. From 16 to 22 September, there was a decrease in ground activity and overflights, but from 23 to 29 September such activity again increased, and tension was heightened by Israeli jet attacks on 24 and 25 September.

339. Reports relating to the month of October (S/11057/Add. 544-547) indicated that ground and air activity remained at a high level from 30 September to 6 October, decreased from 7 to 13 October, increased slightly from 14 to 20 October and again from 21 to 27 October. In a separate addendum dated 31 October (S/11057/Add. 548), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that, on the night of 30 October, unidentified warships had been observed firing flares and naval guns into Lebanese territory.

340. During November, five periodic and four special reports (S/11057/Add. 549-558) were issued. From 28 October to 3 November ground and air incidents decreased, but, on 4 November, Lebanon complained that Israeli forces had blown up a house in Lebanon and abducted its owner and two of his sons. From 4 to 10 November, ground activity increased, but air activity remained on about the same level as that of the previous week. On 12 and 14 November, Lebanon had submitted complaints to UNTSO concerning bomb rocket attacks by Israeli jet aircraft on several areas that had resulted in civilian casualties, Israeli forces penetrations of Lebanon during which houses had been destroyed and three Lebanese kidnapped, and artillery fire from Israeli territory that had caused death and injury to several people. From 11 to 17 November a marked increase in ground, naval and air activity was reported, but from 18 to 24 November, such activity decreased noticeably, with no incidents at all being reported for 23 and 24 November. From 25 November to 1 December, however, all forms of military activity increased.

341. Reports from UNTSO during December (S/11057/Add. 559-565) indicated a slight decrease in activity, mostly firing across the armistice demarcation line, from 2 to 8 December. On 12 December, the headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission near Beirut had observed

an attack by Israeli jet aircraft which, according to a subsequent Lebanese complaint, had been directed at refugee camps. A marked increase in tension attributed to heightened ground activity and the air attack near Beirut was reported for the period from 9 to 15 December. A Lebanese complaint submitted to UNTSO on 18 December concerned a helicopter incursion by Israeli forces, who blew up six houses and abducted four Lebanese. From 16 to 22 December, however, a marked decrease in tension was reported, and, from 23 to 29 December, the number of incidents decreased to the lowest level since early July.

342. On 31 December 1974 and 1 January 1975, according to the reports submitted by UNTSO (S/11057/Add. 566-567), there was increased ground activity and Lebanon submitted four complaints relating to injuries and damages caused by Israeli artillery fire and border penetrations which UNTSO investigated. During January, February and early March 1975, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted eight periodic reports (S/11057/Add. 568-576) on developments in the Israel-Lebanon sector. From 30 December 1974 to 5 January 1975, ground activity had at first increased markedly but decreased considerably after 3 January. From 6 to 11 January, activity remained at a low level but increased on 11 and 12 January. During the early part of the period from 13 to 19 January there was intense ground activity, consisting of artillery and mortar fire, but it decreased considerably after 16 January. From 20 to 26 January, activity decreased markedly and remained at a low level through 2 March.

343. Between 1 April and 5 June, the Chief of Staff submitted five reports (S/11663 and Add. 1-4) on the status of the cease-fire in the sector. In the reports submitted on 1 April and 1 May (S/11663 and S/11663/Add. 1), he indicated that, during March and April, military activity in the sector had remained at a low level. Israel forces personnel had continued the daily occupation during daylight hours of positions inside Lebanese territory, and several cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line and several crossing violations had occurred. He also reported overflights by Israeli jet aircraft, as well as by unidentified aircraft, in early March. Lebanon had lodged numerous complaints concerning such incidents and the penetration of Lebanese territorial waters by Israel naval vessels.

344. On 26 May (S/11663/Add. 2), the Chief of Staff reported increased ground and air activity in the area on 24 and 25 May, including 84 overflights by Israeli jet aircraft. An Israeli force had been observed entering the Lebanese village of Aita Ech Chaab on the morning of 25 May and departing five hours later, during which time there had been an exchange of artillery and mortar fire. The parties had accepted a ceasefire proposed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. Lebanon had lodged a complaint that Israeli forces had attacked a Lebanese outpost and killed seven soldiers. An inquiry conducted by UNTSO observers had confirmed that complaint.

345. In an additional special report dated 27 May (S/11663/Add. 3) on the incidents of 25 May, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stated that Lebanon had complained that Israel artillery fire and rockets and bombs from Israel jet aircraft had fallen on several Lebanese localities, wounding three soldiers and causing damage to material and cultivation. An inquiry conducted by UNTSO observers had confirmed the complaint in so far as damage to material and cultivation was concerned.

346. In a report dated 2 June (S/11663/Add.4), the Chief of Staff indicated that, except for the activity which had taken place on 25 May, the activity in the sector during the month of May had remained at a low level, with tension in the area rising in mid-May and again towards the end of the month.

(b) *Communications containing complaints
by the parties*

347. During the period under review, the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council received several communications from Israel and Lebanon containing charges and countercharges of violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions.

348. In a letter dated 17 June (S/11320), Lebanon charged that Israel, in continuation of its acts of aggression against Lebanese territory, had penetrated Lebanese air space daily throughout the preceding month and had shelled and bombed towns and villages, causing 11 deaths and destruction among the civilian population. Lebanon charged that Israel was seeking to victimize Lebanon for harbouring 300,000 Palestinians on its soil and make it a scapegoat for acts committed by Palestinians operating from within Israel.

349. In letters dated 18 and 21 June (S/11321 and S/11324), Israel rejected the Lebanese charges and asserted that, under an agreement concluded in Cairo in 1969 between the Government of Lebanon and the terror organizations, Lebanon had facilitated the establishment on its territory by those organizations of a practically independent régime, contrary to its obligations under the Charter. Thus, it was from Lebanon that the terrorists set out on their murder missions in Israel and elsewhere. In support of its charges, Israel cited information media reports from Lebanon and around the world to indicate that Israel's actions had been aimed at bases used by terrorist organizations in Lebanon.

350. In a letter dated 25 June (S/11326), Israel charged that, on the previous night, terrorists who had come by boat from Lebanon had attacked a house in the coastal town of Naharia located about 10 kilometres south of the Lebanese border and that, in a subsequent clash with Israeli security forces, the three terrorists had been killed.

351. In a letter dated 10 July (S/11331), Israel reported that units of its naval forces had sunk about 10 boats in each of three harbours in southern Lebanon and that the Israeli commandos had left behind leaflets warning the population that they should not let terrorists operate from their fishing harbours and recalling that terrorists setting out from their harbours had conducted operations on the Israeli coast.

352. In a letter also dated 10 July (S/11332), Lebanon complained that, on 8 and 9 July, Israeli naval forces had attacked three ports in southern Lebanon, destroying 39 fishing boats. Those attacks, following assaults on Palestinian refugee camps between 18 and 20 June in which 73 persons had been killed and 159 wounded, could only serve to revive the cycle of violence in the area and were detrimental to the efforts for a peaceful settlement.

353. In a letter dated 9 August (S/11430), Israel charged that a three-man squad had infiltrated Israel from Lebanon on 6 August and kidnapped four workers, taking them to terrorist bases in Lebanese villages.

354. In letters dated 4 and 27 September (S/11487 and S/11520), Israel submitted further complaints regarding attempted penetrations of its coast and borders by terrorists coming from Lebanon on 9 August and on 3, 4 and 25 September, and charged

that the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon had recently increased their activities and caused political instability in Lebanon. In further letters dated 15 and 26 November (S/11558 and S/11562), Israel complained of additional incidents of infiltration or firing across its frontier from Lebanon on 28 September, 1, 7, 28 and 29 October and 2, 8, 13, 17, 19 and 22 November.

355. In a letter dated 21 November (S/11560), Lebanon charged that its sovereignty had been violated on an almost daily basis by Israeli forces by air, land or sea or by a combination of those means. As a result, many peaceful civilians had been killed or wounded, much property had been destroyed, and the population of southern Lebanon lived in constant fear. The letter cited by way of example a number of incidents that had occurred between 18 July and 14 November.

356. During the month of December, Israel addressed to the Secretary-General six letters dated 2, 3, 9, 12, 16 and 19 December (S/11566, S/11567, S/11570, S/11571, S/11577 and S/11585) containing new charges of attacks on Israeli civilians by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) coming from Lebanese territory or of firing on Israeli settlements from Lebanon. Israel stated that the news agency of PLO had published accounts of many of the cases cited, confirming PLO responsibility for the attacks.

357. In a letter dated 13 December (S/11572), Lebanon protested that, on 12 December, Israeli jets had attacked a Palestinian refugee camp near Beirut, wounding 10 persons, and that, on 13 December, Israeli artillery had shelled a town in southern Lebanon, wounding six.

358. In letters dated 2, 6, 17 and 22 January 1975 (S/11589, S/11591, S/11601 and S/11605), Israel continued to submit charges of attacks by PLO terrorists coming from Lebanese territory against the civilian population of Israel and of firing directed against Israeli territory from Lebanese border areas, where the Government appeared to have surrendered its authority to PLO.

359. In letters dated 4, 6 and 21 January (S/11590, S/11599 and S/11604), Lebanon listed alleged acts of aggression committed against it between 12 December 1974 and 13 January 1975 which included penetration of Lebanese air space by Israeli warplanes breaking the sound barrier 61 times, 15 penetrations of Lebanese territorial waters by Israeli warships, 396 incidents of shelling

or firing across the border and 12 frontier crossings by Israeli troops. Lebanon also charged that Israel, by means of heavy artillery and mortar shelling between 11 and 17 January, had almost demolished a village in southern Lebanon and transformed it into a deserted village.

360. In letters dated 6 and 10 March (S/11654 and (S/11655), Israel presented detailed charges in connexion with an incident on the night of 5 March in which 11 civilians had been killed by PLO terrorists, who had come from Lebanon in a chartered boat and attacked a residential hotel, apartment houses and passers-by.

361. In a letter dated 14 May (S/11688), Lebanon complained that Israel had committed a series of aggressive actions in the period from 1 to 14 May, crossing the Lebanese frontier, flying over Lebanese territory with jet aircraft, penetrating Lebanese waters with a warship and kidnapping a number of civilians. Lebanon strongly protested those actions and called on the Security Council to note that they had been committed in defiance of Council resolutions warning Israel against such activity.

362. In a letter dated 14 May (S/11690), Israel charged that, in the preceding five weeks, more than 30 acts of aggression had been committed by Palestinian terror organizations from Lebanese territory against Israel and its citizens. It asserted that Lebanon's letter was another attempt to mislead public opinion with regard to a situation which the Government of Lebanon itself had created by refusing to enforce its sovereignty within its borders. It was common knowledge that PLO terrorist organizations were in virtual control of parts of Lebanon.

363. In a letter dated 20 May (S/11693), Lebanon charged that, on 17 May, a mortar shell fired by Israeli artillery had exploded and caused the deaths of nine children and injured three others. That tragic incident resulted from Israel's continual acts of aggression and demonstrated the difficulties endured by the innocent civilian population of Lebanon.

364. In letters dated 27 May and 6 June (S/11702 and S/11715), Israel complained of further attacks by PLO terrorists against Israel from Lebanese territory, charging that, on 26 and 27 May and 5 June, rockets had been fired at Israeli localities from terrorist positions in Lebanon, wounding one civilian and damaging residential houses. Israel

held Lebanon responsible for the situation resulting from PLO domination over areas of Lebanese territory and would continue to exercise its international right and obligation to protect its citizens and territory against such attacks.

B. Communications concerning other matters relating to the situation in the Middle East

365. During the period under review, the Secretary-General received a number of other communications on the situation in the Middle East. They related to the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places, the situation in the occupied territories, terrorism and the treatment of prisoners of war.

366. In a letter dated 22 July 1974 (S/11360), Egypt charged that Israel was planning to connect all Arab villages and quarters within the municipality of Jerusalem with the Israeli telephone network, an arrangement that would violate the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the character and status of Jerusalem. In a reply dated 26 July (S/11386), Israel stated that telephone connexions were being provided for the Arab villages at the express desire of their inhabitants.

367. By a letter dated 24 February 1975 (S/11639), the representative of Yemen, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab group, transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of resolutions adopted by the Moslem-Christian meeting on Jerusalem, held in Cairo on 16 January. In the resolutions, the meeting condemned Israeli measures aimed at changing the character of the Holy City and denounced the confiscation of Arab land by the occupation authorities, the evacuation of Arab inhabitants and the conduct of excavations that destroyed cultural property. It asked that the Security Council meet with a view to imposing appropriate sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and that the General Assembly freeze the membership of Israel at its forthcoming session, until the resolutions relating to Jerusalem had been implemented.

368. The sentencing by Israel of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci of Jerusalem was the subject of communications to the Security Council from Egypt and Israel.

369. In a letter dated 16 December (S/11578),

the representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement made by his country's Foreign Minister, denouncing the 12-year sentence imposed on Archbishop Capucci by the Israeli occupation authorities. The Foreign Minister asserted that Israel had fabricated the charge against Archbishop Capucci while he was discharging his obligations towards his co-religionists. The Egyptian people, he added, saluted Archbishop Capucci as a living example of the struggle of free believers against repression, aggression and terrorism and called on the Governments of the world to protest that aggression against human rights.

370. In a reply dated 18 December (S/11581), Israel cited the court sentence indicating that the Archbishop had abused his ecclesiastical status and trust when he smuggled into Israel from Lebanon a large quantity of arms and sabotage material for the use of terrorist organizations. The letter termed the Egyptian Foreign Minister's statement an attempt to exploit the affair for propaganda purposes.

371. Several letters were addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated to the Security Council dealing with the situation in the occupied territories.

372. In a letter dated 1 July (S/11327), transmitting the text of a statement by an Israeli woman lawyer published in *The Times* of London on 17 June, the Syrian Arab Republic asserted that her statement provided proof that Israel violated fundamental rights in the occupied territories by imprisonment without trial, by torture and by failure to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. The article indicated that the author was a member of the central committee of *Rakach*, the Israeli "New Communist" Party.

373. In a letter dated 10 July (S/11333), Israel stated that the Syrian letter and the article annexed to it reiterated the standard Arab propaganda distortions regarding the situation in the Israeli-administered territories. The Israeli letter contained the text of a reply to the article which had been written by the editor of the *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* and chairman of the Israel national section of Amnesty International and published in *The Times* on 5 July.

374. In a letter dated 8 July (S/11330), the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted excerpts from an interview published in the United States magazine *Newsweek*, in which Israel's Prime Minister was quoted as having declared that Israel would never give up the Golan Heights and, with regard to Transjordan, would never return to the 1967 lines. The Syrian Arab Republic cited the interview as proof that Israel was violating the principles of the Charter and United Nations resolutions. In a second letter dated 13 August (S/11443), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that by recalling its reservists, mobilizing forces, building military roads and carrying out extensive military manoeuvres, Israel had continued to create an atmosphere of tension with a view to committing a new aggression and destroying the international efforts made for the establishment of a just peace in the area.

375. In a letter dated 15 August (S/11452), Israel replied that mobilization of reserves of the Israel Defence Forces was an exercise of a limited nature intended to test mobilization procedures and that an announcement to that effect had been transmitted to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Commander in the area.

376. Following the signature of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syrian Forces on 31 May, the Secretary-General received a number of communications containing complaints concerning destruction in the city of Quneitra and other villages on Syrian territory in the Golan Heights formerly occupied by Israel.

377. In a letter dated 30 July (S/11396), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that during the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement and before withdrawing, Israeli forces, using explosives and bulldozers, had destroyed Syrian villages, including the city of Quneitra, in violation of international law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. In a further letter dated 12 September (S/11506), the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted a report from the Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums, charging that Israeli occupation authorities had destroyed and pillaged cultural property, including religious and historical buildings, as well as schools, mosques and churches. The Syrian Arab Republic charged that such actions were violations of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property

in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, which both Israel and Syria had ratified.

378. In a letter dated 12 September (S/11507), the representative of Lebanon, as Chairman of the Arab group, transmitted the text of the "Quneitra Appeal", adopted on 5 September in Cairo by the Council of the League of Arab States concerning the destruction of Quneitra by Israeli forces before they withdrew. The appeal was addressed to the world public and to international organizations in order to expose the acts committed by Israel in Quneitra during its occupation.

379. In a letter dated 13 September (S/11508), the representative of Algeria, in his capacity as Chairman of the group of non-aligned countries accredited to the United Nations, transmitted the text of a declaration adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee of the group, condemning the destruction by Israeli forces of the city of Quneitra and the village of Rafid, contrary to international law and international conventions.¹⁴

380. In replies dated 2 August and 23 September (S/11408 and S/11516), Israel stated that it was a matter of common knowledge that the damage and destruction caused in front-line villages and in the town of Quneitra were the direct result of acts of aggression carried out by Syria in various periods since 1967, culminating in its war against Israel in 1973. Syria's claim that Quneitra had been destroyed on the eve of its evacuation by the Israeli forces was nothing but a propaganda fabrication, which had been reported and given verbal support in the communications from Lebanon and Algeria.

381. With regard to the question of an invitation by the General Assembly to the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel warned, in a letter dated 4 October (S/11530), that such an invitation would be contrary to the Charter and the Assembly's rules of procedure and therefore illegal and not binding. Israel charged that the PLO objective was the destruction by armed force of a State Member of the United Nations, contrary to the Charter, and that PLO was thus totally different from movements for the liberation of subject peoples. The letter enclosed a list of alleged "principal crimes" perpetrated by PLO.

382. With regard to the question of the treatment of prisoners of war, the representative of Israel,

¹⁴ Doc. 147 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

in a letter dated 10 September (S/11502), transmitted a complaint lodged by his Government with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) against the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 committed against Israeli prisoners in the course of the Yom Kippur War and during the period of their captivity in Syria. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11533), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted a statement made by his Government concerning the treatment of Syrian prisoners of war during their captivity in Israel and added that his Government had submitted an official complaint in that respect to ICRC.

383. By a letter dated 6 November (S/11554), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted a document entitled "Israel and South Africa", describing the development of relations between 1967 and 1974, written by Peter Hellyer and previously issued as a document of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*.

384. In letters dated 16 June and 20 January 1975 (S/11600 and S/11602), Israel charged that PLO terrorists had opened fire at an El Al Israel Airlines plane as it was about to take off from the Paris Orly Airport on 13 January. The terrorists had missed their target but had hit a Yugoslav airliner and injured several Yugoslav crew members and airport personnel. In a second incident in which an El Al plane was fired at, terrorists had thrown hand grenades at innocent people in the terminal and taken 10 bystanders hostage. Such acts, for which PLO was responsible, endangered international civil aviation. Despite its disclaimers, PLO could not evade responsibility for those acts in view of the fact that it was the umbrella for all Arab terrorist groups. There could be no doubt that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session in connexion with the question of Palestine had given encouragement to the campaign of murder carried out by PLO against Israeli and non-Israeli civilians.

385. In a letter dated 10 April (S/11669), Egypt informed the Secretary-General that it had been advised by ICRC that, on 30 March, the Israel navy had seized an Egyptian fishing boat that had had mechanical trouble while on the high seas sailing from Port Said to Beirut and towed it into the port of Ashdod. As of 10 April, Egypt

had not received any information from ICRC regarding the release of the crew. Egypt further complained that, on 21 March, the Israel navy had stopped an Egyptian fishing boat sailing in the Red Sea and confiscated quantities of the fish on board and the personal belongings of the crew before permitting it to continue its voyage. Later, the same boat had been fired on by another Israeli boat when the fishermen had resisted arrest, and five Egyptian fishermen had been wounded. The fishing boat had then been forced to proceed to the port of El Tor, where one of the fishermen had died from his wounds. The other four had been released after having been interrogated for four days. Such acts of piracy, Egypt stated, increased tension and endangered human life.

386. In a reply dated 21 April (S/11676), Israel stated that, on 29 March, its navy had given assistance to a Lebanese boat that had drifted close to the Israeli coast because of engine breakdown. The boat had been towed to Haifa for engine repair and had resumed its voyage with its crew to Lebanon on 16 April. The letter further stated that, on 21 March, an unidentified boat had entered Israeli-controlled waters in the Gulf of Suez. When the boat ignored orders to halt and warning shots and even tried to escape, the Israeli vessel had fired in its direction. Four members of the crew had been wounded and given medical care, but one of them had died from his wounds. Following an investigation, the vessel had been identified as an Egyptian fishing boat, and it had been released with its crew on 26 March. Israel charged that PLO regularly used boats in its attacks against Israeli civilians, as had been demonstrated by its attack against the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv. Under those circumstances Israel was obliged to take all the precautionary measures necessary to prevent attacks from the sea.

3

Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)¹⁵

September 12, 1975

1. The General Assembly, by resolution 3331 of 17 December 1974, at its twenty-ninth session extended the mandate of UNRWA¹⁶ for a further three years to 30 June 1978. There was no alteration in the terms of the mandate but the same resolution refers to the provision of essential services and the Commissioner-General assumes that, as he said in paragraph 11 of last year's report,¹⁷ the

mandate may be taken to mean "the maintenance of the programmes of relief, health and education and such additional assistance in time of emergency as circumstances appear to require and the Agency was able to provide", subject to the financial limitations imposed by the available funds, an inescapable qualification referred to in paragraph 13 below. If the General Assembly wishes these programmes to be fully maintained, it is essential that the Agency's finances be placed on a more stable basis.

2. On 1 May 1975 the Agency completed its twenty-fifth year of service to the Palestine ref-

¹⁵ Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1974-30 June 1975, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (UN doc. A/10013), pp. 1-13.

¹⁶ The Agency headquarters is located in Beirut, Lebanon and the five Field Offices are in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. References in this report to Fields refer to these geographical areas. Throughout this report the term "West Bank" means the occupied West Bank of Jordan and the term "Israeli authorities" means the authorities of the occupying Power in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which have been under military occupation by the Government of Israel since June 1967.

Information concerning the origin of the Agency, its mission and work, will be found in the following United Nations documents.

(a) Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC.25/6, parts I and II);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Palestine refugees: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes*, vol. II (A/1060), p. 14;

(c) Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees: document submitted by the Secretary-General (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/4121 and Corr. 1);

(d) Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787 and Corr. 1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/8124);

(e) Records of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 35, document A/8264; *ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 38, document A/8476 and Corr. 1; *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 40, document A/8849; and A/9231;

(f) Pertinent Economic and Social Council resolution: 1565 (L) of 3 May 1971.

[This and following notes are part of the original document.]

¹⁷ Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and the Advisory Commission

to the General Assembly:

- (i) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev.1);
- (ii) *Ibid.*, *Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add.1);
- (iii) *Ibid.*, *Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add.1);
- (iv) *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add.1);
- (v) *Ibid.*, *Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A* (A/2717 and Add.1);
- (vi) *Ibid.*, *Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A* (A/2978 and Add.1);
- (vii) *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A* (A/3212 and Add.1);
- (viii) *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3686 and Corr.1); and A/3735;
- (ix) *Ibid.*, *Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3931); and A/3948;
- (x) *Ibid.*, *Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4213);
- (xi) *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478);
- (xii) *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4861);
- (xiii) *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214);
- (xiv) *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5513);
- (xv) *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5813);
- (xvi) *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6013);
- (xvii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6313);
- (xviii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6713);
- (xix) A/6723 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, document S/8001; and *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/8001/Add.1;
- (xx) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/7213);
- (xxi) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/7614);
- (xxii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8013);
- (xxiii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 35, documents A/8084 and Add.1;
- (xxiv) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8413);
- (xxv) A/8383 and Add.1;
- (xxvi) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8713 and Corr.1 and 2);
- (xxvii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/9013);
- (xxviii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/9613 and Corr.1).

ugees.¹⁸ A twenty-fifth anniversary would normally be celebrated amid congratulations, but though UNRWA may legitimately take pride in some achievements, notably the preservation of the health of the refugees, despite the deplorable living conditions of those in the most crowded camps, and the development of an impressive education system, the perpetuation of refugee status could be no occasion for celebration.

3. As on previous occasions, the extension of the mandate by the General Assembly was decided "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)", a reminder that in more than 25 years no progress has been made in implementation of the resolution "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible". By 1 May 1975, the eighth anniversary was also approaching of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, many of them refugees for the second time, comparatively few of whom had been allowed to return. Their situation is very relevant to withdrawal from occupied territory.

4. The Palestine refugees were bound to be affected by the debate on the question of Palestine that took place in the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session with the participation, at the invitation of the General Assembly, of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as representative of the Palestinian peoples, and it was the occasion for widespread demonstrations in which the refugees were prominent. The granting to the PLO by the General Assembly of observer status at the United Nations and the Assembly's request to

the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the PLO on all matters relating to the question of Palestine, preceded by a decision by the Heads of States of the Arab League, accepted by all the Arab host Governments, that the PLO should be regarded as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, were of significance to the Agency.

5. In the light of the General Assembly resolution, the Commissioner-General called on the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and subsequently informed him more fully of the Agency's financial difficulties and their implications for the Agency's services to the refugees. At the request of the Lebanese authorities, the Agency had already established contact with the PLO's Higher Political Committee for Palestinians in Lebanon, with which, in effect, in the circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, responsibility for the refugee population as a whole rests, as stated in paragraph 25 of last year's report.¹⁹ The Agency remained in contact, through its Lebanon Field Office, with the Committee, which used its good offices on several occasions to facilitate the Agency's work in Lebanon.

6. The situation in Lebanon deteriorated during the year, with frequent Israeli military action and internal violence and, during April, May and June, there were serious civil disturbances, involving both Lebanese and Palestinians, in which casualties were high. The Agency is especially affected by civil disturbances in Lebanon because its headquarters, as well as one Field Office, are situated there. The effects on the Agency's operations of those events are dealt with more fully in paragraphs 24 and 65 below.

Finance and management

7. The Agency's deficit for 1974 was eliminated by the end of June 1974 and the year closed with expenditure of \$ 88.1 million and income of \$ 89.2 million. As a result, working capital at the beginning of 1975 was slightly higher than at the beginning of the previous year, but the persisting financial difficulties were illustrated by an immediate shortage of cash in January 1975, resolved only by early payment of a substantial part of a major contribution. The revised budget on 1 January 1975 was \$130 million and the Agency faced an unprecedented deficit of \$46 million.

¹⁸ A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA's working definition, is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition or the children or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area of UNRWA's operations, and (c) in need.

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/9613 and Corr.1).*

Despite the strenuous efforts referred to below, there was still a deficit of \$30 million on 30 June 1975 against a budget which had been further revised to \$121.6 million by revaluation of contributions in kind. Since 30 June, the Agency has received a special contribution of \$10 million from the Government of Saudi Arabia and an additional special contribution of \$6 million from the Government of the United States of America. These contributions, lower flour prices and other savings have reduced the deficit to \$13.2 million and the level of income is still inadequate to maintain the programme in full until the end of the year.

8. Financial uncertainty and inadequate working capital aggravated the serious supply difficulties experienced by the Agency in the period under report. World shortages of flour and sugar raised prices and made procurement more difficult and congestion of Mediterranean ports caused further delays in delivery. The change in the United States contribution from one partly in kind (but with a financial limit) and partly in cash to one entirely in cash, which affected the Agency for the first time in the latter half of 1974, has meant that the Agency now purchases most of its requirement of flour (86,000 tons out of 117,000) and a quarter of its requirement of edible oil (1,000 tons out of 4,000), but the factors mentioned above preclude stockpiling on any considerable scale, and the need for strict economy necessitates a carefully balanced use of purchased and donated flour which unexpected delays in delivery upset. As regards sugar, the whole of the requirement was due from the European Economic Community under a Convention running from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1975, but the Commission was unable to procure supplies and, as a result, none of the sugar due for 1974-1975 had been delivered by 30 June 1975, and the Agency was only able to maintain even a reduced ration by borrowing from local Governments. On occasion, flour also had to be borrowed, and, generally, short issues of rations were more frequent and severe than in previous years. (For a more extended account of the Agency's logistical difficulties, see para. 195 of sect. F, chap. I, below.)

9. At \$ 139.7 million, the estimate of expenditure for 1976 shows a moderate increase, about 14.7 per cent over the latest revised figure of \$ 121.8 million for 1975, compared with the increase of nearly 40 per cent between the final figure of \$ 88.1

million for 1974 and the latest revised figure for 1975. The reason is that, while inflation continues throughout the area of operations, the United States dollar has shown some recovery and commodity prices are not expected to increase materially over those of 1975. The decision by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session provided reimbursement of the cost of international staff from the regular budget of the United Nations, but local staff costs have risen in the course of 1975 and will amount to \$ 69.6 million in 1976. They now account for as much as 52 per cent of the budget because of the nature of the Agency's programmes, especially the education programme in which 9,900 out of the total of 15,500 staff are employed. In accordance with the Commissioner-General's undertaking to the General Assembly, the savings, amounting to \$2.7 million in 1975, on the assumption by the United Nations budget of responsibility for the cost of international staff, were fully used in 1975 for improvement of the conditions of service of local staff.

10. The estimate of income for 1976, on the basis described in paragraph 11 below, that is, an extrapolation of 1975 regular income excluding special contributions, is \$847 million. The estimated deficit would therefore be \$ 55 million and, even if the deficit for 1975 had been entirely eliminated, the Agency would again be in acute financial difficulty early in 1976.

11. The Agency's budget represents the best estimate that it can make of the expenditure required to maintain the programmes—relief, health and education—which the Agency regards itself as obliged by its mandate to maintain, to the extent that funds permit, with only provision for minor improvements and for the minimum amount of school-building necessary to avoid triple-shifting of classes (though there are other constraints, such as sites and building capacity, on construction). The estimate of income at the beginning of each year is an extrapolation of the previous year's income, except in cases where a higher contribution has been pledged for the current year or where part of a previous year's contribution was expressly stated to be a special contribution for that year only. Estimated income on this basis is invariably much less than the budgeted expenditure and consequently from the beginning of each financial (calendar) year there hangs over the Agency and the refugees the threat that the shortfall of income

will not be made good in time and that sooner or later in the year there will be reductions in services. Time and energy that could be more productively spent on improving the administration of the programmes must be diverted to seeking new or increased contributions from Governments, warnings by the Agency of the threat to services are regarded as if they were proposals by the Agency to reduce the services as a matter of policy and short issues of rations for logistical reasons are interpreted as the beginning of reductions.

12. Because of the gravity of the financial situation, the UNRWA Advisory Commission met twice in the first six months of 1975 to consider measures to deal with it. On 21 March, the Commission adopted a resolution drawing the attention of the Secretary-General to the situation and appealing to him "to re-examine urgently the possibility of securing additional funds from all the Member States of the United Nations, including those who have so far not contributed". The Secretary-General was already aware of the gravity of the problem but he agreed to make a further appeal and later, at the pressing request of the Working Group, he spoke to the Chairmen of regional and other groups at United Nations Headquarters. On 12 June, the Advisory Commission adopted a resolution expressing support for the further appeal made by the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, to intensify their efforts "to obtain additional contributions and also contributions from those who have not so far contributed".

13. At both meetings of the Advisory Commission, the Commissioner-General sought the Commission's advice on the options open to him in regard to reductions in or suspension of services if sufficient funds were not available, but the Commission refrained from giving guidance in its resolutions. Indeed, five members of the Commission, including the four host Governments, questioned the Commissioner-General's authority to make reductions in programmes in any circumstances, contending that maintenance of the programmes was an obligation under the Agency's mandate from the General Assembly. In view of the real danger that funds would be insufficient to maintain programmes in full, as the Commissioner-General had pointed out to the Commission, and since he would be in breach of the Agency's Financial Regulations and would be held responsible if the

Agency defaulted on its legal obligations through lack of funds, the Commissioner-General sought the advice of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations on this contention. In confirmation of the opinion of the Agency's own General Counsel, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations pointed out that the General Assembly had at no time laid down a mandate for UNRWA which was precise either as to the nature or level of services to be rendered by the Agency, and he concluded that, from the legal point of view, the Commissioner-General had the authority to establish the level of UNRWA services within the resources available to him to pay for these services. The Legal Counsel's opinion has been communicated in full to members of the Advisory Commission (see annex IV below).

14. It will be appreciated from the foregoing that the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General are gradually coming to be regarded as ultimately responsible for ensuring that UNRWA has sufficient funds to maintain its services in full, though no text of the General Assembly expressly ascribes this responsibility to either of them. In 1975, the Secretary-General made a special personal effort in view of the gravity of the problem and of its wider implications, but the Commissioner-General cannot expect him regularly to devote so much time to fund-raising for one United Nations programme. In the same way the full responsibility for any reduction of services or, in the alternative, the inability of the Agency to meet its accrued liabilities if funds are insufficient, appears to have devolved upon the Commissioner-General. The Commissioner-General knows of no other United Nations organization in which decisions of this magnitude, let alone with such widespread implications, are not taken by a body representative of Member States, but instead are made the responsibility of the chief administrative officer of the organization.

15. The increasing difficulty in a period of inflation and currency instability of financing a programme of continuing services of the kind and on the scale provided by UNRWA has given importance to these anomalous features of the constitution of UNRWA. It may be that, given the unique conditions of UNRWA's operations, no other constitutional arrangements are immediately possible. Each year, however, a breakdown, both financial and administrative, is more narrowly

avoided and, while the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, which is the body established by the General Assembly to assist the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General in raising funds, has continued to issue appeals and to make approaches to regional groups and to individual Governments, there has been growing disillusionment about the effectiveness of these means of fund-raising.

16. If the General Assembly were to direct that the Agency's programmes should be maintained in full, as an obligation of the United Nations acting on behalf of the international community, the only certain means of ensuring that the necessary funds were provided would be the levying of an assessment on all Member States, either in accordance with the formula used for the regular budget of the United Nations or some special formula, as for the United Nations Observer Forces. If this method of financing were adopted, the Agency's annual financial crisis would disappear, and the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General would be relieved of a responsibility which at present devolves on them by default. So far, however, the General Assembly, and also the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, have taken the view that the principle of voluntary contributions should be preserved for these programmes, with the exception that the cost of the Agency's international staff, less than 3.4 per cent of the 1976 budget, is now financed by the United Nations as well as by UNESCO and WHO. If this view is still adhered to by the General Assembly and financing must remain on a voluntary basis, some means of avoiding the incompatibility between programmes and income, which at present persists for so much of the year, with such unfortunate consequences, is desirable. It seems to the Commissioner-General that, in the absence of financing by assessment, it can only take the form of effective consultation and agreement among contributors before the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, at which pledges for the following year are announced. If the Agency's activities consisted of projects, the number and scale of projects could be limited to the funds pledged and only increased if further funds were pledged. Since, however, the Agency's

activities consist of continuing programmes, such as education, which cannot be treated in this way, it would be necessary to report the financial situation to the General Assembly if pledges proved insufficient, but some more certain remedy than appeals for increased contributions would be required. The Commissioner-General appreciates that there is no easy solution to UNRWA's financial problem, but the experience of 1975 has confirmed the doubt he expressed in last year's report whether traditional methods and sources of financing can deal adequately with it.

17. By the end of the year under review, UNRWA's local staff had largely abandoned the coercive tactics about which serious concern was expressed in paragraph 19 of last year's report,²⁰ and staff relations had improved mainly because staff were favourably impressed by the manner and the outcome of a thorough and comprehensive joint review of staff requests begun in October 1974 by the Agency's Administration and local staff representatives. The improvements in staff conditions of service to which this review led are described in section D of chapter I below.

General operations

18. Refugees registered with the Agency as of 30 June 1975 totalled 1,632,707, an increase, by natural growth, of 3.1 per cent during the year under review. The distribution of the refugees within the Agency's area of operations (Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, West Bank and the Gaza Strip) is shown in table 4 of annex I. It will be noted that the largest concentrations of refugees are in the occupied territories (38.3 per cent) and in east Jordan (also 38.3 per cent) and that much smaller proportions are in Lebanon (12.1 per cent) and in the Syrian Arab Republic (11.3 per cent). Of the approximately 625,000 registered refugees in east Jordan, over 350,000 are members of families who originally sought refugee there in 1948, as many as 50,000 are believed to belong to families who moved from the West Bank to east Jordan between the hostilities of 1948 and 1967, and over 220,000 belong to families who fled from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during or immediately after the hostilities of 1967. The number of refugees allowed

²⁰ *Ibid.*

to return to their original place of refuge—which the Agency estimated at about 8,000 as at 30 June 1974²¹—is believed to have increased by a few hundred (see also A/10253).

19. The Agency provides three kinds of service to the refugees: education, including general education and vocational and teacher training; relief, mainly the basic ration; and a health service, with emphasis on preventive medicine. Of the three, education is the largest element in the Agency's 1976 budget (\$ 65.8 million), relief is substantial but considerably less (\$ 56.1 million), and health is relatively small (\$15.6 million). The host Governments supplement the services of UNRWA in various ways and to varying degrees, for example, by providing, in some cases, upper secondary and university education, access to hospitals and other medical facilities, sites and water supplies. In the Syrian Arab Republic and in Jordan, the host Governments bear the financial burden of caring for an estimated 300,000 persons displaced from territory occupied by Israel in 1967 who are not refugees registered with UNRWA.

20. Only about one half of the refugees (50.7 per cent) received the Agency monthly basic ration of flour, rice, sugar and cooking oil, which is distributed to refugees living in and out of camps and which does not constitute a balanced diet, as it is deficient in the vitamins derived from fresh food-stuffs and in animal protein. Non-receipt of rations by potentially eligible refugees was attributable mainly to exclusion because of ration ceilings, but also to absence, family income high enough to disqualify, award of university scholarships or graduation from UNRWA/UNESCO training centres. The largest single group of potentially eligible non-recipients—young children excluded because of ration ceilings—totalled 440,129.

21. The registered camp population represented somewhat more than one third or 35.8 per cent of total registered refugees, varying from 59.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip to 25.3 per cent in the West Bank.

22. The Agency is not responsible for the administration or policing of the camps in which about 36 per cent of the refugees live. UNRWA provides services to refugees who live in the camps, but it also provides services to refugees outside the camps. Some few UNRWA installations con-

nected with the provision of services exist only in camps (for example, camp service offices), but most exist both in and outside camps (schools, ration distribution centres, clinics) and some only outside (vocational and teacher training centres, central warehouses and the Agency's headquarters and Field Offices).

23. In general, the maintenance and repair of the camp shelters in which the refugees live is the responsibility of the refugees themselves. The main exceptions during 1974-1975 were Agency assistance in the form of building materials for families suffering hardship, Agency financing of repair or reconstruction of shelters damaged or destroyed during Israeli attacks or during civil disturbances in Lebanon, a special Agency project for exterior repair of prefabricated shelters originally constructed by the Agency in the six emergency camps in east Jordan, and Agency contributions to the replacement of public by private latrines. The Agency shared with the host Governments the cost of maintaining and improving camps infrastructure, such as roads, in some camps. The Agency's construction and maintenance activities are limited by lack of funds; the most significant continuing programme is additions to schools to avoid triple-shifting as the school population increases.

24. In Lebanon, five refugees were reported killed in Rashidieh camp in the south during Israeli attacks from the sea in August, October and December 1974. During an Israeli air raid on the Beirut area in December, four refugees were reportedly injured. During Israeli shelling of Nabatieh town in November and December, seven refugees were reported injured. (Most refugees who lived in Nabatieh camp had taken refuge in the town when the camp suffered extensive destruction and damage in an Israeli attack in June 1974 (see para. 24 of last year's report).²² There was only slight damage to shelters and to Agency installations during the attacks up to the end of June. In three separate periods, during April, May/June and June/July, of internal disturbance in Lebanon, mainly in and around Beirut, casualties were heavy, but the Field Office was only notified of 28 deaths of registered refugees and 45 injuries. There was some damage to refugee shelters and to Agency installations. The Lebanon Field Office building was hit by rockets

²¹ See *ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 38, document A/9740, para. 4.

²² Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* [ed. note].

and heavy machine-gun fire. Both the attacks and the internal disturbances disrupted the provision of services to the refugees, particularly the education programme because of frequent closing of schools and training centres. The internal disturbances forced the Agency to close both its headquarters and the Lebanon Field Office for several days during each period of violence.

25. In the Syrian Arab Republic, both the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (the office of the Syrian Government responsible for refugee affairs) and the Agency made every effort to respond to requests from refugees for improvements in the supply of water and electricity, sewerage systems, and roads, but lack of funds prevented response to all but the most urgent needs. The situation with respect to the return of refugees to the occupied area of the Syrian Arab Republic is essentially unchanged from last year.

26. In east Jordan, the Agency's general operations proceeded with no special difficulties. Rectification of ration rolls continued, with nearly 4,100 rations being transferred from refugees verified as dead or absent to young children not previously receiving them.

27. In the West Bank (as well as the Gaza Strip), inflation continued at a high rate, affecting both the refugees and Agency finances. The Israeli pound was devalued by 43 per cent in November 1974 and again by 2 per cent in June 1975 and the possibility of further monthly 2 per cent devaluations was indicated by the Government of Israel. Rectification of ration rolls continued and in the West Bank 2,582 and in the Gaza Strip 5,030 rations were transferred to children not previously receiving them.

28. In Gaza, housing was provided by the Israeli authorities for 53 families of the 266 identified as suffering serious hardship in the joint survey conducted in 1973. Plans for providing housing by Agency construction at the expense of the Israeli authorities for an additional 60 families in this category were well advanced by the end of the reporting period and were expected to be implemented when land was allocated. Also encompassed in this project is housing for 36 families inadequately housed in old barracks, the provision of which is unrelated to demolitions by the Israeli authorities. The practice of punitive demolition of shelters continued (see para. 175 below), and shelters were also demolished in Rafah camp for

the purpose described in paragraph 69. (For further details of demolitions of shelters in the Gaza Strip, see A/10253.)

29. In all fields, self-help projects of the kind described in last year's report²³ were continued and extended. These projects are now standard activity and are a heartening sign of the willingness and ability of refugees to improve their living environment.

30. If the statistics and factual information given above on the refugees are translated into human terms, it becomes clear that the vicissitudes of the past 25 years have affected individual refugees in many different ways and individuals have responded differently to the challenges presented by continuing instability in the Near East. Education, employment and levels of income vary widely from one refugee family to another, even within the camp population. The Agency is unable to do more to alleviate many of the unsatisfactory aspects of life for the refugees, especially those who live in the camps, because funds or land for the relief of congestion are lacking. But, in many cases, the refugees themselves have undertaken self-help projects to improve their environment. Minimum standards of sanitation are maintained and the general appearance and physical facilities in many camps have been improved by refugee self-help projects, but overcrowded housing, a diet barely at subsistence level, and genuine economic hardship is still the lot of very many refugees. Understandably, they connect their inability to live the desired kind of life to the failure to achieve a political settlement in the Near East and they are prone to assume that whatever increases their difficulties, even the Agency's unsatisfactory financial position or its logistical problems, is related to the more general problem of the Near East. They are sensitive to every turn of events. Given the number and distribution of refugees and the frustrations that have built up over the past quarter-century, if the Agency were forced by lack of funds to reduce the services that it provides, the consequences in terms of increased instability in the region would be severe.

²³ *Idem.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/9613 and Corr.1), paras. 25, 27 and 28. [Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* [ed. note].]

Health

31. The Agency continued to promote the health of the refugees living in and outside camps through integrated family health care with emphasis on preventive medicine and nutritional protection of particularly vulnerable groups. Services were improved as part of a three-year (1974-1976) health development plan designed to overcome deficiencies and gaps in the health programme. During the period under review, no case of a disease subject to international health regulations was reported and the incidence of other communicable diseases was kept at about the same low levels as last year. The total expenditure in 1974 on health services, including a share in common costs, increased by nearly 40 per cent over that in 1973.

32. Environmental sanitation in several camps improved and the self-help effort of refugees with the financial and technical assistance of UNRWA showed a further encouraging and commendable increase. Improvements were made in water supply, surface drainage, sewage disposal, and roads and pathways. The replacement of public by private latrines continued.

33. Under the supplementary feeding programme supported by the European Economic Community (EEC), approximately 450,000 units were issued in the form of reconstituted milk, hot mid-day meals, vitamins and extra dry rations for vulnerable categories of refugees.

34. Governments and non-governmental bodies rendered valuable assistance to the Agency's health programme by providing funds, staff, specialized technical advice and guidance, some free hospital services, medical supplies, layettes and food-stuffs, and by co-operating in mass vaccination campaigns. Some donors met the operational costs of individual units, such as health centres, mother-and-child clinics or rehydration/nutrition centres. Funds were also received for professional and vocational training at universities and other institutions in various courses related to public health. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of this valuable assistance and of the co-operation which the Agency has received from the Ministries of Health in the Agency's area of operations.

35. WHO continued its secondment of the Agency's Director of Health and four other public health experts for the technical direction of the health programme. The twenty-eighth World

Health Assembly examined the report of the Director-General of WHO entitled the "Health situation among refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East",²⁴ which also embodied an abbreviated version of the annual report of the Director of Health, UNRWA, for the year 1974, and adopted resolution WHA 28.35. With regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of part A of this resolution, as far as the health of those Palestine refugees availing themselves of Agency health services is concerned, the factual data set forth in section B of chapter I below indicate no deterioration.

Education

36. In the 1974/1975 school year, 275,306 refugee children—6,982 more than the year before—attended the 577 UNRWA/UNESCO schools. The number of teachers had reached 8,046. Although triple-shifting was avoided, double-shifting increased again in all Fields, since limited funds permitted only a modest school construction programme. The situation was worst in the Jordan and Syrian Fields, where more than 90 per cent and almost 86 per cent, respectively, of the elementary schools had to be double-shifted.

37. Satisfactory educational progress was nevertheless made in all Fields except Lebanon, where disruption of work caused by local and international events severely affected school operations and permitted only an estimated average coverage of 80 per cent of the year's curriculum. The schools in Beirut and south Lebanon suffered particularly. Because of the situation prevailing in May and June 1975, an extension of the school year was not considered advisable, but it is hoped to make up arrears of work at the beginning of the next school year.

38. After evaluation of the original two-year project of financial assistance by UNDP, under which the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, in co-operation with UNICEF, made its experience available to Governments in the region,²⁵ an extension of the project for a further two and a half years from 1 July 1974 was approved by UNDP.

²⁴ WHO, document A/28/WP/1 of 17 April 1975.

²⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/9013)*, paras. 35 and 39.

*Relations with other organs of the
United Nations system*

39. UNESCO and WHO continued their collaboration with UNRWA in the conduct of the education and health programmes, thereby assuring professional competence in these two fields. The UNESCO staff, including associate experts, made available to UNRWA from or through UNESCO, without reimbursement, number 28. The number of staff made available by WHO, without reimbursement, is five. Since 1 January 1975, the salaries of the international staff of UNRWA have been financed from the United Nations budget (General Assembly resolution 3331 B (XXIX) of 17 December 1974).

40. The agreement providing for co-operation between UNDP, UNESCO and UNRWA in the operation of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education was extended to cover the period 1 July 1974 to 31 December 1976. UNICEF continued its support of the extension services through which the experience of the Institute is made available to Ministries of Education in the region, the provision of those services being co-ordinated by the UNESCO Regional Office for education in the Arab States, the UNICEF Regional Office and UNRWA.

41. An amount of \$US 32,003 will shortly be transferred to UNRWA from UNHCR, bringing to \$ 60,126 the Agency's share, at 31 December 1974, of the proceeds from the sale of the UNHCR record "Top Star Festival", in the initial promotion of which UNRWA participated. UNICEF continued to extend certain procurement services free of charge and acted as a supplier to the Agency of its competitively-priced pharmaceuticals. The Agency assisted UNICEF with the transport of supplies in the area of operations.

42. In November 1974, the United Nations Emergency Force, in co-ordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, assisted in the transfer from Egypt, via the Sinai, of textbooks urgently needed in the Agency's schools in the Gaza Strip.

43. The Agency's accounts for 1974 were audited by the Auditor-General of Colombia on behalf of the United Nations Board of Auditors.

*Assistance from voluntary agencies and other
non-governmental organizations*

44. The Commissioner-General gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance provided by voluntary agencies, business and professional organizations and individuals, without which many projects would not have been carried out for lack of funds.

45. Projects financed by these contributions are noted in the appropriate sections of the present report and all contributions made direct to UNRWA are shown in table 17 of annex I below. The main contributors were: American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Canadian Save the Children Fund; the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee of the United States of America; Comité belge d'Aide aux Réfugiés of Belgium; the Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO) of New Zealand; Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI-AGIP) of Italy; Federations of Business and Professional Women's Clubs; the Gulbenkian Foundation; the Lutheran World Federation; Matsushita Electric Trading Company of Japan; the Norwegian Refugee Council; OXFAM of the United Kingdom; the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); Swedish Free Church Aid; Swiss Aid Caritas; the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA; the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations; the World Health Foundation of Iran; and Zonta International.

46. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the devoted services rendered direct to the refugees by voluntary agencies in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 19 of annex I).

Conclusion

47. In his last report, the Commissioner-General expressed his concern about the Agency's ability to continue to carry out its mandate in view of the stresses and strains to which it was subject and he described the following year as critical. He also suggested that it might be time for a review of the Agency's responsibilities and he asked for more positive guidance from the General Assembly and the firm assurance of much greater financial support. The General Assembly

made no arrangements for a review, considering, it would appear from the views expressed during examination of the report, that the time was not ripe. The Commissioner-General appreciates the difficulty of instituting a review at a time of continuing uncertainty about the future. He has again invited attention, however, in paragraph 13 above, to the anomalous position in which he is placed

by the absence of positive guidance and, in paragraphs 1 and 14 to 16, to the pressing need for some means of mitigating the financial hazards to which the present system of financing exposes the Agency's programmes and which aggravate the stresses and strains to which he referred last year and which the present report again illustrates.

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

4

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East²⁶

September 12, 1975

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 9 December 1974, the General Assembly, having considered the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, adopted resolution 3263 (XXIX), the operative part of which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

...

1. *Commends* the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Considers* that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. *Expresses the hope* that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the present resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the present resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session,

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled 'Establishment of a

nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East'.

2. By a note verbale dated 19 March 1975, the Secretary-General invited the following States to communicate to him by 30 May 1975 their views concerning the implementation of the resolution and, in particular, of its paragraphs 2 and 3: Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. By a note verbale dated 13 June 1975, the Secretary-General renewed this invitation to the parties concerned.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned resolution, the Secretary-General, on 28 July 1975, submitted his report to the Security Council (S/11778 and Add. 1 and 2). He submits herewith his report to the General Assembly. Both reports contain the replies received from the parties concerned to the notes verbales of the Secretary-General mentioned in the previous paragraph.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

EGYPT

27 May 1975

1. Egypt is prepared to proclaim solemnly its willingness to refrain from producing, testing, obtaining or acquiring nuclear weapons. This proclamation is conditioned on similar action being taken by all countries in the region, particularly those parties to regional conflicts and disputes.

2. The accession of the parties in the area of the Middle East to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons²⁷ is indispensable for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Egypt in 1968 is a positive stance on the side of Egypt. The refusal of Israel so far to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

²⁶ UN doc. A/10221 and Add. 1 and 2 excluding lists of contents. A report containing the same letters from Middle Eastern states had been submitted to the Security Council on July 28, 1975 (UN doc. S/11778 and Add. 1-4.) The letters contained in this report were all originally in English except for those of Lebanon (French), Syria (Arabic) and Egypt's second letter (Arabic).

²⁷ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex [original note].

Weapons has left Egypt with no choice but to stop short of ratifying the Treaty. Egypt is ready to ratify the Treaty the moment Israel accedes to it and becomes a party thereto.

3. Egypt requests the Secretary-General to consider taking certain measures against those countries in the region which might decline to reply to the Secretary-General's note or fail to implement General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX).

4. The full co-operation of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, is one of the decisive factors for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

5. A clear obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States neither to use nuclear weapons against countries in the region of the Middle East nor to introduce or permit the presence of nuclear weapons in the region is another prerequisite for the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. An effective international control system should be established for the supervision and implementation of the above-mentioned obligations.

IRAN

27 May 1975

1. The fact of Iran's strong and clear-cut commitment for the aims and objectives embodied in General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) is evident from its co-sponsorship of the resolution concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, an idea that had been repeatedly advanced by Iran.

2. By signing in 1968 and ratifying in 1970 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran has, from the start, undertaken to refrain from manufacturing, testing, obtaining or receiving nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed under article III of the Treaty, would place all our peaceful nuclear activities under international safeguards.

3. We believe that it is now incumbent upon all parties concerned in the area to proclaim solemnly and immediately—in accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution—to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons.

4. Iran considers that the accession of all the countries in the region to the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would help to realize the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

5. As stated during the debate related to our proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Iran's position remains flexible on the question of the ways and means required in achieving the eventual goals of prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, testing, stockpiling and transport of nuclear arms, under an effective system of control.

6. Moreover, it must be stressed that the full co-operation of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, as stated in paragraph 4 of the resolution, is necessary for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In this connexion, it bears emphasizing that a clear commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States neither to use nuclear weapons against countries in the region of the Middle East nor to allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region would be useful for the successful establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

IRAQ

21 July 1975

The Government of the Republic of Iraq advocates the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. As far as paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) is concerned, Iraq has signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and considers the accession to the Treaty by all parties concerned in the region as an essential step to the implementation of resolution 3263 (XXIX).

JORDAN

14 August 1975

1. The Jordanian Government agrees that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament. The Government is ready to undertake the necessary reciprocal obligations towards the achievement of this purpose.

2. The Jordanian Government is ready to pro-

claim solemnly, in accordance with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX), its intention to refrain from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons, if all the other parties concerned in the Middle East are ready to do the same.

3. The achievement of the above-mentioned goal requires all the parties concerned in the area, as stated in paragraph 3 of the resolution, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Jordan signed and ratified this Treaty. Israel has refused so far to sign and ratify the Treaty. The goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region will remain unattained as long as a principal party fails to accede to the Treaty and abide by its provisions.

4. The nuclear-weapon States must undertake a specific mutual obligation to refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the region of the Middle East, in accordance with the spirit and provisions of the above-mentioned resolution.

KUWAIT

12 May 1975

1. Kuwait voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX).

2. Kuwait signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 15 August 1968.

3. Kuwait was reluctant to ratify the Treaty because it noticed that Israel did not sign or accede to the Treaty. Kuwait is willing to ratify the treaty provided that Israel accedes to it.

4. Kuwait is willing to proclaim solemnly its intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons provided that all parties concerned, especially Israel, make a similar declaration.

LEBANON

30 May 1975

Lebanon, which is one of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, approves the content of paragraph 2 of resolution 3263 (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1974, provided that all States in the region of the Middle East likewise endorse it.

OMAN

12 May 1975

Oman fully supports General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) and this is manifested in the fact that Oman does not possess any nuclear weapons, nor does it intend to become a nuclear-weapon nation in the future. As for acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Oman is now studying the question favourably.

QATAR

6 May 1975

Israel's abstention regarding General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) during the twenty-ninth session warrants us to act as expected from us by paragraph 2 of that resolution. Because of Israel's position on that matter, the trend in the Arab countries is to postpone the adherence of those who have not yet joined until Israel joins.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

5 June 1975

1. The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes in principle the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and has expressed this position by supporting General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX). It believes, however, that the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would not in itself be an adequate measure for ensuring the security and peace of the peoples of the region, unless it is accompanied by the adherence of all parties concerned to, and support for, all other steps aiming at halting the spread of nuclear weapons, prohibiting all types of nuclear tests and ascertaining that nuclear energy and nuclear technical know-how are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes under effective international control and supervision.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic considers that, if a nuclear-weapon-free zone is to be effectively established in the Middle East, the provisions of paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) would have to be implemented, in which case the competent international bodies would request all parties concerned in the region to proclaim officially—in accordance with the provision of the paragraph—their undertaking to refrain from producing, testing, acquiring, obtaining or possessing nuclear weapons in any form. It also believes that adequate international control measures should be established to ensure the constant

respect by those parties concerned for their commitments under the above-mentioned declaration.

3. Naturally, no official declaration issued in this connexion by any of the parties concerned in the area would have any significance of seriousness and sincerity unless such a party first signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or acceded to it and respected its provisions and terms. The Syrian Arab Republic considers the measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) as forming an indivisible whole and an indispensable prerequisite for the realization of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

4. It must be pointed out, however, that the Syrian Arab Republic signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, took positive stands on all disarmament questions and supported all the important resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its last as well as at previous sessions. Israel, on the other hand, has taken an opposite stand by refusing to sign, ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, it continues to take negative attitudes on the disarmament questions and to refrain from supporting a number of relevant important General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 3263 (XXIX), a case that categorically proves lack of good faith on its part in as far as this most critical aspect of security is concerned.

BAHRAIN

22 September 1975

The Government of Bahrain supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) adopted on 9 December 1974. Such support arises primarily from its desire to protect the region from the devastation of a destructive war and protect its people from confrontation, which is not in the interest of humanity or of the people of the region. The stock-piling, production or development of nuclear weapons is, first and foremost, a threat to the peace and security of the people of the area and, second, a threat to world peace and a direct threat to human civilization and the aspiration of people for peace and for building their economy and civilization.

In response to the provisions of the General

Assembly resolution, the Government of Bahrain is undertaking to satisfy the constitutional procedures required to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by the General Assembly on 12 June 1968 (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex). Furthermore, the Bahrain Government is ready to proclaim solemnly, in accordance with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX), its intention to refrain from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons provided that all States situated in the region of the Middle East are ready to make the same proclamation.

ISRAEL

22 September 1975

The Government of Israel wishes to state its support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and considers that this would be a desirable further step towards a just and durable peace in the region, in the light of the new climate created by the recent agreement between Israel and Egypt.

At the same time, it wishes to observe that the notable precedents recalled in the resolution, such as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, were the result of negotiations and agreement between all the States of the regions concerned. In conformity with this precedent and in accordance with general international practice, it is the view of the Government of Israel that such negotiations, leading ultimately to the conclusion of a formal agreement between all the States of the region, are the only means by which a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be established.

The Government of Israel, for its part, confirms its readiness to participate in a conference of all the States of the region convened for this purpose, and regrets that the Arab States have so far shown no readiness to take part in such a conference. This casts doubt on the sincerity of their support for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

With reference to paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Government of Israel supports the principle of such a proclamation, to be made jointly and on a reciprocal basis by all the States of the region, but considers that the proclamation could only be meaningfully made after the successful outcome of negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

With reference to paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Government of Israel cannot disregard the fact that Governments of Arab countries bordering on Israel and beyond unstintingly evoke the threat of force and attempt actively and increasingly to ostracize Israel from the international community. It notes with regret that the Syrian Arab Republic made the following declaration upon ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

The acceptance of this treaty by the Syrian Arab Republic shall in no way signify recognition of Israel or entail entry into relations with Israel thereunder.

This declaration is incompatible with the aims and spirit of the Treaty, and constitutes a grave obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The Government of Israel, for its part, voted in favour of the Treaty, supports its principles and is at present studying its legal and other implications.

EGYPT

13 October 1975

On instruction from my Government, I wish to transmit to you the text of the statement issued today, 13 October 1975, by Mr. Ismael Fahmy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in connexion with Israel's reply with respect to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as contained in document A/10221/Add. 1 of 8 October 1975. The statement reads as follows:

1. As the reply shows, the Israeli position is neither new nor serious; quite the contrary, it clearly indicates Israel's true intentions and policy with regard to this subject.

2. The fact referred to in the reply, that Israel voted in the General Assembly in favour of the resolution on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, does not suffice to establish a conviction, at the Arab or world level, of Israel's good intentions, or to make for a situation where Israel is more seriously committed to refrain from producing or obtaining nuclear weapons. This position, which is announced by Israel in a bombastic manner, is meaningless unless followed by Israel's accession to the Treaty through signature, ratification and observance of all the provisions thereof. Israel also rejects any international inspection with regard to its nuclear reactor at Dimona, and is determined to acquire sophisticated weapons with nuclear potential. Moreover, Israel's indication that it is at present studying the legal and other implications of the non-proliferation Treaty

does not make the well-known Israeli position any more serious. More than seven years have elapsed since the establishment of the Treaty, thus Israel has had ample time to examine and re-examine the implications of the Treaty instead of evading accession to it, and of doing nothing except indicating that it is studying the Treaty and its legal and other implications.

3. The situation has not undergone any change whatsoever, and could not possibly be changed by a diplomatic manoeuvre such as that contained in Israel's reply, which reflects the same Israeli method of misinterpretation and falsification of facts; nor will it be changed by the oft-repeated statement published by Israeli mass media and other media that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. The situation will only be changed when:

- (a) Israel fully accedes to the non-proliferation Treaty;
- (b) Israel opens the Dimona reactor to international inspection;
- (c) Israel ceases its attempts to obtain sophisticated weapons with nuclear potential.

4. As regards Israel's demand that negotiations between the States of the region should be the only means by which a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be established, Israel thereby lays down conditions which it realizes are rejected *a priori*, with a view to evading accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is a host of methods which can be followed if the intentions are truly good, such as the accession of all the States of the region to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This method alone would ensure that the region will be free from nuclear weapons; that may be followed, for example, by a binding declaration to refrain from introducing or using nuclear weapons, to be issued by all the States of the region which are Members of the United Nations or members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 46.

(Signed) Ahmed Esmat ABDEL MEGUID

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the
Arab Republic of Egypt
to the United Nations

5

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3331 D (XXIX) regarding Israeli action concerning the Palestine refugees²⁸

September 16, 1975

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974. In paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General Assembly called upon Israel immediately to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and to desist from all measures that obstructed the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories. In paragraph 3, it reiterated its call upon Israel immediately to take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip, to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters. In paragraph 4, it deplored Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and called upon Israel immediately to desist from such attacks. In paragraph 5 of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General after consulting with the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report as soon as possible, and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the resolution.

2. By a note verbale dated 29 January 1975, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 5 of the resolution and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective provisions.

3. By a note verbale dated 8 September 1975, the Permanent Representative of Israel, on instructions from his Government, conveyed to the Secretary General the following comments:

The Government of Israel has been and is fully conscious of the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the displaced persons who, following the outbreak of a war in 1967 instigated by the Arab Governments, fled from the area of hostilities. The Government of Israel has continued to seek to reconcile its desire to assist with the return of displaced persons, with its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the population in the administered areas and in Israel, as well as the security of the State itself. It is common knowledge that certain Arab Governments continue to furnish aid and support to terrorist organizations grouped under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which are established in and operate from their territory against Israel.

Thus the prevailing situation does not permit a large-scale return of these displaced persons. Nevertheless and despite all these difficulties, the Government of Israel has, during this year, as in previous years, continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967. The special arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases have been maintained and co-operation in this respect with the local Arab authorities has continued. It should be pointed out, however, that the facilities established by Israel for the orderly movement of people across the cease-fire lines, are being exploited by certain Arab Governments for purposes of subversion in order to facilitate the entry of terrorists and the transport of explosives into Israel administered territory. Such actions obviously undermine any efforts to improve the situation. The total number of displaced persons who have returned to their homes since 1967 stands now at 55,000. Further details on this matter will be provided by the delegation of Israel in the course of the debate on the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

With regard to the security measures taken by the Israeli authorities in refugee camps in the Gaza area in 1971, it should be stressed again that these measures were designed to put an end to the campaign of indiscriminate murder and sabotage unleashed there by the terrorist organizations based in Arab States and actively sustained and supported by them. The victims of that campaign of terror were mainly members of the local Arab population and, therefore, by virtue of their responsibility, as stipulated also in Security Council resolution 237 (1967), to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants in the area under their control, the Israeli authorities took the necessary action to protect the lives of the local population. In view of the conditions obtaining in the refugee camps, it was necessary to construct certain access roads, which unavoidably involved the demolition of a number of shelters.

It is important to note that the measures taken have proved to be successful and that the violence and terror have been virtually eliminated. With the security situation in the Gaza area greatly improved, the local inhabitants, including the refugees, have been able to

²⁸ UN doc. A/10253.

engage in work and other normal activities without fear of terrorist attacks on their lives.

Every possible care has been taken to avoid causing undue hardship to the inhabitants concerned. Alternative accommodation was provided and accepted by most of these inhabitants, but some refugees preferred arrangements of their own choice. It subsequently transpired that some of these arrangements made at the time by a number of refugees had not proved satisfactory to them. Consequently, a joint survey of these cases was conducted in 1973 by the Israeli authorities and representatives of UNRWA and accordingly, during this year, more families were provided with suitable housing. Plans for the housing, at the expense of the Israeli authorities, of the remaining inhabitants affected by the opening of the access roads are at an advanced stage and should be completed soon. These plans include accommodation for families whose housing was found to be inadequate without reference to the demolitions resulting from the above-mentioned measures taken by the Israeli authorities.

With respect to the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4 of resolution 3331 D (XXIX) alleging that the action was taken against 'refugee camps', the policy of the Government of Israel on this issue is quite clear. The defensive actions taken by the Israel Defence Forces are not aimed at the peaceful inhabitants and the civilian installations of the camps and the Israel Defence Forces take all the possible precautionary measures to prevent any injury or damage to them. These defensive actions are directed, as has been clarified, against the PLO terror organizations which maintain training bases in the camps and use UNRWA installations for the purpose of terrorist training and operational planning against Israel under the cover of the civilian population. These facts are not new. They have been revealed, on many occasions, by both the Arab and the international news media. For example, the Lebanese correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*, Mr. A. J. McIlroy, reported in the issue of 7 August 1975 that:

... the Palestinian refugee camps... provide civilian cover for the guerrillas and their large stock of mainly Russian-made arms.'

Furthermore, in the last report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session,²⁹ the Commissioner-General reported in paragraph 25 on the continued occupation of UNRWA and Lebanese Government buildings by the PLO, the umbrella organization of all the terrorist groups. The paragraph further stated that Lebanese Government officials and the police had not then returned to the refugee camps from which they were withdrawn

in 1969. This amounts to a virtual abdication by the Government of Lebanon of its sovereignty over these camps and of its duty to maintain law and order in them.

The Government of Israel's position in respect to the annual debates in the General Assembly on the reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA which have been, for many years, exploited by Arab and other delegations for political and propaganda purposes, is a matter of public record. Israel considers that these acrimonious debates, conducted in a manner totally contrary to the spirit of the Charter, not only distort the true state of affairs prevailing in the area and thus complicate the issues, but also hinder efforts to deal with the situation in a manner best calculated to promote the real interests and well-being of the refugees and displaced persons concerned. Small wonder, therefore, that resolution 3331 D (XXIX) was adopted against such a background, failing not only to take into account the actual conditions prevailing in the area but making, as it does, a variety of false allegations against the Government of Israel. Hence the vote of Israel, as well as that of other delegations, against this resolution.

4. With regard to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 3331 D (XXIX), the Secretary-General has obtained from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA such information as is available to him on the return of refugees registered with the Agency. As indicated in paragraph 5 of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 September 1973 (A/9156) and paragraph 4 of his report of 17 September 1974,³⁰ the Agency is not involved in any arrangements for the return of refugees and its information is mainly based on Agency records regarding requests by returning refugees for retransfer of rations to the areas to which they have returned. The Agency would not be aware of the return of any refugees who did not ask for the provision of rations or services but believes they would be very few in number. So far as is known to the Agency, 361 displaced refugees returned from East Jordan to the West Bank³¹ and 45 from East Jordan to the Gaza Strip between 1 July 1974 and 30 June 1975. In addition, 65 displaced refugees returned to the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Thus the figure of 8,000, given in last year's report as the estimate of the number of displaced refugees who returned to the occupied ter-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 38, document A/9740.

³¹ Some of these may not be displaced refugees, but members of the family of a displaced refugee who have now accompanied him on his return, or joined him there, but who were not themselves displaced in 1967.

²⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/9613 and Corr.1). [This and the following notes are part of the original document. For paragraph 25 of this report see doc.3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.]

ritories since June 1967³² has increased by a few hundred.

5. The following report on developments relating to paragraph 3 of the resolution is based on information received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

6. Since the issuance of the Secretary-General's report last year pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII),³³ there have been 13 cases of punitive demolition of refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip. With reference to these cases, the Agency has reiterated its protests to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the practice of punitive demolition of refugee shelters and has called for its cessation. The Agency's claims for compensation remain unpaid.

7. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the report referred to the declared intention of the Israel authorities to rehouse, as a first step, 156 hardship cases from the Rafah camp in the Gaza Strip and, as a second step, to construct new housing in the Bureij area which would accommodate a further 100 hardship cases from the Beach and Jabalia camps.³⁴ So far, 53 of the hardship cases from the Rafah camp have been given free accommodation by the Israel authorities in a nearby housing project (10 of these families had paid for their accommodation but have now an assurance of reimbursement by the Israel authorities).

8. As regards the second step, the Agency has been informed recently that the Israel authorities have reconsidered their plans and now contemplate providing land and a cash grant of £1 20,000 per family to the remaining 210 hardship cases for the construction by them of their own housing, assistance in construction being given, however, to those unable to undertake it themselves because of infirmity or other disability. The Agency has continued to press the Israel authorities on the

need to provide better accommodation for others who are still inadequately housed but who do not fall within the category of greatest hardship.

9. The Israel authorities have set in motion arrangements for the construction, in the Rafah camp, of a market, a bus station, a water reservoir and an industrial area. This has entailed the demolition of a number of refugee shelters. According to the Agency's information, 228 refugee families have been affected and the demolitions (effected by the refugee inhabitants themselves in order to salvage materials) comprise 232 Agency-built shelter rooms, 27 Agency-assisted shelter rooms and 266 privately-built shelter rooms. It is understood that the refugee families were paid compensation for private additions or improvements to Agency shelters. No compensation was paid for the Agency-built shelters. The refugee families were also offered the option of purchasing (on an instalment basis, if need be) new accommodation in a near-by housing project established by the Israel authorities and all 228 have availed themselves of this offer. In addition, 12 refugee families (eight from Rafah camp and four from the Beach camp) whose shelters were not scheduled for demolition but who applied for new accommodation in the Rafah or the Sheikh Radwan housing projects (established by the Israel authorities) were required by the Israel authorities to demolish their existing shelters before being given new accommodation. Compensation was paid only for private additions or improvements to the Agency-built shelters.

10. The Agency has continued to express its concern, and has protested to the Israel authorities at the reduction in this way of available shelter accommodation in the Gaza Strip, especially at a time when a large number of refugee families, affected by the large scale demolitions in 1971, are in need of such accommodation.

11. With regard to paragraph 4 of resolution 3331 D (XXIX), it should be explained that "refugee camps" in Lebanon, recognized as such by the United Nations, are the 15 camps so designated by UNRWA.³⁵ Only about one half of the Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Lebanon

³² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/9613 and Corr.1), para. 9.

³³ Doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* [ed. note].

³⁴ These hardship cases are from among the refugee families who lost their shelters in the large-scale demolitions, by the Israel authorities, in the Beach, Jabalia and Rafah camps (in the Gaza Strip) in 1971 (see A/8383 and Add.1 and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 40, document A/8814. A joint survey by the Agency and the Israel authorities in 1973 showed that of the 942 families surveyed, 708 families were still inadequately housed, of whom 266 were considered to be serious cases of hardship (A/9155, para. 7).

³⁵ The extent of United Nations responsibilities in regard to these camps was set out in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8413), paras. 55-57 (which should be read with *ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/9613 and Corr.1), foot-note 8).

reside in these camps, the other half being dispersed in towns and other localities, in some of which they form a large proportion of the population with the result that those localities are sometimes also referred to as "camps". It is only on the effects in the designated camps of attacks by Israel in Lebanese territory that the Secretary-General can report with any degree of accuracy. Information on the effects of Israel military action on Palestine refugees residing outside of the designated camps is necessarily less complete and accurate.

12. According to information supplied by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the following attacks affecting camps or localities in which refugees form a large proportion of the population have taken place since the adoption of resolution 3331 D (XXIX) on 17 December 1974:

- (a) In regard to designated camps:
 - (i) On 7 July, 1975, as a result of shelling by Israel naval vessels, one refugee was killed and two injured in the Rashidieh camp in south Lebanon. Nineteen Agency-built and 56 refugee-built shelters were destroyed or damaged;
 - (ii) On 13 July 1975, as a result of an Israel aerial attack, three refugees belonging to the Ein el Hilweh camp, in south Lebanon, were killed and 16 were injured. Two hundred and twenty-seven refugee-built shelters in the camp (comprising 461 rooms) were completely destroyed and 331 other refugee-built shelters (comprising 496 rooms) were damaged. Eight Agency schools, a feeding centre and a welfare centre were damaged;
- (b) In regard to other localities, the following information has been reported to the Commissioner-General:
 - (i) On 7 July 1975, an Israel aerial attack took place in the vicinity of Burj el Hewa village in south Lebanon in which four refugees were killed and three injured;
 - (ii) On 4 August 1975, an Israel aerial attack in south Lebanon resulted in the death of five refugees in the Bourgholieh locality. Twenty-five refugees were injured. It was reported

that 20 private dwellings occupied by refugees were destroyed and 25 others damaged;

- (iii) On 3 September 1975, as a result of an Israel aerial attack, two refugees died and four were injured in the Bourgholieh locality. Seventeen private dwellings were reported destroyed. Damage was also caused to an Agency school and an Agency milk centre in the vicinity.

6

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) concerning the question of Palestine³⁶

September 23, 1975

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 7 and 8 of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 concerning the question of Palestine. In paragraph 7 of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on all matters concerning the question of Palestine. In paragraph 8, the General Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In accordance with the request addressed to him by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General established contacts with the PLO and the Secretariat has been in touch with representatives of the PLO as occasion has required.

3. In this connexion it may be recalled that, following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) entitled "Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization", the PLO appointed permanent observers to the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva. The establishment of offices of permanent observers in New York and Geneva has facilitated contacts between the United Nations and the PLO.

4. It is also relevant to refer to the contacts established between the PLO and the Commis-

³⁶ UN doc. A/10265.

sioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), whose activities are of direct interest to large numbers of Palestinians. In the light of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), the Commissioner-General called on the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO in Beirut and informed him more fully of the Agency's financial difficulties and their implications for services to the refugees.

5. In connexion with the discharge of its responsibilities for the provision of services to registered refugees in Lebanon, the Agency also maintained contacts on a working level, through its Lebanon field office, with the Committee of the PLO responsible for Palestinian affairs in Lebanon, with which the Agency had earlier established contact at the request of the Government of Lebanon.

7

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine³⁷

September 30, 1975

Note by the Secretary-General

The twenty-ninth report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering the period from 30 September 1974 to 29 September 1975, the text of which is attached to the present note, was transmitted by the Chairman of the Commission by letter of 30 September 1975 for communication to the States Members of the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952, and paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3331 A (XXIX) of 17 December 1974.

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

1. In paragraph 3 of resolution 3331 A (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert con-

tinued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1975. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth³⁸ and twenty-fifth³⁹ reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. The events which had occurred in 1967 and thereafter complicated an already very complex problem. However, recent developments in the Middle East encourage the Commission to believe that prospects may have improved.

3. In the course of 1972, in response to formal requests for interested parties, and after consultation with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the Commission decided that these interested parties could have access to certain documents⁴⁰ of the Commission with the understanding that the recipient Governments will continue to treat valuation figures contained therein on a confidential basis. Copies of such documents would be furnished on the understanding that any expenses shall be borne by the delegation concerned.

4. In accordance with the Commission's decision to make available to the interested parties upon request copies of certain documents and materials in its possession, and in pursuance of such a request by Egypt, the duplication work was undertaken

³⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451. [This and following notes are part of the document.]

³⁹ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/6846.

⁴⁰ (a) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;
(b) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);
(c) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner).

and completed in June 1974, at which time copies of the relevant set of documents were transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Egypt. On 31 May 1974, the Commission received a request from Jordan for copies of the same set of documents and the Commission agreed that the Permanent Mission of Jordan be supplied also with the same set of documents as Egypt. These were subsequently supplied to Jordan. The Commission also agreed to supply the Permanent Mission of Egypt a second set of microfilm copies of these documents at that mission's expense. Egypt

received this second set of copies in March and May 1975.

5. The Commission is encouraged by the efforts already made during the several months towards a Middle East settlement which could lead to a just and lasting peace in the area. However, the circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission have remained up to now essentially unchanged. The Commission hopes that recent developments will lead to further intensive efforts that will enable it to carry forward its work vigorously.

8

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories⁴¹

October 27, 1975

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⁴¹ UN doc. A/10272 excluding note by the Secretary-General and letter of transmittal.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish the Special Committee, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, to co-operate with it and to facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Mr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and Member of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 26 April 1974, the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session informed the Secretary-General that Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee and that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), he had appointed Senegal a member of the Special Committee. On 30 April 1974, the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that his Government had appointed Mr. Keba M'Baye, Chief Justice of Senegal (*Premier Président de la Cour suprême du Sénégal*), as its representative on the Special Committee (see para. 12 below).

3. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report⁴² in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December

1969. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings, from 7 to 11 December 1970. On 15 December 1970, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV).

4. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee submitted its second report⁴³ (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee submitted a third report (A/8389/Add. 1 and Add. 1/Corr. 1 and 2)⁴⁴ containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report. Those reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings, from 13 to 16 December 1971. On 20 December 1971, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).

5. On 25 September 1972, the Special Committee submitted its fourth report (A/8828)⁴⁵ in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and 2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings, from 30 November to 7 December 1972. On 15 December 1972, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).

6. On 15 October 1973, the Special Committee submitted its fifth report (A/9148)⁴⁶ in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII). On 20 November 1973, the Special Committee submitted a supplement to its fifth report (A/9148/Add. 1). The report and its supplement were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 890th and 892nd to 897th meetings, from 19 to 26 November 1973. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9237) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII). On 7 December 1973, the Assembly

⁴³ Doc. 409 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁴⁴ Doc. 412 in *ibid*.

⁴⁵ Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁴⁶ Doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁴² Doc. 317 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII).

7. On 25 October 1974, the Special Committee submitted its sixth report (A/9817)⁴⁷ in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII) and 3092 B (XXVIII). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 927th to 932nd meetings, from 6 to 12 November 1974. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9843) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII). On 29 November 1974, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3240 A, B and C (XXIX).

8. The present report has been prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII) and 3240 A and C (XXIX).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

9. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure contained in its first report to the Secretary-General.

10. The Special Committee held meetings from 10 to 14 March 1975 at Geneva. At these meetings it reviewed its mandate consequent on the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 3240 A and C (XXIX). It decided on the organization of its work for the year. The Special Committee decided to continue its system of monitoring information on the occupied territories and to hold periodical meetings to analyse the information to keep track of the occupying Power's policies and practices in the occupied territories. At these meetings, the Special Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories which had become available since 25 October 1974, the date of the adoption of its sixth report (A/9817). In response to a request by persons who had just been expelled from the occupied territories, the Special Committee decided to hold hearings in Geneva during its March meetings. In accordance with resolution 3240 C (XXIX) the Special Committee initiated action to recruit an expert or experts and for that purpose, during these meetings, held con-

sultations with qualified institutions and persons to determine the expertise required of the person who would carry out the evaluation requested by the General Assembly.

11. The Special Committee held a second series of meetings at Geneva from 12 to 20 May 1975. At these meetings, the Special Committee reviewed information that had become available since its March meetings and examined further evidence on allegations made by persons who had appeared before it during the previous series of meetings. The Special Committee also heard testimony in closed session during the May meetings.

12. The Special Committee held a third series of meetings from 29 September to 9 October 1975 in New York to examine information on the occupied territories, including allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied territories made by the Government of Egypt. At these meetings the Special Committee considered and adopted its report to the Secretary-General. Mr. Médoune Fall, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, was designated by the Government of Senegal to represent it instead of Mr. Keba M'Baye for this series of meetings. Mr. Chérif Bachir Djigo, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations, attended meetings of the Committee whenever Mr. Fall was unable to be present.

13. During the course of the year, the Special Committee received a number of communications addressed to it directly or referred to it by the Secretary-General, from Governments, organizations and individuals, containing allegations that Israel was taking certain measures in the occupied territories in violation of the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories.

III. MANDATE

14. The Special Committee's interpretation of its mandate was contained in its first report to the Secretary-General, in which the Special Committee determined the scope of its investigation.

15. In its subsequent reports the Special Committee reiterated its interpretation in the light of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and, in each instance, continued to exercise its functions according to that interpretation.

16. In its last report (A/9817) the Special Com-

⁴⁷ Doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

mittee reviewed its mandate in the light of the disengagement of forces agreements concluded during 1974 between Egypt and Israel and between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel.

17. At its twenty-ninth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 3240 C (XXIX), in paragraph 3 of which it requested "the Special Committee, with the assistance of experts, designated if necessary in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction".

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

18. The Special Committee continued its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories consequent on the adoption of resolutions 3240 A and C (XXIX) by the General Assembly.

19. The Special Committee, though still denied access by the Government of Israel to the occupied territories to conduct its investigation on the spot, continued to follow, on a day-to-day basis, developments in the occupied territories and reports of statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. The Special Committee continued its coverage of a representative section of the Arab press. The Special Committee had before it allegations made to it by Governments and evidence furnished by these Governments to substantiate these allegations. The Special Committee heard the testimony of six persons in open meeting (A/AC. 145/RT. 64-69) and one person in closed meeting. In addition, the Special Committee took note of the following material relevant to its mandate:

(a) Information contained in United Nations documents, some of which contain the text of letters from the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) Information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross and contained in its publications;

(c) Studies and reports prepared by organizations and individuals engaged in research on Middle East questions, including a report received from the Women's International Democratic Federation. The Special Committee also had before it evidence in the form of films.

20. The Special Committee did not allow the Government of Israel's refusal of co-operation to interfere materially with its investigation. The Special Committee, however, reiterates its belief that there remain certain allegations, the investigation of which could be more thoroughly conducted on the spot. The investigation of such allegations continues to be hampered by the persistent denial of the Government of Israel to the Special Committee of access to the occupied territories.

21. In resolution 3240 A (XXIX) the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. In its investigation of the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories for the purpose of establishing whether or not those policies and practices were in violation of the human rights of the population of those territories, the Special Committee has examined those sources which it deemed unimpeachable, namely, statements made by the members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders, and Israeli reports of plans and measures in the occupied territories, where such statements and reports have not been challenged, contradicted or refuted.

22. The action undertaken by the Special Committee in the implementation of resolution 3240 C (XXIX) is described in section V below.

23. By a letter dated 19 December 1974, addressed to the Secretary-General by the Chairman of the Arab Group at the United Nations and which was referred to the Special Committee, the Special Committee was formally seized of the question of the arrest, trial and imprisonment of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci. The Special Committee examined the allegations made in the letter of 19 December 1974 and subsequent statements made in support of these allegations to the effect that Archbishop Capucci had been wrongly arrested, tried and imprisoned. The Special Committee had before it letters addressed by the Government of Israel to the Secretary-General replying to these allegations and stating the position of that Government with regard to them.

24. The Special Committee considered the contents of these letters and determined that its inquiry should properly be limited to the question of the status of Archbishop Capucci before the Court and to the competence of the District Court of Jerusalem.

For that purpose the Special Committee examined the pleas of the prosecution and the defence on these points, as well as the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention,⁴⁸ contained in articles 27, 47, 64 and 66.

25. On 15 April 1975, the Government of Egypt addressed a letter to the Secretary-General alleging mass forcible transfer of civilians in Sinai by the Israeli military authorities. The Special Committee took note of further representations made by the Government of Egypt and the replies of the Government of Israel to these allegations contained in United Nations documents.

26. Since the adoption of its last report, the Special Committee has received considerable evidence on the situation in the occupied territories. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Chairman of the Special Committee expressed the Special Committee's view in the Special Political Committee that it saw no further purpose in furnishing the Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes in the situation took place. He stated that the Special Committee had furnished the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, with all the necessary information and it was incumbent on the Assembly to take appropriate action to remedy the situation of the civilians of the occupied territories. In this report, as in its last report, the Special Committee restricted itself to those areas of civilian life in the occupied territories where marked changes were detected, the situation in general remaining as reflected in the previous reports of the Special Committee. In particular, the Special Committee wishes to reiterate that, despite the implementation of the agreements on disengagement of forces reached in 1974, the situation so far as the civilians under Israeli military occupation are concerned was not materially altered as the overwhelming majority of the civilian population brought under Israeli occupation in 1967 continues to remain under such occupation. The same observation applies to those civilians who are prevented from returning to their homes after having fled the hostilities or who had been expelled during and after the hostilities in 1967. In this sense, therefore, no change has occurred in the

situation which forms the subject of the Special Committee's investigation.

27. In general, the evidence received by the Special Committee reflects no significant change from recent years in the day-to-day situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories, whether living under Israeli military occupation or in other areas outside the occupied territories and awaiting return to the homes. Aspects of the occupation that remain unchanged refer, for example, to:

(a) Measures of economic exploitation, in particular the use of the labour force of the occupied territories as a source of cheap labour within Israel;

(b) Prison conditions, particularly in so far as they worsened as a result of the marked increase in the number of persons imprisoned during 1975;

(c) The conditions in which the youth of the occupied territories are receiving their education as well as their character formation;

(d) The continued implementation of the policy of annexation of the occupied part of Jerusalem, in particular through the realization of the Master Plan which formed the subject of comment by the Special Committee in earlier reports, as well as excavation and similar measures in violation of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954.⁴⁹

28. On the other hand, since the date of the adoption of the last report by the Special Committee, certain trends and developments in the occupied territories have manifested themselves sufficiently to warrant mention and emphasis by the Special Committee in this report. These trends may be classified in the following areas affecting civilian life which are protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention:

(a) The continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories;

(b) The abnormal situation of the civilian population living under military occupation, as reflected by the continuing occurrence of incidents manifesting resistance to the occupation, mass arrests, administrative detention and military court trials;

(c) A policy of reprisal in the form of such measures as demolition of houses, expulsion of persons prominent in the Arab community, prohibition

⁴⁸ Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287). [This and following notes are part of the original document.]

⁴⁹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

of the sale of produce during the high market season, and the closing down of shops and commercial areas.

29. In subsections A, B and C below, the Special Committee has endeavoured to give a representative selection of the evidence that it has received as illustrative of the existence and extent of the trends referred to in the preceding paragraph. A fourth section analyses evidence on allegations that do not fall strictly within these three sections.

A. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

30. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegations of the continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories by Israel.

1. *Continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement*

31. On 1 January 1975, Mr. W. Rafael, Minister for Religious Affairs, stated on Radio Israel that 30 new settlements were to be established in the occupied territories during 1975.

32. On 7 February, *Ha'aretz* reported a statement by Mr. A. Ofer, Minister of Housing, in which he referred to "an over-all plan for new settlement, consisting of dozens of new settlements". In the same report 62 settlements are reported to have been established in the occupied territories so far.

33. On 10 February, *Ha'aretz* reported that £I 800 million had been invested in the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories since 1967. According to this report, 44 settlements had been established and 8 were under construction; these settlements are located in the Gaza Strip (11), including Sinai, the Golan Heights (19), and in the Jordan Valley (16).

34. On 17 February, *Ha'aretz* reported plans by the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department to establish about 80 new settlements in Israel and in the occupied territories during the next three years, giving details of the proposed location of these settlements.

35. On 18 February, the *Jerusalem Post* reported an announcement by the Income Tax Commission of Israel that Israelis living in the occupied territories were to be granted "sizable exemptions from income tax".

36. On 5 March, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement

by Mr. Ofer, Minister of Housing, according to which the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs had confirmed the establishment of 11 new settlements in 1975 in addition to the 9 settlements previously decided upon.

37. On 14 April, *Ha'aretz* reported that 48 settlements had been established in the occupied territories since 1967 and that 6 more would be established in 1975.

38. On 21 April, according to a Radio Israel broadcast, the Jewish National Fund was completing preparation for nine new settlements to be established in Rafah, the Golan Heights and the West Bank.

39. On 26 May, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement by Mr. Ofer, Minister of Housing, according to which 15 new settlements were under construction, including 10 in the occupied territories.

2. *Implementation of the policy of annexation and settlement in the occupied territories*

(a) *Gaza Strip*

40. On 24 November 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the establishment of a new settlement in the Gaza Strip called "Ugda".

41. On 27 December 1974, the *Jerusalem Post*, referring to a visit to the Rafah area by the Minister of Housing, Mr. Ofer, stated that "the swiftly rising homes and commercial buildings convince you that the Government meant business when it decided recently that three regions must receive top settlement priority: the Golan, the Jordan Rift-Arava, the Rafah Approaches". The same report quotes the Housing Minister as stating that Israel's real need was for settlers and not places to settle. *Ma'ariv* reports the visit by Mr. Ofer and quotes the Minister as stating that by the end of 1975 a shopping centre, a synagogue and an industrial zone would be ready and education services would be available; there would be 10 settlements in the area and one regional centre providing housing for 1,000 by that time. The report quotes the architect of the regional centre, Mr. Y. Drexler, as stating that the projected Israeli town of "Yamit" was planned on an estimated future population of 250,000 inhabitants.

42. On 10 January 1975, Radio Israel and *Ma'ariv* reported the establishment of a new settlement in the Rafah area.

43. On 14 January, *Ma'ariv* reported that five Nahal settlements in the Rafah area were designated to become permanent.

44. On 12 February, *Ha'aretz* reported complaints by the Bedouin tribes in the Rafah area of expropriation of land and destruction of crops.

45. On 28 February, *Ma'ariv* reported a decision by the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Administration to establish six new settlements in the Rafah area involving an expenditure of £1 60 million; by 1980 the new settlements would join the existing three settlements and would house approximately 1,000 families. On 8 April, Radio Israel reported a meeting between Mr. S. Peres, Minister of Defence, and sheikhs representing approximately 1,500 Bedouin families that had been "evacuated" from this area during the last few years. According to the report, the meeting was part of "current plans to provide assistance to all the Bedouin families evacuated from the Rafah Approaches over the last few years".

46. On 9 April, *Ma'ariv* quoted Defence Minister Peres as stating that 1,530 families had been evacuated from the Rafah area since 1972, and that 666 of them had been resettled elsewhere.

47. On 28 April, *Ha'aretz* reported Mr. S. Avni, of the Housing Ministry, Rural Housing Administration, as stating that "Yamit" would be populated with emigrants from the United States and the Soviet Union. A commission had fixed criteria for this purpose. Three hundred and fifty flats so far available were to be distributed as follows: 80 for immigrants from the United States and Soviet Union, 150 for the general public, 100 for the Israeli army, and the remainder to house policemen, teachers, etc.

48. On 15 May, *Le Monde* carried a report by its special correspondent describing the expropriation and evacuation of the inhabitants of the Rafah area and the consequent establishment of Israeli settlements on their land.

49. On 20 May, *Ma'ariv* reported that land was being "prepared" for 1,000 apartments in addition to the 350 scheduled to be completed by the end of 1975. On 26 May, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that no approval for the completion of these 1,000 apartments had been given but that this was expected before the end of 1975.

50. On 26 May, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Y. Rabin, that there had been no Cabinet decision to build these 1,000 housing units at "Yamit"; rather, the construction of 390 units had been decided upon and the infrastructure for an additional 600 had

been approved.

51. On the same date, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement by the Minister of Tourism, Mr. Moshe Kol, that there had not yet been a government decision to build the town of "Yamit" but only a regional centre—consisting at first of 350 houses—to supply services to the settlements in the area.

52. On 29 May, Radio Israel reported a statement by the Minister of Housing confirming that the Government had given permission for land to be "prepared" for the construction of 1,000 units; approval for the actual construction had not yet been given.

53. On 1 June, Radio Israel announced that apartments in the "Yamit" area were available for sale.

54. On 8 June, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Minister of Transport, Mr. G. Yacobi, as follows: "Even in the most minimal plans ever envisaged by Israel, the possibility of cutting the Rafah Salient from Israel has never been thought of. The best evidence is the policy of this Government which, like its predecessor, continues to develop the urban centre of the Rafah Salient, 'Yamit'". The reports also refer to plans of the Government of Israel for the construction of a new port "a few miles north of Yamit".

55. On 29 July, *Ha'aretz* carried an article by a member of a kibbutz in the Gaza Strip, Mr. O. Lifschitz, protesting against the treatment of the Arab civilian inhabitants who had been evacuated from the Rafah area and the lack of effort to rehabilitate them.

56. On 18 August, *Ma'ariv* reported a decision by the Ministerial Committee for the settlement of the occupied territories (headed by Mr. I. Galili, Minister without Portfolio), "to reduce water and land allocations of existing settlements in the Rafah Salient in order to enable the establishment of a greater number of settlements and to prevent cultivation of soil by 'hired labourers'".

57. On 27 August, the *Jerusalem Post* reported protests by the Arab civilians who had been served with a third eviction order to evacuate their village, Abu Shanar, situated "within a forest of palm trees overlooking the Mediterranean".

58. On 4 September, *Ha'aretz* reported that arrangements to relocate civilians had been "received with ill-humour among Bedouins".

(b) *Golan Heights*

59. On 10 November 1974, the *Jerusalem Post*, reporting on a seminar organized by the Ministry of the Interior and the Association of Engineers and Architects, referred to a master plan for the Golan Heights reported to be in the final stages of completion.

60. On 24 November 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that tractors of the Ministry of Housing had been "preparing" land on the Golan Heights for several days.

61. Reports in *Ma'ariv*, *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 12, 23 and 28 January 1975 give details on the preliminary work for the construction of an urban centre for the Golan Heights and on plans for three new settlements to be built during 1975.

62. On 11 February, *Ma'ariv* reported a complaint by the inhabitants of a village in the northern Golan Heights against a decree under which some other property which they claimed they had cultivated for over 40 years was declared "a natural reserve".

63. On 18 February, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, during a visit to the Golan Heights, to the effect that "Israel did not build settlements in the Golan Heights in order to evacuate them or to create a situation in which these settlements would not be part of the Jewish State". According to the same report Mr. Agmoni, Director of the Settlement Department of the Zionist Federation, stated that £I 250 million had been spent so far on the "non-military infrastructure in the Golan Heights".

64. On 21 February, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Minister of Housing, Mr. Ofer, referring to "the new settlement movement in the territories . . . as the biggest settlement enterprise undertaken since the creation of the State of Israel. These settlements are important to us both for the definition of the boundaries of the State and the strengthening of its security".

65. On 10 March, *Ma'ariv* reported that Israeli national insurance benefits would be extended to cover Israelis in the Golan Heights.

66. On 1 June, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement by Mr. S. Avni, on behalf of the Minister of Housing, according to which £I 800 million had been spent for construction of new settlements, including £I 350 million for the Golan Heights.

67. On 12 June, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the Ministry of Housing had spent £I 90

million for the first stage of a new settlement in the central Golan Heights, to be called "Katzrin".

68. On 18 June, *Ma'ariv* and Radio Israel announced that the Government had approved the construction of an urban centre and two settlements for the Golan Heights.

69. On 4 August, Radio Israel announced that the settlements in the Golan Heights had produced the equivalent of £I 140 million in goods and services during 1975.

70. On 20 August, Radio Israel broadcast a statement by Defence Minister Peres according to which Israel would not give up the settlements in the Golan Heights even after negotiations.

71. On 26 August, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that there were now 20 settlements in the Golan Heights. On the same day *Ma'ariv* reported a statement by Mr. I. Galili, Minister without Portfolio, reassuring representatives of the settlers in the Golan Heights that the Government of Israel had not changed its attitude and that it was "determined that no settlement be removed".

72. On 29 August, the *Jerusalem Post* reported action taken by a settlement group calling itself Bnei Akiva to establish a settlement in the central Golan Heights without Government approval.

73. On 10 September, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer, had called for a reconsideration of the establishment of four new settlements in the Golan Heights; on 14 September, the *Jerusalem Post* announced that the ministerial committee for the settlement of the occupied territories had forwarded the matter of the establishment of four new settlements in the Golan Heights to the full Cabinet.

74. On 19 September, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by Police Minister S. Hillel to representatives of the settlers in the Golan Heights to the effect that the Government had not approved the establishment of settlements in the Golan Heights just to remove them.

75. On the same date, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the inauguration of the first regional elementary school for children of Israeli settlers in the Golan Heights—the report states that there were 330 Jewish school-children in the entire Golan Heights.

(c) *West Bank*

76. A report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* magazine on 8 November 1974 described what it called the policy of the Government of Israel in

the establishment of Israeli settlements on the eastern extremity of Jerusalem and the projects undertaken in the execution of this policy. The report quoted the Director of the Ministry of Housing, Jerusalem District, Mr. A. Baron, as stating that "the purpose of these new projects is to 'fortify the city by contiguous Jewish settlement and provide 'room for sufficient Jewish growth'". According to Mr. Baron, these settlements would also provide a form of defence, and to enable this development, 17 dunams in East Jerusalem had been expropriated for housing developments. Nine thousand families have settled in the occupied part of Jerusalem since 1967 and 20,000 apartments would have been completed or would be in the construction stage by the end of the fiscal year.

77. The Special Committee would draw attention to the following passages from a report appearing in the *Christian Science Monitor* of 5 March 1975 by John K. Cooley entitled "A Bulldozer Battle for Jerusalem" as illustrating the type of information before the Special Committee:

Property developers in Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem are continuing pressure to evict and "relocate" Arab inhabitants of the old walled city and to "modernize" it.

Evicted Arab families see boxlike constructions of new Israeli housing rising from the debris of their demolished homes.

78. On 25 November 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a decision by the Government of Israel to build an industrial centre in the occupied territories in an area 14 kilometres east of Jerusalem on the road to Jericho. On 3 March 1975 Radio Israel and the *Jerusalem Post* reported an attempt by a group of Israelis to settle at the industrial settlement between Jerusalem and Jericho known as "Maale Hadumim"; the group was evacuated by Israeli forces. On 15 April 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported that the military Government had seized "several thousand dunams" of land belonging to the villages of Azariya and Abu-Deis, situated near the industrial settlement of "Maale Hadumim". The land had been declared "closed" two years earlier for military purposes. On 21 May, *Ma'ariv* reported the start of construction of "Maale Hadumim". On 9 July 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported that the military Government had expropriated 30,000 dunams of land near the Jerusalem-Jericho road designed to extend the area of "Maale Hadumim". The report adds that 7,000 dunams

of this land had been declared a "closed" area by the military Government some years earlier. The report states that, so far, property in the West Bank had not been expropriated, but seized by the military Government or declared closed for a limited period; expropriated land was Government owned. On 22 September 1975, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the Government of Israel had given permission for 60 settlers to move into housing at "Maale Hadumim".

79. On 13 January 1975, *Ma'ariv* reported a new settlement to be established in the central Jordan Valley. The settlement would consist of 350 houses, an education centre, and a centre for small industry, agriculture and administrative services to be constructed next to the settlement.

80. On 23 January, *Ma'ariv* reported the publication of new regulations by the military commander of the West Bank permitting Israeli settlers in "Kiryat Arba", the Israeli settlement in Hebron, to buy flats that they now rent and to lease land for construction of houses from the Land of Israel Authority.

81. On 14 February, Radio Israel reported the construction of 150 new houses in the Israeli settlement in Hebron, "Kiryat Arba".

82. On 18 February, *Ha'aretz* reported that the military Government was to start legal proceedings against Arab civilians who had constructed houses near the Israeli settlement, an area which had been declared "closed" some years earlier.

83. On 16 February, *Ha'aretz* reported that the military Government had declared an area of 200 dunams of land belonging to villages from Tubas and the northern Jordan Valley as "closed" for the use of Israeli forces.

84. On 6 March, *Ma'ariv* reported a plan by the Ministry of Housing to construct an additional 577 apartments in the Israeli settlement in Hebron over the next two years and the laying down of foundations for another 200.

85. On 21 April, *Ha'aretz* reported the establishment of two military settlements near Bethlehem, both intended to be converted into civilian settlements.

86. On 7 May, Radio Israel announced that an unauthorized settlement had been established at a former Jordanian army camp 6 kilometres east of Ramallah. On 4 June 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported the establishment of an unauthorized settlement called "Ofra". On 18 June 1975,

Ma'ariv reported that Defence Minister Peres gave his authorization for "Ofra", *ex post facto*.

87. On 23 June, *Ma'ariv* reported the construction of a new settlement in the West Bank and plans for an additional four settlements. The report quotes as its source Mr. U. Yaffe, Chairman, Regional Council of Beit-Shean Valley.

88. On 15 July, *Ha'aretz* reported the establishment of a "workers' camp" north of Ramallah. According to the report the camp, established with Government authorization, was designed to turn into a permanent settlement.

89. On 9 January, Radio Israel reported a communiqué by the Military Governor of Beit Jallah requesting inhabitants of the town who were complaining that their property had been seized to produce their title deeds to the military authorities. The same report states that the military authorities had recently occupied several areas, claiming that this land was not the property of the local population.

90. On 17 July, *Ha'aretz* reported a proposal by the Ministry of Housing to build a 200- or 500-family settlement west of Bethlehem near Ras Beit Jallah.

91. On 22 July, *Ha'aretz* quoted "well-informed sources" according to which the Jewish National Fund was undertaking extensive land purchases in and around Ramallah.

92. On 14 August, *Ma'ariv* reported that land preparation had been undertaken for the "first urban settlement" known as Maaleh Efraim. According to the report this settlement was designed to provide essential services to Israeli settlers in the Jordan Valley and it was to be inhabited by all employed in industrial plants to be set up in the future in the region.

(d) *Sinai*

93. On 20 February 1975, Radio Israel reported the inauguration of a permanent settlement near Sharm El-Sheikh.

94. On 8 April, Radio Israel announced that 46 houses had been completed at Sharm El-Sheikh.

95. On 11 May, the *Jerusalem Post* quoted the Minister of Housing, Mr. Ofer, as stating that there was no plan by the Government for Sharm El-Sheikh. This statement was contradicted by the Director of the Southern Sinai Civil Authority, Mr. Aloni. On 18 May, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a further rebuttal of Mr. Ofer's statement by

Mr. I. Galili, Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for the settlement of the occupied territories, who confirmed there was a Government plan to build 1,000 units at Sharm El-Sheikh over the next few years.

96. On 10 May, Radio Israel reported a statement by the Minister of Housing to the effect that the Government had only voted money for the project and that housing would only be constructed for persons employed at Sharm El-Sheikh. The settlement there was intended to be a military settlement.

97. On 15 April, the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and requested that it be brought to the attention of the Special Committee. In this letter the Government of Egypt alleged that Israeli authorities had "forcibly transferred a number of the population of Sinai from the areas of Ain Sadr and the Al Hama and Al Raha mountains to other areas". According to this letter the transfer affected six tribes, five of which had been evicted in 1969 from the areas of Mitla and Al Gidi Passes and the Gifgafa areas. The total number of persons said to have been affected was approximately 1,800 (A/10074). Upon receipt of this allegation, the Special Committee addressed the Permanent Representative of Egypt on 14 May 1975 as follows:

... Prior to undertaking further consideration of the contents of your letter, the Special Committee would be grateful if your Government could provide the following further details: the time when the forcible transfer referred to in the second paragraph in your letter took place, the identity of the tribes affected, and the place and places to which they were transferred.

98. The Special Committee requested the Government of Egypt to furnish information "as to the time when these transfers occurred in 1969 and whether the figure of 1,800 persons refers to the total number of those transferred in 1969 and in 1975 or, if not, what exactly that figure represents". The Special Committee also stated that it would assist them if the Government of Egypt were to send a representative to give oral evidence in substantiation of the allegations before the Special Committee. On 14 May 1975, the Special Committee, in a communication addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel, referred to the allegations contained in the letter received from the Government of Egypt and in-

formed the Government of Israel that it had decided to ask the Government of Egypt for further substantiation of these allegations. The Special Committee extended an invitation to the Government of Israel "to present its observations on the allegations made by the Government of Egypt" and requested the Government of Israel to send a representative to its meetings for the same purpose.

99. On 24 June 1975, the Permanent Representative of Egypt transmitted further details on the forcible transfer of population in Sinai. This information gives the names and numbers of tribes affected by the transfer as follows:

Agayla Tribe

Ninety families (530 persons) who originally populated the area of Balouza and South Romana were transferred during 1969–1970 to the areas of Salmana, Rabah, El Muraia and El Homeisa.

Akarsa Tribe

Approximately 500 persons who originally populated Romana, Balouza and Abu Hamra areas, were transferred forcibly during 1969 to the Salmana and Vatia areas.

Mala'aba Tribe

Approximately 120 persons were transferred from their original living area in South Romana to the following areas:

- Salmana in 1968
- El Kherba in 1969
- El Muraia and Vatia in 1972

Masaid Tribe

A population of around 400 persons (140–150 families) was transferred after 1967 from the areas of Jelbana and east of Balouza to Bir El Abd and Rabah, then to the Homagrin and Henjela areas.

This information was also contained in a letter to the Secretary-General (A/10128) dated 24 June 1975.

100. On 29 July 1975, the Government of Israel addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (A/10163-S/11780) referring to the allegation by the Government of Egypt and stated that about 400 Bedouin families, numbering approximately 1,500 persons, had been transferred in February 1975 "for imperative military and security reasons and in order to obviate possible dangers to the security of the Bedouin population of the Jabel Raha area". According to this letter, the persons concerned were transferred to Bir Malka or Jabel Risan "according to their own choice" and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross who had been informed in advance of the transfer were present at the time of the transfer "and stated that they were favourably impressed

by the transfer arrangements, the treatment accorded to the transferees and the services provided to them in their new places of residence". The letter adds that compensation was paid to the persons concerned and they were provided with a three-month supply of food for themselves and their livestock. "Appropriate job opportunities" were provided to the transferees and permission was given to return to harvest crops in recently sown fields in the areas which had been evacuated. The letter gives details of the public services available or to be provided to the transferees who allegedly expressed their satisfaction with the arrangements made during and after the transfer.

101. On 31 July 1975, the Government of Egypt replied to the letter of the Government of Israel and reaffirmed its view that the transfer constituted a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention since there was no justification of military necessity and security; on the contrary, these were "acts of repression and violence" (A/10164-S/11784).

102. On 8 August 1975, the Government of Israel addressed itself once more to the allegation of forcible transfer of civilians in Sinai (A/10174-S/11797). The letter states that because of the situation in the area, for which Egypt was responsible, "it was imperative to transfer certain parts of the Bedouin tribes affected by the circumstances to more secure areas in order to ensure their safety, as is indeed stipulated in article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention". The letter states that as a result of the efforts made to help the Bedouins concerned, their standard of living and public facilities "were advanced as a result of the transfer, particularly when compared to the conditions under Egyptian rule".

B. THE ABNORMAL SITUATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION LIVING UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION

103. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the situation of the civilian population who have been living under military occupation since 1967: the continuing occurrence of incidents manifesting resistance to the occupation, mass arrests, administrative detention and military court trials, which render the situation abnormal even when allowance is made for the extraordinary circumstances of military occupation. Reference to incidents in these paragraphs is made only to illustrate conditions of life in the occupied territories.

104. The testimony of Dr. Hanna Nasir, Director of Bir Zeit College, and Mr. Alfred Toubassi, member of the Ramallah municipal council for several years, both expelled on 21 November 1974, and the testimony of Mr. Mustafa Milhem, Mayor of Halhul from 1966 to 1972 and Deputy Mayor from 1972 until his expulsion on 4 November 1974, give an idea of the kind of life that the civilian population has to lead under military occupation. In his testimony, Dr. Nasir stated: "The violations of human rights on the West Bank are so evident and so continuous. Maybe we are taking them for granted on the West Bank and we do not realize that they are obscure to people outside the West Bank." According to the testimony of these persons, prominent in the public life of their community, the military occupation authorities were following a policy designed to stunt the development of the life of the community. Dr. Nasir, who is the head of the highest educational institution in the occupied territories, testified to the interference with higher education and harassment by the military authorities. He stated that this interference and harassment impeded the process of intellectual development and the formation of independent and academically qualified persons from the occupied territories. He gave the following as an example:

(a) The imposition of taxes on Bir Zeit College, thereby depleting its financial resources;

(b) The prohibition of expansion of the College through the veto of the construction of a campus in Ramallah funded by local and foreign Palestinian or Arab sources;

(c) The imposition of impossible conditions on the admission of qualified staff to teaching posts in the College by refusing the return of adequately trained local personnel;

(d) The curtailing of expression within the College by such means as imposing an arbitrary ban on the College newspaper;

(e) The continuing harassment, particularly by closing down the College without sufficient justification as, for example, when the College was closed for three weeks in 1973. Mr. Milhem and Mr. Toubassi, both members of their own municipal council, described the impossibility of carrying out municipal projects because of the harassment and delays that accompany a request for approval of the local military commander. The very fact of their expulsion and that of their

companion public figures in November 1974, they claim, constitutes an example of the policy of the military authorities to deprive the civilian population in the occupied territories of their leadership. None of the three persons who testified before the Special Committee had been charged with any breach of security regulations; on the contrary, Dr. Nasir had, on various occasions, intervened to maintain order between the local population and the occupation authorities.

105. The paragraphs that follow contain a sample of reports of incidents, often violent, that took place in the occupied territories during the period covered by this report. These incidents were often followed by large-scale arrests, administrative detention and trials in military courts.

106. A number of reports appearing in the Israeli press during November 1974 reflected the policy decided upon by the Government of Israel. On 1 November 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that the military occupation authorities had decided "to take strong measures against the Arab dignitaries" in the occupied territories who had signed a petition supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization: the report adds that the expulsion of these persons was being considered. Four public figures were expelled on 4 November 1974 and another five on 21 November 1974. Of these, three appeared before the Special Committee on 11 and 12 March 1975. On 28 November 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported several meetings attended by Prime Minister Rabin, Defence Minister Peres, Justice Minister Zadok, Police Minister Hillel and Minister without Portfolio Galili; the report states that the Ministers decided "to adopt a policy of toughness in the West Bank given the student demonstrations and trade strikes that took place during the previous week".

107. During December 1974, the Israeli press carried reports of riots by high school students in Ramallah, attacks against Israeli private cars and army vehicles in the occupied territories, as well as the killing of an East Jerusalem merchant who was shot dead in the centre of Ramallah (for example: reports appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 1, 9, 12 and 22 December 1974, *Ma'ariv* on 6, 8 and 9 December 1974, and *Ha'aretz* on 26 December 1974).

108. According to a report in *Ha'aretz* on 26 December 1974, "there is hardly a day without some acts of sabotage or attempts to commit

such acts”.

109. According to reports available to the Special Committee, the pattern seems to have continued during January, February and March 1975 with explosions and placing of bombs in various parts of the occupied territories including Jerusalem.

110. In April and May 1975, violence and incidents of civil unrest appear to have reached considerable proportions again: a series of attacks against Israeli vehicles, explosions in various Israeli offices in the occupied territories, and the firing of a Katyusha rocket into Jerusalem.

111. The *Jerusalem Post* of 8 May, contains a report entitled “Terrorism Again Hits Judea and Samaria”, which gives details of the incidents that had occurred and the investigation undertaken by the Israeli forces.

112. On 11 May, *Ha'aretz* and, on 18 May, *Ma'ariv* carried reports of the renewed increase in the number and violence of incidents in the occupied territories.

113. Further examples are provided in reports of incidents that are said to have occurred in Jerusalem on 30 May (*Jerusalem Post*); Gaza on 25 May (*Ma'ariv*); Gaza on 3 June (*Jerusalem Post*); in Jerusalem again on 5 June (*Ma'ariv*) and on 9 June (Radio Israel); at Kfar Saba and Beit Lid on 10 June (*Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv*); in Jerusalem on 6 July (*Jerusalem Post*); in Hebron on 13 July (*Ma'ariv*); in Nablus on 20 July (*Ma'ariv*); in Jerusalem on 1 August (*Jerusalem Post*); in Beit Jalla on 10 August (*Ha'aretz*); and in Nablus on 8 September (*Ma'ariv*).

114. These incidents were all generally followed with reports of large-scale arrests. The paragraphs that follow give an example of the types of reports before the Special Committee.

115. On 7 April, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of “several dozen young men” from Ramallah, Hebron and East Jerusalem.

116. On 5 May, *Ma'ariv* reported a “series of arrests” of suspects from Nablus and Hebron.

117. On 12 May, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of “several dozen” in the Gaza Strip and added “in the last few months some 40 suspects have been arrested each month”.

118. On 13 May, *Ma'ariv* reported that “more than 40 young men so far . . .” had been arrested.

119. On 19 May, *Ma'ariv* reported that 69 persons were arrested from Jenin and the sur-

rounding area.

120. On 30 May, *Ma'ariv* referred to the arrest of “dozens” from the West Bank.

121. On 27 June, *Ma'ariv* reported that 50 persons had been arrested from Hebron and another 32 from other areas.

122. On 30 June, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 100 persons were arrested in the West Bank.

123. On 4 July, *Ma'ariv* reported that 300 young men from Hebron and Bethlehem were arrested in a “special operation designed to capture terrorists and deter youngsters from acting against Israel”.

124. On 16 July, *Ma'ariv* reported large-scale arrests carried out recently following “intensification of terrorist activity in the region, including 80 persons from Jenin”.

125. On 21 July, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of “dozens” from Nablus.

126. On 22 July, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of 13 persons in Nablus and 11 in Ramallah and Jenin.

127. On the same date, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of 14 persons in Tulkarm.

128. On 19 August, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of “numerous suspects” in Ramallah.

129. On 22 August, Radio Israel and *Al-Hamishmar* reported the arrest of 18 persons from Jerusalem.

130. On 25 and 26 August, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* respectively reported the arrest of 25 persons from the area near Hebron.

131. On 28 August, *Ma'ariv* reported that over 800 persons were arrested during 1974.

132. On 31 August, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of a “network” in Bethlehem and the *Jerusalem Post*, the arrest of “an undisclosed number” of persons.

133. On 8 September, *Ma'ariv* reported that “Thanks to numerous arrests in the West Bank many sabotage acts were prevented, in particular on the eve of and during the visit of Dr. Kissinger”.

134. The occurrence of incidents was invariably followed by large-scale arrests and trials in military courts. These trials are the subject of reports appearing regularly in the Israeli press. The evidence before the Special Committee does not contain sufficient detail for a proper examination of the procedure during these trials.

135. Reports appearing in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* between 16 July and 10 August, referred to a

hunger strike by a number of administrative detainees, apparently in protest against their prolonged detention without trial.

136. On 23 July, Radio Israel reported that the administrative detention of 34 persons had been prolonged—their detention had so far lasted over a year.

C. EVIDENCE RELATING TO A POLICY OF REPRISAL AGAINST CIVILIANS

137. The evidence before the Special Committee reflects the adoption of a number of measures which over the years reflect a practice, if not a policy, of reprisal by the military authorities against the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territories. In the subsequent paragraphs the Special Committee gives examples of the types of reports in which such measures are described. They include demolition of houses of persons suspected of hostile activity, expulsion—usually of leaders of a community, closing of shops and businesses in areas where incidents take place, prohibiting the export of produce as punishment for incidents that occur in a town, and mass arrests.

138. In his testimony before the Special Committee on 12 March 1975, Mr. Mustafa Milhem, Mayor of Halhul from 1966 to 1972 and Deputy Mayor from 1972 until his expulsion in November 1974, testified to the policy of reprisal followed by the occupation authorities in his town. He said that collective punishment in the form of destruction of houses recurred between 1967 and 1972. According to Mr. Milhem, collective punishment was resorted to in Halhul on 8 occasions in 1967, 10 in 1968, 18 in 1969, 10 in 1970, twice in 1971 and once in 1972. The Special Committee would point out that the destruction in Halhul was the subject of reports in the international press in 1969 and was referred to by the Special Committee in its first two reports.⁵⁰ Dr. Hanna Nasir testified that he was an eyewitness to demolition of houses in Ramallah and in Bir Zeit.

139. On 24 November 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of a house in the village of Beit-Mirsim near Hebron.

140. On 6 December, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of a workshop and the sealing of a house in Nablus.

141. On 17 December, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of a house in Nablus where a family of 17 lived; according to the report, one of the members of the family had been arrested a short time earlier "for his contacts with hostile organizations".

142. On 21 January 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of a house in a village near Jenin.

143. On 27 February, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of four houses.

144. On 2 March, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of three houses in a village near Ramallah.

145. On 18 March, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of two apartments in the Gaza Strip belonging to the parents of a 20-year-old man arrested earlier.

146. On 26 May, *Ma'ariv* reported the demolition of two houses in the Shati refugee camp.

147. On 30 May, *Ma'ariv* reported the demolition of five houses.

148. On 10 June, *Al-Hamishmar* reported the closing down in Nablus of a printing press, shops and the town centre after an explosion. In the same report, reference is made to Ramallah and El-Bireh where "several shops" had been closed for 14 days after Israeli cars had been set on fire in the area.

149. On 12 June, *Ha'aretz* reported that young men between the ages of 16 and 25 were not allowed to leave the occupied territories unless it was for a minimum of six months; subsequent reports show that after considerable protest this measure was repealed.

150. On 8 July, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the demolition of "several houses" and the sealing of two others in the village of Dura. On 16 July 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of two other houses in Dura.

151. On 17 July, *Ma'ariv* reported the trial of a young Palestinian and stated: "The military court also said that it would have sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment but that, because the defendant had co-operated with the investigators, and because the security forces had blown up his father's house, it was not too severe with him and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment only."

152. On 21 July, *Ma'ariv* reported the sealing of a house in Nablus.

153. On 27 July, *Ma'ariv* reported that the main entrance to the old quarter in Nablus had been

⁵⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089, para. 73; A/8389, para. 57.*

blocked "as a reaction" to a bombing incident. The same report states that "a number of shops of persons who refused to give evidence on the incident" were also shut down.

154. On 10 August, *Ha'aretz* reported that some shops were allowed to reopen but that others in the market in the old town were left closed down.

155. On 29 August, *Ha'aretz* reported that 19 shops were closed down in Ramallah after a bomb was planted in the main square. The same report refers to similar measures having been taken a few months ago in Ramallah and El-Bireh.

156. On 11 September, *Al-Hamishmar* reported that 20 shops that had been closed down because shopkeepers refused to give information regarding an incident that had taken place in the vicinity were reopened after one month.

157. On 9 December 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that the military government of the West Bank had lifted the embargo on the export of olives and olive oil from Nablus. The embargo was imposed by way of reaction to strikes and demonstrations in the town. A similar embargo imposed on Ramallah was still in force. In his testimony before the Special Committee, Mr. Mustafa Milhem stated that in 1969, when he was Mayor of Halhul, a town near Hebron, the occupation authorities had imposed an embargo on produce from the surrounding area during the peak season as punishment for anti-occupation demonstrations.

158. Reports appearing in November 1974 and April 1975 show that a number of persons were expelled from the occupied territories. All these persons had held responsible office or were leaders in their communities.

159. The Special Committee also considered large-scale arrests referred to in the preceding section, the numbers involved, the age of the persons arrested, and the timing of their arrest in their aspect as a measure of reprisal.

D. OTHER ALLEGATIONS

1. *The Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron*

160. A number of reports reaching the Special Committee during the period covered by this report concern measures adopted by the military authorities with regard to the use of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. A series of disturbances by Israeli settlers from the settlement at Kiryat Arba and protests by the local civilian leaders were reported during the early part of 1975. On 28

July 1975, the subject of "the recent incidents at the Mosque and plans to reconstruct the Jewish quarter in Hebron" was raised in the Knesset. This was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and in *Ma'ariv* on 29 July 1975. On 5 August 1975, *Ma'ariv* announced that new arrangements had been put into force to regulate the use of the Mosque by Jews and Moslems. These arrangements were themselves the subject of vehement protest by the Supreme Moslem Council and other Moslem bodies. Protests against the arrangements were also made, alleging that Jews too were being subjected to discrimination. Incidents occurred throughout the month of August and are the subject of reports in the Israeli press. On 9 September 1975, *Ma'ariv* reported a protest by 30 members of the Israeli settlement against restrictions on Jewish use of the Mosque during Ramadan.

161. The Special Committee took note of the protests made by the Government of Jordan on 7 August 1975 (A/10178-S/11799) and the reply thereto by the Government of Israel on 20 August 1975 (A/10204-S/11809), as well as several protests against the new arrangements forwarded to the Special Committee by the Secretary-General, who had received them from individuals and organizations.

162. The Special Committee examined the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and took note in particular of the passage in the commentary on that convention concerning article 27, which lays down the right of protected persons to respect for, *inter alia*, their religious convictions and practices. The commentary states: "Religious freedom is closely connected with the freedom to practice religion through religious observations, services and rites. Protected persons... in occupied territories must be able to practise their religions freely, without any restrictions other than those necessary for the maintenance of public law and morals".

2. *Ill-treatment of detainees*

163. A number of reports reaching the Special Committee during the period covered by this report concern the ill-treatment of persons under detention. In addition, three of the persons who appeared before the Special Committee in March 1975 stated that they themselves had been the victims of torture. They described to the Special Committee the various forms of ill-treatment and torture to which they had been subjected. They are

Mrs. Lutfiya El-Hawari, who was imprisoned for over six years, released in February 1975 and immediately expelled; her husband, Mr. Ahmad Jamal, imprisoned for over seven years and released and expelled on the same day as his wife; and Mr. Suleiman Al-Najab, who was detained on 30 April 1974 and kept in detention until he was expelled on 28 February 1975 without trial. In each of the three cases, the person concerned testified that the ill-treatment had taken place for the most part during the period immediately following their being taken into custody. Mrs. El-Hawari stated that she had suffered most of the ill-treatment at the very beginning of her detention but that she was in poor health during most of her incarceration. Mr. Jamal said that he was last ill-treated—beaten up—approximately one year and eight months prior to his release; Mr. Al-Najab stated that he was severely ill-treated between his arrest on 30 April 1974 and 25 June 1974. The witnesses' testimony has been reproduced as documents of the Special Committee (A/AC. 145/RT. 67–69).

164. Mrs. El-Hawari's case deserves special attention. There are certain points in her testimony which strengthen her credibility; she stated, for example, that on 7 August 1969 she was falsely arrested, since, she maintains, the objects or ammunition that she was accused of possessing in her house had actually been planted in her bedside table by the very same soldier or officer who claimed to have discovered them. The Special Committee notes that Mrs. El-Hawari had been detained on five previous occasions already, namely, in August 1967 (when she was detained for six hours); in November 1967 (when she was held for four days for questioning); in June 1968 (when she was held for 10 days); and in July or August 1968 (when she was placed under administrative detention for eight months). A person of Mrs. El-Hawari's intelligence (mathematics teacher), who was clearly being kept under close and constant surveillance, would hardly have incriminated herself so recklessly by keeping ammunition in her bedside table. Moreover, she had already given hostage [*sic*] to the authorities, as her fiancé had been imprisoned since December 1967 and attempts had already been made to extract information from him by threatening her. When subjected to medical examination in March 1975, her body did not show any marks of injury or

any other evidence that could be exclusively attributed to ill-treatment while under detention. The conclusion of the surgeon, Dr. G. Kobel, who examined Mrs. El-Hawari at the Special Committee's instance, was as follows: "Apart from a few scars on both knees, Mrs. El-Hawari has no cutaneous scar or post-traumatic induration of ligaments other than in the knees. She is suffering at present mainly from Scheuermann's Disease accompanied by L5-S1 spondylolisthesis. These two complaints are of morbid, if not congenital, origin. . . . In the case with which we are concerned, there is a bilateral lysis of the posterior arch which makes an hereditary or congenital origin appear likely. . . .". Dr. Kobel's report is not reproduced here in full.

165. Recurrent reports appearing in *Wafa*—Palestinian News Agency—alleged ill-treatment of prisoners, in some instances leading to their deaths. On 17 March 1975, *Wafa* reported that three prisoners whose names are given had died as a result of the torture that they had received. On 29 March 1975, three other persons were reported in serious condition in Remle Prison. The names of these persons are given as Daoud Turkey, Mustafa Ma'alda and Mahmoud Abu Al-Zaghir. These reports are available in the records of the Special Committee.

166. The Special Committee took note of recent Red Cross reports which reflect a sharp increase in the number of persons from the occupied territories who have been imprisoned. The ICRC publication *The ICRC in Action* of 3 September 1975, No. 224b, states that about 3,100 detainees were visited by its delegates during the thirty-second series of visits to 13 places of detention, held between 8 July 1975 and 28 August 1975. Statements by witnesses appearing before the Special Committee attest to the poor conditions existing in the prisons where they had been incarcerated. The most common cause for complaint appears to be serious overcrowding.

V. QUNEITRA

167. In the last report, the Special Committee communicated its observations and conclusions on the allegation made by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic that the town of Quneitra was deliberately destroyed by the Israeli forces before their withdrawal under the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces

(A/9568-S/11396). The Government of Israel had replied that the destruction of Quneitra was "the direct result of acts of aggression carried out by Syria in various periods since 1967..." (A/9570-S/11408).

168. The Special Committee took note of a report appearing in the *London Free Press* of Ontario, Canada, on 26 November 1974 entitled "Puzzling Denial of Destruction" by Mr. William C. Heine. The article states:

Despite official Israeli denials, Kuneitra was deliberately and methodically destroyed by Israeli forces before they withdrew behind new United Nations ceasefire lines last summer ...

If the Israelis had said they could not tolerate an occupied city in that location and had destroyed it for military reasons, the rest of the world might have deplored it, but it would have been recognized that cities have been destroyed in war in the past. Militarily, I think the destruction of Kuneitra was understandable, and it might even be justifiable.

Israelis, however, piously say they did not demolish it, that it was destroyed by shellfire.

169. In resolution 3240 C (XXIX), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to undertake, with the assistance of experts, a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction. In its investigation the Special Committee, as requested by the General Assembly, after examining the qualifications of a number of candidates, selected an expert and requested him to undertake a preliminary survey and to advise the Special Committee on the best manner in which it could obtain a report on the following points:

(a) To what extent the destruction was or could have been caused by:

- (i) Aerial bombardment, artillery or mortar shells;
- (ii) The use of heavy equipment, such as bulldozers;
- (iii) The use of explosives;
- (iv) The use of any other means;

(b) During what period this destruction was caused;

(c) The proportion of that type of damage, borne to the total, bearing in mind subparagraph (a) above;

(d) The value of each type of damage according to the estimations of the expert.

170. The Special Committee requested the ex-

pert to report to it on his findings and to submit a preliminary report during its meetings in New York from 29 September to 9 October 1975. The expert submitted his report to the Special Committee at meetings held on 30 September and 1 October 1975. At these meetings the expert gave oral evidence before the Special Committee in further elaboration of his report.

171. The survey requested in resolution 3240 (XXIX) could not be completed in time to enable the Special Committee to make a full report on Quneitra to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

172. In this report the Special Committee has analysed the evidence that came before it since the adoption of its sixth report (A/9817). The Special Committee has continued its investigation as reflected in its earlier reports, which were considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth sessions.

173. The Special Committee has again restricted itself to the examination of those areas of civilian life in the occupied territories where marked changes were detected. As the Chairman of the Special Committee stated before the Special Political Committee at the twenty-eighth session (A/SPC/PV. 890), the Special Committee saw no further purpose in furnishing the General Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes took place in the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories.

174. The evidence before the Special Committee indicates that the policies and practices pursued by the occupying Power in the occupied territories, in so far as they affect the human rights of the population of those territories, have not changed to any marked extent except with regard to certain aspects, considered by the Special Committee in section IV above. The general situation continues to give cause for concern because the civilian population has now been living under military occupation since June 1967. This has created a state of restlessness which has manifested itself this year in the marked increase of incidents, often violent; reprisals by the military occupying authorities; and the noticeable increase in the number of persons in custody. As indicated in section IV, the economic dependence of the

occupied territories, in particular the continued abuse of the labour force from the occupied territories, persists. There is no evidence that prison conditions have improved; on the contrary, the recent increase in the number of detainees has not served to ameliorate prison conditions. The state of occupation and the consequent interference with daily life for such a long period are obviously affecting the youth of the occupied territories, who have become the object of military intervention as their sense of frustration and resentment at occupation grows with its prolongation.

175. The policy of annexation pursued by the occupying Power in Jerusalem continues unabated with the further eviction of local Arab inhabitants and their replacement by new Jewish immigrants and the construction of housing projects to accommodate these immigrants on the eastern fringes of the city.

176. In section IV A above the Special Committee gave a sample of the evidence before it on the existence of a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories and the implementation of such a policy. The recurring references by members of the Israeli Government to the existence of plans for the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, together with uncontradicted reports of the establishment of such settlements, prove the existence of this policy, which is contrary to articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee notes with particular concern the measures that have been taken in the Gaza Strip and in the Rafah area where numerous persons have been forcibly evicted from their land to allow the construction of Israeli settlements. The same applies to the continued establishment of settlements in the Golan Heights and the statements of policy by Israeli Ministers concerning the permanent character of these settlers in occupied Syrian territory. As illustrated in section IV above, measures taken in the West Bank for the expropriation of property and the subsequent establishment of Israeli settlements on such property have continued during 1975. Such a situation is contrary to one of the fundamental premises of the Fourth Geneva Convention: that the state of occupation should be a temporary one during which the civilian population must, as far as possible, be left unaffected except where urgent military and security considerations otherwise dictate.

177. In particular, the Special Committee notes that forcible eviction and transfer of the civilian population has occurred during 1975 in the southern part of the Gaza Strip near Rafah. With regard to the allegation made by the Government of Egypt of forcible transfer of population in the Sinai, the Special Committee is not in a position to reach a conclusive finding in the absence of precise information on the dates when the transfers are alleged to have occurred and the location from which the alleged transfers took place.

178. The evidence before the Special Committee this year shows that the civilian population's predicament has become worse, even after due allowance is made for the abnormal conditions inseparable from a state of military occupation. In section IV B above, the Special Committee has given a sample of the evidence before it which, when examined as a whole, gives an idea of the abnormal situation of the civilian population.

179. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee received information which indicates the existence of a policy of reprisal carried out by the adoption of such measures as demolition of houses, expulsion of persons prominent in the community, and interference in the commercial life of the civilian population. In section IV C above, the Special Committee has given a sample of the evidence before it which has led it to conclude that such a policy, which is contrary to articles 33, 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, does exist.

180. The following excerpt from the *Annual Report* of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 1974 is relevant in this context:

... the main problems encountered by the ICRC for which no satisfactory solutions have yet been found are those connected with expulsions and the destruction of dwellings ordered by the Israeli authorities under the heading of repressive measures, in violation of articles 49, 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

While no person has been expelled, to the knowledge of the ICRC, from the occupied territories of Gaza and Sinai, it is known on the other hand that 12 West Bank Palestinians were compelled to leave their homes and seek refuge in an Arab country.

On 12 March, two inhabitants of the village of Halhoul in the district of Hebron were removed across the border to Jordan.

A similar measure was taken on 21 November against four schoolteachers in Ramallah and one in Jericho.

These persons were visited by an ICRC delegate in

Jordan.

In addition, on 4 November, five persons were expelled and sent to Lebanon.

In each of these cases the ICRC delegation in Israel and the occupied territories approached the Israeli authorities, requesting that the persons expelled might be allowed to return to their families in the occupied territories.

The situation of the victims whose homes were destroyed by the Israeli army in the occupied territories was often aggravated by the arrest of one or more members of the family concerned, and such cases continued to be a source of concern for the ICRC, which holds that such destructions are contrary to the provisions of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

In 1974, the ICRC delegates in Gaza were notified of 50 such cases, involving nearly 300 persons. In West Bank territory, 30 houses were destroyed and six bricked up, affecting more than 150 persons.

On several occasions, the delegation communicated its viewpoint to the Israeli authorities as to the principle of carrying out the destruction of houses and the deep concern it felt about such acts, and requested that steps should be taken to find homes for the victims.³¹

181. In particular, the Special Committee is of the view that the large-scale arrests referred to in section IV B above, the number of persons involved, their age and the timing of these arrests, reflect a tendency towards communal or collective punishment as an alternative to proper investigation for the purpose of tracing the responsible parties.

182. With regard to the question of the measures adopted by the military authorities in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, referred to in section IV D above, the Special Committee is of the view that these measures, as well as those instituted in 1968, are contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention inasmuch as they contravene the provisions of article 27, which gives protected persons the right "to respect for... their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs".

183. With regard to the evidence before the Special Committee of ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention, referred to in paragraphs 163 to 166 above, the Special Committee would refer to its findings in its earlier reports on allegations of torture to the effect that, despite the compelling nature of the evidence it had received, it was unable to reach a conclusive finding, since this would only be possible after a free investiga-

tion by the Special Committee inside the occupied territories. Nevertheless, in these reports the Special Committee has stated its conviction that on the basis of the evidence before it to date, interrogation procedures very frequently involved physical violence.

184. The Special Committee feels that the evidence of Mrs. El-Hawari in particular contains elements that have been corroborated by other persons who have appeared before the Special Committee in 1970, namely Mrs. Abla Taha (A/AC. 145/RT. 22) and Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh.

185. On the basis of the evidence of Mrs. El-Hawari as corroborated by earlier witnesses, and by her husband, and for the reasons given by the Special Committee in paragraph 164 above, the Special Committee feels that a strong *prima facie* case of ill-treatment has been established. With regard to Mr. Jamal and Mr. Al-Najab, the Special Committee can only state that their testimony deserves examination to establish the facts and to provide the necessary remedies. Nevertheless, the Special Committee must voice its deep concern that such serious allegations continue to be made.

186. With regard to the question of the arrest, trial and imprisonment of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the Special Committee examined the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the establishment of courts in occupied territories (articles 64 and 66) as well as the legislative measures adopted unilaterally by the Government of Israel by virtue of which the District Court of Jerusalem was established in the occupied part of Jerusalem. The Special Committee has already had occasion to state that the measures taken by the Government of Israel to annex the occupied part of Jerusalem are contrary to international law and in particular to article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Therefore, the occupying Power would appear to have been in contempt of the Fourth Geneva Convention when it established the District Court of Jerusalem. For this reason the Special Committee is of the view that Archbishop Capucci was tried in a court that was not properly constituted under international law.

187. With regard to the implementation of resolution 3240 C (XXIX) on Quneitra, the Special Committee would refer to paragraph 171 of this report. Considering the importance of the matter, the Special Committee deems it necessary that

³¹ Doc. 201 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

the survey of the destruction in Quneitra should be resumed and completed as soon as possible. The Special Committee would therefore recommend that the General Assembly approve this proposal and provide the necessary funds for the purpose.

188. It follows from the evidence before the Special Committee that the occupying Power continues to behave in the occupied territories and to act towards the population of these territories in flagrant violation of the basic rights of the above-mentioned population and in defiance of relevant international conventions.

189. The Special Committee would therefore reiterate its conviction that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

190. The Special Committee would draw attention once again to the proposal that it has repeatedly made for the adoption of an arrangement inspired by the Protecting Power formula envisaged under the Geneva Conventions which protects civilian persons living in occupied territories.⁵² This machinery or one similar to it should be established to provide future protection for the population of the occupied territories.

⁵² The Special Committee, in each of its reports, has recommended:

"(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

"(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

"(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement."

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

"(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

"(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

"(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work."

VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

191. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 13 October 1975 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure.

(Signed) H. S. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka)

Chairman

M. FALL (Senegal)

B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

9

Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) regarding the economic effects on the Arab states of Israeli occupation of their territories (excerpts)⁵³

November 3, 1975

1. On 17 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3336 (XXIX) entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", in paragraph 5 of which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, to prepare a report on "the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples, resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session".

2. The Member States directly concerned, in addition to the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, were invited to provide relevant information as a basis for the report.

3. On 18 March 1975, therefore, the Secretary-General sent notes verbales to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations (see annex I below).

4. The Permanent Representative of Egypt to

⁵³ UN doc. A/10290, excluding list of contents and Annexes VI (Letter dated 19 March 1975 from the Secretary-General to the heads of UNCTAD, UNIDO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO and IBRD), VII (Letters dated 2 May and 26 August 1975 from the Director-General of the ILO addressed to the Secretary-General) and VIII (Letter dated 8 July 1975 from the Director-General of UNESCO).

the United Nations replied in notes verbales dated 26 June, 8 July, 26 August, 23 and 30 September and 24 October 1975, transmitting tables presenting "examples of losses incurred by some ministries, governmental departments, public sector enterprises and services sectors" (see annex II below). In the view of the Government of Egypt, the information conveyed represents a fraction of the total losses.

5. On 8 July 1975, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General a note verbale (see annex III) transmitting five tables entitled: "the amount of damage suffered by State bodies and the public sector; the amount of direct damage suffered by the private sector; the amount of direct damage suffered by villages in the theatre of operations and villages occupied in 1973 and subsequently evacuated; amount of damage resulting from the devastation of the town of Quneitra and occupation of the district; and the amount of agricultural damage resulting from the occupation of Quneitra district". The reply also contained figures which represent the value of antiquities, which the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic stated were removed from this district, as well as the amount of aid to the people displaced during the period 1967-1975 and the economic damage which the Government anticipated it would incur, as from 1976, owing to the loss of revenue from properties and public utilities. The reply further indicated that the information was not all-inclusive and that Syrian authorities were still in the process of assessing other direct and indirect damage.

6. In a note verbale of 6 August 1975, the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations stated that "the position of Israel on the subject matter of the resolution in question was made clear by the delegate of Israel in the Second Committee on 15 November 1974 and in the plenary meeting on 17 December 1974" (see annex IV below). It further noted that "the wording of paragraph 5 of resolution 3336 (XXIX) completely prejudices the issue, leaving no room and no purpose for the preparation of an objective report".

7. The Secretary-General also received replies dated 26 August and 9 September 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations. The reply of 9 September transmitted the Government's revised report on the adverse

effects of Israeli occupation of the West Bank on Jordan's economy (see annex V below).

8. In a letter dated 19 March 1975, the Secretary-General also requested information from the relevant specialized and United Nations organs, namely, UNCTAD, UNIDO, FAO, UNESCO, the ILO, WHO, IBRD and IMF, as well as the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) (see annex VI below). These agencies or organs have co-operated by sending relevant documentation. Some stated that they had no information directly related to the subject-matter and others advised that they only had information of a general nature.

9. The reply of UNCTAD, dated 29 May 1975, focused on its report entitled *The Economic Effects of the Closure of the Suez Canal*.⁵⁴ That study identified and quantified the effects of the closure of the Canal on ocean shipping services and costs, and evaluated the trade losses of the areas affected. It concluded that countries south of the Canal, especially in East Africa and in South-East Asia, had been principally affected, but it did not provide a breakdown for any country in particular.

10. According to the UNCTAD report, in 1966, the last full year of the operation of the Suez Canal, a total of 242 million tons (176 million tons of oil and 66 million tons of dry cargo) passed through the Canal, equal to 14 per cent of world sea-borne trade. Egypt received about \$US 224 million in toll revenues in the 12 months ending May 1967, but the losses to the economy (actually not computed) go beyond this figure in view of the many activities induced by the traffic through the Canal.

11. In its reply dated 24 June 1975, UNIDO transmitted the following relevant information:

In the course of the hostilities, Egypt suffered the loss of two oil refineries and one fertilizer plant with the result that the country has been forced to meet its crude oil and fertilizer requirements through imports. On the other hand, the present situation on the Sinai peninsula deprives the Egyptians of no less than one third of their oil resources, since the oil fields are currently occupied by the Israelis. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Homs oil refinery was put out of action. Lebanon made available a certain proportion of its refining capacity with the result that there have been local shortages, impeding

⁵⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No.: 73.11.D.13. [This and following notes are part of the original document.]

the operation of the transport system and certain industrial facilities. The Hamma steel rolling mill in Syria was also put out of operation when its generator plant was damaged. Moreover, funds that should have been devoted to industrial development in the Arab region have been directed to defence purposes.

12. In its replies of 2 May and 26 August 1975 (see annex VII below), the ILO, while indicating that it had no directly relevant material, drew attention to a resolution adopted by the International Labour Conference at its fifty-ninth session concerning the policy of discrimination, racism and violation of trade union freedoms and rights practised by Israeli authorities in Palestine and in other occupied Arab territories (see annex VII, appendix III, below), as well as to the action and decision related to that resolution taken subsequent thereto.

13. In its reply of 8 July 1975, UNESCO, while noting that this information was not entirely of direct concern to the subject covered by General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX), drew attention to a report prepared for the eighteenth session of the General Conference entitled "The situation of the national education and the cultural life of peoples in the occupied Arab Territories",⁵⁵ prepared pursuant to UNESCO resolution 10.1, part III, paragraph 19. The reply of UNESCO identified the paragraphs of the report concerning economic or financial matters. These paragraphs, as well as the resolution adopted following the consideration of the above-mentioned report, are reproduced in annex VIII below.

ANNEX I

Note verbale dated 18 March 1975 from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of — to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974. In paragraph 5 of that resolution, the General Assembly:

Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs,

including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples, resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

Information concerning economic matters which is normally available to the Secretariat is not adequate to enable the Secretary-General to prepare the report requested by the General Assembly. He must, therefore, turn to the Member States directly concerned which may be in a position to provide the required information, as well as to the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

The Secretary-General would be grateful if your Government could provide him with information available to it which it considers to be relevant to the subject-matter of the report requested by the General Assembly in so far as it relates to Arab territories which have been occupied by Israel since June 1967. The Secretary-General very much hopes that your Government will find it possible to make the required information available to him no later than 1 July 1975, in order that the requested report may be submitted to the General Assembly before the opening of its thirtieth session.

ANNEX II

Notes verbales dated 26 June, 8 July, 26 August, 23 and 30 September and 24 October 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

A. *Note verbale of 26 June 1975*

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's note, dated 18 March 1975, regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith examples of losses incurred by some Ministries, governmental departments, public sector enterprises and services sectors, as a result of repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation.

The attached information is, therefore, not comprehensive. It only represents a fraction of the total losses. This is due, *inter alia*, to the following:

⁵⁵ UNESCO document 18C/16 of 10 September 1975.

1. Losses incurred by some other sectors are not included in the attached estimates. For example, there are the huge military losses, as well as the losses resulting from destruction of the three cities of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, as well as villages, institutions and property in the Suez Canal region, in addition to the loss of Suez Canal revenue for exactly eight years.

2. The losses in Sinai and in the Gaza Strip are not included, with the exception of preliminary estimates of the loss of production of the Sinai oil fields.

3. The attached estimates do not account for the continuing rise in the "replacement cost", as a result of inflation and the rising labour cost. Furthermore, the majority of estimates cover periods ending before or at the end of 1974. They do not account for losses incurred up to the present.

4. The estimates do not cover human losses, including the loss of life.

5. There is also the tremendous cost to the national economy resulting from the severe dislocation of productive factors and resources as a result of Israeli aggression and continued occupation. Since June 1967, Egypt has mobilized its resources against aggression and for the ultimate liberation of the occupied territories.

6. The temporary resettlement away from their homes of more than a million displaced persons from the Gaza Strip, Sinai, the Suez Canal zone and its three major cities, also constituted a heavy burden on the economy. In addition, the psychological distress resulting from the occupation of the national soil, the abandonment of homes and the dislocation of the economy had considerable adverse effect on national production and productivity.

Consequently, while the estimates attached to this note provide some relevant information, the need for a comprehensive study, as envisaged in paragraph 5 of resolution 3336 (XXIX), is to be stressed. The text of this paragraph, taking into account the magnitude and complexity of the task requested from the Secretary-General, made specific reference to "the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development" in preparing the Secretary-General's report "on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples", related to the subject-matter of the resolution.

The role of the specialized agencies, United Nations organs, and specifically UNCTAD, has been spelt out in the statement made on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, which underlined that paragraph 5, as revised:

is designed to *involve the relevant United Nations organizations* in the preparation of the report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation.

In this respect, the co-sponsors wish to underline the need to seek the assistance of the UNCTAD secretariat in preparing the report, since *UNCTAD has the machinery to carry out studies and research* which would be useful in the preparation of the report.

Similarly, the UNESCO secretariat is expected to assist the Secretary-General in assessing the losses, destruction and damages caused to educational, cultural and scientific institutions and infrastructure in the Arab States subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation, as much of the losses and damages have a bearing on the economies and development efforts of the countries concerned. Furthermore, the loss of items of cultural and national heritage should be taken into account by UNESCO whether they relate to biblical heritages in Arab-Jerusalem and the Western Bank of the Jordan River, or in Sinai, where a most ancient and glorious monastery, that of St. Catherine's exists, or in the Golan Heights and the Syrian City of Quneitra, where loss of valuable items of national heritage during Israeli occupation have been reported.

These are only examples of the cases where the specialized agencies and United Nations organs are to assist the Secretary-General in preparing the requested report. The co-sponsors wish to emphasize that other organizations within the United Nations system, such as WHO, FAO, UNIDO etc., are also expected to participate in preparing the report.

It was also in view of the magnitude and complexity of the task that the Secretary-General submitted a statement (A/C. 5/1649) on the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution (A/C. 2/L. 1372) in which:

it was indicated that it was proposed to prepare the report on the basis of inquiries from, and visits to, the States concerned and consultations with the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. A large part of the work involved would be carried out in co-operation with the Economic Commission for Western Asia, and, in view of the short time available and the limited staff resources currently available to that newly created regional commission, would require four economists, appointed for six months each, and General Service secretarial support, as well as travel funds.

(A/C.5/1649, para. 3)

However, in an oral statement on behalf of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee pointed out that the main justification offered for the appointment of four economists for six months each was the fact that the Economic Commission for Western Asia had currently only limited staff resources to draw upon. In that connexion, he was in a position to inform the Fifth Committee that the Advisory Committee would recommend the adoption of the Secretary-General's staffing proposals for ECWA, as included in his progress report on the programme budget for the biennium 1974-1975,⁵⁶ namely, a net increase of 25 posts in the Professional category and 60 additional local-level posts in 1975. On the assumption that this recommendation would be adopted, it would not prove necessary to engage four economists. The Advisory Committee therefore recommended that an additional provision in the amount of \$37,000 to cover the cost of two economists only for a period of six months each

could be made under section 12 of the programme budget (A/9978. Add. 1, para. 4).⁵⁷ This additional appropriation for the purpose indicated was before the General Assembly in document A/9978/Add. 1 as it adopted resolution 3336 (XXIX).

The Permanent Representative wishes to recall that this question was discussed in detail during two meetings, held on 12 February and 22 April 1975 with the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, with a view to stressing the importance of preparing the Secretary-General's report as envisaged by paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) and as spelt out by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, as well as the statement submitted by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution, within the allocations approved by the General Assembly upon the explanation given by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions as stated in document A/9978/Add. 1.

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY INSTITUTIONS AND INSTALLATIONS
AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated loss in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1. Ministry of the Interior	Buildings, installations, structures, raw materials, and martyrdom remuneration	223 072	from 5 June 1967 to 31 December 1972	
2. Transport Sector	Railroads, roads, bridges, marine transport, land transport, vehicles, lorries, tractors, equipment etc., plus evacuation costs and civil defence expenses etc.	145 978 725	from June 1967 to October 1973	Direct damage: 11 269 325 Indirect damage: 134 351 400
3. Ministry of Commerce	(a) Egyptian Public Cotton Corporation: increase in import-export expenses, evacuation costs and loans.	1 337 450	from June 1967 to 31 December 1974	
	(b) Subsidiaries of the Egyptian Foreign Trade Corporation: decrease of exports resulting from		from June 1967 to 31 December 1974	Number of companies: 9

⁵⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 6 (A/9606).*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 73.

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated loss in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	partial or total breakdown of productive units; transportation accommodation and compensation costs; civil defence costs; closure of companies' branches in Port Said and the termination of business in Suez and Sinai.	21 477 501		Losses are direct and indirect
	(c) International exhibitions and fairs: losses sustained by the permanent Egyptian Pavilion at the Damascus International Fair, and the suspension of work on the Cairo International Fair project etc.	1 028 000		Direct and indirect damage
	Subtotal	23 842 951		
4. Civil Aviation Sector	Cairo Airport and the Meteorological Office, plus compensation to families of martyrs	31 263 466	from June 1967 to 31 March 1974	Direct and indirect damage
5. Ministry of Health	Medicaments for regular and emergency treatment, and medical supplies, as a result of direct aggression on Al-Za'faran Medical Aid Station on 9 September 1969	2 103 627		Direct and indirect damage
6. <i>Al-Awakaf</i> (religious endowments)	Damage caused to mosques and immovable properties administered by the <i>Awakaf</i> Authority	1 773 300	From 1967 to 31 March 1974	
7. Agriculture		513 105 403	From 5 June 1967 to 19 February 1975	Direct and indirect damage
8. Ministry of Electricity	Buildings, services, and damage repair	27 139 480	From 1967 through 1974	Direct and indirect damage
9. Ministry of Social Affairs	(a) Compensation paid in the Governorates of Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and Sinai, as well as to families of martyrs	7 179 875	From 1 May 1974 to 31 December 1974	It is to be noted that these figures are exclusive of the evacuation operations expenses, which amount to £E 24 million per year
	(b) Compensation pending reimbursement for loss of life and assets	13 030 000	For 1975	
	Subtotal	20 209 875		
10. Radio and Television Sector		5 305 368	From June 1967 to 30 March 1974	Direct damage: 63 535 Indirect damage: 5 241 833

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated loss in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
11. Ministry of War Production (Civil Sector)	Costs of shutdown during raids, and increase in import expenses, etc., plus loss of nitric acid production in Suez	16 137 296	Up to 31 December 1974	Direct damage: 1 522 000 Indirect damage: 14 615 296
12. Petroleum Sector	(a) Direct damage up to 31 December 1974	406 300 000		
	(b) Indirect damage up to 31 December 1974	355 500 000		
	(c) Losses resulting from the loss of Sinai fields up to 30 June 1975	875 000 000		
	Subtotal	1 636 800 000		
13. Industry and Mining	17 public sector industrial installations damaged or destroyed; cost of their restoration and loss caused to the local market by lack of supplies	860 000 000	From June 1967 and during the war of attrition through 1973	
14. Tourism	(a) Direct damage incurred by tourist companies, especially in Port Said, Ghardakah, Al-Ain, Al-Soknah, and tourist offices in Port Said, Suez, Al-Areesh Rest House, as well as the loss sustained by the Ministry's offices in the aforesaid locations.	24 016 770	through 1973	
	(b) Indirect losses in Egypt's tourist revenues as a result of the aggression	434 800 000	through 1973	
	Subtotal	458 816 770		
15. Higher industrial education institutes	Damage caused to buildings and installations, such as the Higher Industrial Institute in Port Said and the Higher Mining Institute in Suez, etc.	153 756		
16. Manpower		76 527		Direct damage: 13 173 Indirect damage: 63 354
17. Education Sector	Damage caused to buildings, installations, and services; evacuation expenses, teachers' salaries etc.	36 745 046		Direct damage: 34 032 294 Indirect damage: 2 712 752

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated loss in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
18. Irrigation Sector		16 011 100	From June 1967 to 30 September 1974	Direct damage: 1 007 600 Indirect damage: 15 003 500
19. Ministry of Justice	Renovation of Suez, Ismailia and Port Said courthouses damaged as a result of aggression, as well as the decrease in the revenues of courts, the Land Registration Administration, the State Council and the Forensic Medicine Department in the Governorates of the Canal zone	1 443 615	From June 1967 to 31 March 1974	Direct damage: 9 430 Indirect damage: 1 434 185
20. Ministry of <i>Al-Azhar</i> Affairs	Damage caused to Al-Azhar's affiliated institutions in Port Said, Ismailia, and the Nasser Boarding Quarters for Moslem students in Cairo	171 572		
21. Economic co-operation	Losses incurred by the Free Zone in Port Said, including damage to buildings and roads and loss of revenues	105 087 210		Direct damage: 87 210 Indirect damage: 105 000 000
22. Insurance Sector	Damage caused to buildings and installations and the decrease in revenues and the increase in expenses of the General Egyptian Insurance Corporation	3 521 969	From June 1967 through November 1974	
23. Sea transport	Damage caused to the Department of Ports and Lighthouses and the port of Alexandria	91 611 700	From June 1967 to 31 December 1972 during 1973	Direct damage: 9 006 300 Direct damage: 3 863 700
			From 1967 to 31 March 1974	Indirect damage: 78 741 700
24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Damage caused to our consular offices in Jerusalem and to the personal property of our consular staff there during the 1967 aggression	19 369		

B. Note verbale of 8 July 1975

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and further to the Permanent Representative's note dated 26 June 1975 regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17

December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith partial estimates of losses incurred by the Ministry of Supply Sector in the Suez Canal region as a result of repeated Israeli aggression since June 1967.

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF LOSSES—DIRECT AND INDIRECT—INCURRED BY INSTITUTIONS
AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967 (continued)

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated loss in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
25. Supply	(a) Direct losses sustained in supply commodities and produce of miscellaneous nature in warehouses in different areas of Canal cities.	70 794	from June 1967 to 31 Dec. 1974	
	(b) Direct losses incurred by the warehouses of the Supply Commodities Corporation in Port Said and Port Tawfiq areas—exclusive of warehouses totally destroyed or severely damaged, the value of which is being estimated.	11 000	Ditto	
	(c) Damage caused to equipment and vehicles rendering them useless.	9 000	Ditto	
	(d) Indirect losses including:			
	(i) Demurrage due to military operations and the closure of Port Said and Suez ports.	13 000 000		
	(ii) Decline in revenues of warehouses in the Canal Zone.	150 000		
	Subtotal	13 240 794		

C. Note verbale of 26 August 1975

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, pursuant to the Permanent Representative's note dated 8 July 1975, regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17

December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith further partial estimated losses incurred by the Ministries of the Interior, Local Administration and War, in Egypt as well as in the Gaza Strip, as a result of Israeli aggression and occupation since June 1967.

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Items</i>	<i>Estimate of losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
26. Ministry of the Interior	Construction; installations of machinery; raw materials; indemnities for casualties	2 724 088	from 1 Jan. 1973 up to present	To be added to data concerning the Ministry in item 1.
27. Ministry of Local Government	Buildings; installations; furnishings and equipment; means of transportation; general economic damages	144 078 000	from 5 June 1967 to 31 Dec. 1974	Losses suffered by the Governorates of Sinai, El Arish, and Kantara East only
28. Ministry of War	Direct and indirect civilian losses to bodies under the Ministry's supervision	724 197	from 5 June 1967 to 31 Dec. 1973	Apart from losses of Armed Forces units, whether in personnel, installations or equipment

D. Note verbale of 23 September 1975

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and further to the Permanent Representative's note, dated 26 August 1975, regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX)

of 17 December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith partial estimates of the losses incurred by the Gaza Strip and the Ministry of War, and re-estimates of the losses incurred by the Ministries of Social Affairs, Commerce and Petroleum.

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND
UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated of losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
29. Ministry of Social Affairs	(a) Compensation paid for losses of private property	11 128 161	up to 15 Aug. 1975	Amending item 9
	(b) Compensation expected to be paid for losses of property	3 871 839	from 16 Aug. 1975 to 31 Dec. 1975	
		15 000 000	from 1 Jan. 1967 to 31 Dec. 1967	
	(c) Compensation paid for civilian casualties	182 088	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(d) Reparation paid to evacuees	119 336 111	from 5 June 1967 to 31 July 1975	
	(e) Reparation expected to be paid	10 502 053	from 1 Aug. 1975 to 31 Dec. 1975	
	(f) Reparation paid to families of troops	22 628 000	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(g) Cost of the Social Development Plan in the Suez Canal region	2 000 000	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(h) Sums paid from the allocation for victims of the aggression	4 647 499	up to 1 Sept. 1975	

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967 (continued)

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
29. Ministry of Social Affairs (continued)	(i) Assistance paid to charity societies in service of the battle	11 886 939	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(j) Financial estimates of unrealized profits	390 000 000	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(k) Estimate of losses incurred in the installations of the Ministry and of other affiliate bodies	235 301	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(l) Sums paid against evacuation and for commercial and real-estate loans	Under preparation by the Ministry of Finance		
30. Ministry of Commerce	(a) Direct damages	61 994 550	up to 31 Dec. 1974	Amending item 3 (above)
	(b) Indirect damages	457 800	up to 31 Dec. 1974	
31. Ministry of Petroleum	(a) Direct damages	452 499 000	up to 31 Dec. 1974	Amending item 12 (above)
	(b) Indirect damages	368 264 000	up to 31 Dec. 1974	
	(c) Losses resulting from the enemy's seizure of Sinai's petroleum production	896 200 000	up to 31 Dec. 1975	
32. Gaza Strip	(a) Losses incurred by the Directorate of Education	440 000	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(b) Losses incurred by the Directorate of the Interior and Public Security	1 606 825	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(c) Losses incurred by the Directorate of Finance and Economy	12 019 248	up to 1 Sept. 1975	
	(d) Losses incurred by the Directorate of Social Affairs and Refugees	233 666 000	up to 1 Sept. 1975	

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND
UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967 (continued)

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
33. Ministry of War	(a) Losses of equipment, weapons and ammunition:			
	June 1967 operations	1 200 000 000		
	War of Attrition	260 000 000		
	October 1973 war	1 500 000 000		
	(b) Losses in installations	26 000 000		
	(c) Compensations for families of casualties	40 000 000		In addition to monthly pensions paid to entitled persons

E. Note verbale of 30 September 1975

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, further to the Permanent Representative's note dated 23 September 1975, regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith partial re-estimates of the losses incurred by the Ministries of Electricity, Military Production (Civil Sector) and Education.

It should also be pointed out that the Ministry of Finance, in connexion with information gathered from most ministries, has estimated that the global losses incurred by these ministries and up to 31 August 1975 should read as follows:

(In Egyptian pounds)

1. Civil losses
 - (a) Direct losses 2 412 000 000
 - (b) Indirect losses 4 655 900 000
2. Military losses (approx.) 4 942 400 000

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS
AND UTILITIES AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE JUNE 1967 (continued)

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Estimated losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
34. Ministry of Electricity	(a) Direct damages	31 526 600	from 5 June 1967 to 31 Dec. 1974	Amending item 8 above
	(b) Indirect damages	267 076 700	"	
35. Ministry of War Production (Civil Sector)	Cost of suspension of production during the raids and rise in cost of imports etc., as well as loss of production of nitric acid in Suez	18 349 769	from 5 June 1967 to 31 Aug. 1974	Direct losses 1 522 000 Indirect losses 16 827 769 (amending item 11 above)
36. Ministry of Education	(a) Direct damages	51 048 491	from 5 June 1967 to 1 Sept. 1975	Amending item 17 above
	(b) Indirect damages	4 281 468		

F. Note verbale of 24 October 1975

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, further to the Permanent Representative's note dated 30 September 1975, regarding General Assembly resolution 3336

(XXIX) of 17 December 1974, has the honour to enclose herewith partial estimates of losses incurred by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, and re-estimates of the losses incurred by the Ministries of Health and Wakfs.

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND
ORGANS AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE 1967

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Statement of losses</i>	<i>Estimate of losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
37. Ministry of Health	(a) Medicines for treatment and emergencies and medical equipment, as a result of a direct attack on the First Aid Station at Zaafarana on 9 Sept. 1969	2 103 627	from 9 Sept. 1969 to 1 Oct. 1975	Amendment of item 5
	(b) Losses incurred by the Governorate of Sinai	18 061 000	from June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	
	(c) Losses incurred by the Gaza Strip	60 884 365	from June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	
	(d) Losses incurred within Egypt	623 050 000	from June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	
38. Ministry of Wakfs (endowments)	(a) Cost of renovation and restoration of the Ministry's mosques in the Governorates of the Suez-Canal region and Sinai	2 008 725	from June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	Amendment of item 6

APPENDIX

PARTIAL ESTIMATES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOSSES INCURRED BY DEPARTMENTS AND
ORGANS AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION SINCE 1967 (continued)

<i>Sector or Ministry</i>	<i>Statement of losses</i>	<i>Estimate of losses in Egyptian pounds</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
38. Ministry of Wakfs (endowments) (continued)	(b) Cost of renovation and restoration of mosques endowed by private individuals in the Governorates of the Suez Canal region and Sinai	480 000	from June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	
	(c) Egyptian Wakfs Authority:			
	(i) Direct losses	125 491	from 5 June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	
	(ii) Indirect losses	6 597		
39. Ministry of Housing and Construction	Losses incurred by contracting companies (direct and indirect)	30 042 632	from 5 June 1967 to 1 Oct. 1975	

ANNEX III

*Note verbale dated 8 July 1975 from the Permanent Representative
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General*

The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, in response to the Secretary-General's note of 18 March 1975 requesting information on the adverse economic effects suffered by the Syrian Arab Republic since 1967 as a result of repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of part of its territories, in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, encloses tables containing the following information on such economic effects:

		<i>\$US 1,000</i>
1. Table 1	Amount of economic damage suffered by State bodies and the public sector, 1967-1975	2,541,543
2. Table 2	Amount of direct damage suffered by the private sector, 1973-1975	316,840
3. Table 3	Amount of direct damage in villages in the theater of operations and villages occupied in 1973 and subsequently evacuated	261,161
4. Table 4	Amount of damage resulting from the devastation of the town of Quneitra and the occupation of the district, 1967-1975	2,347,765

5. Table 5 Amount of agricultural damage resulting from the occupation of Quneitra district, 1967-1975	593,852
6. Value of antiquities taken from the district and looted by the enemy	1,000,000
7. Amount of aid to the people displaced during the period 1967-1975	354,048
Grand Total	7,019,209

In addition to this economic damage, which amounted to \$US 7,019,209,000, the Syrian Arab Republic will incur, as from 1976, \$US 184 million, at current rates, owing to the loss of agricultural land, the cost of providing for the needs of the displaced persons and the loss of revenue from properties and public utilities.

Furthermore, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic would like to draw the Secretary-General's attention to the fact that, in 1967, Israeli forces occupied two towns, 137 villages and 100 farms. In 1973, they occupied 24 villages and 23 farms. They withdrew in 1973 from one town, 27 villages and 23 farms, while to date they continue to occupy one town, 134 villages and 100 farms. The estimated number of persons forced by Israeli aggression to leave their land in the Quneitra district in 1967 is 82,000. The 1970 census shows that 122,937 inhabitants

of Quneitra were at that time living in other Syrian districts.

It is to be noted that the attached information on the damage suffered by the Syrian Arab Republic as a result of repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of part of its territories is not all inclusive. Syrian authorities are in the process of assessing other direct and indirect damage that might have been caused by Israeli aggression to private establishments and individuals in respect of which no claim or notification has yet been made. Nor does the information cover casualties, including loss of life.

The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmits this information to the Secretary-General for inclusion in the report he is to prepare in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX).

TABLE 1

AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC DAMAGE SUFFERED BY STATE BODIES AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR AS A RESULT OF
CONTINUED OCCUPATION AND REPEATED ISRAELI AGGRESSION, 1967-1975

Body	1967-1973			1973-1975			\$US 1 000
	Direct damage	Indirect damage	Total	Direct damage	Indirect damage	Total	
Ministry of Petroleum	-	-	-	402 580	111 322	513 902	513 902
Ministry of Electricity	21 000	6 000	27 000	692 000	134 000	826 000	853 000
Ministry of Industry	-	-	-	15 020	54 693	69 713	69 713
Ministry of Communications	276 000	24 000	300 000	186 000	24 000	210 000	510 000
Ministry of Public Works	1 050	6 000	7 050	3 450	3 105	6 555	13 605
Ministry of Education	73 100	-	73 100	1 080	-	1 080	74 180
Ministry of Higher Education	-	-	-	13	-	13	13
Ministry of Health	661	-	661	35	1 026	1 061	1 722
Ministry of Information	-	-	-	260	293	553	553
Ministry of Supplies	-	-	-	200	126	326	326
Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade	-	-	-	55	30 236	30 291	30 291
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	-	-	-	782	-	782	782

Ministry of Tourism	—	5 600	5 600	10	—	10	5 610
Civil Aviation Administration	—	—	—	—	6 080	6 080	6 080
Ministry of Finance	—	—	—	100	43 200	43 300	43 300
Ministry of Euphrates Dam	—	—	—	7 640	—	7 640	7 640
Ministry of Local Administration	—	—	—	—	641	641	641
Ministry of Housing and Utilities	10 228	1 150	11 378	350	2 000	2 350	13 728
Ministry of Transport	—	305	305	—	152	152	457
Grand total	882 039	43 055	425 094	1 309 575	410 874	1 720 449	2 541 543

TABLE 2

AMOUNT OF DIRECT DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 1973-1975

Data	\$ US 1 000
Buildings destroyed and damaged in the city of Damascus	22 673
Cars destroyed in Damascus and Homs	2 282
Industrial plants	256 200
The construction sector	8 500
Public transport	6 600
Hotels, entertainment and tourism facilities	17 085
Other sectors	3 500
Total	316 840

TABLE 3

AMOUNT OF DIRECT DAMAGE IN VILLAGES IN THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
AND VILLAGES OCCUPIED IN 1973 AND SUBSEQUENTLY EVACUATED

<i>Data</i>	<i>Villages in the theatre of operations</i>	<i>Villages occupied in 1973 and subsequently evacuated</i>	<i>\$US 1 000 Total</i>
Buildings	16 874	51 513	68 387
Funds, commodities and merchandise	17 583	21 035	38 618
Trees and agricultural products	41 348	84 427	125 775
Animals and livestock	3 378	17 430	20 808
Utilities and structures	5 508	2 065	7 573
Total	84 691	176 477	261 161

TABLE 4

AMOUNT OF DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DEVASTATION OF THE TOWN
OF QUNEITRA AND OCCUPATION OF THE DISTRICT, 1967-1975

<i>Data</i>	<i>Town of Quneitra</i>	<i>Cities, villages and farms</i>	<i>\$US 1 000 Total</i>
Buildings	1 042 700	312 060	1 354 760
Funds, commodities and merchandise	472 575	79 430	552 005
Utilities and government structures	441 000	<i>a</i>	441 000
Total	1 956 275	391 490	2 347 765

a Included in table 1.

TABLE 5

AMOUNT OF AGRICULTURAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE
OCCUPATION OF QUNEITRA DISTRICT, 1967-1975

<i>Data</i>	<i>Direct damage</i>	<i>Losses in production</i>	<i>\$US 1 000 Total</i>
Farm products	—	161 560	161 560
Produce of productive trees	—	210 920	210 920
Animal products	102 760	101 304	204 064
Agricultural machinery	2 954	295	3 249
Mills	984	2 496	3 480
Oil presses	270	1 132	1 402
Molasses presses	285	8 892	9 177
Total	107 253	486 599	593 852

ANNEX IV

*Note verbale dated 6 August 1975 from the Permanent
Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General*

The Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note of 18 March 1975, concerning General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974.

The position of Israel on the subject-matter of the resolution in question was made clear by the

delegate of Israel in the Second Committee on 15 November 1974 and in the plenary meeting on 17 December 1974 and is reflected in documents A/C. 2/SR. 1630 and A/PV. 2323 enclosed herewith.

Furthermore, it is noted that the wording of paragraph 5 of resolution 3336 (XXIX) com-

pletely prejudices the issue, leaving no room and no purpose for the preparation of an objective report. In fact, the resolution is merely a reflection of the political warfare carried out by the Arab States against Israel in the United Nations.

APPENDIX I

Statement by Mr. Israel Eliashiv in explanation before the vote on item 12 (report of the Economic and Social Council) at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly on 17 December 1974 (A/PV.2323)

I wish to address myself to draft resolution II recommended by the Second Committee in document A/9886⁵⁸ now before the Assembly. It is indeed regrettable that those who have inspired and initiated the draft resolution, and their supporters, have once more involved the Second Committee in highly sensitive political subjects which not only are extraneous to it but have been fully dealt with elsewhere in this Assembly, thus establishing a very negative and unproductive pattern of work for the Second Committee by engaging it in bilateral political disputes. Furthermore, the specific questions referred to in the draft resolution relate to the areas administered by Israel since 1967, and these questions have been fully discussed in the Special Political Committee and in the plenary Assembly. There we have given a very full statement of the factual situation and of our position, and I do not intend to repeat all that.

Last year a very similar proposal was initiated by the same delegation. Its purpose was clear: by the constant repetition of spurious charges, to try and rewrite history. The draft resolution now before us continues in that vein. It singles out one so-called economic issue, which cannot be divorced from that of the whole complex Middle East problem. The motives behind this draft resolution are essentially political in character. They attempt to attribute to Israel exclusive responsibility for all the consequences of the continuous aggression committed by Arab States against it ever since 1948, ignoring the responsibility of the Arab States which cannot escape the consequences of their own aggression against Israel.

As is well known, only a few hours after the proclamation of Israel's independence in 1948, Arab States proclaimed war against Israel and

marched their armies across the borders to crush it at birth. The telegrams sent by Arab Governments and by the Secretary-General of the Arab League on 14 May 1948, brazenly informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their planned invasion of our country, bear testimony to that fact. I refer to documents S/743,⁵⁹ S/745⁶⁰ and S/748 and Corr. 1.⁶⁰

For more than 26 years Israel has been subjected to constant aggression and belligerency by Arab Governments in defiance of the United Nations Charter and resolutions. This aggression included economic boycott, blockade of international waterways, armed raids and sabotage, political warfare and terror, designed, in the words of the late President Nasser, to strike the death blow at Israel.

The culmination of the Arab aggression was their assault on 6 October 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a massive premeditated and unprovoked attack against Israel, as fully described in the reports of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and clearly admitted by the President of Egypt and other Arab leaders. In 1967 Israel, embattled and besieged, and in the face of the avowed aggression of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, was compelled to defend itself, and the occupation of the areas administered by Israel since then is the outcome of that situation.

The continuation of that occupation is a direct consequence of the refusal of the Arab States since then to enter into negotiations with Israel to establish a firm and just peace in the area. To refer to Israeli presence in the occupied areas while ignoring that Israel arrived there in the course of a war of Arab making is to pervert fundamental truth. International law and the specific United Nations resolutions have entrusted Israel with the responsibility for the security of the territories and the safety of their population.

No amount of fanciful allegations and distorted reports will deter Israel from pursuing its policy of maintaining the law in force in the territories and to conduct its administration in accordance with the relevant rules of international law and binding international conventions, to promote social and economic development, to foster good neighbourly

⁵⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 66, 292nd meeting, pp. 2 and 3.*

⁶⁰ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Third Year, Supplement for May 1948.*

⁵⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 12, para. 21.*

relations and to maintain options open for future peace negotiations.

We reject all the baseless allegations aimed at the creation of confusion and exploitation of fake issues for political purposes.

I would also recall that the Special Committee, whose report (A/9817) the proponents of this draft resolution relied on so heavily, was established in an entirely irregular and unconstitutional manner. Furthermore, as our delegation has previously shown in detail when discussing the Special Committee's report, no validity whatsoever can be attached to the findings and conclusions of that Committee. Anyone who carefully scrutinizes its report must reach the unavoidable conclusion that it is based on preconceived ideas, irrelevant assertions, baseless allegations, selective quotations, and so-called findings that have no foundation whatever.

With reference to the issue of the so-called exploitation of natural resources, I fully explained our position during the debate in the Second Committee and I shall reiterate only that it is our view that there is no rule of international law which could have the effect of barring Israel from the use of natural resources available in the area. Israel has acted in complete and absolute accord with international law and practice in this matter.

In conclusion, the draft resolution before us is completely uncalled for. It is one-sided and biased. It passes over in utter silence the fact that Israel has endured extremely adverse economic effects as a result of continuing Arab aggression against it since 1948 in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolutions. It is based on utterly false legal premises. It seeks to prejudice any forthcoming negotiations and will serve no purpose in the quest for peace in the Middle East.

For the reasons presented by my delegation in the Second Committee and here in the General Assembly, we utterly reject the draft resolution and will vote against it.

APPENDIX II

Statement by Mr. Israel Eliashiv on 15 November 1974 at the 1630th meeting of the Second Committee of the General Assembly on agenda item 12

I wish to address myself to draft resolution A/C. 2/L.1372. Before doing so one can only express once again regret at the renewed attempt to involve

this Committee in highly sensitive political matters which are not only extraneous to it, but are being fully dealt with elsewhere in this session in the General Assembly. The draft establishes a very negative and non-productive pattern of work for the Second Committee by engaging it in bilateral political disputes. The Second Committee has built up, over the years, a positive tradition of dealing with purely economic and financial matters, and in any case it has avoided as a general practice any reference in its resolutions to countries involved in bilateral disputes, even on economic issues. I need not spell out examples which are of common knowledge to members of this Committee. This draft breaks with this tradition.

Last year a very similar proposal was sponsored by a number of countries. Its purpose was clear, by the constant repetition of spurious charges, to try and rewrite history. The draft now before us continues in that vein.

Those who have inspired and initiated the draft resolution have singled out one so-called economic issue which cannot be divorced from that of the whole complex Middle East problem, which is being discussed elsewhere in this session of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the specific questions referred to in the draft resolution have no relevance to the agenda item we are discussing, which is the report of the Economic and Social Council. The draft relates to the areas administered by Israel since 1967, and these questions have been discussed in the Special Political Committee. There we have given a very full statement of the factual situation and of our position, and I will not take up this Committee's time by repeating all that.

The motives behind this draft resolution are essentially political in character. They aim at attributing to Israel exclusive responsibility for all the consequences of the continuous aggression committed by Arab States against it ever since 1948, ignoring the responsibility of the Arab States who cannot escape the consequences of their own aggression against Israel. As is well known, only a few hours after the proclamation of Israel's independence in 1948, Arab States proclaimed war against Israel and marched their armies across the borders to crush her at birth. Let me recall the telegrams sent by Arab Governments and by the Secretary-General of the Arab League on 14 May 1948, brazenly informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their planned invasion of

our country. I refer to documents S/743, S/745, S/748. In a cable to the Security Council, contained in document S/743, the then Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Bey Fawzi, announced explicitly the invasion, saying that now that the British Mandate in Palestine has ended, the Egyptian armed forces have started to enter.

For more than 26 years, Israel has been subjected to constant aggression and belligerency by Arab Governments, in defiance of the United Nations Charter and resolutions. This aggression included economic boycott, blockade of international waterways, armed raids and sabotage, political warfare and terror designed, in the words of the late President Nasser, "to strike the death blow at Israel". The culmination of the Arab aggression was their assault on 6 October 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a massive premeditated and unprovoked attack against Israel as fully described in the reports of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and clearly admitted by the President of Egypt and other Arab leaders.

By what perverse logic can the Arab representatives accuse Israel of aggression? A belligerent cannot preach and practise unilateral aggression, and then demand to be protected from the consequences of his acts.

The principal organs of the United Nations repudiated the malicious Arab thesis that aggression and a state of war which the Arab States have proclaimed and practised against Israel conferred upon them the right to blockade, boycott, threaten, intimidate and engage in political warfare and terror, while requiring Israel to resign itself to its annihilation, openly promised and planned by Arab States. They also repudiated all unfounded Arab charges that Israel has been guilty of aggression.

In 1967, Israel, embattled and besieged and in the face of the avowed aggression of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, was compelled to defend itself, and the occupation of the areas administered by Israel since then, is the outcome of that situation. The continuation of that occupation has been the direct consequence of the refusal of the Arab States since then to enter into negotiations with Israel to establish a firm and just peace in the area.

To refer to the Israeli presence in the occupied areas while ignoring that Israel had arrived there in the course of a war of Arab making is to pervert fundamental truth.

International law and specific United Nations resolutions have entrusted Israel with the responsibility for the security of the territories and the safety of its population. The policy of the Military Administration in the territories has been to maintain the laws in force in the territories and to conduct its administration in accordance with the relevant rules of international law and binding international conventions, to promote social and economic development, to foster good neighbourly relations and to maintain options open for future peace negotiations.

Progress has been achieved in every field of human life and endeavour, be it in the sphere of education, health, social services, building activity, agriculture, industry or development.

To ignore these facts and to place the matter in the distorted mirror of the draft resolution is an invidious and tasteless misrepresentation which exceeds all limits. To refer to a situation where tens of thousands of workers from occupied territories find useful and remunerative employment in Israel as "exploitation of existing resources", including human resources, is absurd.

We reject all the baseless allegations aimed at the creation of confusion and the exploitation of faked issues for political purposes. I would also recall that the Special Committee,⁶¹ on the report of which the proponents of this resolution relied so heavily, was established in an entirely irregular and unconstitutional manner and, for the further reasons presented by my delegation in the Special Political Committee when discussing that report, none of its findings and conclusions have any validity whatsoever.

With reference to the issues of the so-called "exploitation of natural resources", as I stated last year in this Committee, it is our view that there is no rule of international law which could have the effect of barring Israel from the use of natural resources available in the area.

Israel has acted in complete and absolute accord with international law and practice on this issue. Israel has, in accordance with international law, the responsibility and financial burden of providing public and social services for the population of the territories and it is entitled to that income to which the former authorities were entitled. It is completely and patently untenable to claim

⁶¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511.

that international law stipulates that the occupying Power is bound to provide those services given by the Government, but that the income to which the Government is entitled reverts to the previous authority. On this issue, The Hague Regulations clearly state that the occupying Power is entitled to the usufruct. Any other interpretation would lead to a situation whereby the occupying Power provides the services and public utilities, while the income from public property belongs to the previous Power, who, during the period of occupation, provides no services whatsoever. Such a result would be founded neither on logic nor on international law.

It is obvious that the repeated Arab aggression against my country since 1948, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, has had extremely adverse economic effects on Israel.

To conclude, the draft resolution is completely uncalled for, it seeks to prejudge any forthcoming negotiations and will serve no purpose in the quest for peace in the Middle East. We, therefore, reject

it completely and hope that many other delegations will oppose it and not adopt an attitude which can be interpreted as implying support for it.

ANNEX V

Note verbale dated 9 September 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 March 1975 and regarding General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, and pursuant to his note of 26 August 1975, has the honour to enclose herewith the revised and final report on the adverse economic effects on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, resulting from the Israeli aggression and occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan.

The adverse effects of Israeli occupation of the West Bank on Jordan's economy

1 September 1975

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. Jordan is situated off the south-eastern shores of the Mediterranean (between longitudes 34° and 39° East and latitudes 29° and 33° North) and extends eastwards to the Arabian desert. Jordan covers an area of 94,740 square kilometres of which 5,874 square kilometres (6.2 per cent) lie on the West Bank of the Jordan River. The total cultivable area is estimated at 13 million *dunums*, of which 3.2 million *dunums* (25 per cent) lie on the West Bank.

2. The population of Jordan is estimated at 2.7 million persons in 1975, of whom about 2 million persons live in the East Bank and 0.7 million persons live in the West Bank. The rate of growth of population is 3.2 per cent per annum. The density averages at 28.4 persons per square kilometre of total area and 207.7 persons per square kilometre of cultivable area. Adult literacy rate was 60 per cent in mid-1971.

3. The 1961 population census of Jordan indicated that there were 389,978 persons economically active; of this, 172,101 persons (44.1 per cent) were in the West Bank. Assuming a participation rate of 20 per cent, the total labour force in 1975 is 540,000 persons, of whom 400,000 are in the East Bank.

II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE

4. Jordan's economy prior to June 1967 witnessed higher rates of growth than any other developing country in the world. Jordan's initial effort in drawing up a Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1967) was superseded by the Seven-Year Plan for Economic Develop-

ment (1964-1970).

5. The Seven-Year Plan (1964-1970) was launched in 1964 aiming at increasing the gross national product (GNP) in real terms by 7.4 per cent per annum and reducing the ratio of foreign trade deficit to GNP from 30 per cent in 1964 to 11 per cent in 1970. The plan also aimed at reducing budget support from JD 14 million to JD 6 million between 1964-1970 and at increasing employment by 5.5 per cent per annum.

6. In order to achieve these objectives, the plan called for a total investment of JD 275 million.

7. Most of the development projects and proposals included in the plan and scheduled for implementation between 1964 and June 1967 were either implemented or under way.

8. The gross national product rose at an annual rate of growth of 9.4 per cent. This high rate of economic growth was maintained with a fairly high degree of price and monetary stability. The significant features of growth trends in the composition of expenditure were the rising share of consumption, whose rate of growth was 15.5 per cent per annum, and the increasing share of investment, whose annual rate of growth was 11 per cent. The rate of growth of exports of goods and non-factor services was almost double the corresponding figure for imports of goods and non-factor services (15.4 per cent for exports as against 8.5 per cent for imports). The net-factor income from abroad rose at an annual rate of 15.3 per cent. The structural change was evidenced in domestic output (whose rate of growth was 8.4 per cent per annum) in favour of the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors. The annual rate of growth of the agricultural sector over the 1959-1966 period was 9.1 per cent, mining and

industry 15.7 per cent, construction 10.4 per cent, electricity and water 16.9 per cent and the services sectors 7 per cent.

9. It is sufficient to mention here that Jordan's absorptive capacity expanded, its natural resources were efficiently utilized, its human resources were upgraded and became more productive, its institutional set-up modernized and developed, its stock of entrepreneurs increased under the umbrella of constitutional continuity, stability, law and order. The social overhead capital accumulated and increased and the capacity of the public sector in providing public services and infrastructural facilities promoted and expanded.

10. A large number of institutions, corporations and firms were established in the fields of agriculture, industry, mining, trade, business and banking.

III. THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON LAND AND HUMAN RESOURCES OF JORDAN

A. Land

11. The Israeli aggression in June 1967 resulted in the loss of the West Bank, 6.2 per cent of the total area of Jordan, 25 per cent of Jordan's cultivable area, 80 per cent of the land planted with fruits, 45 per cent of land planted with vegetables, 25 per cent of land planted with cereals and 35 per cent of total livestock.

AREA AND CULTIVABLE LAND USE
(IN MILLIONS OF DUNUMS)

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Agricultural land</i>	<i>Cereals</i>	<i>Vegetables</i>	<i>Fruits</i>	<i>Unutilized</i>
Kingdom	94.740	13.0	8.7	0.6	0.9	2.8
West Bank	5.874	3.2	2.2	0.3	0.7	
% of total	(6.2)	(25)	(25)	(45)	(80)	

12. The net irrigable area is 728,000 *dunums* (mostly lie in the Jordan Valley), of which 156,000 *dunums* (32 per cent) are in the West Bank. This area in particular was subject to frequent attacks and bombardment by Israeli artillery and by air raids, which continued for years after the occupation and caused severe damages to irrigation schemes, roads, houses, farms and other installations, which ended in the destruction of agricultural produce. The total loss in the East Bank caused by continuous Israeli raids in the Jordan Valley, amounted to JD 55 million, or JD 97.2 million in 1975 prices.

13. In the West Bank, the agricultural land was greatly reduced owing to the expropriation of 190,259 *dunums* of land between 1967 and 1974. Most of the confiscated land is located around Jerusalem, Jericho and Nablus. Over 13,000 housing units were demolished between 1967 and 1974, leaving their dwellers homeless.

14. In Judaizing Arab Jerusalem, the Israeli

authorities demolished entire villages around Jerusalem, whole quarters in the city, mosques and schools. The Israeli authorities have also confiscated the Palestine museum, 20,000 *dunums*, including 600 buildings, five mosques, four schools, two markets and two Islamic centres, leaving their dwellers homeless, in order to resettle 100,000 Jews in 30,000 housing units to be built in Jerusalem so as to outnumber the 70,000 Arabs living there.

15. The sanctity of the holy places, including the Dome of the Rock and the Aqsa Mosques and a good number of other mosques and churches, was violated. The Aqsa Mosque was burnt and its structure threatens to collapse owing to excavations by Jewish fanatics searching for Solomon's temple.

B. Human resources

16. Israeli aggression caused the influx of over 414,000 evacuees from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to East Bank.

17. Israeli authorities deported and put to exile 1,500 persons between 1967 and 1972, entirely demolished three villages, leaving 8,500 persons homeless, and destroyed 7,542 houses in refugee camps, whose dwellers became homeless for the second time in their history. Moreover, 6,000 persons were tempted to migrate. Some of them were supplied with air-tickets free of charge in order to migrate to the United States of America, Canada and Latin America.

18. The end result was that the population of the West Bank, estimated to be 1.3 million persons in 1965, was reduced to only 700,000 persons who are actually living there. Of these, 19,000 were committed to prison because they denounced Israeli occupation.

C. Employment

19. The total labour force, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, numbered 126,400 persons in 1973 at a participation rate of 19 per cent.

20. Israeli policy was determined to utilize the maximum number of the Arab labour force available in the occupied territory, in order to achieve the following goals:

(a) To serve Israeli development in the fields of agriculture, industry and construction and thereby replace the maximum number of Jews serving their armed forces;

(b) To choke the occupied territory's resistance to occupation;

(c) To bleed the occupied territory's labour force, which resulted in the substantial reduction of the West Bank's economic growth and development potential.

IV. THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON THE SEVEN-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

21. The implementation of the Seven-Year Plan was halted in the West Bank owing to Israeli military occupation and work on several vital projects in East Bank was either delayed or halted. Among these were the Yarmouk Dam, electrification of Jordan, Jerusalem airport and other projects in the various sectors of the economy. The total investment of these projects was estimated at JD 175 million (or JD 332.7 million in 1975 prices), an amount which, if it had been spent, would have expanded further Jordan's economic potential and its productive capacity.

22. In East Bank, the Government had to adopt an *ad hoc* development programme and launched an emergency programme in an attempt to absorb the economically active population seeking work. The Government also proceeded in implementing projects and proposals included in the Seven-Year Plan for East Bank.

INVESTMENT IN THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN
(1964-1970)
(IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS)

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Plan	22.2	29.1	38.9	49.5	45.8	46.7	42.3
Actual	18.8	23.2	24.9	24.3	27.4	34.2	23.2

23. Actual investment totalled JD 176 million, part of which was spent on capital projects not included in the plan. According to the evaluation report, only 40 per cent of the total number of projects and proposals were implemented.

24. Again, Israeli occupation of the West Bank stood in the way of Jordan's development drive and in the way of achieving the plan's goals.

V. THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF JORDAN

25. The adverse effects of Israeli occupation and its aftermath had precipitated far-reaching effects envisaged in the following:

(a) The economic performance in East Bank after the 1967 Israeli aggression was characterized by recession, which started immediately after

June 1967 and continued until the end of 1968. Then a period of recovery continued until mid-1970, followed by a period of depression, a picture which reversed itself marginally in 1971, and the economy has continued to revive since then.

(b) East Jordan's economy suffered, until 1972, from excess demand, inflationary pressures, financial imbalance, sectoral deficit, rise in prices and substantial expansion in money and credit.

(c) Table 1 shows Jordan's GNP projected at 1975 prices for the period from 1967 to 1975 on the proviso that conditions and growth rates experienced prior to June 1967 remained the same. Table 2 shows actual data for East Bank's GNP for the corresponding period in 1975 prices.

(d) In comparing both tables, we find that GNP annual rate of growth dropped by 7.6 per cent, GDP at market prices dropped by 7.8 per cent, GDP at factor cost declined by 7.4 per cent, con-

sumption declined by 7.1 per cent, investment dropped by 0.4 per cent, imports of goods and non-factor services outgrew the 1959-1966 growth rate by 1.4 per cent, exports of goods and non-factor services declined by 4.6 per cent and net factor income from abroad also dropped by 6.3 per cent.

(e) Again, by subtracting the findings in table 2 and those in table 3 (West Bank's GNP in 1975 prices according to the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel) from table 1, we observe the following (as shown in table 4):

(i) Jordan's accumulated loss amounted to JD 2.2 thousand million in terms of economic resources. In 1966, the West Bank contributed about 45 per cent of the total economic resources in the country;

(ii) The accumulated loss in GNP amounted to JD 1.6 thousand million and in GDP at market prices JD 1.5 thousand million.

JORDAN'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND USES
(1967-1975)
(IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS)

	<i>Projected East and West Banks</i> 1	<i>East Bank</i> 2	<i>West Bank</i> 3	<i>Accumulated loss (1-2-3) 4</i>
GNP	5,379.1	2,741.2	1,009.6	1,618.2
Imports of (G + NFS)	2,078.4	1,059.1	474.5	544.8
Resources/uses	7,457.5	3,800.3	1,484.1	2,163.0
Consumption	4,817.4	2,537.6	871.8	1,408.0
Investment	801.7	505.2	180.0	116.5
Exports of (G and S) including net factor income from abroad	1,838.3	757.5	432.3	638.5

(iii) West Bank's economic resources as shown in the previous table did not exceed 20 per cent of Jordan's economic resources compared with 45 per cent in 1966. The drastic change can also be seen in other macro-economic variables.

(iv) Again, Jordan's economy lost in terms of domestic demand an accumulated amount of JD 1.5 thousand million and in terms of external demand JD 0.6 thousand million.

(v) The negative saving-investment gap widened. Otherwise, if Israeli occupation had not taken place, it would have shown positive savings:

a. Jordan's domestic savings, as shown in table 1, has shown a surplus since 1972 and until 1975 compared with negative domestic savings in previous years;

b. Jordan's net-factor income from abroad (in table 1) showed an accumulated amount of JD 561.4 million, which would have been used in supplementing national savings;

c. External savings in this case would have been in the range of only 30 per cent of total savings, compared with 58.1 per cent in East Bank.

(f) Again, East Bank suffered from balance-

of-payments pressures, especially from 1969 through 1971. The estimated accumulated loss in exports of goods and non-factor services was JD 525 million and in net-factor income from abroad was JD 113.8 million.

(g) Domestic revenues of the government budget incurred a loss of 32 per cent of the total. Furthermore, the budget was subject to further financial pressures owing to the following:

(i) The influx of over 414,000 evacuees, who needed food, shelter and clothing;

(ii) Labour-market pressures;

(iii) The need to expand and reconstruct infrastructure facilities;

(iv) Higher budgetary allocations for defence instead of investment;

(v) Allocations for compensation of farmers at the Ghor area and for reconstruction of the severely damaged areas in the Jordan Valley as a result of the continuous daily Israeli raids for several years after June 1967.

(h) Jordan lost half of its markets, which caused a severe shock in Jordan's economy, especially in the industry, trade and construction sectors.

(i) The unfavourable effects on business confidence, which caused reluctance in investment.

(j) The re-routing of sea-borne trade through Beirut instead of Aqaba, owing to the closure of the Suez Canal.

The economic situation of the West Bank after June 1967

26. The statistical data, presented by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, on the West Bank do not reflect the true picture for several reasons, among which are:

(a) GNP figures and other macro-economic variables for the West Bank in 1971 are far below the 1966 level;

(b) Statistics for the integrated pre-war Jordanian economy showed that GNP of the West Bank reached JD 79.2 million in 1966, while GNP, as shown in Israel's own statistics (in 1975 prices), was JD 78.2 million in 1971 for the West Bank;

(c) Investment in the West Bank (in 1975 prices) was only JD 5.9 million in 1968, JD 7.7 million in 1970 and JD 9.2 million in 1971, which is far below the actual figure for 1966;

(d) Figures quoted for 1968-1971 are far below the corresponding figures for succeeding years;

(e) Production growth rates between 1968 and

1975 for the West Bank were 34.8 per cent in GNP, 27 per cent in GDP, 25 per cent in consumption, 26 per cent in imports and 17 per cent in exports. In constant terms, taking into account the rise in consumer price index of 38.2 per cent, the rates of growth sustained at market prices will turn to be negative at a declining trend of 3.4 per cent in GNP, 11 per cent in GDP, 13 per cent in consumption, 12 per cent in imports and 21 per cent in exports.

27. Therefore these statistical peculiarities should be kept in mind in discussion throughout the report.

28. During the period from 1967 to 1975 the economic performance was below potential on account of low absorptive capacity, reflecting largely institutional and manpower constraints.

29. GNP of the West Bank in real terms rose from JD 34.2 million in 1968 to JD 117.4 million in 1975.

30. If Israeli occupation did not take place, assuming conditions remained the same, Jordan's GNP in real terms would have reached a global figure of JD 434 million. The West Bank's contribution, in this case, will be only 27 per cent in 1975 against 42.6 per cent in 1966, when the West was part of Jordan.

31. *Per capita* GNP in real terms in the West Bank was JD 109 in 1972 against the equivalent of JD 514 in Israel in 1972.

32. This low income accompanied by a substantial rise in prices of 38 per cent per annum, played a dominant role in determining demand and output.

33. West Bank's gross domestic expenditures in real terms is estimated to reach JD 112.8 million in 1975 against JD 418.3 million for Jordan if the Israeli occupation had not taken place.

34. Incremental capital output ratio in the West Bank was only 1:1 during the period, which denotes that most projects were labour intensive projects.

35. The deficit in the balance of trade of goods and non-factor services was JD 91 million in the West Bank in 1975 against JD 68 million for the Kingdom.

(a) Exports of goods and non-factor services in the West Bank is estimated to reach JD 52 million in 1975 against JD 234 million for Jordan.

(b) Imports of goods and non-factor services in the West Bank is estimated at JD 143 million in 1975 against JD 303 million for Jordan.

36. This left the West Bank with a negative saving-investment gap; otherwise if the economies of both Banks were still integrated, it would have shown a positive domestic savings.

37. The factors responsible for holding down growth and development in the West Bank, which continued to exert themselves throughout the period 1967-1975, are numerous, among which were:

- (a) Israeli occupation of the West Bank;
- (b) Continuous daily raids on the Jordan Valley for years after the cease-fire in 1967;
- (c) Oppression and confiscation of land and property;
- (d) Demolition of entire villages, quarters of cities, refugee camps and houses;
- (e) Bleeding the Arab labour force to serve their own development, which had adverse effects in the West Bank's development;
- (f) Committing thousands of persons to prison and deporting others outside Israel because they denounced Israeli occupation;
- (g) Shifting the economic resources of the West Bank to Israel;
- (h) The October War of 1973;
- (i) Control over the exploitation of natural and human resources by means of expropriation, imposition of high tax rates between cities and at ports of entry and on farmers so that they would leave their farms;
- (j) Slow suffocation of human rights, freedom and development.

38. The end result culminated in low productivity, which led to low income reflected by low savings and low investment, decline in output and in the productive capacity, especially in people's ability to produce more goods and services.

VI. MAJOR SECTORS

39. The interlocked economic integration between the West and East Banks and intrasectoral flow of goods and services between both Banks was disintegrated and disrupted as a result of the Israeli occupation.

40. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank deprived Jordan of 40 per cent of its domestic output, or 40 per cent in the primary sector, 12.4 per cent in the secondary sector and 47.6 per cent in the tertiary sector.

41. Again, table 4 (Jordan's loss in GNP owing to Israeli occupation) shows that the accumulated

loss in GDP at factor cost between 1967 and 1975 totalled JD 1.1 thousand million. To put it in a different perspective, Jordan lost (owing to the Israeli occupation) in domestic income generated out of the primary sector JD 232 million, in the secondary sector JD 171 million and in the tertiary sector JD 727 million.

A. Agriculture

42. Income generated from this sector in 1966 totalled JD 27.7 million, 40 per cent of which was contributed by the West Bank. The labour force engaged in this sector accounted for over 35 per cent of the total, of which almost one half were in the West Bank. Agricultural exports constituted 51 per cent of the total domestic exports in 1966, almost one half of which were contributed by the West Bank.

43. Unfortunately, Israeli occupation in 1967 caused the loss of 80 per cent of land planted with fruits, 45 per cent of land planted with vegetables, 25 per cent of crops and 35 per cent of total livestock.

44. Output of wheat rose by 21.2 per cent per annum between 1958-1960 and 1964 and 1966, while tomatoes production rose by 7.9 per cent per annum, other vegetables 8.1 per cent, olives 2.8 per cent, citrus 30.1 per cent and grapes by 3.7 per cent.

Output of principal agricultural products

(000 Tons)

1964-66 Average

	Kingdom	West Bank	%
1. Wheat	224.4	67.3	30
2. Tomatoes	187.1	121.6	65
3. Other vegetables	338.5	220.0	65
4. Olives	55.8	44.6	80
5. Citrus	47.1	28.3	60
6. Grapes	72.7	43.6	60

45. The West Bank's contribution in 1966 in Jordan's agricultural production was 30 per cent in terms of wheat, 65 per cent in tomatoes, 65 per cent in other vegetables, 80 per cent in olives, 60 per cent in citrus and 60 per cent in other fruits including grapes.

46. Agricultural output of the irrigated area constitutes 30 per cent of the total, in spite of the fact that only 5.6 per cent of all cultivable land is under irrigation. Therefore, the Government gave top priority to irrigation schemes, most of

which were in the Jordan Valley. Unfortunately the continuous Israeli raids for several years after 1967 on the Valley severely damaged several houses, farms, roads, irrigation schemes and other installations, including the Yarmouk dam, East Ghor Canal and other canals and laterals. Consequently, agricultural produce, income and exports were heavily affected. The total estimated loss was JD 55 million, or JD 97.2 million in 1975 prices.

47. The main features of the Yarmouk project included the construction of two dams of an annual capacity of 550 MCM, main canals and a system of laterals, extending and raising the sides of the East Ghor Canal, drainage system and erecting a hydro-electric power plant of a capacity of 62 MW, at a total cost of JD 45 million. This project was to irrigate over 500,000 *dunums* and to increase agricultural income by JD 24 million when completed. This meant a further loss in agricultural income in the amount of JD 47.3 million, as estimated in 1975 prices, and JD 97.2 million caused also by Israeli raids on the Jordan Valley or a total of JD 139.5 million.

48. Furthermore, the sectoral deficit between East and West Bank after the 1967 Israeli aggression can be attributed to the flow of agricultural products from the West to East Bank, which had a direct effect in accumulating over JD 40 million in terms of currency held by the public in the West Bank, which would constitute a threat to the Jordanian dinar's par value if it were to be claimed by Israel.

49. Consequently, the situation of the agricultural sector in the West Bank is in no way to be envied owing to several intolerable measures which have been undertaken by the Israeli authorities:

(a) Several villages were almost demolished and farmers' houses were destroyed, leaving farmers

homeless seeking refuge somewhere else;

(b) The agricultural land has been decreased substantially owing to continuous confiscation of agricultural land, which amounted to a total figure of over 190,000 *dunums* till 1974;

(c) The percentage of agricultural workers of the total labour force dropped from 35 per cent in 1966 to only 21 per cent owing to several types of pressures and persuasion;

(d) The farmers are suffering from the rising cost of inputs marketed mostly in Israel and from the heavy burden of taxes, which in several cases forced the farmers to leave their farms and to seek work somewhere else;

(e) Israeli authorities are endeavoring to introduce changes in the cropping pattern by discouraging production of competitive crops and favouring complementary crops to Israeli agricultural produce;

(f) These measures led to a reduction of West Bank's output, income and exports;

(g) The estimated accumulated loss in agricultural net income between 1967 and 1975 is JD 232 million (see tables 1 to 4) and, on the account of the Israeli raids on the Jordan Valley, JD 140 million, or a total of JD 372 million.

B. Mining and manufacturing

50. The role of the West Bank in this sector was significant. Income generated out of this sector was JD 17.3 million in 1966, of which JD 3.5 million (20 per cent) was the contribution of the West Bank. Total industrial employment in the West Bank was 13,850 persons or 37 per cent of the total. Industrial establishments in the West Bank were 3,308 or 48 per cent of the total establishments in both Banks.

51. A cursory analysis of industrial production

OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES

	<i>May-June</i>		<i>Change</i> %	<i>June-December</i>		<i>Change</i> %
	1966	1967		1966	1967	
1. Cement (000 tons)	140	137	-2	225	152	-35.3
2. Petroleum products (000 tons)	165	198	20	265	195	-26.4
3. Sole leather (tons)	144	133	-10	201	105	-47
4. Upper leather (tons)	177	254	-44	409	168	-59

during the period prior to the events of 1967, revealed that cement production had risen five-fold between 1958 and 1966, while the production of soap and brewing tripled, cigarettes more than doubled, while petroleum products doubled between 1961 and 1966.

52. Again, Israeli aggression and occupation of the West Bank caused the loss of half of Jordan's markets, which was an important outlet for East Jordan's products.

53. With the exception of phosphate production (whose exports declined owing to closure of the Suez Canal and Syrian borders), output of principal industries did not reach the 1966 level except in late 1968 and 1969. Curtailment in the rate of growth of production by leading industries as a result of the loss of the West Bank markets contributed to the sharp decline in production of 59 per cent in upper leather, 47 per cent in sole leather, 35 per cent in cement and 26 per cent in petroleum products. This sharp decline and slackening of growth resulted in a sluggishness in consumer spending, retail sales and production in other lines of industry.

54. The Israeli aggression and occupation of the West Bank caused the delay in implementing the potash project, which was scheduled to commence operation in 1968 with an initial production capacity of 500,000 tons. The total cost of the project was JD 30.5 million to be invested throughout the plan period. Jordan's exports would have increased by JD 5.4 million by 1970. Several other projects were scheduled to be implemented in the manufacturing and mining sector, but unfortunately were not implemented owing to occupation of the West Bank.

55. Again, Israel exerted their concerted efforts to integrate the activities of this sector with Israel's own activities and undertook several measures in order to isolate this sector from other sectors of the economy, among which were:

(a) Restriction of the purchase of raw materials needed by the West Bank's industries to those produced by their own;

(b) Imposition of direct import controls;

(c) Creation of marketing problems in order to weaken this sector;

(d) Maintaining the West Bank as a consumer market and an outlet for Israel's industrial production;

(e) Prevention of the establishment of compet-

itive industries and encouragement of industries complementary to their own.

56. Again the estimated accumulated loss in income generated out of this sector between 1967 and 1975 is JD 103 million (see tables 1 to 4).

C. Construction

57. Jordan's generated income out of construction activity in 1966 amounted to JD 9.3 million, of which JD 3.3 million (35 per cent) constituted the West Bank's contribution in this sector. The area of residential and non-residential buildings built in 1966 in Jordan totalled 314,000 square metres, of which 75,000 square metres (24 per cent) were built in the West Bank. The rate of growth between 1959 and 1966 was 10.4 per cent per annum.

58. Unfortunately, the Israeli occupation caused severe deterioration in this activity to the extent that the volume of the area built for residential purposes in 1970 equalled only the volume of the area built in Nablus in 1965.

59. Moreover, Israeli occupation not only hindered the bolstering of this activity, but also demolished a total number of 13,000 housing units up to 1974, leaving their dwellers homeless and seeking shelter elsewhere; in many cases they were deported to East Bank.

60. The estimated loss of income generated out of this sector is JD 58 million between 1967 and 1975.

D. Electricity and water

61. Jordan's value added in this sector in 1966 totalled JD 2.3 million, of which JD 0.7 million (31 per cent) was contributed by the West Bank. The installed capacity of electric power in Jordan in 1961 was 29 MW, of which 9.4 MW (32 per cent) was installed in the West Bank. Electricity consumption rose from 59.6 million Kwh in 1961 to 154.1 million Kwh in 1966 or at an annual rate of growth of 21 per cent. The generated electric power in Jordan of 177 million Kwh in 1966 dropped to 96.6 million in 1967 or a drop of 45.4 per cent.

62. Assuming the same rate of growth of 21 per cent, electricity generation would have a global figure of 809 million Kwh in 1974 as against 213 million Kwh actually generated in East Bank in 1974.

63. Jordan's electrification scheme was about

to be implemented. The project of JD 5.7 million involved the erection of a national grid of 132 Kv linking Zerqa, Amman, Jerusalem, Nablus and Irbid, and construction of a steam power station of 88 MW and a hydroelectric generating plant of a capacity of 30 MW.

64. Unfortunately, Israeli occupation stood in the way of implementation.

65. Currently, Israel is exerting concerted efforts to link several cities in the West Bank, especially in the Nablus area, with their own network, thus increasing the reliance of the West Bank's needs on Israel's own power and resources.

66. The total loss in income generated out of this sector is JD 10 million between 1967 and 1975.

E. Tourism

67. Jordan is endowed with some of the most interesting historical and religious sites in the world. These inexhaustible natural resources in terms of Jordan's history, geography, scenery and climate, far from depreciating with use, have yielded attractive returns to Jordan.

68. Tourist arrivals in Jordan increased substantially from 104,100 persons in 1959 to over 618,000 persons in 1966 (or at an annual rate of growth of 29 per cent). Tourism income increased accordingly from JD 2.9 million in 1959 to JD 11.3 million in 1966 (or at an annual rate of growth of 21.4 per cent).

The situation after the 1967 Israeli aggression

69. The estimated accumulated loss in tourism income is JD 453.6 million between 1967 and 1975.

70. Several hotels, touristic facilities and other development projects in the tourism sector were scheduled to be implemented, but unfortunately Israeli occupation stood in the way of development.

71. Israeli occupation prevented the preservation, consolidation and maintenance of several holy places, historical and archeological sites.

72. The sanctity of Jerusalem, Hebron and other holy places, including mosques and churches, were violated.

73. Israeli authorities demolished and destroyed several mosques and Christian holy places which are part of the inheritance of all mankind.

74. Israeli authorities confiscated the Palestine Museum, Moslem Waqf property, and a large area of land.

75. The new plan of judaization had placed 70 per cent of all Moslem properties around the great twin Moslem mosques under Israeli possession.

76. Israeli acts of oppression extended to Arab people's rights, freedom, existence and development, which are subject to slow suffocation.

F. Trade

77. Income generated out of this sector was JD 28.9 million in 1966, of which JD 13.0 million (45 per cent) represented the contribution of the West Bank. Total business concerns in the West Bank were 6,118 establishments in 1966 or 53 per cent of the total number of establishments in Jordan. The labour force engaged in this sector in the West Bank were 12,028 persons or 44 per cent of the total.

78. The West Bank accounted for 64 per cent of Jordan's exports of goods and services and one half of its imports of goods and services.

The situation after 1967 Israeli aggression

79. The estimated accumulated loss in terms of exports of goods and non-factor services is JD 525 million between 1967 and 1975 and, in terms of imports of goods and non-factor services, is JD 545 million.

80. Jordan's loss in capital inflow is estimated at JD 639 million.

81. The estimated accumulated loss in net factor income from abroad is JD 114 million.

82. In the West Bank, the export/import ratio was 43 per cent, the imports aggregate demand ratio 38 per cent and imports total consumption 54 per cent.

83. Israel authorities undertook several measures to threaten the development of this sector by demonstrating the following policy:

(a) It subjected Arabs to Israeli laws and regulations and abrogated all Jordanian laws previously applied;

(b) It imposed heavier taxes and municipal fees causing undue hardship and additional financial burdens;

(c) It subjected inhabitants to heavier rates of income tax thus burdening them with further material losses to those already sustained in consequence of the occupation;

(d) It erected customs barriers between cities and collected excise duties on all imported goods from other cities within the West Bank;

(e) It imposed customs and duties according to

Israeli laws, including goods already in stock which were imported even before June 1967, bearing in mind that *per capita* GNP in the West Bank is only one fifth of Israel's;

(f) It refused to recognize Jordanian licence permits and exerted further economic pressures, especially on travel offices and their agents.

84. Again the estimated accumulated loss in income generated out of this sector is JD 239 million between 1967 and 1975.

G. Transport and communications

85. The role of the West Bank in the transport sector was significant. The West Bank accounted for 50 per cent of Jordan's generated income of the transport sector, 36 per cent of the total labour force engaged in the transport sector and 65 per cent of total transport facilities.

86. Unfortunately, works on several roads had to be halted owing to the occupation of the West Bank. Among these roads were the Ramtha-Amman-Jerusalem road, the Hebron-Jerusalem-Nablus road and the Hebron-Dead Sea road. Also the work for the improvement of the Jerusalem Airport was stopped.

87. Currently, only heavy-vehicle movements under strict control can be carried out between East and West Banks through the reopened bridges. This situation led to the segregation of transport activities, which have been transformed into the Israeli economy.

88. The estimated accumulated loss in income generated out of the transport sector is JD 117.6 million between 1967 and 1975 (see tables 1 to 4).

89. In communications, the work in improving the telecommunication networks and installing the microwave system of JD 2.4 million between Jerusalem and Amman were halted. Implementation of several other projects in telecommunications, such as automatic exchanges and carrier units, had to be stopped.

90. These and several other projects were financed out of foreign loans, which had to be repaid, including interest by the Government of Jordan, thus honouring the amounts of the loans withdrawn.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

91. The Israeli aggression of 1967 and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and its aftermath

have precipitated far-reaching adverse effects on Jordan's socio-economic set-up, economic development and performance.

92. The Israeli aggression resulted in massive population displacement of over 414,000 to East Bank; created pressures on the budget, labour market and urban infrastructure; caused an unfavourable effect on business confidence and the entrepreneurial climate; hampered development; suspended the implementation of the Seven-Year Plan; and caused financial imbalances and balance-of-payment pressures.

93. In violating the cease-fire orders taken by the Security Council in 1967, Israel continued its daily raids on the Jordan Valley for several years, thus causing severe damage to irrigation schemes, infrastructural facilities, farms, agricultural produce, houses and other installations and structures in the area, which culminated in a total loss of JD 140 million.

94. In the West Bank, Israeli authorities confiscated over 190,000 *dunums* of agricultural land, demolished over 13,000 houses, entire villages, whole quarters in the city of Jerusalem, several mosques, schools and markets. The property of absentee Arab landlords was placed under Israeli custodianship—a preliminary step towards complete confiscation.

95. Moreover, the sanctity of the holy places was violated. The Israelis violated the sanctity of the two great twin mosques (the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosques), the holy sepulchre, Al-Ibrahimi Mosque, the nativity and several other mosques and churches.

96. The Israeli oppression, aggression and intolerable acts extended to Arabs' rights, freedom, existence and development, and subjected them to slow suffocation. Over 1,500 persons were deported, 19,000 persons were committed to prison, over 6,000 persons were either forced or were tempted to migrate to the Western Hemisphere and several thousands were tortured, humiliated, dragged and forced to be homeless, unsheltered and without any means of survival.

97. In addition, Arab economic resources in the West Bank were shifted to Israel; the Arab labour force was bled, thus choking growth potentials and causing severe reduction in the agricultural and the industrial output of the West Bank.

98. Inhumane acts of aggression were envisaged

in the construction of physical barriers and customs barriers between cities, which restricted passage throughout the West Bank. Israel subjected Arabs to heavy income tax, high rates of customs and excise duties, municipal fees and a host of other intolerable measures, thus causing undue hardship to farmers, landlords, real estate owners, businessmen and industrialists, who were forced to leave their farms and business concerns seeking some other means of survival.

99. It is quite clear from the above that Israel had and still is violating, ignoring and neglecting the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basic principles of justice, the Geneva Convention, a whole series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the stipulations of international law and international conventions governing the state of war and the treatment of civilians in occupied territories.

TABLE 1

PROJECTED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF JORDAN 1967-1975
(AT 1975 PRICES)
(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total	Growth rates (1959-66) per cent
1. Gross national product (MP)	185.78	416.37	451.80	500.90	533.55	574.68	632.83	690.17	753.98	824.78	5 379.06	17.2
2. Gross domestic product (MP)	170.63	380.80	411.41	455.03	481.47	515.53	565.66	613.91	667.38	726.44	4 817.63	16.8
(a) Gross domestic product	149.74	332.29	356.90	393.76	412.64	438.19	478.76	516.29	557.69	603.19	4 090.71	16.2
(b) Indirect taxes	20.89	48.51	54.51	61.27	68.83	77.34	86.90	97.62	109.69	123.25	727.92	21.8
3. Consumption	188.78	415.34	441.81	469.86	499.22	530.17	562.67	596.61	632.26	669.44	4 817.38	15.5
4. Gross capital formation	26.39	59.84	65.62	72.00	78.95	86.60	94.99	104.16	114.25	125.32	801.73	18.9
5. Resources gap	-44.52	-94.38	-96.03	-86.82	-96.70	-101.23	-92.06	-86.86	-79.14	-68.32	-801.54	12.8
(a) Imports of G and NFS	-76.60	170.18	182.87	196.56	211.21	226.99	243.96	262.13	281.73	302.78	2 078.41	16.5
(b) Exports of G and NFS	32.06	75.80	86.84	109.74	114.51	125.76	151.90	175.27	202.59	234.46	1 276.87	23.2
6. Net factor income from abroad	15.15	35.57	40.39	45.87	52.08	59.15	67.17	76.26	86.60	98.34	561.43	23.1

Source: For 1966, Department of Statistics.

Notes: ¹ 1967-1975 figures were computed by the National Planning Council according to the 1959-1966 trend plus a 7.8 per cent rise in prices and adjusted according to 1975 prices.

² Exports of goods and non-factor services were computed as follows:

- (a) Exports of goods were computed according to the 1959-1966 trend of 17.3 per cent plus a 7.8 per cent rise in prices and adjusted according to 1975 prices;
- (b) Travel income was computed according to the 1959-1966 trend of 21.4 per cent plus a 7.8 per cent rise in prices and adjusted according to 1975 prices;
- (c) Other services receipts were computed at the 1959-1966 trend of 9.4 per cent plus a 7.8 per cent rise in prices and adjusted according to 1975 prices.

³ GNP and GDP figures were slightly adjusted in accordance with the findings of exports of goods and non-factor services.

⁴ In all computations, 1966 figures were taken as a base year.

100. The influence of the adverse effects of the Israeli occupation on Jordan's economy can be felt in the following:

(a) The loss of the West Bank, 6.2 per cent of total area of Jordan, 25 per cent of its cultivatable area, half of its markets, 48 per cent of the industrial establishments and 53 per cent of the business concerns;

(b) Jordan was deprived of 45 per cent of its economic resources, 43 per cent of its GNP, 40 per cent of its GDP, 40 per cent of total income generated in the primary sector, 31.2 per cent in the secondary sector and 42.6 per cent in the tertiary sector;

(c) To put it in a different perspective, Jordan's material loss can be summarized as follows:

(i) The estimated loss in total economic resources is JD 2.2 thousand million, of which:

a. The loss in GNP is JD 1.6 thousand million;
b. The loss in exports of goods and non-factor services is JD 0.5 thousand million;

c. The loss in net factor income from abroad is JD 114 million.

(ii) In other words, the estimated loss in gross domestic income generated within the economy is JD 1.1 thousand million of which:

a. The loss in the primary sector, including damages sustained in the Jordan Valley, is JD 0.4 thousand million;

b. The loss in the secondary sector is JD 0.2 thousand million;

c. The loss in the tertiary sector is JD 0.7 thousand million.

TABLE 2

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF EAST BANK (1967-1975) AT 1975 PRICES
(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total	Growth rates actual (1967-1975) per cent
1. Gross national product (MP)	329.91	290.23	318.11	272.45	274.82	276.46	283.18	336.04	360.00	2 741.20	9.6
2. Gross domestic product (MP)	308.93	272.65	295.39	252.99	256.87	258.62	256.15	300.27	322.00	2 523.87	9.0
(a) Gross domestic product	276.51	240.99	261.31	223.05	229.25	228.04	222.07	263.41	285.00	2 229.63	8.8
(b) Indirect taxes	32.42	31.66	34.08	29.94	27.62	30.58	34.08	36.86	37.00	294.24	10.2
3. Consumption	303.21	290.24	314.86	263.47	263.77	263.72	250.28	284.01	304.00	2 537.56	8.4
4. Gross capital formation	43.86	45.73	51.94	34.43	49.72	53.51	58.75	80.22	87.00	505.16	18.5
5. Resources gap	-38.14	-63.33	-71.41	-44.91	-56.62	-58.60	-52.88	-63.96	-69.00	-518.85	
(a) Imports of G and NFS	91.54	112.58	123.35	92.81	93.91	105.74	111.63	148.51	179.00	1 059.07	17.9
(b) Exports of G and NFS	53.40	49.25	51.94	47.90	37.29	47.14	58.75	84.55	110.00	540.22	18.6
6. Net factor income from abroad	20.98	17.58	22.72	19.46	17.95	17.84	27.03	35.77	38.00	217.33	16.8

Source: Department of Statistics.

Note: Figures shown are at market prices and adjusted according to 1975 prices.

TABLE 3

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE WEST BANK AT 1975 PRICES (1968-1975)
(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total	Growth rates (1968-1972) per cent
1. Gross national product (MP)	82.00	73.50	71.40	78.20	108.50	112.90	124.40	358.70	1 009.60	34.8
2. Gross domestic product (MP)	80.60	65.90	61.70	63.00	83.00	82.70	88.90	253.50	779.30	26.6
(a) Gross domestic product	75.00	60.50	56.20	56.90	77.10	76.50	82.20	234.20	718.60	26.6
(b) Indirect taxes	5.60	5.40	5.50	6.10	5.90	6.20	6.70	19.30	60.70	34.3
3. Consumption	96.40	81.50	78.70	75.80	95.80	92.80	95.30	255.50	871.80	25.5
4. Gross capital formation	5.90	6.70	7.70	9.20	15.90	19.60	25.90	89.10	180.00	61.0
5. Resources gap	21.70	-22.30	24.70	22.00	28.70	-29.80	32.20	-91.10	-272.50	
(a) Imports of G and NFS	51.50	42.80	40.90	39.60	52.50	51.30	52.90	143.00	474.50	26.3
(b) Exports of G and NFS	29.80	20.50	16.20	17.60	23.80	21.50	20.70	51.90	202.00	17.5
6. Net factor income from abroad	1.40	7.60	9.70	15.20	25.50	30.20	35.50	105.20	230.30	

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel, for 1968-1972.

Notes: ¹ 1973-1975 figures were computed according to the 1968-1972 trend at market prices prevailing in Israel and adjusted according to 1975 prices.

² Consumer price index and Israel's official exchange rates were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (*International Financial Statistics*, vol. 26, No. 11, November 1973; and vol. 28, No. 6, June 1975).

³ Consumer price index of Israel for 1968-1975 were (1967 = 100): 102.0, 104.5, 110.9, 124.2, 140.2, 168.1, 235.0 and 305.6.

⁴ Exchange rates of Israel's pound/JD for 1967-1970 were 10, for 1971, 1972 were 12, 1973 were 12.8 and for 1974, 1975 were 19.2 pounds per 1 Jordanian dinar.

TABLE 4
JORDAN'S LOSS IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (DUE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK)
AT 1975 PRICES BETWEEN 1967-1975
(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total
1. Gross national product (MP)	86.46	80.17	109.01	189.70	221.66	248.79	283.73	293.54	115.08	1 618.20
2. Gross domestic product (MP)	71.87	58.76	93.46	166.78	195.66	223.96	264.70	278.21	159.94	1 504.40
(a) Gross domestic product (FC)	55.78	41.51	71.67	133.39	152.04	173.54	207.36	212.08	92.89	1 131.42
(b) Indirect taxes	16.09	17.25	21.79	33.39	43.62	50.42	57.34	66.13	67.05	372.98
3. Consumption	112.13	55.17	73.50	257.05	190.60	197.15	253.53	252.95	109.94	1 408.02
4. Gross capital formation	15.98	13.99	14.36	36.82	27.68	25.58	26.19	8.13	51.22	116.57
5. Resources gap	56.24	11.00	+ 6.91	-27.09	22.61	- 4.76	14.18	- 17.02	- 91.78	20.19
(a) Imports of G and NFS	78.64	18.79	30.41	77.50	93.48	85.72	99.20	80.32	19.22	544.84
(b) Exports of G and NFS	22.40	7.79	37.30	50.41	70.87	80.96	85.02	97.34	72.56	524.65
6. Net factor income from abroad	14.59	21.41	15.55	22.92	26.00	24.83	19.03	15.33	44.86	113.80

Note: Figures shown in the table above are table 1 minus the sum total of tables 2 plus 3.

TABLE 5
JORDAN'S LOSS IN TOURISM INCOME
(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

	Projected		Actual		Loss
	Market prices	1975 prices	Market prices	1975 prices	1975 prices
1967	14.55	27.47	6.79	12.95	14.52
1968	18.80	33.07	4.60	8.09	24.98
1969	24.29	39.42	4.53	7.35	32.07
1970	31.38	46.98	4.85	7.26	39.72
1971	40.54	55.99	6.35	8.77	47.22
1972	52.38	66.73	8.30	10.57	56.16
1973	67.67	79.51	10.71	12.58	66.93
1974	87.43	94.77	17.29	18.74	76.03
1975	112.96	112.96	17.00	17.00	95.96
		556.90		103.31	453.59

Source: Department of Statistics and Central Bank.

Note: 1966 considered as base year of JD 11.26 million as tourism income.

TABLE 6

COST-OF-LIVING INDEX OF AMMAN

	<i>Cyclical</i>	<i>Deflator Used</i>	<i>Spliced</i>
	<i>1966 = 100</i>		<i>1967 = 100</i>
1967	104.1		100.0
1968	103.8		99.7
1969	111.9		107.5
1970	119.5		114.8
1971	124.6		119.7
1972	134.7		129.4
1973	148.8		142.9
1974	178.5		171.5
1975	197.2		190.1

Source: Department of Statistics.

TABLE 7

ISRAEL'S CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND THE POUND'S EXCHANGE RATES
(1967-1975)

	<i>Deflator used</i>		<i>Exchange rates</i>	
	<i>1966 = 100</i>	<i>1967 = 100</i>	<i>Pound/Dollar</i>	<i>Pound/Jordanian Dinar</i>
1967	101.7	100.0	3.5	10.0
1968	103.3	102.0	3.5	10.0
1969	106.3	104.5	3.5	10.0
1970	112.8	110.9	3.5	10.0
1971	126.4	134.2	4.2	12.0
1972	142.6	140.2	4.2	12.0
1973	171.0	168.1	4.2	12.8
1974	239.0	235.0	6.0	19.0
1975	310.8	305.6	6.0	19.2

Source: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, vol. 26, No. 11, November 1973; and vol. 28, No. 6, June 1975.

General Assembly Debate: The Question of Palestine

10

General Assembly, 2399th meeting: statements made in explanation of voting on resolutions 3375 and 3376⁶²

November 10, 1975

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes on one or both of the draft resolutions before they are put to the vote.

Representatives will also be given an opportunity to explain their votes after the two draft resolutions have been voted upon.

Before calling on the first speaker on the list, I should like to invite the attention of representatives to rule 88 of the rules of procedure which provide, *inter alia*, that:

The President shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment.

Mr. KOH (Singapore): As my delegation did not participate in the general debate on the question of Palestine, we would like to take this opportunity to state our views and to explain how we intend to vote on the two draft resolutions before us.

Let me first turn to the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1. This draft resolution is entitled "Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East". The thrust of this draft resolution is to be found in its operative paragraphs 2 and 3.

Operative paragraph 2:

Calls for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East, which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties".

Operative paragraph 3:

Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution and to take all necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace;

My delegation will support this draft resolution for the following reasons: First, we believe that if the question of Palestine is to be resolved in a satisfactory manner, then it is necessary for the Palestinian people, through its representative, to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences concerning Palestine. We note that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been recognized by the League of Arab States and by the Organization of African Unity as the representative of the Palestinian people. My delegation is therefore prepared to accord the same recognition to the PLO.

Secondly, this draft resolution is consistent with my delegation's belief in dialogue between the parties directly concerned in any dispute. If a dispute is to be resolved peacefully and not by violent means, then it is imperative to bring about dialogue between the disputants. In the case of the dispute over the question of Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelis are the two primary disputants and we must encourage them towards a dialogue with each other.

I shall now turn to the draft resolution in document A/L. 770. Operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution reaffirms General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, which, *inter alia*, reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine. Those rights include, first, the right to self-determination without external interference; secondly, the right to national independence and sovereignty; and, thirdly, the right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted.

Resolution 3236 (XXIX) contains an ambiguity. This concerns the geographical area in which the rights of the Palestinian people are to be exercised. The resolution refers to "Palestine". If "Palestine"

⁶² Excerpted from the English text, UN doc. A/PV. 2399, pp. 6-76. For other statements made during the debate see docs. 177, 179, 180 182 and 321 below.

is used to refer to the area of the former Mandate, then we have to take into account the fact that parts of that area now constitute the Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel.

The most reasonable interpretation of resolution 3236 (XXIX) is that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to a national home are to be expressed in those parts of the Palestine territory which are not part of the national territory of Jordan and Israel.

My Government has diplomatic relations with Israel and we believe that the State of Israel is entitled to the same respect for its independence, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity as other States. If Israel withdraws, as it must, from the territories it has occupied since the 1967 war, then Israel's right to exist as a State within secure and recognized boundaries should not be endangered. We therefore interpret resolution 3236 (XXIX) as upholding, on the one hand, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to a homeland of their own: and, on the other hand, the right of Israel to exist within the boundaries prevailing before the 1967 war.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in document A/L. 770

Decides to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people...

Since we are of the view that the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people is compatible with the right of the State of Israel to exist, we therefore see no difficulty in accepting this paragraph. As for the composition of the Committee, we hope that it would comprise States which represent the views and interests of all the parties directly concerned with the question of Palestine. Any temptation to compose the committee exclusively or even predominantly of States holding only one view should be eschewed because such a committee would lack credibility.

Operative paragraph 4

Requests the Committee to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme of... [action] designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise... [their] rights...

In formulating its recommendations the committee is authorized to take into account "all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations".

With respect to this paragraph, my delegation

would like to make two clarifications. First, our acceptance of the committee does not in any way prejudice our position on its recommendations. Our position on the committee's recommendations will be based upon our assessment of their merit. Secondly, whilst we can agree that in making its recommendations the committee can take into account all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations, we wish to make it clear that the committee itself cannot exercise such powers. The committee's competence is limited to making recommendations.

The positive vote which my delegation will cast on the draft resolution in document A/L. 770 is therefore based upon the interpretation which my delegation has given to resolution 3236 (XXIX) and to operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution.

Finally, I wish to reiterate my Government's consistent support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which established the only agreed framework for the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Mr. ALGARD (Norway): By its resolutions 242 (1967) of November 1967 and 338 (1973) of October 1973 the Security Council laid down the guidelines for a just and comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. We find it of the utmost importance that United Nations organs, be it the General Assembly or the Security Council, in dealing with the Middle East conflict avoid any move which might tend to upset the balance of these two resolutions which are fundamental to the work for peace in the Middle East.

My Government therefore regrets that the draft resolution before us in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1 refers only to General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) and does not contain any reference to the two resolutions of the Security Council, as this leaves doubt about the basis on which negotiations in the Middle East shall take place. For this reason my delegation cannot support that draft resolution.

I should like to reconfirm, however, that my Government still holds the view that no lasting peace can be achieved in the Middle East unless the legitimate interests and rights of the Palestinians are taken into account.

Norway has consistently supported Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as a basis for just and lasting peace in the Middle

East. It is our view that such peace must be built on the following main principles. First, the acquisition of territory by force cannot be accepted. This is a basic principle of the Charter of the United Nations. Any changes to or adjustments of borders can be effected only as the agreed result of peaceful negotiations. Secondly, all States in the area must have the right to live within secure and recognized boundaries. This principle, which is laid down in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), is essential to any peace settlement and must be retained intact. Thirdly, a just solution must be found for the Palestinians. The Norwegian Government recognizes the fact that no lasting peace can be achieved in the Middle East unless the legitimate interests and rights of the Palestinians are taken into consideration.

As to the draft resolution before us in document A/L. 770, it is the view of my Government that it leaves out a very important element which was contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), that is, the right of all States in the Middle East to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

The present draft resolution aims at establishing a committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. It is regrettable that as a basis for the work of the committee the draft resolution refers only to resolution 3236 (XXIX) and does not contain any reference to the guidelines for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East laid down in resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

In the opinion of my Government, the draft resolution also raises certain constitutional problems as it seems to trespass on the competence of the Security Council. For this reason, my delegation will have to vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 770.

Mr. SIKIVOU (Fiji): Since Fiji's admission to the United Nations my delegation has consistently advocated dialogue in this world forum rather than confrontation or the use of arms in the settlement of differences, including major international problems such as the Palestine question.

As recently as 8 October, my Deputy Prime Minister when he addressed this Assembly during the general debate again repeated our position, saying, *inter alia*:

We do not believe that a lasting solution to any of these problems can be brought about by force or by exclusion from the world family of nations. In seeking solutions

to the problems arising from differences and conflicts of national interests, we prefer that ... [we] actively encourage peaceful accommodation through continuing dialogue and constructive discussions among those directly involved.

(2380th meeting, p. 21)

Our position on the question of Palestine is based on the following: first, the right of the displaced Palestinian people to a homeland; secondly, the right of Israel and of every other State in the area to exist within secure and recognized boundaries; thirdly, the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab lands it occupied in the 1967 war; and fourthly, the need for dialogue among all parties directly concerned in settling differences, including, for example, those arising from the implementation of the four imperatives I have just mentioned.

It is for these reasons that we shall support draft resolution A/L. 768/Rev. 1 sponsored by Egypt and other delegations. It invites the PLO to participate in the Peace Conference on the Middle East. We trust that the draft resolution will be adopted and that thereafter Israel and the PLO, as well as those working closely with them, will be able to discuss, to negotiate and to iron out their differences. It is to be hoped that the participation of the PLO will help in the achievement of the ever-evasive acceptable solution to the question of Palestine and the attainment of lasting peace in the area as a whole.

We trust that Israel will recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in the subject under debate. It cannot be left out of serious attempts to find solutions to problems that so vitally affect them.

My delegation regrets that, for the same reasons, we are unable to support draft resolution A/L. 770, because it makes no mention of Israel or of its sovereignty, or of its right to secure and recognized boundaries; it makes no mention of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It proposes, however, to establish a committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; it speaks of a programme of implementation of steps to be taken for the resettlement in Palestine of Palestinians, and of other matters which, in the opinion of our delegation, are matters for careful and thorough negotiation and discussion by the PLO and Israel. They are problems better dealt with by dialogue in a spirit of give and take, and not by confrontations or by

resolutions which encourage or cultivate them.

My delegation therefore does not see how adoption of the draft resolution (A/L. 770) can serve a useful purpose. It would only add another unimplementable resolution to an already large stock of similar resolutions because of its weaknesses.

Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): My delegation would have very much wished to give its support to a moderate and balanced draft resolution which facilitated further negotiations and advanced the cause of peace in the Middle East. We acknowledge the efforts of Egypt and some other Arab delegations to produce a moderately worded draft resolution which would lead to an early reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

Unhappily, in my Government's view, neither draft resolution meets the criteria of balance and even-handedness which would allow us to vote for it, and we doubt, therefore, that either of them can facilitate the negotiation of a settlement.

I am obliged to say that the way in which this matter is being handled in the rather superheated atmosphere of plenary meetings under strict deadlines, without the opportunity for the normal detailed examination and exchange of views on texts in the Political Committee, and with resolutions being submitted at the last minute and only minimal opportunity being afforded for consultation of Governments, is unlikely to lead to the emergence of a constructive resolution which would take due account of all the interests involved in this item.

We cannot ignore the fact that the draft resolutions before us are one-sided, negotiated essentially among the Arab delegations, and that efforts by others to introduce a more balanced approach would have little chance of success.

The position of New Zealand was clearly stated in last year's debate, and it remains the same: we recognize the rights of the Arab people of Palestine—including their right to self-determination. We wish their voice to be heard, and we wish them to be participants in a peace settlement which takes full account of their rights and aspirations. Equally, we recognize the rights and existence of the people and State of Israel, including those of territorial inviolability and political independence, and believe that a peace settlement must take full account of those rights.

Both draft resolutions (A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770) take as their starting point resolution

3236 (XXIX). No reference is made to the key Security Council resolutions which, in our view, provide the appropriate basis for the negotiation of a settlement. Resolution 3236 (XXIX) dealt solely with the rights of the Palestinian people and ignored the rights and interests of the other principal parties, which must obviously be taken into account in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

New Zealand therefore abstained from voting on that resolution and for that reason must abstain from voting on the draft resolutions in documents A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770.

Finally, if the draft resolution in document A/L. 770 is nevertheless adopted, I would express the earnest hope that the proposed committee will take into account the rights and interests of all the parties and thus open up the possibility of making an effective contribution to the lasting Middle East settlement that we all desire.

Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): As the delegation of the Ivory Coast did not take part in the general debate at the beginning of the session or in the debate on this agenda item, I should now like to make a brief statement on the position of the Ivory Coast regarding the question of Palestine and to explain my delegation's vote on the two draft resolutions before the General Assembly.

The question of Palestine, which the General Assembly is now considering for the second consecutive year with the participation of representatives of the Palestinian people, should be taken up with realism if we sincerely wish to work for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in an area of the world which has suffered all too much from the clash of weapons, from violence, from intransigence, from human frustration and from lack of understanding, and, finally, from the hegemonistic policies of the major Powers purveyors of weapons.

We believe that the Sinai Agreement of 4 September 1975 between Egypt and Israel, which led to the evacuation of part of Egyptian territory by Israeli troops, is an important step on the difficult way to peace in the Middle East.

The efforts which led to that agreement should, of course, be encouraged but we should not lose sight of the fact that they might in the long run prove to be vain if they are not viewed in perspective, if they do not take into account what is

the very core of the crisis in the Middle East: the problem of Palestine. In spite of the progress, which we have every reason to welcome and to congratulate those responsible upon, the situation in the Middle East remains very grave, for the very simple reason that people have refused to accept two obvious realities: the fact of Israel and the fact of Palestine.

Our Arab and Israeli friends must accept those realities, harsh though they may seem to be. The former must resign themselves to accepting the existence of Israel as a sovereign and independent State Member of the United Nations; the latter must recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people, in particular its right to a homeland on the territory of Palestine, which, rightly, all Palestinians, whether Jews, Arabs, Moslems or Christians, claim—the land of Palestine, where they lived together in harmony for many centuries. Neither the one side nor the other will, in our opinion, be working towards a genuine settlement of the crisis in the Middle East if it strives to disregard those realities. We do not believe we are rendering any valuable service at all if we do not speak the truth, for the just and lasting peace to which they aspire calls for the acknowledgement and acceptance of those two political realities.

In its statements on 27 September and 19 November 1974 the Ivory Coast stated its position on the question of Palestine and showed how the tragedy of the Middle East arose from the historic decision of the United Nations on 29 November 1947 to divide Palestine into two States, one for the Jewish Palestinians and the other for the Moslem and Christian Palestinians. We cannot denounce the major Powers too strongly for the heavy responsibility they bear in this matter because they either could not or did not wish to adopt the measures required—and for good reason, to gain acceptance for their decision which guaranteed the borders between the two States. What suffering and poverty could have been avoided in that area of the world. What material and spiritual resources could have been made available for the development of that region if the major Powers had discharged their responsibilities properly.

The partition resolution was only partially implemented because only one State, Israel, emerged with and has an independent national existence, recognized and guaranteed by the

great Powers, an existence which the overwhelming majority of States will not allow to be challenged. The other State which was to result from that partition resolution and was to have been the homeland of the Moslem and Christian Palestinian Arabs never saw the light of day and those Palestinians have become stateless persons, left to their own devices. Their part of Palestinian territory is today occupied by Israel and held by other States in the area.

We wish to stress once again that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is the *sine qua non* for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, we believe that any realistic solution must be based on the principles which we enunciated in our statement of 19 November 1974, which we now reaffirm because we believe they are essential, just as we reaffirm our full support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, as the basis for the settlement of the situation in the Middle East.

Consequently, Israel must evacuate the Arab and Palestinian lands which it has occupied since the war of June 1967 and all other States which are holding Palestinian territory should give it back to the Palestinians so that they may settle there, create their own State and enjoy their own national, independent, sovereign existence, with international recognition.

We appeal earnestly to Israel to understand that it is high time that it gave sympathetic consideration to the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and recognized their rights to a distinct, separate homeland, both in Israel and in Jordan. We understand that they are reluctant to give any representative quality to the Palestine Liberation Organization, but they should overcome their bitterness and agree to begin a dialogue with that Organization, which represents the Palestinian people and is a valuable spokesman for them. Their future lies in peaceful and brotherly coexistence with that people. They should not fall into the trap of the same kind of absolutism for which they criticized others not so long ago, after a certain conference, but should today show themselves more than ever understanding in their approach to the question of Palestine.

I would address myself to the Arab countries, neighbours of Palestine: we believe that you also should help your Palestinian brothers to recover

their national rights, giving those rights real and concrete substance. If with your assistance they had been able to create their own State, perhaps the situation in the Middle East today would have been quite different and the crisis, instead of being an Arab-Palestinian crisis, would have been only an Israeli-Palestinian crisis, which equally could have been overcome through dialogue, mutual understanding, co-operation and peaceful coexistence of the two States.

To the Palestinians, represented here by the Palestine Liberation Organization, I say: we understand and share your frustration and your ardent desire for justice and peace. You have appealed to the United Nations, which has welcomed you and recognized the legitimate rights of your people, and we believe that you should help us to help you to make your rights a reality in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Your very legitimate ideal is the establishment of "a secular democratic state in all of Palestine" where all, "Moslems, Christians and Jews, can dwell together in brotherhood, equality and openness to the world and live free from any fear or anxiety", in fulfilment of your advanced and progressive aspirations for the future—to borrow the words of the leader of the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Your ideal is a noble and praiseworthy one but I'm sure you will agree that its realization, unfortunately, belongs to some time in the future which it is hard to predict. Why not deal with realities? Why not base your future on today's realities and reassure Israel that it has the right to existence, and abandon any idea of destroying that State as a sovereign, independent nation? By giving such an assurance you would surely be creating favourable conditions for a fruitful dialogue between all, Palestinians, Jews, Moslems and Christians, in the interests of resolving your differences and establishing a basis for fraternal, confident co-operation which should lead tomorrow to that entity for which today you yearn. Hatred, intransigence, distrust, to which we might add the unrealistic positions of some, cannot lead to the peace which you, Israelis and Palestinians, yearn for and which we too so ardently desire. We are convinced that your desire for peace is sincere, but we believe it is our duty to reaffirm that we believe that you should preach and practise a policy which will be a source of reassurance to both sides.

As President Houphouët-Boigny declared in another connexion, on 28 April 1971,

Peace requires an effort, an effort of faith and courage. Political courage means facing up to a situation which cannot be corrected overnight with the determination that by our perseverance, by our love transmitted to others and by our faith in peace, we can one day change that situation .

And inasmuch as you are all believers, that will, that faith, that courage can build a bridge of truth and reconciliation over your antagonisms, your quarrels and your present divisions to bring together brothers that have been separated and create a situation where the unity of Palestine can be envisaged with a real chance of success and as one of the things that are possible once peace is restored.

As far as we, the Members of the United Nations, are concerned, it is our duty to do our utmost to create a climate of confidence that will be propitious for dialogue not only among the Palestinians—whether they be Jews, Moslems or Christians—but also between the Arab world and the Israelis. Let us strive to see beyond their antagonisms in order to devote ourselves to everything that can bring them together. Although their claims and demands are very often mutually exclusive and contradictory, let us select those that really contribute to the drive towards peace, reject those that do not, because they are not in the interest of the parties concerned, nor will they help us to move towards a settlement of the problem. Let us no longer be satisfied with the sort of resolution which, once adopted is soon forgotten inasmuch as it does not take into account all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and, in particular, ignores the reality which will determine the establishment of a just and lasting peace in that part of the world which we hold so dear.

I wish to thank you Mr. President, for giving us this chance to state the views of our Government. The delegation of the Ivory Coast will take a decision on draft resolutions A/L. 768/Rev.1 and A/L. 770 in the light of the following considerations. First, the existence of the State of Israel is an irreversible fact and the creation of an Arab Palestinian State, with its own national identity, is imperative. Secondly, we reaffirm that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people must be exercised and implemented in an Arab Palestinian State and we support the formation

of that State out of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and of those now held by other States in the area. Thirdly, the question of Palestine is the very core of the crisis of the Middle East. Therefore, the participation of the Palestinian people through their representatives, the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the process of negotiation and their commitment to that and to efforts for a just and lasting peace are a necessity. Fourthly, any solution to this problem must be sought through peaceful means, through negotiations, or direct or indirect dialogue. Fifthly, the return of the Palestinians to any of their homes, and property which are in Israel would be unrealistic if it did not take into account the prerogative of any sovereign State to regulate immigration into its territory. Sixthly, any reference to certain relevant provisions of the Charter and particularly to prerogatives of the Security Council that might imply a return to measures with the unavowed intention of suspending or expelling any party that is already a Member of the United Nations, or that might imply the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, is in our view difficult to accept.

Finally, the creation of any committee, the essential purpose of which would be, on the one hand, to help Palestinian Moslems and Christians to realize their national rights and to create an Arab Palestinian State that would coexist with Israel and, on the other hand to assist the international community to understand the need for this, would meet with no fundamental objections on our part, if that is the true objective of those who have sponsored draft resolution A/L. 770.

It may be deduced from the foregoing that the delegation of the Ivory Coast will vote in favour of A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and will abstain on draft resolution in document A/L. 770.

Mr. RAE (Canada): The carefully phrased draft resolution before us in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, contains elements with which Canada agrees. It also presents aspects which we cannot accept.

We agree with the general proposition that the Palestinian people are entitled to be heard, and thus to participate, in the negotiations on the Middle East. It is evident that they have a direct interest in such negotiations, a fact fully recognized by the Canadian Government. In consequence, we can support the reference to resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 in so far as the right of participation is concerned. In spite of reserva-

tions which we have previously expressed about the specific organization mentioned as the sole spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, at the General Assembly last November expressed the Canadian view that the Palestinian Arabs had a right to take part in all negotiations involving their destiny.

We cannot agree to the reference to resolution 3236 (XXIX) in so far as that resolution calls in question the existence of the State of Israel, which clearly is not a subject for negotiation.

In view of these considerations the Canadian delegation will abstain on the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1.

With regard to the draft resolution in document A/L. 770, while the Canadian Government wishes to join in the expression of deep concern that limited progress has been made in the search for a just solution of Middle East problems, it cannot support that resolution. By its direct linkage with and re-endorsement of all elements of resolution 3236 (XXIX), on which it will be recalled Canada abstained at the last session of the Assembly, that resolution ignores the right of existence of the State of Israel and its role as an essential party in the search for a negotiated settlement.

Furthermore, Canada cannot support the establishment of a United Nations special committee on Palestine. If such a committee fully complied with the proposed mandate, it would, perforce, be prejudging the activities of another body responsible for the ongoing process of negotiation, already established by the United Nations, and which Canada has endorsed and continues to support. Such a committee in our view would both complicate and interfere with existing arrangements without itself contributing to a resolution of the basic problem. For these reasons, we will vote against the resolution in document A/L. 770.

Mr. CORREA DA COSTA (Brazil): In relation to the draft resolutions in documents A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770 the Brazilian delegation would like to place on record the fact that, as it has repeatedly stated, the Brazilian Government recognizes the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and sovereignty. We consider the exercise of those rights by the Palestinian people as an essential condition for the attainment of a just and lasting peace in

the region. Any other solution would be illusory and would only serve to aggravate matters even further.

The Brazilian Government sees with growing concern the absence of progress towards the exercise of those rights and considers that the prolongation of this unjust situation is a disturbing factor of international order. One of the obstacles in the way to peace is the non-participation of representatives of the Palestinian people in the halls where their destiny is under debate. It seems to us, furthermore, that the creation in the United Nations of an appropriate mechanism to guarantee to the Palestinian people the exercise of their rights is a just and constructive idea. Brazil rejects the occupation of territories by force and considers that such occupation must cease.

The Brazilian delegation, however, does not feel able to participate in the vote on the two draft resolutions before us, especially in view of their reference to a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session the interpretation of which has still not been made entirely clear to us. The Brazilian attitude arises only out of the circumstances which I have just mentioned and does not change the fundamental position of my Government in relation to the Palestinian question.

Mr. MORENO MARTINEZ (Dominican Republic) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of the Dominican Republic regrets that the two draft resolutions should be based on resolution 3236 (XXIX) of the General Assembly which, in our opinion, is ambiguous and could thereby lead to an aggravation of the Middle East conflict instead of promoting its settlement. We regret that these draft resolutions are not based on resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council, which provides a solid foundation for the search for peace. The Dominican Republic wishes to have peace in the Middle East, a just and durable peace, and efforts to achieve that peace should be based on justice which can only be attained through dialogue among all the parties concerned. We do not believe that we can achieve a just and lasting peace if the unjust exclusion of the Palestinian people is remedied by the equally unjust exclusion of the Israeli people. The Palestinian people have a right to live in their own independent and sovereign State, but that right does not negate the right of the Israeli people to live in their own independent

and sovereign State.

To survive it is necessary to coexist. To coexist it is essential to have a dialogue.

For the above reasons, the delegation of the Dominican Republic, which seeks through dialogue to achieve peace and peaceful coexistence among all independent and sovereign peoples, will abstain in the voting on both draft resolutions.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): In conformity with rule 91 of the rules of procedure, we shall vote first on the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1. A roll-call vote has been requested by several delegations.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Netherlands, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

[For the voting record see Appendix F.]

The draft resolution was adopted by 101 votes to 8, with 25 abstentions [resolution 3375 (XXX)].

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 770. As Members will recall, the Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee introduced the report of the Fifth Committee on the financial implications of this draft resolution orally. A roll-call vote has been requested on this draft resolution also.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

[For the voting record see Appendix F.]

The draft resolution was adopted by 93 votes to 18, with 27 abstentions [resolution 3376 (XXX)].

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I shall now call on those delegations which wish to explain their vote after the vote. I should like to make two comments: first, to ask all those who are going to speak now to confine themselves to what may be considered an explanation of their vote rather than a continuation of the debate; secondly, to tell the first two speakers that as sponsors of one of the two resolutions they can only explain their vote on the draft resolution of which they are not sponsors.

Mr. AL-SHAIKHLY (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I have asked for permission to explain the position of the delegation of Iraq with regard to the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1. Our non-participation in the voting is in line with Iraqi policy on the Palestine question. I can assure you that I shall not speak for long.

It is correct to say that the international deliberations and conferences referred to in the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1 are the Geneva negotiations, the Geneva Conference. Here we should like to explain two basic points.

First, we have reservations with regard to the Geneva Conference and Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) which were the bases for that Conference. As regards the reference in operative paragraph 2 to the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), this requires a review of the bases on which the Geneva Conference is set up and also that some parties be urged to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX). For that reason we consider that if we do not have the necessary changes in those bases in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) there will be no sense or meaning in the present resolution.

The second thing that worries us is that one important fact is being ignored, namely that the scope of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), and the framework for its implementation in our view exceed the Geneva Conference which came as a result of the circumstances and consequences of the Zionist aggression of 1967. To impose General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) on the Geneva Conference or on any negotiations carried out in the same manner would contradict the context of that resolution and the meaning thereof.

Although we are convinced that the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1—now resolution 3375 (XXX)—has some positive aspects, particularly the first operative paragraph, nevertheless we consider that the inclusion of this paragraph with other counter-productive paragraphs will not help the Palestinian struggle through the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX).

For these reasons and owing to the reservations of Iraq with regard to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the Geneva negotiations, in order to get a clearer resolution which would guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), and because we are not convinced that this is guaranteed by General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the delegation of Iraq did not

participate in the voting thereon. We affirm that Iraq, led by the Arab Socialist Baathist Party, has been and will continue to be loyal and faithful to the cause of the Palestinian people and their just struggle and with the attitude maintained here is giving further proof of its loyalty.

Mr. VINCI (Italy) (interpretation from French): In my capacity as the representative of the country at present exercising the chairmanship of the European Economic Community and on behalf of the nine States I have already had occasion on 5 November to explain our views on the crucial item now before the Assembly.⁶³

I should like to recall here that for us a peace settlement taking account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must on the one hand respect the rights of Israel to exist within secure and recognized boundaries on an equal footing with other States in the region and on the other hand recognize to the Palestine people its right to express its national identity. The nine members of the Community believe that particular attention should be given to the Palestinian problem, which seems to be the most complex among the essential aspects of the settlement. We emphasize particularly the need to implement Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) which we continue to support firmly.

With regard to the draft resolution submitted in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, we were receptive to the constructive motives that prompted this initiative. However, we cannot support an exclusive reference to resolution 3236 (XXIX), a text on which we abstained last year. We would have wished the draft resolution, rather, to be based on the principles of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) that must define the framework for a peaceful settlement as well as for negotiations and for any efforts exerted to that end.

These considerations also apply to the draft resolution submitted in document A/L. 770, about which we have even more serious misgivings. We have reservations regarding the establishment of a committee the mandate of which, as defined in paragraph 4 of the resolution, is based on resolution 3236 (XXIX) and does not take into account all the elements which should be taken into consideration to arrive at a just and lasting settlement, particularly respect for the right

⁶³ Doc. 177 below.

of all States in the region, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized boundaries.

In the view of our delegations, the provisions of this draft resolution should not infringe upon the prerogatives and responsibilities entrusted by the Charter to the existing bodies within the United Nations, particularly the Security Council.

In view of the foregoing reasons, the nine member States of the European Economic Community regret not having been in a position to vote in favour of the draft resolutions in documents A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770. If individual circumstances led them to vote differently on these two draft resolutions, they nevertheless share the same essential concerns in regard to them.

Mr. KIKHIA (Libyan Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of the Libyan Arab Republic did not participate in the general debate on agenda item 27 concerning the question of Palestine because our point of view and our attitude with regard to this cause that destiny has made that of the Arab people are well known. We already explained our point of view in our speech to the General Assembly during the general debate on 6 October.

My delegation sponsored the draft resolution in document A/L. 770, for which a great majority of the General Assembly voted. My delegation did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, which the General Assembly also adopted.

On this occasion, we would like to reaffirm our support for the position of principle adopted by the Palestinian people and explained by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) when he addressed the General Assembly on 3 November. That position comprises the following five points: first, there can be no peace in the area without justice, and there can be no justice without full implementation and full recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people; secondly, no international conference has the right to discuss the question of Palestine in the absence of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; thirdly, any resolution which ignores the national rights of the Palestinian people is to be rejected; fourthly, the PLO refuses to participate in any conference which considers such a resolution as the basis of its work; and fifthly, the PLO welcomes any international effort arising out of Gen-

eral Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) adopted last year.

We also considered that the naming of any particular international conference in the third operative paragraph of the draft resolution (A/L. 768/Rev. 1) might raise some doubts. I would like on behalf of the Libyan Arab delegation, to reaffirm our previous attitude with regard to Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

Mr. LAI (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese Government and people have always supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to regain their national rights and recover their lost territories. We are firmly opposed to Israeli Zionist aggression and the super-Power contention and expansion in the Middle East. Since the draft resolution contained in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1 mainly concerns the question of the Geneva conference, which is based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and since the Chinese delegation's position on these two resolutions is known to all, the Chinese delegation based on this position did not participate in the voting on the above-mentioned draft resolution.

Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): The debate held in this Assembly during the previous week and concluded today with a vote on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770 has, if it is still necessary, again established a number of undisputable facts—among them the fact that the Palestinian people, their legitimate rights and interests, and their aspiration to a homeland are central to any efforts and deliberations aiming at the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Stressing this fact, the debate has also indicated that disregard of the Palestinian question and failure to achieve progress in this particularly sensitive area of the Middle East crisis, might entail nefarious consequences and can have negative effects on the over-all peace effort.

On previous occasions in discussing the questions of the Middle East and Palestine, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, the Austrian delegation and its representatives have not been oblivious of these facts.

Mr. HERZOG (Israel): The two votes which have been taken are illustrative of the utter incongruity of this Assembly, which has not only continued its policy of passing resolutions which have

no prospect of being honoured because they are unreal, but has also now begun to indulge in the very counter-productive exercise of voting in a manner which sets one United Nations organ against the other.

These two resolutions are utterly unacceptable to my Government. The Government of Israel has unequivocally defined its position regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization. This so-called organization, which is the umbrella organization for a number of terrorist groups bent by their covenant on the destruction of the State of Israel, and which is far from representing the Arabs of Palestinian origin, has no right to participate in any consultations or negotiations on matters of peace.

I can only repeat that my country will not in any circumstances sit down and negotiate with the representative of a body which in principle rejects compromise as a basis for solving international problems and which avowedly sees, as the only solution to the Middle East problem, the destruction of Israel, not to mention the destruction of other societies in the region as well.

I emphasize once again that, while we reject the Palestine Liberation Organization as an interlocutor, we recognize the existence of a Palestinian Arab problem which, as our Foreign Minister pointed out to this Assembly, will find its proper solution when an Arab change of heart as regards its attitude to the State of Israel will allow the necessary progress towards a peaceful settlement to take place.

The adoption of these resolutions is a tragic blow to the peace effort mechanism in our region, and Members of the Organization who voted for them will bear the responsibility for the dire consequences which may emerge. These two one-sided resolutions, drafted by Arab delegations, make no mention of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council, and make no mention of the Geneva Conference, as if the General Assembly could ignore the resolutions of the Security Council as well as the existing international mechanisms which have brought about in the course of the year the signature of the significant agreement between Israel and Egypt. Moreover, in the face of this development so generally welcomed, the Palestine Liberation Organization has pursued its terrorist activities and has done everything possible to sabotage the negotiations between Israel and Egypt and the agreement arrived at between them.

Not a single hint of compromise or tendency in this direction can be discerned in the positions taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization, whether the official statements made by its representatives at this Assembly are followed or those at meetings with the press, in which their representative has stated bluntly that he considers even Tel Aviv as occupied territory. It should be obvious that the adoption of resolutions which are manifestly intended to be in the nature of a *diktat* by the Palestine Liberation Organization must gravely compromise the cause of negotiation and peace.

The two resolutions adopted by this Assembly can now create an impasse. The Government of Israel, in the exercise of its rights, rejects such recommendations of the General Assembly. It will not participate in any negotiation with the so-called Palestine Liberation Organization and will not co-operate in any manner within the framework of resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) or within the framework of the resolutions just adopted.

I can only conclude by deploring a situation which has been created whereby the General Assembly, blithely ignoring the situation and the developments in the area, injects new and unacceptable elements and thereby guarantees that its recommendations become devoid of any moral or practical basis. This is but part of the disintegration of this Organization, in which extreme elements have taken control and are contributing so actively.

For our part, in declaring the Government of Israel's intention of ignoring these resolutions, I reconfirm its readiness to move towards a peaceful settlement in the area within the broad framework of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the resultant mechanism thereby created in Geneva. We shall likewise continue to honour all agreements entered into within this framework.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The Palestine Liberation Organization was not able to participate in the explanations of vote, not having participated in the vote itself. However, its representative has asked to speak, I think in order to express their gratitude at the end of the week's debate and also to reiterate their position. Last year, the Assembly deemed it appropriate to allow the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to speak. In line with the wish of the Assembly last year, therefore, I believe I am em-

powered to call on the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization for a brief statement.

Mr. KADDOUMI (Palestine Liberation Organization) (interpretation from Arabic): With the termination of the general debate on the question of Palestine and the completion of the voting on the two draft resolutions submitted by our colleagues here, I should like to take the opportunity to express our deep appreciation of and gratitude for the efforts exerted to consolidate the rights of our people and the great support shown for our just struggle.

The people of Palestine, in their long, unceasing struggle, will never forget the brotherly and friendly attitude of all the countries which have supported us, in application of their principles and ideals. We confirm that we shall continue to exert every effort to secure the support of those who have not yet given it to us, by increasing and strengthening our contacts with them and explaining to them the scope of our cause and the slogans and flags under which we fight. We feel sure that time is always on the side of the struggling peoples and their just causes. Our belief in victory will not be shaken; it grows day by day, as aggression and invasion become increasingly isolated.

This session and the previous one have constituted a turning point in the history of this international Organization; its universality and credibility have increased. The results achieved are a reflection of the international march against imperialism, colonialism and backward racist beliefs, foremost among which is Zionism. As this progressive policy gains momentum, the hopes the peoples place in this Organization will increase, because it will provide a means of achieving peace and justice and for the elimination of violence and tension from the world.

Perhaps of all the peoples struggling for liberation, freedom and independence the people of Palestine is the one most desirous of achieving peace and of living in security and stability, after all the bitter years in which they have lived in exile or in their occupied land, suffering oppression and fighting for a natural, free life such as other peoples throughout the world enjoy. We struggle and fight, not for the sake of struggling and fighting but to achieve noble and legitimate aspirations and objectives, for a secure and peaceful life in which there will be no oppression, repression or aggression, and for a democratic, free society in which social justice will prevail.

The attitude of this General Assembly and its stand makes us more anxious to continue to bear the olive branch in our hand and to see the olive of peace cover all our valleys and mountains, bringing peace in the land of Palestine. We shall continue our legitimate struggle on all fronts—political, economic, cultural and military—in order to deter the enemies of peace and justice whose intentions have now been revealed and who have no alternative but to give in to the logic of the age in this last quarter of the twentieth century.

We have lived with the Assembly for many days during which we have listened to all that has been said here, whether in this forum or in the corridors of this international Organization, as the Assembly has listened to our opinions and ideas and our proposed solutions, and we feel sure that this dialogue between us will deepen our conception and understanding of the question of Palestine and that it will also pave the way towards the achievement of peace and justice.

We return today with new hopes that have been reaffirmed by historic decisions which denounce and condemn racism and aggression and support the struggle against them in favour of democracy and right and justice. These resolutions were no surprise to us; we had expected them in view of our objective understanding of the movement of history which always goes forward in spite of impediments and obstacles which may be placed by imperialism and colonialism along its path.

Our people in exile and in the occupied lands which has looked forward to this session and placed its hopes in it and in its resolutions will remember these days in its history with great pride and appreciation for this great international support which will form the basic corner-stone of our struggle.

Israel was set up by a resolution of this international Organization adopted by a very small majority, and now the Palestine Liberation Organization, after the long-continued struggle of the Palestinian people, has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Member States, a majority that maintains that our struggle and the establishment of our secular democratic State are facts which only await the support of the United Nations for their realization.

I should like to offer our profound thanks to the Assembly for this support that has been so strengthened as to increase far beyond the support

we received last year. This is a source of great pride and satisfaction to us, and until we meet again at the next session we wish you and all the free and liberated peoples of the world greater victories along the path of progress, prosperity, freedom, justice and peace.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I thought that we had come to the end of this morning's meeting, but the representative of Saudi Arabia has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of his right of reply. Normally the right of reply is exercised at the end of the day, but the representative of Saudi Arabia insists on exercising his right of reply now since we are closing the debate on this item.

I am prepared to allow the representative of Saudi Arabia to speak in exercise of his right of reply, although in most meetings of the General Assembly it is not customary to reply to an explanation of vote since that might reopen the debate.

I count on his understanding, but in view of the late hour I would very much appreciate it if his exercise of his right of reply is just that and I hope that he will make it very brief.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, in order to correct any impression you may have formed to the effect that I was going to explain my vote, I know that I am a sponsor of both resolutions and thus I never asked to speak in explanation of our vote. On the other hand, I should like to bring to your attention the fact that, although the General Assembly has decided that the right of reply should be exercised at the end of the day, the Palestine question has been disposed of by the vote on the two resolutions this morning. Therefore, this afternoon we will be dealing with the report of the Third Committee, which technically has nothing to do with the question of Palestine, although Zionism is mentioned in one of the draft resolutions of the Third Committee.

Therefore, in order to make it clear that I am not abusing the rights of any person by speaking, I must say that all that I am asking the President is to allow me to exercise my right of reply to what our colleague from Israel has just mentioned. Is that satisfactory to you, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I ask the representative of Saudi Arabia to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Let me tell Mr. Herzog from this podium, and every Zionist

wherever he may be, that the Zionists do not represent all the Jews of the world. In fact, many Jews have shunned the Zionist movement since its inception. Zionism was and still is a European ideology, a European movement that was started by the late Mr. Herzl and that found acceptance with the Khazars who had been converted to Judaism in the eighth century A. D.

Likewise, as I have said before and will mention again as an example, the Free French, during the Second World War were recognized by the so-called Allies—by Britain, the United States, and all those who fought Germany—as representing France, although they did not represent the French people as a whole. So why should there be a double standard? The Palestine Liberation Organization is recognized as representing the Palestinian people as a whole, not only by the Arab States but by the majority of States Members of the United Nations.

The core of the Middle East question, the core of all this trouble is that under the Mandate the Palestinian people were denied their inalienable right to self-determination. What right did anybody have to keep them outside the pale of those who were ruled by colonial Powers in order to satisfy the late Arthur Balfour? The Zionists in England railroaded the United States into the First World War. Who has the right to say that the PLO does not represent the Palestinian people as a whole?

Be that as it may, I should like to address a few words from this podium to the Zionists to say that nobody hates the Jewish people. On the contrary, the Jewish people—especially those in our area—are our own brothers. Let this be known: it is the fact that Zionism used an old religion, Judaism, as a motivation for a political and economic end with which we take issue. This is not the first time that religion has been used for a political and economic end. I do not have to cite what I have already said in my last statement on this question, and what I have repeated since 1947 at Lake Success.

Let it be known that if Israel seeks acceptance in the Middle East—leave aside Palestine; not only in the Middle East, but in the whole Moslem world; and not only in the Moslem world, in the third world; not only in the third world, but wherever justice is recognized—the Israelis, if they are wise, will themselves stretch out their hands

to the PLO and ask them to negotiate with Israel on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Failing that, sooner or later they will disappear, if not by war then by assimilation, as did the Crusaders before them, as did many people before the Crusaders when they invaded that part of the world: as did the Greeks, as did the Romans, as did the Byzantines, as did the Seleucids, before them. They cannot survive as a nation, as a people, as Jews, unless they seek acceptance in their environment and live at peace with others.

By giving renewed recognition to the important place the problem of Palestinian rights must hold in any future arrangement for peace in the Middle East, the Assembly is obviously making a sincere effort to provide new momentum to the ongoing endeavours for peace. While these efforts have in the most recent past shown considerable promise and an indisputable degree of success, they certainly need to be further sustained and enlarged so as not to lose their beneficial effect on all parties concerned. And there is no doubt that it is in regard to the problems of the Palestinians that the least progress has been made.

Recognizing the damaging effects of such a situation, the two resolutions just adopted by the Assembly aim at providing progress where none has been achieved and at giving hope to those who have so far felt left out of the over-all peace effort. We find it difficult not to sympathize with such an approach. We also find ourselves in full agreement with the attempt made in these resolutions to involve representatives of the Palestinian people in the international process of negotiation and dialogue and to allow them to present their aspirations in this ongoing process themselves.

This should be all the easier since the parties concerned recognize the existence of a Palestinian problem and the fact that it needs a new and imaginative approach, a fundamentally political approach. The Palestinian problem must at last be treated on a new level, different from the two extremes from which it was so often exclusively viewed in the past—either as a purely humanitarian problem requiring little more than a relief effort to be gradually increased over the years or as a problem chiefly associated with a particularly heinous form of international violence, terrorism.

We therefore continue to believe that the best way to achieve progress is to allow this problem to become part of the process of negotiated peace

in the Middle East, the only alternative acceptable not only to the parties but also to the international community as such.

Both resolutions constitute, in our view, valuable and apparently serious efforts—on which we wish to congratulate the sponsors—on the way to disengaging the problem of Palestine from war and violence, neither of which can be regarded as means adequate to secure even the most legitimate rights for any or all parties in the Middle East.

The two resolutions, to our regret, do not however include all the elements which they should contain in order to achieve their purpose. Firmly attached to the framework of United Nations decisions on the Middle East and Palestine, my delegation is concerned about the absence of reference to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), the latter having been adopted when my country was a member of that organ. As these resolutions have found acceptance by the parties, they are and remain among the most important corner-stones of present and future peace-making efforts in the Middle East. We therefore feel that they could thus also serve in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian questions, mindful of the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Furthermore, as Austria reserves an equal amount of respect and understanding for the rights and interests of all parties in the area, we have to remind ourselves that when defining the rights and aspirations of one people no proper purpose would be served by infringing the rights and aspirations of another, particularly a neighbour. This means, in the context of the Middle East, that another chief element of a just and lasting peace in the region is the equally inalienable right of Israel and its people to exist and to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries as a sovereign and independent nation at peace with its neighbours, including its Palestinian neighbour.

That was one of the main reasons and considerations which prevented my delegation from supporting resolution 3236 (XXIX) with its vote last year, and we have again been guided in our attitude to the two resolutions concerned by these same considerations. We therefore had to abstain in the votes just taken on the two draft resolutions.

Mr. ALEMAN (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): Ecuador voted in favour of the draft resolution inviting the Palestine Liberation Orga-

nization to participate in all conferences on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations. We are convinced that it is only by means of dialogue, understanding and negotiations among all the parties concerned that a just and peaceful settlement of the protracted conflict in that part of the world can be found.

As stated on a number of occasions, Ecuador believes that that settlement would be unrealistic if it did not take into account on the one hand the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence and sovereignty, which my country expressly supports and, on the other hand recognition of the existence of the State of Israel within secure and recognized boundaries.

I should like to recall here the well-known position of my country on the question of the Middle East as explained by the head of the delegation of Ecuador in his statement on 6 October to this session of the General Assembly.

Mr. SARRO (Japan): The Government of Japan has consistently taken the position that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and that the terms of the settlement of the Middle East problem should be reached through peaceful negotiations.

Accordingly Japan supports the proposal advocated by President Sadat of Egypt that the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, be invited to participate in the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

Therefore, Japan could have voted for the original draft resolution in document A/L. 768. We understand the underlying spirit which inspired the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, but Japan abstained in the vote on that draft resolution because it is intended to implement General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), on which the Government of Japan abstained last year.

Mr. GALLARDO MORENO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): We voted in favour of the draft resolutions in documents A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770, which have just been adopted by the Assembly, because, as we stated very clearly at this same rostrum last year:

... we are convinced that there can be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East unless ... appropriate measures

[are taken] to guarantee the Palestinian people a future of freedom and dignity.
(2295th meeting, p. 122)

On that occasion we stated, and we wish to reaffirm today, that the establishment of the Palestinian people as a sovereign, independent State, with all the prerogatives of such a State, will be only:

... the final step in the implementation of the historic resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which the Assembly approved a plan to partition Palestine between a Jewish State and an Arab State, both of them to be independent and sovereign. (*ibid.*, p. 123)

Having established that, I wish to make it equally clear, as we did in the speech from which I have been quoting, that recognition of the Palestinian State should not affect in any way the existence of the State of Israel. Indeed, we are convinced, as we stated on that earlier occasion, that within the framework of resolution 181 (II),

... and as an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment and strengthening of peace, one of the parties will have to recognize the existence and legal status of the Palestinian people, with all the rights, accruing to any other people; the other party, in turn, will have to recognize the existence of the State of Israel as an irreversible fact, irrevocably approved by the United Nations. Otherwise—to put things in the simplest way—there can be no peace. For, above and beyond ancestral rivalries and the grievances that each of the parties may have regarding the other, it must be borne in mind that they both belong to the same region of the world and therefore must live together peacefully and with mutual respect for the guiding principles of peace. It is not merely a question of a cease-fire; peace has to be based on law and order. (*ibid.*)

The significance and meaning that we attach to the provisions of both resolutions that have been adopted should be viewed in the light of the considerations I have just put forward.

We are convinced also that a settlement of the so-called question of Palestine is but one part of the complex problem of the Middle East because, as the President of Mexico stated here on 7 October last:

A recent fact-finding trip through the Middle East has served to strengthen my conviction that there can be no firm foundation for peace in that area of the world without an over-all agreement that will cover the departure of troops from all occupied territories, guarantee

the borders of the States in the area, and provide definitive recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Such an agreement must necessarily be achieved within the framework of the United Nations, which is the objective hope of the world, ... (2377th meeting, p. 21).

In our view, that can be achieved only through strict compliance with resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council.

Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): The Swedish Government supports the participation of the PLO in negotiations on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations. Thus we are basically in agreement with the purpose of the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, which we have just adopted. Sweden, notwithstanding, had to abstain from voting on that resolution. The reason for this is that it is based exclusively on General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of last year. In the view of my Government, resolution 3236 (XXIX) lacks the fundamental prerequisite of a confirmation of Israel's rights. I would add that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), in the view of my Government, remain the basis for any just settlement of the Middle East problem.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1. We did so because we consider it important that the PLO be represented in those bodies which deal with questions of vital importance to the Palestinian people. Our vote does not constitute any change in our position to General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), on which we abstained from voting last year.

My delegation abstained from voting on the draft resolution in document A/L. 770. In our opinion, that draft resolution did not reflect in a proper manner the principles and purposes of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), including the principles concerning secure and recognized boundaries of Israel and recognition of the rights of the Palestinians.

Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Chile would like to place clearly on record the reasons for its vote on the resolutions adopted this morning.

Chile wishes to discharge its duty in this General Assembly, which means co-operating in the cause of peace and in the efforts honestly undertaken to attain it and thus to provide the peoples

of the Middle East with peace and tranquillity.

It was in that spirit that the Foreign Minister of Chile put before this Assembly the essential points of a policy that would achieve peace, tranquillity and respect for justice in that area of the world: respect for the right to self-determination and national sovereignty of the Palestinian people; the return of the occupied territories; and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the area, within secure and recognized boundaries.

In keeping with those purposes, the delegation of Chile felt that the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, which essentially contains the original proposal by Egypt, seeks realistic ways and means of continuing peace negotiations. Aside from the reservations that some of its provisions might call for, it thus contributes to facilitating an appropriate solution to the Palestine problem; therefore we voted in favour of the draft resolution.

We were, however, unable to support the draft resolution in document A/L. 770. We abstained on that draft resolution because we believed it did not meet all the conditions the present situation requires and which are essential to the success of these complex, difficult and important negotiations.

Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): My delegation is fully convinced that no meaningful solution of the Middle East problem can be found without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is evident that the alternative to dialogue is confrontation, and that is too ghastly to contemplate, but no dialogue can be complete and fruitful without the participation of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. My delegation is aware of the tragedies and the untold sufferings undergone by the Palestinian people for almost three decades. It is now time that their legitimate rights were recognized forthwith and past injustices rectified.

With that end in view, my delegation supported the draft resolutions (A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770) just adopted by this Assembly.

My delegation further reiterates our consistent support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which we believe provide an adequate framework for a joint and lasting solution of the Middle East problem. Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, a step which we believe is a *sine qua non* for the solution

of the Middle East problem. We recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination but at the same time we cannot ignore the political reality obtaining in the area. Israel has existed as a State for almost three decades now. It would be a great mistake to ignore that reality. In no case will my delegation agree to the dismemberment of a Member State of the United Nations; therefore our support for the draft resolutions should be understood in that light. And the rights of the Palestinian people should in no way preclude the rights of Israel to exist within secure and recognized boundaries.

Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): My delegation voted for both the draft resolutions (A/L. 768/Rev. 1 and A/L. 770) which have just been adopted by the General Assembly. I should like to qualify our support for the draft resolutions with the following explanation.

First, both draft resolutions reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, which recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In this connexion, the delegation of Thailand explained its support for that resolution at the time of its adoption last year as follows:

Of all the problems confronting the United Nations none has a longer history of tragic suffering and political complexity than the question of Palestine. For far too long the Palestinian people and the peoples of other States in the Middle East have endured hardship and injustices. We in Thailand have long held sympathetic views on the plight of the Palestinians, not only as refugees but also as people entitled to national independence and sovereignty.

At the same time, while we recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, we must take into full account also the legitimate rights of other peoples and existing States in the Middle East region. The State of Israel, with which my Government maintains friendly relations, is a fact of life, irrespective of whether or not one agrees with the circumstances of its birth. We are dealing not with the past but with the present and the future. Peace-

ful coexistence is the essential requisite for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question.

In our view that element is incorporated, together with others of no less importance, in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which continues to have the support of the Government of Thailand. (2296 meeting, p. 28-30).

Secondly, in regard to the draft resolution in document A/L. 768/Rev. 1, while my delegation concurs fully with the formulation that the participation of the Palestinian people on an equal footing with other parties is essential in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East, we are convinced also that the participation of the State of Israel on the same basis is equally an essential element in any efforts or deliberations aimed at the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Any attempt or plan to exclude the representatives of Israel from such forums, now or in the future, would in our view be unrealistic and counterproductive.

Thirdly, in casting its vote for the establishment of a committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, provided for in the draft resolution in document A/L. 770, we reiterate the firm position of our Government that the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to exist as a State within recognized borders are not and never can be mutually exclusive.

On the question of the mandate of the proposed committee, my delegation agrees with paragraph 4, in that the committee will have power only to consider and make recommendations and that it will not be able by itself to exercise any powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal bodies of the United Nations. Our acceptance of the establishment of the committee cannot therefore prejudice our position on its recommendations, nor can we prejudice the outcome of the deliberations of the committee, which will be examined with due objectivity.

Statements by UN Officials

11

Appeal of the President of the Security Council to Egypt to reconsider its refusal to renew the UNEF's mandate⁶⁴

July 21, 1975

Based on discussions I have held with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and members of the Security Council, and taking account of the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, I believe a further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force would make in the present circumstances a significant contribution to creating an atmosphere conducive to progress towards agreement on a just and lasting peace in the area. Therefore, on behalf of the Security Council, I appeal to Your Excellency to reconsider the attitude of Egypt on the situation. I assure Your Excellency that the Security Council, appreciative of the constructive measures already taken towards peace, follows the situation very closely and emphasizes the importance of achieving further progress towards a just and lasting peace and preventing a stalemate in the Middle East.

⁶⁴ Text as published in a note by the President of the Security Council. UN doc. S/11771 on July 23, 1975. The text of the appeal was agreed to at the Council's 1832nd meeting (cf. UN doc. S/PV. 1832, p. 3), in response to Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy's letter of July 14, doc. 263 below.

12

Statement by the President of the Security Council announcing that the PLO is to be invited to participate in the Council's debate on Palestine set for January 12, 1976⁶⁵

November 30, 1975

It is the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 January 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Security Council resolution 381 (1975) the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be invited to participate in the debate.

⁶⁵ Made after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 381 (1975) as a result of consultations outside the Council chamber. Text drafted by Guyana, Mauritania, Cameroon and Tanzania, UN doc. S/11889, dated November 30, 1975. The PLO participated in a Security Council debate earlier than anticipated, when an urgent meeting was called to discuss Israeli attacks on Lebanon which took place December 2, 1975. On December 4 the Council adopted by a majority vote (the USA opposed) a procedural decision to invite the PLO to participate in the debate (UN doc. S/PV. 1859) which started on December 5, 1975.

Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

13

General Assembly Resolution 3375 (XXX) calling for PLO participation in efforts toward a Middle East peace⁶⁶

November 10, 1975

The General Assembly,
Having considered the item entitled "Question of Palestine",

Reaffirming its resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, in which it recognized the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

Recognizing the necessity of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East at the earliest possible time,

Believing that the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is a prerequisite to achieving a just and lasting peace in the area,

Convinced that the participation of the Palestinian people is essential in any efforts and deliberations aiming at the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. *Requests* the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX);

2. *Calls* for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of resolution 3236 (XXIX);

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution and to take all

necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly as soon as possible.

14

General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX) regretting the lack of progress towards the implementation of Palestinian rights and establishing a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People⁶⁷

November 10, 1975

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of that resolution,⁶⁸

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved,

Recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 3236 (XXIX);

2. *Expresses its grave concern* that no progress has been achieved towards:

(a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty;

(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted;

3. *Decides* to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian

⁶⁶ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, pp. 3-4. Adopted at the Assembly's 2399th plenary meeting by 101 votes to 8 with 25 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

⁶⁷ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, p. 5. Adopted at the Assembly's 2399th plenary meeting by 93 votes to 18 with 27 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

⁶⁸ Doc. 6 above.

People composed of twenty Member States to be appointed by the General Assembly at the current session;

4. *Requests* the Committee to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme of implementation, designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), and to take into account, in the formulation of its recommendations for the implementation of that programme, all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations;

5. *Authorizes* the Committee, in the fulfillment of its mandate, to establish contact with, and to receive and consider suggestions and proposals from, any State and intergovernmental regional organization and the Palestine Liberation Organization;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks;

7. *Requests* the Committee to submit its report and recommendations to the Secretary-General no later than 1 June 1976 and requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Security Council;

8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX);

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Committee of the action taken by the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 8 above;

10. *Authorizes* the Committee, taking into consideration the action taken by the Security Council, to submit to the General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, a report containing its observations and recommendations;

11. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session.

15

General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) determining that Zionism is a form of racism⁶⁹

November 10, 1975

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures",

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, *inter alia*, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination",

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session,⁷⁰ held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organ-

⁶⁹ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, p. 177. Adopted at the Assembly's 2400th plenary meeting by 72 votes to 35 with 32 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

⁷⁰ Doc. 137 below.

ically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being",

*Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries,*⁷¹ adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

16

General Assembly Resolution 3414 (XXX) condemning Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, calling for a cessation of military and economic aid to Israel and for a planned implementation of UN resolutions on the Middle East⁷²

December 5, 1975

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the United Nations as well as those principles of international law which prohibit the occupation or acquisition of territory by the use of force, and which consider any military occupation, however temporary, or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part thereof, as an act of aggression,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's persistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

Recalling relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those concerning the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate

in any efforts for peace,

Convinced that the early reconvening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

Convinced that the present situation prevailing in the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, and that urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,

Recognizing that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solution under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and therefore all territories thus occupied must be returned;

2. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated United Nations resolutions;

3. *Requests* all States to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;

4. *Requests* the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of

⁷¹ Doc. 145 below.

⁷² United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, p. 13. Adopted at the Assembly's 2429th plenary meeting by 84 votes to 17 with 27 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

the Palestinian people and the attainment of those rights;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

17

General Assembly Resolution 3419 (XXX) concerning the administration and finances of UNRWA and reaffirming the Palestinians' right to return and to self-determination⁷³

December 8, 1975

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 B (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 B (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and 3331 C (XXIX) of 17 December 1974,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,⁷⁴

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV), 2672 B (XXV), 2792 B (XXVI), 2963 B (XXVII), 3089 A (XXVIII) and 3331 C (XXIX);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-

General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued dedicated and effective efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)⁷⁵ and requests the Commis-

⁷³ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, pp. 93-96. Adopted at the Assembly's 2430th plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: without a vote
Part B: 121 to none with 1 abstention
Part C: 97 to 3 with 28 abstentions
Part D: Adopted unanimously

For voting details see Appendix F.

⁷⁴ The introduction is printed as doc. 3 above.

⁷⁵ See doc. 7 above.

sion to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1976;

4. *Directs attention* to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with profound concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present year, and that, at presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficits projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their regular contributions.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974.

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report of the Secretary-General of 16 September 1975,⁷⁶

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. *Deplores* the refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

3. *Calls once more upon* Israel:

(a) To take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

(b) To desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

4. *Reiterates* its call upon Israel:

(a) To take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation,

(b) To desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters;

5. *Condemns* Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and calls upon Israel to desist from such attacks;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of the thirty-first session on Israel's compliance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 above of the present resolution.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,

Gravely concerned at the alarming financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, imminently endangering the essential minimum services being provided to the Palestine refugees,

Emphasizing the urgent need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

⁷⁶ Doc. 5 above.

in the Near East,

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Working Group;

3. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

18

General Assembly Resolution 3474 (XXX) calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East⁷⁷

December 11, 1975

The General Assembly,

Recalling resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which the General Assembly overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly,⁷⁸ and the responses contained therein, on the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, -

Recognizing, on the basis of the above-mentioned report, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

Mindful of the prevailing political situation in the region and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the coun-

tries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

Taking note of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Expresses the opinion* that the Member States with which the Secretary-General has consulted through his notes verbales of 10 March 1975 and 13 June 1975 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

2. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective;

3. *Recommends* that the Member States referred to in paragraph 1 of the present resolution, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards:

(a) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons, in their territory or the territory under their control by any third party;

(b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;

4. *Recommends* to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

⁷⁷ United Nations. *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*. UN press release GA/5438, pp. 57-58. Adopted at the Assembly's 2437th plenary meeting by 125 votes to none with two abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

⁷⁸ Doc. 4 above.

19

General Assembly Resolution 3516 (XXX) expressing dissatisfaction with the Secretary-General's report pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3336 (XXIX) and requesting a comprehensive report on the adverse effects on the Arab states of Israeli occupation and aggression⁷⁹

December 15, 1975

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", paragraph 5 of which requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples, resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories,

Recalling the statement made on behalf of the co-sponsors in introducing the revised draft resolution, underlining the need to seek the assistance of relevant United Nations organizations in preparing the report requested of the Secretary-General as these organizations had the machinery needed to carry out studies and research which would be useful in preparing the report,

Recalling further the statements submitted by the Secretary-General, in which he proposed that the report would be prepared on the basis of inquiries from and visits to the States concerned and consultations with the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,

Recalling also that, in his two statements, the Secretary-General indicated that a large part of the work involved would be carried out in co-operation with the Economic Commission for Western Asia, and that the Commission would require four economists, appointed for six months each, and General Service secretarial support as well as travel funds for the preparation of the report,

Noting that, in view of the staffing proposals for the Economic Commission for Western Asia, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended an additional provision in the amount of \$37,000 to cover the cost of two economists only for a period of six months each and that the General Assembly approved this additional appropriation to supplement the staff and resources of the Commission in the work involved in the preparation of the report,

Noting also that the report of the Secretary-General was not prepared in conformity with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX), the related statements made on behalf of the co-sponsors and by the Secretary-General, and the administrative and financial implications and provisions approved by the Assembly, but contained only annexes setting forth information available to Governments and to some of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs which were not involved in the preparation of substantive studies related to the report,

1. Notes that the report of the Secretary-General is inadequate as it did not incorporate the necessary substantive and comprehensive studies required in conformity with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) and related documents, including A/C. 2/SR. 1635, A/C. 2/L. 1385, A/C. 5/1649 and A/9978/Add. 1;

2. Requests the heads of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, particularly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to co-operate actively and adequately with the Secretary-General in the preparation of a final and comprehensive report;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session his final comprehensive report, which should fulfil the above-mentioned requirements.

⁷⁹ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, pp. 153-154. Adopted at the Assembly's 2441st plenary meeting by 100 votes to 2 with 30 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

⁸⁰ Doc. 9 above.

20

**General Assembly Resolution 3525 (XXX)
on the Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the
Human Rights of the Population of the Oc-
cupied Territories⁸¹**

December 15, 1975

A

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling its resolutions on the subject, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies concerned and by specialized agencies,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,⁸² which contains, inter alia, public statements made by leaders of the Israeli Government,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

3. *Calls again upon* Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

4. *Deplores* the continued and persistent viola-

tion by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments;

5. *Condemns*, in particular, the following Israeli policies and practices:

(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;

(c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals, on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories, on the other;

(e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and the denial of their right to return;

(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(h) The interference with religious freedoms and practices, as well as family rights and customs;

(i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;

6. *Declares* that those policies and practices of Israel constitute grave violations of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the principles and provisions of international law concerning occupation, as well as constitute an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace;

7. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, are null and void;

8. *Reaffirms further* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of relevant United Nations resolutions, and urges all States to refrain from any action which Israel will exploit in

⁸¹ United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 16 September-17 December 1975*, UN press release GA/5438, pp. 99-102. Adopted at the Assembly's 2441st plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 85 to 7, with 26 abstentions

Part B: 112 to 2, with 7 abstentions

Part C: 87 to 2, with 32 abstentions

Part D: 82 to 5, with 33 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix F.

⁸² Doc. 8 above.

carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories;

9. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the annexation and colonization of the occupied Arab territories as well as from all the policies and practices referred to in paragraph 5 above;

10. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

11. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

(b) To make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;

(c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat;

(d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on the tasks entrusted to him;

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974,

Considering that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Noting that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

Taking into account that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;

3. *Calls once more upon* Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

4. *Urges* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3240 C (XXIX) of 29 November 1974,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in particular section V thereof concerning action by the Special Committee to implement the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 3240 C (XXIX),

Noting that the Special Committee was not able to submit to the General Assembly at its current session a full report in accordance with the request made in paragraph 3 of resolution 3240 C (XXIX),

1. *Requests* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to

continue its efforts to undertake a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to make available to the Special Committee all the facilities necessary in the performance of its tasks and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 and 3240 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 and Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971,

Taking note of the information contained in the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,

Noting with concern the actions of the Israeli authorities in changing the institutional structure and established religious practices in the sanctuary of al-Ibrahimi mosque in the city of al-Khalil,

Considering that these actions constitute grave violations of human rights and religious freedom and of the norms of international law, in particular article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Considering also that these violations of established religious rights are a challenge to the susceptibilities of hundreds of millions of Muslims all over the world,

Considering furthermore that these violations, which have already caused civil and religious disturbances, constitute a new threat to peace and security in the area,

1. *Declares* all measures taken by the Israeli authorities with a view to changing the institutional structure and established religious practices in the sanctuary of al-Ibrahimi mosque in the city of al-Khalil null and void;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind and to desist forthwith from all such measures;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to investigate the situation in al-Ibrahimi mosque by contacting the Islamic, Arab and other authorities concerned, and to report as soon as possible on the implemen-

tation of paragraph 2 above;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to co-operate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate his task.

SECURITY COUNCIL⁸³

21

Security Council Resolution 368 (1975) extending the mandate of the UNEF for three months⁸⁴

April 17, 1975

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974) and 362 (1974),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11670 and Corr. 1),

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 July 1975;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

⁸³ Members of the Security Council in 1975 were Byelorussian SSR, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, USSR, UK and USA.

⁸⁴ UN doc. S/RES/368 (1975). Adopted at the Council's 1821st meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

22

Security Council Resolution 369 (1975) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months⁸⁵

May 28, 1975

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11694),

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Reaffirming that the two Agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

23

Security Council Resolution 371 (1975) extending the mandate of the UNEF for six months⁸⁶

July 24, 1975

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974), 362 (1974) and 368 (1975),

Taking into account the letter dated 14 July 1975 addressed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of

Egypt to the Secretary-General (S/11757),⁸⁷

Bearing in mind the appeal addressed by the President of the Security Council to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on 21 July 1975 (S/11771)⁸⁸ and expressing satisfaction for the reply of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt thereto (S/11771),⁸⁹

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force of 16 July 1975 (S/11758),

Expressing concern at the continued state of tension in the area and the lack of progress towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 October 1975;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period or at any time in the intervening period a report on the situation in the Middle East and the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

24

Security Council Resolution 378 (1975) extending the mandate of the UNEF for one year⁹⁰

October 23, 1975

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974), 362 (1974), 368 (1975) and 371 (1975),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11849),

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East,

Having further noted the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle

⁸⁵ UN doc. S/RES/369 (1975). Adopted at the Council's 1822nd meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

⁸⁶ UN doc. S/RES/371 (1975). Adopted at the Council's 1833rd meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

⁸⁷ Doc. 263 below.

⁸⁸ Doc. 11 above.

⁸⁹ Doc. 271 below.

⁹⁰ UN doc. S/RES/378 (1975). Adopted at the Council's 1851st meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

East problem could be especially dangerous in the months to come and that it is his hope, therefore, that urgent efforts will be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

1. *Decides*

(a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1976;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy.

25

Security Council Resolution 381 (1975) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months and deciding to reconvene on January 12, 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East and Palestine questions⁹¹

November 30, 1975

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/11883 and Add. 1) on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),

Having noted the discussions of the Secretary-General with all parties concerned on the situation in the Middle East,

Expressing concern over the continued state of tension in the area,

Decides:

(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions;

(b) To renew the mandate of UNDOF for

another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on further developments.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

26

Commission on Human Rights Procedural Decision 2 (XXXI) admitting the PLO to observer status⁹²

February 3, 1975

The Commission approved the request made by the League of Arab States that representation with observer status be accorded at the thirty-first session of the Commission to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

27

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 6 (XXXI) deploring Israel's continued violation of human rights in the occupied territories⁹³

February 21, 1975

A

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,⁹⁴

Recalling the pertinent United Nations resolutions on the situation in the occupied territories and the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories, and in particular General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX), 3240 (XXIX) and 3336 (XXIX),

⁹² UN doc. E/CN.4/L.1295/Add.1. Adopted at the Commission's 1290th meeting by 23 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions.

⁹³ UN doc. E/CN.4/L.1295/Add.1. Adopted at the Commission's 1315th meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 22 to 1 with 9 abstentions

Part B: 21 to 6 with 5 abstentions

⁹⁴ Doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

⁹¹ UN doc. S/RES/381 (1975). Adopted at the Council's 1856th meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting. See also doc. 12 above.

Taking into account that the General Assembly has reaffirmed, in resolution 3236 (XXIX), the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference,

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty,

Taking note of the reports of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations on the situation of the occupied Arab territories and their inhabitants, in particular the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/9817),⁹⁵

Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, in particular the continued occupation of these territories and the measures aiming at annexation as well as the continuing destruction of houses, expropriation of Arab properties and ill-treatment of prisoners,

Deeply concerned over Israel's persistence in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories, implementing massive programmes of immigration, continuing the deportation and transfer of the indigenous population and refusing their return,

Recalling also resolution IX adopted by the International Labour Conference at its fifty-ninth session, in 1974, which declares that any military occupation of territory constitutes in itself a permanent violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and in particular of trade union and social rights,

Noting the conclusion of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories that the Israeli occupying forces were responsible for the deliberate and total destruction of Quneitra and that this constituted a violation of article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and fell within the scope of article 147 of that Convention,

Seriously concerned that the population of the occupied Arab territories are hindered in the exercise of their inalienable rights to national education and cultural life,

Taking into consideration that the General Assembly has adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX), which qualifies as an act of aggression the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,

1. *Deplores* Israel's continued grave violations, in the occupied Arab territories, of the basic norms of international law and of the relevant international conventions, in particular the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which have been considered by the Commission on Human Rights as war crimes and an affront to humanity, as well as its persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

2. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the Arab people to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted and calls for their return;

3. *Reaffirms also* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the United Nations resolutions and urges all States to refrain from any action that might be exploited by Israel in carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories;

4. *Reaffirms further* that all measures taken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources and wealth of the occupied Arab territories infringe upon the permanent sovereignty of the Arab people over their natural resources and calls upon Israel immediately to rescind all such measures and to compensate and make full restitution for the exploitation and depletion of their human and natural resources;

5. *Reaffirms* that military occupation of territory constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security and is in itself a permanent violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

6. *Declares* that Israel's policy of annexation, establishment of settlements and transfer of an alien population to the occupied territories is in contravention of the purposes and principles of

⁹⁵ Doc. 8 above.

the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and provisions of international law, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people;

7. *Further declares* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, the demographic structure and the status of occupied Arab territories are null and void;

8. *Censures* in the strongest terms all measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem;

9. *Condemns* Israel for its deliberate destruction and devastation of the town of Quneitra and considers these acts as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

10. *Calls upon* Israel once more to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to acknowledge and abide by its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to implement all the relevant United Nations resolutions;

11. *Calls upon* all States to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and that it desists from all acts and policies aimed at colonizing and changing the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, particularly through the establishment of settlements and the deportation and transfer of the indigenous inhabitants;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations and to give it the widest possible publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session;

13. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

B

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Decla-

ration of Human Rights as well as the other related international instruments,

Deeply concerned over Israel's continued policies and practices of suppressing the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories in their struggle to attain their inalienable rights, entailing arbitrary imprisonment and inhumane treatment, which did not even spare religious personalities such as Archbishop Capucci, Archbishop of the Greek Catholic Church in the occupied Arab West Bank,

1. *Deplores* the policies and practices of desecration of Moslem and Christian shrines, disrespect and ill-treatment of religious leaders and violations of rights of worship in the Arab territories occupied by Israel;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to ensure freedom of worship and accord the esteem, regard and protection due to the religious shrines and personalities in accordance with the established traditions in the region, particularly in Jerusalem, which have been fully respected by all authorities throughout the centuries;

3. *Further calls upon* Israel to rescind its aforementioned policies and release immediately Archbishop Capucci.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

28

World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 28.35 calling on Israel to implement all UN and WHO resolutions relevant to the health conditions in the occupied territories and condemning Israel's refusal to cooperate with the Special Committee of Experts⁹⁶

May 28, 1975

The Twenty-eight World Health Assembly,

Recalling its resolution WHA 27.42 on the health conditions of the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East as well as the population of the occupied territories,

⁹⁶ *Official Records of the World Health Organization, Twenty-eighth World Health Assembly, Part I, Resolutions and Decisions*, pp. 16-17. Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting.

A

Having considered the Director-General's report on the health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East, document A28/WP/1,

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security,

Considering that Israel's deliberate destruction and devastation of refugee camps, cities and towns such as the destruction by Israel of the town of Kuneitra, gravely affects the physical and mental health of their inhabitants,

Deeply alarmed by the deterioration of health and living conditions of the Palestinian refugees, the displaced persons and the population of the occupied territories,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to immediately implement the relevant United Nations and World Health Assembly resolutions calling for the immediate return of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to their homes as well as the full implementation of the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war of August 1949,

2. *Requests* the Director-General to allocate appropriate funds to be devoted to the improvement of the health conditions of the population in the occupied Arab territories,

3. *Further Requests* the Director-General to ensure that the above-mentioned funds be spent under the direct supervision of WHO and through the provision of its representatives in the occupied Arab territories.

B

Bearing in mind resolution WHA 26.56 which established the Special Committee of Experts to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East,

Having received the report of the Special Committee and noting from its content that the Committee was refused, once again, to visit the Arab territories under Israeli occupation,

Aware of resolution WHA 24.33 and the relevant provisions of the Constitution of WHO concerning the failure of Members to meet their obligations to the Organization,

1. *Condemns* the refusal of Israel to cooperate with the Special Committee and calls once again upon its Government to cooperate with it and particularly to facilitate its free movement in the occupied territories,

2. *Express its appreciation* for the efforts of the Special Committee and urges it to continue its efforts in the accomplishment of its mandate and to report to the Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly,

3. *Requests* the Director-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all facilities necessary for the performance of its mission.

C

Noting General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) concerning the question of Palestine and 3237 (XXIX) concerning granting the observer status of the Palestine Liberation Organization,

Bearing in mind its resolution WHA 27.36 and WHA 27.37,

Requests the Director-General to cooperate with the Palestine Liberation Organization concerning assistance to be rendered to the Palestinian population.

International

Statement by Defence Minister Peres of Israel warning against military intervention by Syria in Lebanon¹

Jerusalem, January 6, 1975

Israel has never been inclined to plot against Lebanon, its sovereignty and independence. It is not Israel's intention to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs. However, Israel cannot ignore the fact that non-Lebanese forces with aggressive intentions towards Israel are constantly threatening, not only Lebanon's stability and integrity, but also the security and safety of Israel's northern borders.

It is obvious that once the Syrian army steps outside its borders, this would signify the beginning of a confrontation and a continuation of aggression.

Press interview statements by President Goldmann of the World Jewish Congress explaining his lack of confidence in Israel's policies and suggesting ways towards an Arab-Israeli settlement²

Paris, early January, 1975

Q. You emphasized in your articles the Jewish state's tragic isolation in the world, and you went on to point out that when a vote was taken on the United Nations' invitation to Arafat, Israel was supported only by—apart from the United States—Bolivia and Paraguay, “two of

the world's most odious dictatorships.” And you sounded an alarm claiming that it was Israel's future that was now at stake. How do you account for Israel's isolation?

A. I think it's due in large measure to Israeli policies—and occasionally the lack of them—since the State was founded 26 years ago and to the attitude of the Zionist movement earlier still. I have always held that in the long run a Jewish State could not survive in a sea of Arab hostility. I caused a sensation when, on the heels of the 1917 Balfour Declaration (by which the British Government gave its approval to the creation of a “Jewish national home” in Palestine) I wrote in a Jewish paper published in Germany that, however significant it was historically, a similar declaration by the Arabs would be even more important.

There was a widespread outcry over my article: how could I rate “Bedouins,” who weren't even organised into independent states at the time, higher than the mighty British empire?

Thirty years later, when the United Nations came up with a plan for the partition of Palestine into two States, one Jewish, the other Arab—a project which had my full support—I suggested to Ben Gurion that he should not unilaterally proclaim a Jewish State. Weak and isolated though the Arabs were at the time, I argued that they shouldn't be confronted with a *fait accompli*. I was hoping that the Arabs, whose cause had just been dumped in the lap of the United Nations by both the democratic nations and the Communist bloc, would be willing not to accept the partition of Palestine, but at least to refrain from reacting by unleashing a war. Unfortunately, a war it turned out to be, and this was followed by three other Arab-Israeli conflicts.

Egyptian diplomats in Washington had indicated to me that their Government would probably be willing to negotiate such an arrangement with Moshe Sharett (head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, Israeli Foreign Minister from 1948 to 1956 and Prime Minister from 1953 to 1955; he advocated a moderate policy towards the Arabs) and myself—we represented the moderate wing in the World Zionist Congress executive. We were to have gone to Malta or Rhodes for this purpose. President Truman offered to lend us his personal plane. But Ben Gurion, with the majority of the Zionist executive behind him, refused to put

¹ Made in response to a question in the Knesset; excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text in *Knesset Records*, Eighth Knesset, Second Session, January 6–8, 1975, pp. 1137–1138. The statement was made on the background of Syrian President Asad's visit to Lebanon, see doc. 220 below.

² Interview conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 9, 1975, p.5; English translation, *Guardian Weekly* (Manchester), January 25, 1975, p.12. In a letter to *Le Monde* (January 10, 1975, p. 28), Goldmann stressed that his views did not necessarily represent those of the World Jewish Congress.

off proclamation of the State of Israel in view of the wild enthusiasm of the Jewish population in Palestine, and especially after the UN decision.

Since then Jerusalem hasn't taken vigorous enough advantage of several opportunities which might have led to a reconciliation with the Arabs, because it was unwilling to make the necessary concessions. The last of these chances came after the Six Day War. A few days before war broke out, Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol made a solemn statement pledging that Israel had no territorial ambitions. If, after its overwhelming victory, Israel had offered to evacuate the occupied territories (save Jerusalem) on condition that they were demilitarized—with legal guarantees from the big powers, formal recognition of Israel by the Arab States and a peace treaty—I believe, and a number of experts concur with me, there would have been chance of a settlement. At any rate, the attempt should have been made.

If the Arabs rejected the proposal, world opinion would have condemned them. The Israeli attitude stemmed from the firm belief—which I never shared and which I fought against for years on end in public discussions with Ben Gurion—that time was on their side, that the status quo was preferable as the Arabs and the whole world would finally come round to accepting the fait accompli. The October war and the oil crisis showed the opposite was true, that the Arabs were gaining ground far more rapidly than ever I had foreseen.

In a nutshell, therefore, I'd say Israel's present isolation is largely the result of two things:

1. The Government's so-called status-quo policy has ended in disappointing or irritating even Israel's long-time friends like Western Europe, Yugoslavia, Romania, and many poorer nations;

2. A number of States have manifested a desire not to upset Arab holders of fabulous oil and financial resources.

Israel's argument that such an attitude is "immoral" is ethically justified, but unfortunately unrealistic. Morality little enters into consideration when it is a question of a State's political and economic survival. Israel and the Jewish people had the advantage of special conditions after the end of the Second World War because of the world's bad conscience over the destruction of six million Jews. But now, 30 years after the Nazi holocaust, this sensitivity about us has lost its edge. The rising generation, even in Germany, doesn't think it is responsible for Hitler's crimes.

Q. In the event, what should the Government of Israel do to get out of the impasse?

A. It will have to take initiatives, bold initiatives. Only the Arabs can afford to drag their heels, for time is on their side. That's why I think the "step-by-step" approach adopted by Dr Kissinger is ineffective and inadequate. The situation in the Middle East is explosive, and it calls for a prompt and thoroughgoing settlement. But such a settlement is possible only if the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate closely. Israelis who count on a revival of the cold war are fostering a dangerous illusion among the public. Any attempt to cut the USSR out of a Middle East settlement is not only doomed to failure but will even fuel the risk of another war.

Q. Considering the present military balance, Israel could perhaps emerge victorious in another encounter.

A. Nothing is less certain. A swift victory, similar to that of 1967, is no longer likely. Israel runs a big risk of suffering heavy human casualties in view of the weapons available to the Arabs, who moreover can absorb greater casualties without undue harm since their numbers are so much bigger. In any case, a new Israeli victory, like the previous victories, wouldn't solve the problem. On the contrary, it would only make it worse by fostering revanchist feelings in the Arab world. I am convinced, however, that the two superpowers would permit neither an Arab defeat—which the Soviets wouldn't countenance—nor a decisive Israeli victory, which would be thwarted by the United States so as not to alienate the Arab world, and to prevent it from turning firmly to Moscow.

Q. If that's the case, how would Israel get out of the situation?

A. The Israeli Government should accept UN Security Council resolution No. 242, and offer to give back the territory conquered in 1967 in return for a formal peace and a de jure recognition of the Jewish State. It is not absolutely necessary to insist on establishing diplomatic relations as well, as this is a matter exclusively concerning the national sovereignty of the Arab States. Additionally, minor frontier adjustments could be negotiated by Israel and its Arab neighbours. As for Jerusalem, it's a problem in its own right and ought to be settled as such. One could, for example, give the old city a special statute, as this alone concerns Moslems and Christians, while preserving the geographic and administrative unity of the city

as a whole. If the Arabs reject such an arrangement by refusing to recognise Israeli authority they would lose the sympathy and backing of most of the world, since the East as well as the West and a large part of the Third World insist on the existence of Israel and its recognition as a state.

Q. But you know many Israelis doubt the bona fides of the Arabs even when they say they are willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

A. Such scepticism betrays a lack of political maturity. In some it breeds despair leading to an abandonment of faith in Israel's future, and in others it gives rise to suicidal tendencies called the "Massada spirit." I said a lack of political maturity because history shows no people have ever had absolute guarantees for their security. Many States have at one time or another gone back on the commitments and the treaties they have signed. If the Israelis persist in thinking that the Arabs will not accept a Jewish State, then the whole Zionist ideal will collapse. That ideal is based on the conviction that Jew and Arab can not only live side by side, but can also cooperate with each other in their common interest. A confederation of Middle East States, Arab-Jewish cooperation reinforced by Israeli knowhow on the one hand and Arab financial and economic muscle on the other, could rapidly lead to the establishment of a new and flourishing centre of human civilisation in the Middle East, as in ancient times.

Q. What kind of solution do you see for the specific question of the Palestinians?

A. The Zionist movement and the State of Israel, from their very inception, ought to have recognised the Palestinian people's legitimate aspirations. Chaim Weizmann, the greatest figure in the Zionist State (he was its first president), argued that the dispute pitted the Jewish people's right to a homeland against the Palestinian people's right to keep theirs. Weizmann was justified when he held that the Jewish people's right was the more pressing, since it was a question of life or death for them, whereas for the Arabs the loss of a part of Palestine was not critical considering the extent of the land they possessed. But Weizmann added that the ideal solution was one which inflicted the least injustice on the Palestinians.

Most Zionist leaders reject this argument. Mrs Golda Meir, for example, has always refused to recognise the existence of a Palestinian people.

Fortunately this is not the case with most of the present rulers of Israel, though they haven't for all that followed a consistent line of conduct.

They don't want an independent Palestine to be established between Israel and the West Bank. But it is not up to them to dictate their terms in a matter which concerns the Palestinians primarily. The best solution would be for the United Nations to administer the West Bank territory and hold a plebiscite to enable the Palestinians to decide whether they want to join a confederation with Jordan, or to set up their own state.

As far as the Palestine Liberation Organisation is concerned, I whole-heartedly endorse the Israeli Government's refusal to negotiate with a group whose "strategic aim" is to destroy Israel and which resorts to terrorist methods. Mr Yasser Arafat must also take into account the pressures from Palestinian extremists—they have dominated the political stage for decades—as well as the fedayeen groups hostile to him.

But it's always possible to envisage solutions to a deadlocked issue. The Palestinians, for example, could form a government in exile not linked to PLO objectives. Or Mr Arafat's organisation could be invited to the Geneva peace conference on the basis of UN Security Council resolution No. 242, which recognises Israel's right to exist within "secure and guaranteed boundaries." Of course this resolution should be first amended so the Palestinians' "national rights" are also recognised. If the PLO agrees to send a delegate to Geneva on this basis, it would be tantamount to a de facto recognition of the State of Israel, and negotiations could then proceed towards a compromise arrangement. Another way would be for a United Arab delegation, including the Palestinians, to be present at the Geneva talks.

In any case, it's clear there can be no lasting peace without an agreement between the representatives of the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. Such an agreement could even extend to establishing a confederation between two fully sovereign States.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasise that a definitive settlement must be arrived at without wasting time. The Arab position is becoming harder. That was shown in the immoral, anti-Israeli decision they imposed on Unesco, and which brought protests from a large segment of world opinion, even from quarters traditionally sym-

pathetic to Arab demands. This hardening also explains why the Egyptian Foreign Minister made the absurd demand that Israel bar Jewish immigration for the next 50 years, an act which would deprive the Jewish State of its principal reason for existing.

The only way to head off another disaster in the Middle East and the radicalisation of Arab and Israeli positions—for the fact remains that over the years extremists on both sides have always been encouraging each other—is to adopt a bold policy aimed at finding a definitive solution based on superpower cooperation (which seems quite feasible, judging by what I gathered in Washington in recent weeks). I don't think that the existence of Israel itself is in any danger, for neither the United States and the Western democracies nor the Soviet Union would go along with its destruction. All the same, a war would be a disaster and, irrespective of who wins it, it would relegate all hope of a final settlement to a remote future.

31

Address by Herut Party leader Begin of Israel proposing an eight point peace plan to the Arabs (excerpt)³

Hebron, January 12, 1975

From the city of our Fathers, the city of Caleb ben Yefunch, the comrade who kept faith with Joshua and shared his trust that the Children of Israel would find the courage and strength to change the course of history and conquer the Land of Canaan; from the first royal residence of David, the greatest of Israel's captains and poets, we look to the future of our people in its land. Let it be to the future that we dedicate our deliberations.

We propose that Israel assume the initiative in establishing peace in the Middle East, and bring the following proposals to the attention of the Arab and other nations:

1. That an absolute armistice be agreed on between the Jews and the Arabs, for an initial period of three years.
2. That the armistice apply to the regular forces

on land, at sea and in the air, and to any other force or organization bearing arms.

3. That, during these three years, an effort be made to establish peace between the two nations, by means of signed peace treaties between the Jewish State and its Arab neighbour States, in which the borders between them shall be laid down.

4. That an effort be made to find an agreed humane solution to the problem of the Arab refugees and their property and of the property of the Jewish refugees who have left the Arab States and come to Israel.

5. That every Government which is a party to the negotiations appoint representatives authorized to conduct them.

6. That the negotiating sessions be held alternately in Jerusalem and in the capitals of the neighbouring Arab States, or in a neutral place such as Geneva, Lausanne or San Remo.

7. That each party be entitled to present at the negotiations whatever proposals it deems fit, in mutual recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the negotiating states.

8. That an official note containing these proposals be presented on behalf of the Government of Israel to the states adjoining Israel, and be brought to the attention of all states with which Israel maintains diplomatic relations, and that the contents of the note be brought to the attention of all nations through publication by appropriate means.

I should like to add to this Israeli peace initiative a few words of explanation to the Arabs.

Because of the historical dispute between our nations over the ownership of the Land of Israel, you have attempted, ten times in fifty-five years, to drown in blood our aspirations of returning to the land of our fathers and of our national revival. You attacked us in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1936, 1947, 1948, between 1949 and 1956, between 1957 and 1966, in 1967, and in 1973. Now let me ask the Arabs to consider: What have the results of these bloody attacks been, from your viewpoint and from ours? You have not succeeded in destroying us; on the contrary, we have increased in numbers and strength.

That is how it will continue, if you persist in your senseless ways. The tragedy of death affects both sides. You set out to kill us, even our little children, but it is you who are killed. Out of our knowledge of the elementary facts, we can tell you that you

³ Excerpted from the English text of the address made at the Twelfth Convention of the Herut Party and published as an advertisement in *The Jerusalem Post*, February 4, 1975, p. 4.

do not have the slightest chance of destroying our state, for two reasons:

First, our generation, the generation of destruction and revival, is the generation in which the *fighting Jew* has come to life again. For centuries, you and other nations in different parts of the world thought that this human type, the fighting Jew, had disappeared forever; but he has arisen and will not disappear again. You need only to look around in this very hall in Hebron to know what that means—the fighting Jew: Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Joseph Trumpeldor, the Jewish Battalions in the First World War, Tel Hai, Hagana, IZL, LHY, Palmach, the Jewish units in the Allied armies, Mahal, the pilots, paratroopers, tank crews, gunners—the fighting Jew; Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon—the fighting Jew—David Raziel, Abraham Yair, those who commanded the few when they stood against the many.

The fighting Jew is a human being. He is the son of a Jewish mother, that most marvellous of all God's creatures, with all the softness of her love and the heavy burden of her concern. The fighting Jew loves children, all children—Arab children, too, I assure you. The fighting Jew loves books, loves liberty and hates war, like Garibaldi, but he is prepared to fight for liberty.

The fighting Jew does not want to harm any Arab. He wants peace between us and all Arabs. But if you ever raise a hand against this people, know this: the fighting Jew is fearless, his heart is of steel, his hands are trained for war and his fingers for battle. He will strike the enemy, disperse him, repulse him and destroy him, and ensure that this people shall have life, freedom and human respect in the Land of its Fathers for all eternity.

Secondly, behind our just cause stands our renewed strength. We do not want to harm you, but in case you ever come to believe that you can endanger the existence of our State, know that we can destroy all the sources of your wealth.

Our hands are stretched out to you in peace.

What sense is there in our continuing to wage war against each other, to kill each other, to plan destruction. We appeal to you from this city of Hebron to make a serious, real, direct effort to replace mutual killing with dialogue (without mediators) between us. Let us all learn from history. Nations have fought each other for decades and even for centuries.

There was once a Thirty Years' War. There was

a Hundred Years' War between England and France. There was another war, in our lifetime, that lasted for thirty years, from 1914 to 1945, with a short armistice in between. How many lives have been destroyed, how many civilizations have disappeared, how many children have been killed and murdered. All those peoples have come to the conclusion that those wars were pointless, and have made peace. Let us also make a serious, direct, sincere attempt to establish peace between our peoples.

While we will not yet beat our swords into ploughshares during the three years of absolute armistice, let no Arab raise his sword against any Jew and no Jew against any Arab, and let us make an effort to give our nations the blessing of peace, until the day when we shall make war no more.

But until that day comes, we must defend our nation and our country. To that end, we propose the establishment of a joint Council of the Jewish People and the Jewish State. Its composition and powers might be in accordance with the pattern which we present here for consideration:

The Council shall consist of 60 members, thirty of whom represent the State of Israel, and thirty, the communities of the Diaspora. The Knesset shall elect its 30 representatives on the Council in accordance with its composition at the time; the representatives of the Jewish communities shall be chosen by public democratic election, according to an appropriate proportional distribution. The Council shall meet once a month at Jerusalem for a session of three days. The Council will not replace the regular Jewish and Zionist institutions, such as the Zionist Congress, the World Jewish Congress or the national organizations. Its tasks will be *operational*. The Council of the Jewish People and the Jewish State shall concern itself in a practical way with the main problems affecting their existence and future.

Return to Zion from the USSR: After the exchange of letters between Dr. Kissinger and Senator Jackson, we hoped that immigration by the tens of thousands would indeed start this year. In view of Gromyko's note to Dr. Kissinger and the threats uttered in Moscow, the blood libel trial in Vinnitsa of Dr. Shtern and the fact that prisoners of Zion are being kept in concentration camps, there are grounds for concern.

Saving the Jews of Syria: This is a case of breach of trust. We were told in connection with the sep-

aration agreement that the release of the Jews from Syria would be dealt with determinedly. Syria's ruler mocks Dr. Kissinger, telling him that the Jews in Syria feel comfortable, while they are kept in a ghetto, are persecuted and are ground into the dust. We shall have to resume the campaign to save our brothers in Syria in full force.

In the Diaspora, whole sections of our people are disappearing, no longer through physical annihilation, but through spiritual assimilation. Hundreds of thousands of Jews disappear. How can we stand by seeing all this assimilation, and do nothing? And there is something we can do. We cannot send them thousands and tens of thousands of our children, but we can invite thousands and tens of thousands of our young brothers from over there and teach them, essentially, two things: Hebrew and Scripture. They will return to the lands of the Dispersal and start schools there—if not day schools, then evening classes—and teach the younger generation Hebrew and Scripture. If they learn and study that, they will not be assimilated and there will be fewer mixed marriages.

The negotiations for peace treaties should, when the time comes, be conducted on Israel's part according to the doctrine endorsed by the majority of the nation as represented in the Knesset. We shall present the principles of the doctrine to which we have dedicated our lives, and make every effort to gain majority support for it.

These principles are:

1. Maintaining our right to the Land of Israel.
2. Striving for true peace with the Arab States, such peace to be laid down in peace treaties.
3. Failing peace, no further withdrawals, which merely bring the enemy forces closer to our population centres and endanger the security of the whole nation.

What does that mean—interim settlements? Withdrawals without peace are the ruin of the very chance of peace. Particularly dangerous would be withdrawal in the South, beyond the Jidi and Mitleh passes, and the surrender of the oil fields of Abu Rodeis. Those oilfields supply us with more than half our annual energy needs, and all other sources of supply will always be questionable.

It is being said that if we insist on these principles, we shall involve ourselves in a conflict with our great friend, the United States. You must not accept that intimidating mechanistic theory. There

is a deep friendship between the United States and the State of Israel, which will continue.

Churchill, a great friend of Roosevelt, used to say: One must always realize where the focus of power and decision in the United States is. We can say today, from our observation and experience, that it is not true that, if we stand firm and act wisely, out of love for the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, out of love of liberty and peace, we shall be in conflict with America.

From Israel's viewpoint one may say, if I may borrow a phrase, that there are three Americas. There is the State Department, and in the State Department there are Arabists. They are prepared to sacrifice Israel's security and future for their theories. But in addition to this America, and it is a very small one, there are two other Americas. One is represented by the two Houses of Congress, the elected representatives of the great American people. Since the State of Israel came into existence, there has not yet been a Congress whose two Houses have been more favourable to us than this one. And then there is a third America, perhaps the America that matters most: the public opinion of a free country, that is also involved in crises of human freedom and always overcomes them. Public opinion in the United States, not only Jewish but also non-Jewish public opinion, has never been bound by such strong bonds of sympathy to Israel as in these times.

There are grounds for being confident that, even if our position should at some point be contrary to that of the State Department, the other two mighty Americas—the elected representatives of the American people and free public opinion in the United States—would overcome the first. There can be no Munich in the Middle East. This little nation and that great nation, and other free nations with them, will make a stand against totalitarian aggression and the base oil blackmail which seeks to destroy great nations, humiliate them to the point of oppression and even ruin their lives. We can give an example of civic courage to other free peoples and make them realize their and our common interests.

For the right to the Land of Israel is *basic* and inseparable from our right to security, without which there can be no prospect of peace. The choice does not lie between maintaining our right to the Land of Israel and obtaining peace for a Jewish State in some part of the Land of Israel;

the true choice lies between maintaining our right to the Land of Israel and endangering the existence of a Jewish State in any part of the Land of Israel. In order to prove the justice of our cause to many nations, we must mount a special campaign to explain the right of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel. We propose that our Masters and Teachers, the Chief Rabbis, convene a world conference of acknowledged rabbinical authorities in Jerusalem, including Rabbi Soloveitchik and Rabbi Schneerson and all the other great Rabbis, so that the appeal may be issued from Jerusalem and followed up by a continuous effort to explain to all nations and religions—also to the Vatican, which sent us a message and forgot to say that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people—that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people by right.

To the Arabs of the Land of Israel, we hold out our hand not only in peace, but in brotherhood. They will be given equality of rights in our country. They will enjoy cultural autonomy. They will have a free choice of citizenship. If they apply for Israeli citizenship, they will receive it; if they prefer their former or any other citizenship, they will not be forced to adopt ours. If they are citizens of Israel, they will enjoy all citizens' rights, including that of voting for the Knesset; as foreign citizens, they will enjoy all rights, as individuals and as a nation, except that of voting for the Knesset, according to the same rules that apply to Jewish citizens or residents of the country. They will enjoy civic freedom, human respect, and social progress.

It is being argued that if we insist on our right to the Land of Israel, to security and peace, war is inevitable. Let us reject that argument. That is the voice of Chamberlain. All peoples believed that after May and September of the year 1938, the voice of Chamberlain would never be heard again. But it is heard again today, also from the State Department, and it says: If Israel does not surrender, does not continue to withdraw without peace, war in the Middle East is inevitable. That is the Munich system of pressure, and it is characteristic. My generation remembers a small, courageous, well equipped nation, with fortifications, a nation that knew how to say 'no' to the bloodthirsty; but its friends came and told it: surrender, or there will be war. For your own sake and for the sake of world peace, hand over your fortifications, for "demographic" reasons. In May,

that people stood fast and did not move and did not surrender, but then came the pressure of its friends, and in September it bent its head. What remains of that country, and what has been the fate of the whole human race, after they listened to the voice of Chamberlain? There is no question of war being inevitable. The proof is there: Yom Kippur. When did our enemies attack us in the North and in the South? When they had come to the conclusion—so Sadat tells us—on Thursday afternoon, a day and a half before Yom Kippur, that we were not ready, that we had not mobilized, that our soldiers were far away and our armour was standing at base camps. Then, only then, did they attack us. Let us learn the lesson.

If our forces are ready and alert, the enemy will know that, if he attacks, he must expect a crushing defeat within the first few hours and he will shrink from attempting an act of aggression that is bound to fail. In view of our experience, we will do better to sound ten precautionary alerts than to make one single mistake of unreadiness. On no account must we accept the argument that war is inevitable, for that is Chamberlain's kind of argument, and its purpose is to put us under pressure.

Above all, there is the justice of our cause. But for our belief that our cause is just, that Zionism is one of the most wonderful things in human history, doing justice by redressing the greatest injustice since man emerged on earth, we would not have held our own in this fight.

There are grounds for assuming that we will be exposed to an accumulation of threats and pressures this year. To stand up to them, Israel needs a strong Government. Paradoxically in its hardest hours it has its weakest Government since the establishment of the State.

That is the truth. I acknowledge the good wishes of the Prime Minister and his suggestion that we may adopt constructive resolutions at this Convention. Indeed, I think that one of the most constructive decisions in Israel would be to hold new elections soon.

This Government lacks a moral mandate from the electorate. The Alignment electioneers claimed before the elections that the Geneva Conference was the road to peace; now we are told by the leader of the Alignment that the Geneva Conference leads to war. By misleading the electorate in this manner, the Alignment, as the former Minister of Finance has admitted, won the 4-6

extra seats which made it, rather than Likud, eligible according to parliamentary custom to be called on to form a Cabinet.

This Government has no moral mandate for running the country. Who does not remember the 'beehive': Dayan, Sapir and Golda. That difference of six seats was given to a previous leadership. Therefore, in the name of democracy we say: Let us go to the people and let them decide what policy and what leadership they want. Elections can be held this Spring, before the pressures and threats start to become cumulative.

If new elections are held, we shall propose that Likud address itself to the electorate with a double appeal: for *change and unity*. Change—in the sense of replacing the Alignment by Likud as the group to be empowered to form the Cabinet, according to all the rules of democracy. A test of democracy, a true test, occurs when the cabinet is changed—there must be a peaceful, quiet handover of power.

Unity—for we believe that in these times, the nation needs a National Unity Government. We have offered a helping hand to establish such a government but the hand remained hanging in the air. That is why we say that, if the people give us a mandate, we shall propose to all Zionist parties the formation of a National Unity Government.

Some people like to call us all kinds of names. But who is dogmatic? Those who believed that there must be a Jewish State in our lifetime?—and there is; a Jewish army—and there is; 'illegal' immigration?—and there was; Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel—and it has been so proclaimed; the whole of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel—and it has been made whole. Those who said: go down to the Jordan?—and today everyone says that the Jordan is where we must make our stand? Who is dogmatic? Those who said all these things and have now been proved right by the facts of life? Or those who say: let us give up Judea and Samaria for the sake of peace, while the enemy says: even if you withdraw to the lines of June, 1967, you will not have peace; even if you surrender all of East Jerusalem, you will not have peace; even if you surrender the Golan Heights, you will not have peace; even if you withdraw to the lines of November, 1947, you will continue to live under a question mark, unless you agree to disappear in Arafat's "secular, democratic State"?

When the enemy says all this, and people say: Let us announce concessions and promise that we

will withdraw without peace—surely that is being dogmatic and out of touch with the realities of life.

Another name people call us is "extremist." Jews, Zionists, what has happened to us? If a Jew says that Eretz Yisrael belongs to the Jewish people by right, not only to the Jews who live in Eretz Yisrael, but to all sons of the Jewish people—is that extremism? Is that not what Herzl said, and Nordau, and Jabotinsky, and Ben-Gurion, and Ussishkin? When our fathers prayed for rain, where did they pray that it should fall? Not in the countries where they lived, but here, in this country, in Eretz Yisrael. A man who loves his homeland, who says it is his country, his ancestral heritage, and who wants it to be the heritage of his children—is he an extremist? I call that being moderate.

But there are extremists in Israel, and they compete among themselves to be the one who wants to make the greatest concessions. One is prepared to give up the whole of the Sinai peninsula, and the next to throw in "six lousy kilometres" on the Golan Heights. The next one is prepared to add Judea, and Samaria as well, and the Old City of Jerusalem, or to talk about international arrangements for all of Jerusalem, or to negotiate with Arafat's messengers. Those are the extremists: extremists in making concessions, extremists in the surrender of the mind, in the willingness to surrender that leads, God forbid, to Munich.

Until the Yom Kippur War, there was an idea in this country that our main problems are domestic ones. Until the Yom Kippur War, we of Herut thought that the domestic issues, the social and economic issues, were extremely important. The quality of life, the standard of living depends on them. But on security, life itself depends. Therefore, let us never say again that domestic issues are more important than security. While making sure of our security, let us deal with those immeasurably important social, economic and moral issues.

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32

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran (excerpts)⁴

Cairo, January 12, 1975

In response to an invitation from President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, His Majesty the Shahinshah Aryamehr, the Shah of Iran, and Her Majesty the Shahbanu, paid a visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from January 8–12, 1975

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The two sides devoted great attention to the situation in the Middle East in the light of their common interest in the establishment of security and peace throughout that area which is of such extreme strategic importance and on the basis of the rule of the principles of international law and the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter and of the need to establish international legality and justice and to reject all forms and manifestations of aggression.

The two sides concluded that an early move should be made towards securing the full implementation of all United Nations resolutions on the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, realization of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and prohibiting any unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem.

The two sides believe that the Geneva peace conference should be convened as early as possible with a view to establishing a just and permanent peace in the area, which requires the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization as representing the people of Palestine in the conference.

His Majesty the Shah expressed his appreciation of and support for the wise national policy pursued by President Muhammad Anwar Sadat in dealing with the Middle East crisis and for the achievements of the Egyptian people and their intrepid armed forces in the glorious war of liberation they fought in October 1973, while President Muhammad Anwar Sadat expressed his regard and esteem for the leader of Iran and her people for their sincere fraternal support of Arab rights and their rejection

of the precedent of the usurpation of territories by force, as manifested in the splendid and high-principled attitude adopted by Iran in the October 1973 war.

33

Speech by Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China made at the Fourth National People's Congress (excerpt)⁵

Peking, January 13, 1975

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The third world is the main force in combating colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to the third world. We should enhance our unity with the countries and people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and resolutely support them in their struggle to win or safeguard national independence, defend their state sovereignty, protect their national resources and develop their national economy. We firmly support the just struggles of the people of Korea, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Palestine and the Arab countries as well as countries in southern Africa. We support the countries and people of the second world in their struggle against superpower control, threats and bullying. We support the efforts of West European countries to get united in this struggle. We are ready to work together with the Japanese Government and people to promote friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries on the basis of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement.

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⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 13, 1975. The Shah visited Jordan before going to Egypt.

⁵ Excerpted from the English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 4 (January 24, 1975), p. 24.

34

Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger announcing the refusal of the USSR to implement the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement on the conditions required by the recent US Trade Act⁶

Washington, January 14, 1975

Since the President signed the Trade Act on Jan. 3, we have been in touch with the Soviet Government concerning the steps necessary to bring the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement into force.

Article 9 of that agreement provides for an exchange of written notices of acceptance, following which the agreement, including reciprocal extension of non-discriminatory tariff treatment (MFN), would enter into force. In accordance with the recently enacted Trade Act, prior to this exchange of written notices the President would transmit to the Congress a number of documents, including the 1972 agreement, the proposed written notices, a formal proclamation extending MFN to the U.S.S.R. and a statement of reasons for the 1972 agreement. Either House of Congress would then have had 90 legislative days to veto the agreement.

In addition to these procedures, the President would also take certain steps, pursuant to the Trade Act, to waive the applicability of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. These steps would include a report to the Congress stating that the waiver will substantially promote the objectives of the amendment and that the President has received assurances that the emigration practices of the U.S.S.R. will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of the amendment.

It was our intention to include in the required

exchange of written notices with the Soviet Government language, required by the provisions of the Trade Act, that would have made clear that the duration of three years referred to in the 1972 trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. was subject to continued legal authority to carry out our obligations. This caveat was necessitated by the fact that the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment would be applicable only for an initial period of 18 months, with provision for renewal thereafter.

The Soviet Government has now informed us that it cannot accept a trading relationship based on the legislation recently enacted in this country. It considers this legislation as contravening both the 1972 trade agreement, which had called for an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions, and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. The Soviet Government states that it does not intend to accept a trade status that is discriminatory and subject to political conditions and, accordingly, that it will not put into force the 1972 trade agreement. Finally, the Soviet Government informed us that if statements were made by the United States, in the terms required by the Trade Act, concerning assurances by the Soviet Government regarding matters it considers within its domestic jurisdiction, such statements would be repudiated by the Soviet Government.

In view of these developments, we have concluded that the 1972 trade agreement cannot be brought into force at this time and that the President will therefore not take the steps required for this purpose by the Trade Act. The President does not plan at this time to exercise the waiver authority.

The Administration regrets this turn of events. It has regarded and continues to regard an orderly and mutually beneficial trade relationship with the Soviet Union as an important element in the overall improvement of relations. It will, of course, continue to pursue all available avenues for such an improvement, including efforts to obtain legislation that will permit normal trading relationships.

⁶ English text as published in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), March 3-9, 1975, p. 26995. The passing of the Trade Act had been hampered by Congressional insistence on the so-called Jackson amendment which would have made the easing of restrictions on US-Soviet trade dependent on Soviet emigration policy, in particular with regard to Soviet Jews. In an exchange of letters on October 18-19, 1974, (docs. 158 and 159 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*) between Secretary Kissinger and Senator Jackson a modification was agreed upon whereby the President would be allowed to waive the conditions of the Jackson amendment for up to 18 months if this was felt to benefit the desired objective. The modified amendment was incorporated as section 402 of Title IV, and the Act was passed on December 20, 1974, in the House by 323 votes to 36 and in the Senate by 72 votes to 4. *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, March 3-9, 1975, pp. 26992-26995.

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues of France warning of the dangers in the Middle East situation⁷

Paris, mid-January, 1975

Q. Minister, are you worried about the latest developments in the current international situation, with the Soviet decision not to apply the trade agreement with the United States⁸ and the rumblings in the Middle East?

A. The international situation is obviously presenting some reasons for concern. The combination of the energy crisis and the absence of a solution to the Middle East conflict necessarily carries with it some important risks. It is with these risks in mind that we have been adjusting our activity over the past six months. The events that you mentioned, are they not aggravating the situation? Personally, I do not believe that the non-application of the trade agreement will jeopardize the politics of détente. I will not interpret what has led to a decision, apparently motivated by the concern of the USSR, to reject those clauses considered to be a challenge to their sovereignty. It was not unexpected. I am inclined to think it is a question of an incident, the outcome of which must not be overestimated.

Q. Is it a question of Soviet hardening arising from internal reasons?

A. Speculations on the internal Soviet situation are always hazardous. What is certain is that the USSR is a great power asserting that politics cannot be dictated to the Soviets, and that a problem like the Middle East cannot be settled without them.

Q. But is there not also a hardening on the part of Kissinger with his threats to resort to force, a matter on which France has remained silent?

A. I do not believe it is useful to criticize the ideas held by a foreign government. We would not like it if this were done to us. This elementary courtesy does not imply any approval of certain ideas that I, in any case, do not see contained in the proposals in question.

Concerning this matter, I took part in meetings in Martinique where all the main problems were dealt with. The conclusion is indicative: the results

of the French-American summit were harmonious rather than discordant.

Q. Is military intervention in the Middle East technically conceivable?

A. I am not a military expert. However, it seems to me that even if such a move were militarily possible, it would be politically difficult to conceive of because the consequences would be of extreme seriousness.

Q. Are the step-by-step negotiations as advocated by Mr. Kissinger a good method?

A. I will not criticize this in any way. If there is a disengagement in the Sinai thanks to American diplomatic efforts I will be the first to congratulate them for it. But our essential idea remains that the dynamics of peace must not be engulfed by a new partial accord. We know that the road to peace can only be long and progressive. But even if we were to desire a more active intervention by all who have fundamentally the same views on the essential facts of the settlement, what we wish for above all is that discussions for an overall settlement will take place within a definite period. We are not sure that a request for French participation will hasten this undertaking but, of course, as soon as the discussions begin and have progressed we will recall that France and Europe are ready to participate in the guarantees of the settlement and that the settlement cannot come about without us.

Q. So you share Mr. Waldheim's fears regarding the expiration of the mandate of the UN troops?

A. Yes, there is a potential danger.

Q. In case of war, do you fear a new oil embargo and do you think France will be exempt from it?

A. In case of armed conflict, the risk of an embargo will be great and the European countries will be directly affected. We must undertake to convince the producers against this, and especially to promote dialogue. This is the objective we envision and not the searching for special advantages for our country. Who could believe that France can prosper in a Europe deprived of oil?

Q. This European solidarity, does it not presuppose a European policy on the Middle East?

A. There is such a thing. It does not go as far as you do, but I do not exclude its evolution. The emotion raised by our vote in the United Nations

⁷ Excerpted and translated from the French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 19–20, 1975, pp. 1, 3.

⁸ See doc. 34 above.

in favour of the presence of the PLO had calmed down considerably two weeks later.

As to Euro-Arab dialogue, to which the Nine attach great importance, it is currently dealing with the problem of PLO participation as observers. At the time of my visit to Cairo, I suggested a formula, the nature of which I believe will permit us to take steps forward.

36

Letter from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Noyes to Representative Hamilton (Dem.) detailing the shortages in US arms reserves caused by emergency assistance to Israel⁹

Washington, January 17, 1975

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., January 17, 1975

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN—

(U) Before Congress' recess for the Christmas holidays, you requested that Secretary Schlesinger provide commentary on the Evans and Novak article in the *Washington Post* of November 18, 1974. I am replying to your request.

(U) There is concern, of course, at the Pentagon over the supply of arms to Israel since October 1973 and its impact on US readiness. As you know, the US has supplied substantial quantities of arms and equipment in support of Israel under the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act,

as amended, as well as the \$2.2 billion Emergency Security Assistance Act passed by the Congress in December 1973. Some of those items, such as tanks and aircraft, are long-lead time articles which require two years and more to produce and it is only natural that Pentagon officials are reluctant to release these types of DOD assets. Such reluctance does not, however, signify that DOD is opposing the basic policy of support to assure Israel's integrity as a sovereign state.

(U) There is some misunderstanding about the security assistance that is being provided to Israel. Only part of the assistance provided to Israel since 6 October 1973 has been taken from US inventories; a substantial part of the funding on behalf of Israel has been devoted to procurement of items from production as well.

(U) Incidentally, the Evans and Novak article also suggests or infers that the entire \$2.2 billion in emergency assistance was airlifted to Israel. It is true that deliveries arriving in Israel during the October War were airlifted, but most of the material provided has been carried on Israeli ships.

(U) You also asked for information on tanks, TOW missiles and F-4 aircraft. The data which follows will assist in putting the Evans and Novak article in better perspective.

[Security deletion.]

(U) The supply program for Israel has intensified some of the shortages we had already been experiencing, most notably of tanks, requiring drawdowns from prepositioned sets of equipment in Europe, from Reserve Components and National Guard inventories, and, in some instances, from the active forces themselves.

[Security deletion.]

(U) I hope these comments are responsive to your needs and I thank you for your interest in this most important matter.

Sincerely,

JAMES H. NOYES,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs.

⁹ Text of letter as inserted by Rep. Hamilton in *Congressional Record* (daily), January 28, 1975, p.E 217; the letter was sent in reply to the following letter of Rep. Hamilton, dated November 19, 1974:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would like very much for the Department of Defense to comment on the enclosed Evans and Novak article which appeared in the *Washington Post* of November 18, 1974.

In addition to your general observations about the tone and focus of what the article says about Pentagon thinking on Middle East issues, I would like to have your specific comments on the statements made relating to the effects then and now of the supply to Israel since October 1973 to M60 and M48 tanks, TWO missiles and F4 fighter aircraft.

I would appreciate your early consideration of this request.

Sincerely yours,

37

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Gandhi of India (excerpt)¹⁰

Baghdad, January 21, 1975

His Excellency the Deputy Chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council dealt with the Arab Gulf and the tense situation prevailing there and on Iraq's eastern border. He referred to the extent of the threat to peace and security in the area which this [situation] poses. The Indian Prime Minister expressed the Indian Government's full understanding of the dimensions of these problems. The two sides stressed the need to resolve these problems in accordance with the provisions of treaties, international law and the principles of the UN Charter. . . . The two sides . . . reiterated their belief that a just peace cannot prevail in the [Middle East] area without the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian Arab people's recovery of their full rights. The Indian Prime Minister clarified the recent developments over the return to normal of the relations among the countries of the [Indian] subcontinent. HE the Deputy Chairman expressed his appreciation of the initiatives taken by India and of the positive results achieved in this direction.

38

Television interview statements by US President Ford discussing military options in the Middle East and affirming that resumption of the Geneva conference is the alternative if the step-by-step approach fails¹¹

Washington, January 23, 1975

Q. The other day at your press conference, you were asked about Dr. Kissinger's quote¹² and the possibility of

military intervention and something surprised me, Sir. You have been in politics for a long time and you are as expert a question-ducker as anybody in that trade. Why didn't you duck that question? Why didn't you just say that is hypothetical? You did go into some detail on it.

A. I did. In part, I reiterated what I had said, I think, at a previous conference. I wanted it made as clear as I possibly could that this country, in case of economic strangulation—and the key word is “strangulation”—we had to be prepared without specifying what we might do, to take the necessary action for our self-preservation.

When you are being strangled it is a question of either dying or living and when you use the word “strangulation” in relationship to the existence of the United States or its non-existence, I think the public has to have a reassurance, our people, that we are not going to permit America to be strangled to death. And so, I, in my willingness to be as frank, but with moderation, I thought I ought to say what I said then and I have amplified it—I hope clarified it—here.

Q. The “New Republic” this week has a story saying there are three American divisions being sent to the Middle East, or being prepared for the Middle East. We called the Pentagon and we got a confirmation on that, that one is air mobile, one is airborne and one is armor. It is a little unclear as to whether this is a contingency plan because we don't know where we would put the divisions in the Middle East. Could you shed any light on that?

A. I don't think that I ought to talk about any particular military contingency plans, John. I think what I said concerning strangulation and Dr. Kissinger's comment is about as far as I ought to go.

Q. Then, we have reached a point where another question would be unproductive on that?

A. I think you are right.

Q. You said the other day, speaking about this, that general area, you think there is a serious danger of war in the Middle East. Earlier this year, you were quoted as saying something over 70 percent. Has it gone up recently?

A. I don't think that I ought to talk in terms of percentage, Tom. There is a serious danger of war in the Middle East. I have had conferences with representatives of all of the nations, practically,

¹⁰ Broadcast on Baghdad radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4811/A/1; reprinted by permission.

¹¹ Excerpted from the partial transcript of the interview conducted by Tom Brokaw and John Chancellor for NBC News published by the US Embassy in Beirut on January 27, 1975.

¹² In an interview with *Business Week*, January 13, 1975; see doc.

199 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*. President Ford was asked the question at his press conference on January 21, 1975.

in the Middle East. I have talked to people in Europe. I have talked to other experts, and everybody says it is a very potentially volatile situation.

It is my judgment that we might have a very good opportunity to be successful in what we call our step-by-step process. I hope our optimism is borne out. We are certainly going to try.

Q. Is it tied to Secretary Kissinger's next trip to that part of the world?

A. Well, he is going because we think it might be fruitful, but we don't want to raise expectations. We have to be realistic; but if we don't try to move in this direction at this time, I think we might lose a unique opportunity.

Q. Should we not succeed this time, Mr. President, do you think it is probably time we have to abandon this step-by-step process and go on to Geneva as the Soviets would like us to do?

A. I think that is a distinct possibility. We prefer the process that has been successful so far, but if there is no progress, then I think we undoubtedly would be forced to go to Geneva.

I wouldn't be anymore optimistic, and in fact, I would be less optimistic, if the matter was thrown on the doorstep of Geneva.

Q. Mr. President, really, the Russians have been shut out of Middle Eastern diplomacy since Dr. Kissinger began step-by-step diplomacy. Why was that?

Couldn't the Russians play more of a positive role than they are doing? They are arming the Arabs to the teeth and that is really about all we have been able to see or all they have been allowed to do under the way we have set out policies.

A. I am not as authoritative on what was done during the October War of 1973 in the Middle East as I am now, of course. I can assure you that we do keep contact with the Soviet Union at the present time. We are not trying to shut them out of the process of trying to find an answer in the Middle East. They can play and they have played a constructive role, even under the current circumstances.

So, I think it is unfair and not accurate to say that they are not playing a part. We are taking a course of action where it is more visible perhaps that we are doing something but I say sincerely that the Soviet Union is playing a part even at the present time.

Q. Would you tell us what you think about the idea

that is going around a little bit—and perhaps you have heard it as well, perhaps you know a great deal about it, I don't know—that if the Israelis made a significant pullback on various fronts in the Middle East, that that could be followed by some sort of American guarantee for their security?

A. John, I really do not think I ought to get into the details of what might or might not be the grounds for a negotiated settlement. This is a very difficult area because of the long history of jealousies, antagonisms and it is so delicate I really do not think I ought to get into the details of what might or might not be the grounds for a settlement.

Q. Would you entertain a question based on the reported Israeli desire for a three-fold increase in our aid to them?

A. The United States, over the years, has been very generous in economic and military aid for Israel. On the other hand, we have been quite generous to a number of Arab nations. The State of Israel does need adequate military capability to protect its boundaries or its territorial integrity.

I think because of the commonality of interest that we have with Israel in the Middle East that it is in our interest as well as theirs to be helpful to them, both militarily and economically. There has been no determination by me or by us as to the amount of that aid....

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if we can come back at you again about Israel security in another way. As you know, reporters don't give up easily on some of these questions.

A. I found that out, Tom.

Q. On a long-range basis, do you think it is possible for Israel to be truly secure in the Middle East without a United States guarantee of some kind?

A. Of course, Israel, to my knowledge, Tom, has never asked for any U.S. manpower or any guarantee from us for their security or their territorial integrity. I think the Israelis, if they are given adequate arms and sufficient economic help, can handle the situation in the Middle East.

Now, the last war, unfortunately, was much more severe from their point of view than the three previous ones and I suspect that with the Arabs having more sophisticated weapons and probably a better military capability, another war might even be worse. That is one reason why we wish to accelerate the efforts to find some answers over there.

But, I think the Israelis, with adequate equipment and their determination and sufficient economic aid won't have to have U.S. guarantees of any kind.

*Q. Sir, when we talk about strangulation—and I hope we don't talk about it any more tonight after this, and I do believe it is the hypothetical—I agree with you on that—what about the moral implications? If a country is being strangled by a country or another set of countries that own a natural resource, is it moral to go and take that? It is their oil, it is not ours. Isn't that a troublesome question?*¹³

A. I think it is a troublesome question. It may not be right, John, but I think if you go back over the history of mankind, wars have been fought over natural resources from time immemorial. I would hope that in this decade or in this century and beyond, we would not have to have wars for those purposes and we certainly are not contemplating any such action. But history, in the years before us, indicates quite clearly that that was one of the reasons why nations fought one another.

39

Statement by Prime Minister Miki of Japan outlining Japan's attitude on the Middle East¹³

Tokyo, January 24, 1975

Let me first outline Japan's foreign policy, with special emphasis on the Middle East and issues that have arisen in the Asian and Pacific area.

Developments in the Middle East in conjunction with the oil problem are bound to constitute the major international issue of 1975.

The oil problem and the Middle East dispute cannot be discussed separately. It is therefore imperative that all countries of the world should cooperate on the basis of their respective standpoints in order to prevent a recurrence of armed conflict in the Middle East and achieve a just and lasting peace in the area.

Japan strongly appeals to the various countries concerned to translate into action United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution,

emphasizing inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, called on Israel to withdraw her troops from the occupied areas as a result of the 1967 conflict. The resolution, furthermore, urges that the right to live of all parties, including Israel, be respected. I consider it a just and fair resolution.

However, with regard to the Palestinians, it refers only to the refugees. What must be achieved is the recognition, of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in accordance with the United Nations Charter, together with a solution to the Jerusalem problem, through peaceful negotiations.

Japan on her part will exert utmost efforts to help amicably settle all these problems so that just and lasting peace and stability prevail in the Middle East.

The price of crude oil, quadrupled at a stroke, has thrown the world economy into a quagmire of confusion and has particularly aggravated the cost-push inflation and international payments position of Japan, which is heavily reliant on overseas oil supplies.

We have full understanding of the background of the oil-producing countries of having had complaints over extremely low prices of their products over a long period, despite rises witnessed in the meantime in the prices of industrial products as well as of other raw materials and resources.

It is, nevertheless, a grim fact that the quadrupled price of crude oil has as a consequence brought about confusion in the world economic order, which has been unable to promptly adjust itself to the development. I would like to ask for the understanding of the oil-producing countries on this score. It is my sincere desire that both oil-producing and consumer countries seek to adjust mutual interests not through force but through dialogue in a spirit of collaboration.

Japan, heavily dependent on the Middle East oil, naturally has to make careful consideration in framing her Middle East Policy.

¹³ Made in a speech to the Diet; English text supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy in Beirut.

40

Press interview statements by US Senator Sparkman (Dem.) discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁴**Washington, late January, 1975**

Q. President Ford in his interview with "Time" magazine this week said that the U.S. will have to base its policy on what is in its own best interests in the Middle East. What do you think are U.S. interests in the Middle East?

A. I think they are the same that they are everywhere else—to do our best to have and maintain good relations with all the countries in the area, to carry on trade and commerce with them like we do with all the countries of the world.

Q. Given the critical Arab reaction to Kissinger's statements, do you feel that his role, or that of the United States, as a mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been jeopardized?

A. No. I would not say that because, as I say, most of the criticism of his comment, I think, has overlooked the narrow limits within which he couched that. In other words it was severely limited. He used the word "economic strangulation" and I don't see why we should be speculating on those things. I am not thinking of any industrialized nation—and I hope not any other nation being economically strangled.

Q. Do you feel that a settlement is possible in the Middle East with Israel withdrawing from the occupied Arab territories and recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people?

A. Well, let me say this. I am not going to try to determine what the terms ought to be. But I do believe there should be negotiation among Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Particularly those countries because they are the ones that are most concerned with the problems in that area. And Jordan is drawn in because of the displaced Palestinians.

Q. Given the world-wide recognition of the PLO as

the representative of the displaced Palestinians, do you think the U.S. should recognize the PLO?

A. I don't understand that the PLO is set up as a government, as a state.

Q. Well, it has been recognized by the U.N., by many Arab and non-Arab nations as the representative of the displaced Palestinians?

A. Well, all right. I would like to hold myself to this, that if the displaced Palestinians will organize themselves—and I am purposely avoiding the use of the PLO because as you know that has been in the past very much a revolutionary organization, I am talking about an orderly government. If the displaced Palestinians will organize themselves into a state then I would like them to have a place they could call their own and a state that would be recognized by the nations of the world.

Q. Senator, the Israelis have said that they are not ready to withdraw from Jerusalem, from the Golan Heights and from parts of the West Bank and Sinai. Do you think that a peace settlement is possible under these conditions?

A. I believe that Israel has, rather recently, said that they would withdraw from some of the lands they have taken. I see there being an attitude of willing to withdraw. And I think this is the time for negotiations. And I believe that if the countries primarily concerned—Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan would negotiate among themselves, I feel certain they could work out a satisfactory solution.

Q. Senator, Jordan has agreed, at the Arab summit conference in Rabat,¹⁵ to renounce its claims to speak for the Palestinians in favor of the PLO and Israel before that had refused to negotiate with Jordan over the return of the West Bank.

A. Where are you going to settle the displaced Palestinians? Wouldn't you settle them on the West Bank? Jordan claims the West Bank and I still say that I think that it could best be handled by negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the displaced Palestinians.

Q. George Ball, Nahum Goldmann¹⁶ and others have recently criticized Secretary Kissinger's approach in the Middle East and said that it will not succeed because it excludes the Soviet Union. Do you agree with such

¹⁴ Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by Edmund Ghareeb, *The Daily Star* (Beirut), January 26, 1975, p. 8. Sen. Sparkman had just taken over as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee replacing Sen. Fulbright.

¹⁵ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹⁶ Doc. 30 above.

criticism and do you think the Geneva conference should be reconvened, or do you feel that a settlement is possible outside it?

A. I don't know. Of course, as far as I am concerned, I would be glad to see the Soviet Union come in. I would like to see the Soviets and the U.S. work together in trying to bring together lasting peace to that area. And it doesn't matter whether it is through negotiations with these countries or through Geneva.

Q. Many people have been prophesying a new war in the Middle East. What is your assessment?

A. I think the Soviet Union and the United States could be most helpful in preventing anything like that.

Q. Senator Fulbright called for international guarantees, perhaps a peace treaty with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. And recently President Ford tied this guarantee to progress in Middle East negotiations. What is your opinion?

A. I believe Senator Fulbright tied the two together, did he not? I felt Senator Fulbright made a very good presentation. And it seems to me that President Ford, I haven't just read what he said, but I noticed the headline in this morning's paper that he was non-committal about it.

Q. He said that he was not going to give the guarantees unless progress in the negotiations was made?

A. That's all right. I think that's all right. Israel has been saying through the years that she wanted this additional area in order to give her security. Now, I think it would be fine for major powers to give Israel assurance that she is safe within her borders in return for Israel's surrendering some of the land, if not all.

Q. The article in today's "Post" said that the President's statement might be construed as pressure on Israel to withdraw.

A. I don't think we have rendered any pressure on Israel.

Q. Your predecessor, Sen. Fulbright, said last year that about 80 per cent of the votes in the Senate are subservient to Israel's interest, and that "what Israel wants, Israel gets."¹⁷ Do you share his view and to what do you attribute the powerful pro-Israeli influence in Congress?

A. Well, of course, you know we have a large Jewish population in this country and, undoubtedly, they raise issues favorable to Israel and make their wishes known to members of Congress, and Congress responds. I don't agree to any statement that would go as far as to say that what Israel wants, Israel gets.

Q. There have been hints that Israel may use nuclear weapons in a Middle East war. Now, the U.S. has signed a treaty opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Do you think the U.S. can and should put pressure on Israel to sign that treaty?

A. Well, I don't know whether we can put pressure on Israel. I am not a believer in one nation trying to twist the arm of another nation.

Q. Yet this nation is the nation that has been supplying Israel with money and material to do what it has been doing.

A. Now, you're going to say if you don't do certain things we are going to stop supplying you with weapons. That's arm twisting.

41

Speech by President Giscard d'Estaing of France made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Sadat of Egypt (excerpt)¹⁸

Paris, January 27, 1975

As you know, and as I have expressed since my accession to the presidency, we appreciate how the weight of the Middle East conflict hampers the development of your region of the world and how much it constrains Egypt's natural vocation as a place for meetings and dialogue.

France is convinced that it is possible to put an end to the conflict and to establish conditions for a durable peaceful settlement beginning the moment one accepts to see, as they are, the requirements for the dignity and rights of those parties concerned: the right of the Arab countries to recover their territorial integrity by the evacuation of the occupied territories, the right of the Palestinian

¹⁷ Doc. 78 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the partial text, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 29, 1975, p. 2.

people, like all peoples of the world, to a homeland, and the right of Israel to exist, like all states in the area, with secure borders, recognized and—I add—effectively guaranteed.

We do not claim to dictate to the states concerned the methods and avenues for peace. It is obvious that we do not have the means to do so. But I assert the conviction that the return to a peaceful situation in the Middle East is essentially a matter of internal and external political willingness. Technically and diplomatically, one is aware of the nature of the possible settlement. I declare that chances for a just settlement for all countries involved is greater today than it has ever been, thanks to the diplomatic activity undertaken in the past year, to the effectiveness which you personally have contributed, and thanks to the new awareness of certain objective realities to which France has given impetus in the last six months.

I also declare that the chances for a just settlement are greater today than they would ever be in a situation arising from the unleashing of an armed conflict, whatever motives might stimulate it.

We congratulate you, Mr. President, for all progress towards this just settlement, on condition that this progress constitutes one more step in the search for a total settlement and not an alibi for delaying its realization.

42

Press interview statement by Socialist Party leader Mitterand of France expressing approval of the role of Egypt in the current Middle East situation¹⁹

Late January, 1975

Q. President Sadat has come to Paris presenting himself as a man who sincerely wants peace in the Middle East.²⁰ You had the occasion to meet him slightly less than a year ago in Cairo. What do you think of his current position?

¹⁹ Excerpted and translated from the French text, *L'Unité* (Paris), January 29, 1975, p. 7.

²⁰ President Sadat visited France January 27–29, 1975; see doc. 45 below.

A. On the personal level, I believe he is sincere—something which is true of all statesmen. I believe that this sincerity is based on a good analysis of the situation. Egypt needs to work for economic progress. She cannot tolerate a permanent war budget with demographic growth—a yearly increase of one million—and the enormous differences existing between the various social classes. Egypt is not an oil-producing country, therefore she is not one of those benefitting from the oil boom. Sadat is certainly not lacking in feeling for Arab solidarity but he accords a particular importance to internal political considerations. This gives him, if not a position as a mediator, at least a spiritual disposition which leads him to understand that peace is a great blessing, and to reject war as a means of desperation. I believe therefore that Sadat can play a great role in the peace process. Moreover, it is he that can play the greatest role in the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

In this sense, it is necessary that the French socialists remember the welcome that was given them in Cairo and wish him the maximum success, while reserving, in case of failure, their critical spirit on the proposals resulting from Franco-Egyptian talks.

43

Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing his coming Middle East trip²¹

Washington, January 28, 1975

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the difficulty of this phase of the Middle East negotiations, and now looking back at the reaction to your remarks,²² do you think it was a mistake to leave open the possibility of American military intervention in the Middle East oil fields in the gravest of emergencies?

A. Well, I think what I said and the way it was interpreted were not always identical. I believe that what I said was true and it was necessary. It is irrelevant to the issues which we now confront.

²¹ Excerpted from the partial transcript published by the US embassy in Beirut on January 29, 1975.

²² In *Business Week*, January 13, 1975; see doc. 199 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

And I have repeatedly stated that the United States will deal with the issues of energy on the basis of a dialogue with the producers and with an attitude of conciliation and cooperation.

The contingency to which I referred, as I pointed out previously, could arise only if warfare were originated against the United States. And I don't foresee this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to date on the diplomatic situation in the Middle East? Specifically, what are your travel plans? Secondly, do you think it's possible to reconcile Egypt's desire for further regaining of territory—in particular the passes and the oil fields which President Sadat referred to²³—with Israel's desire for further political acceptance by the Arabs?

A. First, I think you all recognize that we are dealing in the Middle East with an enormously delicate problem affecting the relations between Israel and its neighbors, the relations of Israel's neighbors to each other, and the relationship of outside powers to the whole area. And in this extremely complex and very dangerous situation, it is necessary for us to move with care and, hopefully, with some thoughtfulness.

My plans are to go within the next few weeks—and the precise date has not yet been set, but I hope to be able to announce it early next week—to go within the next few weeks on an exploratory trip to the Middle East. It will not be a trip designed to settle anything or to generate a shuttle diplomacy. It will be designed to have first-hand talks with all of the major participants—all of the Arab countries that I previously visited—as well as Israel—in order to see what the real possibility of a solution might be.

I personally believe that the two interests—which you correctly defined—of Egypt for the return of some territory and of Israel for some progress towards peace, can be reconciled. And I believe also that the alternative to reconciling it will be serious for all of the parties concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, several months ago you said you wouldn't be returning to the Middle East unless you were fairly sure that your presence there would lead to an agreement. You are now saying that you are going back there on an exploratory mission. Why have you changed your tactics?

A. I have changed my tactic at the request of all of the parties, and based on the belief that the situation requires that this step be taken. I have also pointed out in this press conference that I am hopeful that progress can be made. And I am going there with that attitude.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question I would like to follow up on your first reply on the Middle East. In that reply, you said that you believe the Egyptian desire for additional territory in Sinai, together with the Israeli desire for specific political concessions, can be reconciled. I understand that you probably don't want to get into the specific demands that Israel is asking from Egypt. But perhaps you can give us some general criteria for what types of political acts Egypt may offer to Israel that would satisfy Israel. And the second part of the question is—the questioner had specifically referred to the oil fields and the passes—were you referring to those specific points as possibly being reconciled?

A. I think all of you have to accept the fact that I cannot possibly go into the details of the negotiation before I have gone to the Middle East. And therefore, with all due respect, I cannot possibly answer this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, along this line, but not asking you to go into any details of the negotiations, in your discussions with the Arab countries in the Middle East, have you found any evidence that the Arab world is prepared to accept the existence of Israel?

A. It is my impression that there is an increasing willingness to accept the existence of Israel as part of the process of peace, yes.

44

Press interview statements by Christian Socialist Union leader Strauss of West Germany outlining his impressions of China's Middle East policy²⁴

Late January, 1975

Q. Moving from the Far East to the Middle East—what is your impression of the Chinese position should

²⁴ Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Quick* (Munich), January 30, 1975, p. 86a; Strauss had just returned from a visit to China.

²³ Doc. 224 below.

it come to a renewed outbreak of fighting in the area?

A. Here the Chinese fulfil their role as defender of the coloured peoples and therefore also as the advocate or champion of the Arab world. On the other hand the Chinese position was not presented to me as if they would want the Arabs to have a free hand vis-à-vis Israel or that they would wish for the destruction of the state of Israel.

Q. Is this really your impression?

A. Yes. The Chinese gave me the impression that they want all states to live secure within their boundaries. This would imply that the Israelis must withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967. I myself doubt very much, that such a withdrawal, which would carry for the Israelis strategically very important risks, would put an end to the conflict. One might question whether or not the extremist Arab circles would want to stop there.

45

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to France of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)²⁵

Paris, January 29, 1975

In response to an invitation from President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic, President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and his wife paid an official visit to France from January 27–29, 1975.

The two Presidents observed that their views were in agreement on important international problems and they paid close attention to recent and possible future developments in the situation in the Middle East which give cause for alarm. They expressed their common conviction that such positive steps must be taken at an early date to assist in the rapid achievement of a peaceful settlement which, if it is to be just and permanent, must meet the following three basic conditions:

Withdrawal from all the territories occupied

in 1967, guaranteeing²⁶ the right of the Palestinian people to have a homeland, and recognition of the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed frontiers.

The two Presidents reviewed the conditions for the initiation of an Arab-European dialogue and expressed the hope that this idea might be translated into actual fact in the near future.

46

Television interview statements by UK Prime Minister Wilson denying that oil price rises are strangling Western economies²⁷

January 29, 1975

Q. Prime Minister, I wonder if I could squeeze one in here. I would like your evaluation or your opinion of Henry Kissinger's statement of a few weeks ago on the possible use of force in an ultimate phase of an oil confrontation in the Middle East.²⁸

A. I don't think that's a direct quotation. I've studied what he said very, very carefully and of course he spelled it out in greater length in his speech in California a few days ago. He was not talking, of course, as I understand it—he must interpret it for himself, and he has done—he was not talking, as I understand him saying, that military force will be used to get the oil price down. I can imagine no way of [unintelligible] successfully, apart from the other consequences of it. But he said if there was a strangulation of the West, a strangulation that destroyed our ability to [live as communities], I think it was in that hypothetical

²⁵ The French text reads, “la prise en considération”. *Le Monde* (Paris), January 30, 1975, p. 1.

²⁷ Interview conducted for Canadian television; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by the British embassy in Beirut.

²⁸ Made to *Business Week*, January 13, 1975, p. 69; the relevant section is doc. 199 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

²⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 30, 1975.

sense of circumstance that he was talking. But he has, I think, spelled out much more fully now what he had in mind.

Q. Well, it's not so much an interpretation of what he said, Prime Minister, that I'm curious about as to whether any reference at this stage at all of the use of force is an advisable thing to do, since the Arabs seem to have reacted so sensitively toward that statement.

*A. Well, he's answering a question. (One always has this problem when you get questions, you know, and then you've got to answer the question in *Business Week*.) I haven't discussed it with him. I don't see any need to but I think he was perhaps making a warning to some wilder elements, not the more responsible oil people, that if they felt that they could use the oil weapon as itself a weapon of war, then some kind of response would have to be shown, but he has made it very clear that he thinks it's a very distant and remote hypothetical contingency and I agree with him.*

Q. But you are strangling, aren't you?

A. No.

Q. You were the last major country to go into the Middle East militarily because you felt you were being hurt at the time of Suez. It seems to me that you're suffering more now than you were then.

A. I hasten to add that my party were very vigorously opposed to that lunatic action in Suez which wasn't in any way a question of economic strangulation. It was a question of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the phoney belief that Egyptian pilots couldn't take ships through it, which has been proved wrong, and we opposed that. But we're not strangling. We're in the same position as other countries. We have a surcharge, a tax, if you like, being placed on our oil, therefore on our cost of living, on our standard of living, on our balance of payments. That's not strangulation. It's a challenge. It's a hell of a challenge. We've got to meet it. But it is not strangling the economy. I do not know of cases where, for example, we're not able to live our normal economic life or factories having to close down because we haven't got the oil. Indeed in the present circumstances Europe is almost awash with oil, at a very high price.

47

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)²⁹

Damascus, February 3, 1975

At the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Soviet Foreign Minister, paid an official, friendly visit to the Syrian Arab Republic from 1st to 3rd February 1975.

During these meetings, which were held in an atmosphere of complete understanding characterizing Syrian-Soviet relations, views were exchanged on bilateral relations and the situation in the Middle East.

During the talks, the Syrian and Soviet Foreign Ministers expressed the two sides' satisfaction with the development and the strengthening of fruitful co-operation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR. They stressed their two countries' resolve to continue and to strengthen this co-operation in the political, economic, commercial, cultural, scientific and other fields.

The two sides stressed the especially great importance of the meetings between President Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and President of the Republic, and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, including the meeting which took place in April 1974, and in which the basic issues concerning the two countries were discussed.

The following two documents were signed during the visit: the agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR and the agreement between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government of the USSR on co-operation on health and medical sciences.

The Foreign Ministers of the two countries reviewed the tense situation in the Middle East and stressed that the cause of this tension, which is

²⁹ Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic and by Moscow radio in Russian; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4822/E/1-2; reprinted by permission.

threatening international peace and security, is Israel's continuous aggression against the Arab territories and its refusal to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

Proceeding from their common stand, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Soviet Union emphasize the need to put an end to Israel's expansionist policy and military provocations as well as the need for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and the guaranteeing of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The two sides have expressed their conviction that the establishment of a just and durable peace in the region requires that the Middle East question should involve all parties concerned and should solve all issues resulting from the dispute.

The two sides are firmly convinced of the need to immediately resume the work of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East not later than February or early March this year and with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the representatives of the PLO, to discuss all issues related to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the region.

The two sides stressed the stand they announced in the Joint Syrian-Soviet statement of 13th April 1974³⁰ concerning the importance of strengthening the defence capability of the Syrian Arab Republic so long as the Israeli aggression continued, and the Syrian Arab Republic's firm and legitimate right to use every effective means to liberate its occupied territory.

The Syrian side stressed its stand that the Soviet Union must participate at all stages and in every field related to the efforts to find a just solution to the Middle East question.

The Soviet side highly appreciated the efforts of the Syrian Arab Republic to strengthen Arab solidarity and the common action of the Arab states against the plans of imperialism and world Zionism. The Soviet Union also announced its determination to continue to render comprehensive assistance and support to the Arab peoples in their just struggle to strengthen their independence and to remove the effects of the imperialist Israeli aggression.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko expressed his thanks and appreciation to the Syrian

leaders for the warm reception given him during his stay in the Syrian Arab Republic. He confirmed his invitation to the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, to pay an official visit to the USSR at a date suitable to both sides.

48

Statement by USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterating that the best way towards Middle East peace is through the Geneva conference³¹

Cairo, February 3, 1975

As for the Soviet Union, the aim of its policy on Middle East affairs is well known:

In the first place, it is the liberation of all the Arab territories occupied by the invaders in 1967; secondly, it is the safeguarding of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish their own statehood; thirdly, it is the granting of the possibility to all states and peoples in that region to live in conditions of peace and security.

This is the policy pursued by the Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev and by the Soviet Union in Middle East affairs.

Irrespective of the policy pursued by this or that state, irrespective of their role and influence in the world, our position remains consistent, for principles from which we do not deviate are at stake.

Figuratively speaking, the watershed which is becoming ever more distinctly visible in the Middle East makes clear who stands for the genuine protection of the lawful rights of the peoples and who stands for flouting these rights.

We are convinced that, given the desire for this by all the interested sides, a political settlement in the Middle East is an attainable and a real aim. There is no need here to explain in detail why the Geneva Conference is the most suitable forum for a discussion of all the aspects of a Middle East settlement.

I should only like to say that the more time that

³¹ Made in a speech at a dinner in his honour; excerpted from the partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5773 (February 11, 1975), p. 46.

³⁰ Doc. 96 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

passes the firmer is our conviction that the Geneva Conference should be resumed as soon as possible. In other words, it is necessary for all those who can make a contribution to the settlement of the problem to sit down at a conference table. Considerations of sheer prestige and, still more, vanity, should be brushed aside. It is a pleasure to see that on this question, as on many others, if we understand Egypt's position correctly, the views of the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt coincide.

Questions of a Middle East settlement are only part of the broad all-round foundation of basic common interests between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Egypt in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and friendship of peoples. We would like the present meeting and talks in Cairo to make a good contribution to Soviet-Egyptian all-round co-operation and to help further to deepen and expand it.

Any setbacks to or blemishes on our relations please those who, from the very beginning, did not want new and friendly relations to develop between the Soviet Union and Egypt. Our countries, however, must be guided by their own interests, the more so since these interests are inseparable from the broader interests of the struggle for a lasting world peace.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpt)³²

Cairo, February 5, 1975

Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, paid a friendly visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt February 3–5, 1975.

In particular, the talks included an exchange of views on the Middle East problem and ways of settling it. The two parties expressed their concern at the Middle East situation which is still tense and

fraught with the danger of a renewal of military operations. They pointed out that the reason for this is the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories and repeated Israeli aggressions against the neighbouring Arab countries.

The two parties affirmed, as a matter of principle, their conviction that permanent peace in the Middle East can never be achieved without the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories they occupied in 1967 and the safeguarding of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination and to establish their national entity.

It was pointed out in particular that the settlement in the Middle East must be comprehensive in character, that is to say, it must include all parties to the conflict and solve all the problems arising from that conflict, and that such a settlement alone is in accord with the vital interests of all the countries and peoples of the area and with their aspiration to live in permanent and guaranteed peace and security, a peace that is compatible with the interests of world peace.

The USSR and Egypt reaffirmed their conviction that the Geneva conference on peace in the Middle East is the most appropriate venue for the discussion of all aspects of the settlement, and the two sides call for the immediate resumption of the meetings of the conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Egyptian side expressed the view that it is important and necessary that the USSR should take part in the settlement of all aspects of the Middle East crisis at all stages, including participation in all such working committees as may be set up at the Geneva conference.

The Soviet side expressed its determination to continue to provide aid and support in all fields to the just Arab cause and the struggle of the Arab peoples to eliminate the traces of Israeli aggression and to establish a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

The two sides stressed the importance of undertaking regular contacts and consultations on the subjects that concern both sides including all aspects of a Middle East settlement, in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,³³

³² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 6, 1975.

³³ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

the conclusion of which has led to the further consolidation of the firm basis of the relations between the two countries.

The two sides expressed their determination to reinforce and strengthen Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation, which they regard as an achievement of historic importance attained through the immense efforts of the Soviet and Egyptian peoples.

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Statement by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU asserting that only a full settlement will bring about a Middle East peace³⁴

Moscow, February 14, 1975

As has been the case in the past, one of the paramount objectives is the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The situation in that area remains explosive. And it cannot, indeed, be otherwise so long as the aggressor holds on to the foreign soil he has seized and so long as the rights of the peoples are flouted. The peoples of the Middle East need a just and lasting peace as much as the very air they breathe.

One sometimes hears arguments to the effect that a full peace settlement in the Middle East is hard to achieve and that, instead, one should be content, in the next few years, with partial agreements.

What can be said on this subject?

Naturally, partial measures, such as the withdrawal of the occupying forces from this or that part of the Arab territory that has been seized and its return to the Arabs, are in themselves useful, but only if they constitute steps towards a real peace settlement at the earliest possible date and are not used as a pretext for freezing the situation as a whole, for delaying a peace settlement, and for weakening the unity of the Arab countries.

There are some who seem to want to offer the Arab peoples something in the nature of a soporific in the hope that they will calm down and forget about their demands for the restoration of justice

and the complete elimination of the consequences of the aggression. But a soporific knocks you out only for a short time, and then you wake up only to be faced with the same real life, with all its problems.

Practical experience very eloquently bears this out. It will be remembered that partial bilateral measures have already been carried out in the Middle East. Have they eased the tension there? Unfortunately, no. Have they given the peoples of the Middle East tranquillity? No, they have not. Have they limited in any way the onerous and dangerous arms race in which the Middle East countries are involved? It is well known that they have not.

All this indicates that there is no substitute for a genuine and enduring peace settlement. And its postponement is inadmissible unless complete indifference is to be shown to the destinies of the countries and peoples of the Middle East (naturally, including Israel, whose people can scarcely be interested in living endlessly in a country transformed into a military camp) and to the fate of world peace.

That is why the Soviet Union is resolutely in favour of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference being resumed at the earliest possible date. Representatives of the Palestinian Arab people must be heard at the conference on an equal footing with others, for a just solution of the Palestine problem is a key element in a lasting peace settlement.

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Television interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel reviewing the visit of US Secretary of State Kissinger and rejecting any change in the format of the Geneva conference³⁵

February 14, 1975

Q. Mr Prime Minister, has this visit of Dr. Kissinger's come up to your expectations?³⁶

³⁴ Made in a speech at a luncheon in honour of visiting UK Prime Minister Wilson; excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5774 (February 18, 1975), pp. 59, 63.

³⁵ Broadcast by Israeli television in Hebrew; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4832/A/1-3; reprinted by permission.

³⁶ Dr. Kissinger visited Israel February 10-12 and went on to Egypt and Syria.

A. . . . Dr Kissinger's visit on this occasion was not designed to lead to negotiations, but to explore the positions of the parties as to what extent there is a possibility of and room to continue searching for a settlement between Egypt and Israel—a partial settlement constituting progress towards peace. Accordingly Dr Kissinger was careful during his talks with the Egyptians, I assume, and certainly with us, to remain within the framework of examining thoughts and positions, presenting the international picture, and presenting the American picture, but not engaging in concrete negotiations. Therefore, there was no room for exaggerated expectations in this visit. The next visit, which will take place in the first half of March, will deal more with the negotiations themselves.

Q. Nevertheless, during the talks a map was brought into the room. Did you talk about a 30 to 50 km withdrawal?

A. First of all, the map was on the wall before the talks began—and this as a general background. During the talks we did not engage in the drawing of lines. As is known, the Ministerial team was equipped with the Government's decisions which clearly defined what the team should talk about with Kissinger, the main aim being to seek ways to advance towards an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel. The Government decision refers to the possibility of territorial concessions of between 30 to 50 km, but not including the [Gidi and Mitla] passes and the [Abu Rudays] oil fields, of course, in return for a limited withdrawal. A not very significant political quid pro quo should be expected; at any rate, it is clear that the intention is to get a political quid pro quo for any interim settlement. . . . It is known that my personal view—and this has not yet been approved by the Cabinet—[is] that in return for Egypt's renunciation of war against Israel—renunciation of a state of war, publicly and in a binding manner—Israel would be prepared to consider the demilitarization of the passes and leaving the area of the oilfields in Abu Rudays, but this would be done only when Egypt publicly announced in a binding manner that the war had ended between it and Israel, and that the renunciation of war was unconnected with what would happen between Israel and each one of the other Arab states. Thus a total renunciation of war will lead, in my opinion, to the possibility of demilitarizing these areas.

Q. . . . What does Israel mean when it talks about non-belligerency?

A. . . . I believe that peace with neighbouring states is first of all—so long as they are still in a state of war—the ending of the state of war and furthermore the building of a system of relations of peace having a positive element of co-operation with each side prepared to help the other. Therefore, to me peace is much more than the disappearance of the state of war. . . . The termination of the state of war, which basically means . . . that there is no further use of force or threat of the use of force in Egyptian-Israeli relations, is for me a state of non-belligerency. . . .

Q. If you will permit me, during the Foreign Minister's visit to the United States,³⁷ the press reported . . . that Mr Allon had indicated the elements which Israel would have liked to see as the signs of non-belligerency. I wanted to ask you whether these are things which Israel will insist on. . . .

A. Allow me not to enter into details. As I said earlier: the Ministerial team presented the Government's decision. The Government's decision is known. The quid pro quo for the Government's decision must be in significant political terms. . . . Two possibilities have been created: a limited possibility and a broad possibility. It is clear that in return for a limited possibility the political quid pro quo is more limited. As for the broader possibility, the quid pro quo is unequivocal: a declared termination of the state of belligerency, the state of war, between Israel and Egypt.

Q. Will Israel definitely insist on a written agreement?

A. The basis for any settlement between Israel and Egypt is first of all an Egyptian-Israeli settlement or agreement, a settlement which would be written and signed by the two sides as part of the Geneva conference. Since we often distort the concept which is called the Geneva conference, I have no doubt that an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt would also be part of the Geneva conference, just as the disengagement agreements were also within the framework of the Geneva conference.

Q. Do you agree with me that there is one basic difference between the Kissinger talks, for example, and

³⁷ Allon visited the US January 9–17, 1975.

the Geneva conference, and that is that the Russians are not involved in the Kissinger talks?

A. My approach to the concept called the Geneva conference is apparently different from yours, or from what is accepted occasionally, inaccurately. The Geneva conference's objective is to lead to peace or progress towards peace between Israel and the Arab states. Within the framework of the concept called the Geneva conference the sides can undertake different forms of negotiations. Since Egyptian-Israeli relations are not necessarily similar to Syrian-Israeli relations, what is suitable on the Egyptian-Israeli level does not necessarily have to be identical to what is suitable on the Syrian-Israeli level. Everything that is presented as a bilateral agreement between an Arab state and Israel must be formalized and acquire a legal, declared status within the framework of the Geneva conference. In the first stage there were disengagement agreements. If it is possible to achieve an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt, this too must be part of the Geneva conference. If at a later stage we are able to achieve a contractual peace agreement with any one of the neighbouring Arab states, it, too, will have to be part of the Geneva conference. For some reason or another the public has got the idea that the Geneva conference is a sort of symposium or meeting of all the parties in the presence of the big Powers and the UN representative, and the parties talk in a manner which was once acceptable at the United Nations. I am afraid that such a meeting of the Geneva conference without prior preparation and without knowing for what reasons the parties are going to the conference will eventually lead to an aggravation of positions and a deadlock, with all the consequences entailed in this. We have no reason to be afraid of this, but we have every reason to search in directions which would perhaps ensure for us much better results, results that would advance us towards peace.

Q. If you say we have no reason to be afraid of such a conference, is there no fear that on entering the hall we shall find the PLO representatives, among others?

A. As is known, in the letter of invitation to the Geneva conference it was clearly agreed that the addition of an organization, body, or state, which was not among the first parties to be invited to the Geneva conference, requires agreement of the

participants. Therefore, there is no possibility of inviting any body which was not included in the list of those invited to the first session of the Geneva conference without prior discussion with us. The terrorist organizations were not invited. Israel's position is clear and unequivocal: we will not conduct negotiations with them.

Q. When speaking about agreements, you did not mention the element of time. Reports say that Israel is prepared to compromise to reach an agreement for a period of a year and a half, on the premise that there are two years to the US elections. Do you have anything to say in this regard?

A. So many inaccurate reports about the details have been published that if we have to start denying every one of them, I think I shall have to occupy the television screen for a long time. Since you have asked about this report of 18 months, let me say that there is no support for it in reality from the standpoint of the Israeli position.

Q. We began the interview with the expectations which you had from this visit of Dr Kissinger, and you, of course, went on to the part expected in his forthcoming visit. Do you expect movement in the negotiations at that time?

A. I have learned that I am not one of those to whom the gift of prophecy was given after the destruction of the Temple. Therefore, I prefer to determine for myself towards what end it is necessary to strive and to act. I am not sure we shall achieve this. We are not seeking an interim settlement at any price and under any conditions. The Israeli positions are clear today. Only a settlement that will serve Israel, promote peace, not affect the security of Israel will be acceptable to us. Since we are talking about a meeting which will take place within three or four weeks, there is no sense in prophesying what will happen in it. Let us wait calmly and confidently, knowing our strength and our will, and see what the results will be.

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Demands adopted by a conference of mayors of Arab local authorities in Israel³⁸

Nazareth, February 16, 1975

1. Complete equality in the granting of loans and grants to all local authorities in Israel, taking into consideration that the underdeveloped villages require more aid than the developed ones.

2. Early approval of the basic development maps so that the development of the Arab village may proceed; less difficulty in obtaining building licences; abolition of demolition orders; abolition of the heavy fines at present imposed on unlicensed building; extension of building areas in coordination with the local authorities, after which the local authorities and the building regulation committees should cooperate in the combatting of unlicensed building with a view to ensuring proper control and planning in Arab villages.

3. Extension of the jurisdiction of the local authorities to include all lands owned by persons subject to the competence of such authorities.

4. We request that an early and radical solution be found to the problem of the shortage of classrooms, with the local authorities contributing 25 per cent of the cost in the form of loans, and the remainder being in the form of government grants. We also request assistance in expanding the scientific sections of secondary schools and in the provision of laboratories and the modern teaching aids necessary to raise the standard of education.

5. Encouragement of teachers in Arab schools to specialize in their various subjects, and, with this end in view, the holding of more advanced courses in all subjects, with a view to raising teaching standards in the Arab sector.

6. Allocation of the necessary areas for playing fields for the young, along with sufficient aid to build cultural, sporting and social clubs.

7. Expansion of the health services by making an immediate start on the implementation of drainage projects and supplying nurses for schools and maternal and child welfare centres.

8. Inclusion of all Arab villages in development areas, to encourage capitalists to establish factories in the larger villages where labour is available and to establish factories for groups of smaller

villages.

9. Extension of both drinking water and irrigation networks and increased allocations of water to Arab farmers on the same basis as their Jewish brothers.

10. Refunding of all sums collected in property tax from the inhabitants since the year 1966–1967, after deduction of collection expenses.

11. Electricity supplies for all villages not yet supplied and expansion of electricity and street lighting systems, through grants and loans to the local authorities.

12. Solving the housing problem in Arab villages on the same terms as those granted to young married couples in the Jewish sector.

13. We call on the competent authorities to regard income derived from agriculture as supplementary to the main source of income and to exempt it from the purchase financing tax, as this law could well lead to the liquidation of the property of large numbers of people in the course of a few years.

14. As Arabic is an official language in Israel, we demand that letters, circulars and laws issuing from the various ministries be in both Hebrew and Arabic, so that all citizens may understand them.

15. Linking up the Arab villages that are still isolated with the main road system.

16. Opening tourist centres in the Arab areas.

17. Establishing control committees for all villages with a population of more than 8,000, and control committees consisting of members representing each of several adjacent villages.

18. Reducing to the minimum the contribution of the local administrations to the Social Affairs budget until such time as they receive the same treatment as the Jewish local authorities as regards grants and loans, while the contribution of the Ministry of Social Affairs to the expenses of hospitals should remain unchanged.

19. Telephones for all villages.

³⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), February 19, 1975, pp. 1, 6.

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Joint communiqué issued following a meeting between US Secretary of State Kissinger, and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)³⁹

Geneva, February 17, 1975

As previously agreed, a meeting between Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, took place on February 16 and 17 in Geneva.

In the course of the conversations, particular attention was given to the Middle East. The two sides remain concerned over the dangers persisting in the situation there. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in the area on the basis of UN Resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independent existence of all states in the area.

The two sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work at an early date.

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Press conference statements by Foreign Ministers Allon of Israel and Genscher of West Germany outlining the subjects discussed during their talks⁴⁰

Bonn, February 28, 1975

Genscher: Ladies and Gentlemen. At the conclusion of the Israeli Foreign Minister's visit we

can only note that the content of our talks justifies us in describing this visit as an important step in the direction of furthering the existing relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel. Our discussions centered on both multilateral and bilateral questions. As expected, we also discussed the situation in the Near East. This gave us the opportunity to explain the principles and basis of our even-handed Middle East policy. Concerning the future development of our bilateral relations we agreed to expand our economic cooperation and to examine all future possibilities in this regard.

Allon: Dear Friends. I have expected much from this visit to Bonn and I must say now, at the conclusion of my visit, that its results are far better than my expectations had been. This holds also true for the blue sky, the great hospitality of my host as well as the friendly surroundings and atmosphere in which our conversations were held. I am able to tell you that during our talks we had the opportunity to present Israel's position on international issues, the question of the Middle East as well as bilateral relations and I have taken careful notice of what my host had to say in this regard. Furthermore I had the opportunity to meet other high officials of both government and opposition. And now that these talks are concluded and our official discussions have come to an end, I am able to say: I am very much satisfied with my visit to Germany.

Q. Was it possible during these days to solve the problem of what seems to be an apparent contradiction in the German position on the issue of Israeli borders? On the one side, the Federal government insists that Israel live within secure and recognized boundaries; on the other hand the government also supports the EEC statement calling for an end to the territorial occupation of the Arab territories.⁴¹ This would imply a return to the borders of 1967. But it was these 1967 borders that were neither recognized nor secure in spite of the presence of UN forces.

Genscher: I have outlined, as you already know from my speech of the evening before yesterday,⁴² the above stated basic principles of the FRG's even-handed Middle East policy. These are also

³⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1863 (March 10, 1975), pp. 291-292.

⁴⁰ Excerpted and translated from the German text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy in Beirut. Allon arrived in West Germany on February 26, 1975.

⁴¹ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁴² Made at a dinner in honour of Allon; German text in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn) no. 27 (February 28, 1975), pp. 261-262.

based on the declaration made by the Foreign Ministers of the EEC in November 1973. Your particular question which you just now mentioned did not come up for discussion because the purpose of our talks was not, unlike other parties, to find a solution to the Middle East conflict. In addition to my introductory statement, one might add that the FRG not only welcomes the efforts of the US Secretary of State but also actively supports them.

Q. Mr. Allon, in your interview with Die Zeit you declared that the Palestinian identity must find its national expression as an independent state in the framework of a peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Does this mean that Israel is now willing to accept a Palestinian state, separate and independent of Jordan?

Allon: In all my answers to this particular question, namely concerning the Palestinian identity, I have always tried to point out clearly two points. Point one: The community of the Palestinians cannot be identified, or made equal to the so-called PLO. As far as I can judge and know from my own experience, the Arab Palestinians living in the administered territories are probably the most tame, moderate element to be found in the Arab world. These Arab Palestinians are just as eager to find a political solution to this conflict. They are looking to a peace which makes it possible for them to give free expression to their identity. The second point which I always pointed out clearly is the following: It is possible to find a just and constructive solution within the framework of the effort to bring about peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Naturally the Palestinian Arabs must participate in this process. As far as I know this country and our neighbours, I must say that any attempt to differentiate between the Palestinian Arabs of Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank is artificial and only done to fit the needs of the PLO. We insist that on the land between the Mediterranean and Iraq two states should exist, one Jewish state called Israel, one Arab state—it doesn't matter if it is called Palestine or Palestine-Jordan, and that the borders between these two states must be negotiated.

Q. Mr. Genscher, did you reach any further agreement concerning the problem of the 600 million DM?⁴³

Genscher: This question was not discussed since it does not prevent a problem between the FRG and Israel.

Q. Did I understand you right, you did not talk about it at all?

Genscher: You understood me right.

Q. Mr. Allon, why didn't you discuss the problem with officials of the government, but with representatives of the opposition?

Allon: I did not raise this issue as a topic for discussion, neither in my discussions with the Bonn officials of the government nor with representatives of the opposition, because this topic falls within the competence of the Claims Conference. But I am not only Foreign Minister of the state of Israel, I also belong to the Jewish people, and in my latter capacity, I referred to the topic but I did not negotiate about it. During our talks I represented the viewpoint that it would be useful to view this question as a bipartisan issue between government and opposition. As such it was not a topic for discussion but was only referred to during our talks.

Q. Mr. Genscher, you stated in your declaration that you agreed to extend economic cooperation with Israel. Which specific ideas do you have in mind in this regard?

Genscher: For the first time you are not citing me correctly, because I also added that we want to examine the possibilities. Therefore I cannot answer your question.

Q. Mr. Genscher, we are told that you assured your Israeli counterpart that the FRG will never abandon Israel. A new conflict in the Middle East, as for example UN Secretary-General Waldheim has warned of, would make this assurance very pressing. Would the FRG in such a case allow or forbid US weapons deliveries over German territory?

Genscher: Yesterday, in concluding my speech in answer to Mr. Allon's speech, I said: You, your country and your people should know that we shall not abandon you. I ask you to understand it in this way. The question that you raised was not at all included and could never have been a topic for our discussions.

⁴³ Israel was requesting this amount to take the place of the payments under the reparations agreement which had expired in 1974.

Q. I would like to know from Mr. Allon whether or not the FRG has weighed the possibility of recognizing the PLO under certain conditions and what is the Israeli position thereon?

Allon: The PLO was not a topic of the discussions which I had with Foreign Minister Genscher. As I gathered from my contacts with government officials of the FRG and other European countries, as well as during the Socialist International in Berlin, no European country will grant recognition to the PLO as long as the PLO keeps its so-called Palestine Covenant, i.e., as long as it denies Israel its right to exist and as long as it employs terrorist methods directed against Israel.

Q. Besides the issues of the Middle East problem and German-Israeli economic relations, did you discuss any specific bilateral issues?

Genscher: All aspects of our bilateral relations were discussed in addition to European issues, namely Israel's relationship to the EEC and problems of a Mediterranean policy. It was truly a discussion of contemporary international issues. It would not be correct to say that the main point of our discussion was centered on bilateral relations.

Q. Did you reach any new agreements concerning youth and cultural exchanges between the two countries?

Genscher: No.

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Statement by President Leone of Italy made at the conclusion of his visit to Saudi Arabia (excerpt)⁴⁴

Riyad, March 4, 1975

At the end of my short but extremely cordial and fruitful visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I should like to express my warm acknowledgement of the reception accorded me by His Majesty the King, and my deep satisfaction with the results of our talks which mark a new stage in the strengthening of relations, already close, between our two countries, to which the visit of the sovereign to Rome had already largely and significantly con-

tributed.

I should like to prove, through my presence in Riyadh, the particular interest Italy has in its relations with Saudi Arabia because of the important contribution it is in the process of making to general international stability on the political and economic levels.

Our two countries are equally aware of the fact that there can be no security or development in the Mediterranean basin as long as the Middle East conflict is not resolved in a spirit of justice and as long as peace has not returned to the lands from which our civilizations drew the values which allowed them to contribute at the same time to the spiritual enrichment and the material progress of humanity. Therefore, an end must be put—in conformity with the decisions of the international community—to the prolonged Israeli military occupation of all the territories mentioned in resolution 242 of the Security Council. Its full application should permit the guarantee of both the territorial inviolability and the security of all the states in the region. I wish to assure our Saudi friends and all our Arab friends that the Italian government has always followed and will continue to follow this line and that it will leave nothing to chance in order to have it accepted by all those governments most directly concerned, acting towards this end by its bilateral contacts on international levels and in particular within the framework of political cooperation with other countries of the community.

In this spirit I should like to recall that the Italian government has always been among the first to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. It continues to work in the specific framework of its Mediterranean and European responsibility so that this people also may obtain the right to have its own country. The fundamental harmony which was displayed on these subjects during the Italian-Saudi dialogue these last days has given an impetus to the growth of the form of already fruitful collaboration between the two countries.

⁴⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Italian text, *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXIX, 11 (March 15, 1975), p. 261. The Italian president visited Saudi Arabia March 2–5, 1975, and went on to Oman.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (excerpts)⁴⁵

Amman, March 10, 1975

From March 3 to 10 a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by N.M. Matchanov, Vice-President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Republic, was on an official friendly visit to Jordan at the invitation of the Jordanian National Assembly.

The sides exchanged opinions on pressing international problems, above all the present situation in the Middle East. They confirmed the fact that the establishment of a just and durable peace in this area is possible only on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem, and ensurance of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people in accord with their national aspirations.

The delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet appraised highly the struggle of the Jordanian people against the Israeli aggression. It resolutely denounced Israel's unlawful actions aimed at changing the status and appearance of the Arab sector of Jerusalem, occupied in 1967, as well as attempts of annexing it.

The sides confirmed the need for fulfilling Security Council resolutions No. 242 of November 22, 1967 and No. 338 of October 22, 1973. The Soviet delegation stressed that the resumption of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East in the near future with the participation of the parties concerned should play an important role in establishing a just and durable peace in this area.

The sides noted the importance of the decisions taken by the Rabat summit conference⁴⁶ for strengthening the unity of actions of Arab states and peoples in the struggle for liquidating the Israeli occupation, achieving the Mideast settlement and establishing a just and lasting peace in this area.

The Soviet side confirmed the immutability and consistency of the Soviet course for the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation with Arab countries and expressed complete support for the just cause of Arabs and their struggle for eliminating the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression.

Statement by US State Department official Sober reporting to a Congressional committee on the Arab boycott of Israel⁴⁷

Washington, March 13, 1975

I am sure the subcommittee will understand that while we are in the middle of delicate negotiations in the Middle East, this is a particularly difficult time to be discussing the subject before us today. I nevertheless wish to be responsive to the subcommittee's interest in discussing the policy of the Department of State toward the Arab boycott of Israel and actions by the Department in connection with the boycott.

Let me begin by putting the boycott in its Middle East context.

The Arab boycott of Israel is one manifestation of the basic Arab-Israeli conflict and thus arises from deep-seated political and emotional factors. The initial boycott organization, which was set up as a committee of the Arab League Council at the beginning of 1946, applied a primary boycott to prevent the entry of certain products into Arab countries from what is now the State of Israel. The secondary boycott, designed to inhibit third parties from assisting in Israel's development, was introduced in 1951, and it is this secondary boycott that affects American economic relations with a number of Middle East countries.

The scope of the boycott has been broadened through the years, and it applies to a variety of activities which are seen by the Arab countries as constituting a special economic relationship with Israel. An extension of the boycott has involved the blacklisting of foreign actors, artists,

⁴⁵ Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the Novosti Press Agency in Beirut.

⁴⁶ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

⁴⁷ Made before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1867 (April 7, 1975), pp. 451-453.

and other entertainment figures (and their films or recordings) judged to have aided Israel, such as through fundraising. It is our understanding that, generally speaking, the act of trading with Israel—as such—does not violate any of the regulations of the boycott organization and does not of itself bring the boycott into effect. However, the Arab countries themselves reserve the power to interpret the boycott regulations and decisions, and our experience suggests that they are not uniformly applied. There are a number of firms which do business in Israel and Arab countries.

It is impossible to determine how much the boycott up to now has actually harmed Israel, whose economy has been growing at the rate of about 10 percent annually. We recognize, however, that the rapidly increasing economic strength of certain Arab countries has enhanced the Arab boycott as a potentially effective weapon against Israel. There is a likelihood that the growing attractiveness of commerce with Arab countries will place greater pressure on some foreign firms not to deal with Israel because of the boycott.

Now I want to come to the position of the United States with regard to the boycott. As stated on numerous occasions, our position is clear and it can be summarized as follows: The United States opposes the boycott. We do not support or condone it in any way. The Department has emphasized our opposition to the boycott to the Arab governments on many occasions as it adversely affects U.S. firms, vessels, and individuals. Where the commercial interests of American firms or individuals have been injured or threatened with injury, we have made representations to appropriate Arab officials.

Consistent with our policy of opposition to the boycott, as reflected in the Export Administration Act of 1969, the Department of State has refused hundreds of requests from U.S. companies for authentication of documents relating to the boycott as being contrary to public policy.

A number of American firms with boycott problems have consulted with Department officials. These firms have been (a) reminded of their reporting responsibilities under the Export Administration Act and (b) encouraged and requested to refuse to take any action in support of restrictive trade practices or boycotts.

A fundamental factor which has to be faced is that Arab governments regard the boycott as an

important element in their position toward Israel and one of the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be dealt with as progress is made toward resolving that conflict. Indeed, this is one of the issues which we have very much in mind as we continue our diplomatic efforts to help the parties achieve a just and lasting peace. The problem has been how to change effectively the underlying conditions which led to imposition of the boycott. We believe we can best serve this objective not through confrontation but by continuing to promote with the parties directly concerned a peaceful settlement of basic Middle East issues. We believe that our present diplomatic approach is the most effective way to proceed.

Though the boycott emerged from the political problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are also concerned by reports that it could be used for discrimination on outright religious grounds. On this subject President Ford has recently said [in a news conference on February 26]:

There have been reports in recent weeks of attempts in the international banking community to discriminate against certain institutions or individuals on religious or ethnic grounds.

There should be no doubt about the position of this Administration and the United States. Such discrimination is totally contrary to the American tradition and repugnant to American principles. It has no place in the free practice of commerce as it has flourished in this country.

Foreign businessmen and investors are most welcome in the United States when they are willing to conform to the principles of our society. However, any allegations of discrimination will be fully investigated and appropriate action taken under the laws of the United States.⁴⁸

In summing up, I want to reemphasize that we oppose the boycott and will continue to make our opposition to it known and that we will continue to oppose any efforts to discriminate against American firms or individuals on the basis of religion or ethnic background.

At the same time, we will continue to do our utmost to help the countries in the Middle East to find a basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute and to arrive at a just and durable peace. It is our conviction that in the attainment of peace lies the fundamental basis for the resolution of the boycott issue, among others which we are discussing today.

⁴⁸ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1864 (March 17, 1975), p. 333.

58

Statement by Prime Minister Castro of Cuba concerning the Middle East conflict⁴⁹

Havana, March 19, 1975

The heroic battle of the Arab people to liberate the occupied territories took place in October 1973, ending the myth of the invincibility of the aggressor Israeli State, giving rise to a new correlation of forces in the Middle East and also to a new phase in the struggle of the Arab people to recover their legitimate territories and restore the national rights of the heroic Palestinians, criminally oppressed and expelled from their native land.

Today imperialism is making efforts to counteract this situation and it maneuvers perfidiously to divide the Arab countries, isolate the courageous Syrian people, cheat the Palestinians of their rights and extend its presence and influence in the Middle East, in order to impose the onerous peace conditions that most suit its interests and those of its allies in the aggression against the Arab people. Political opportunism cannot replace frank, open and revolutionary diplomacy, and sometimes it leads to flagrant betrayal. The present situation in the Middle East cannot be alien to the interest and deepest concern of the non-aligned countries.

59

Final declaration of the 3rd Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts)⁵⁰

Havana, March 19, 1975

I

The 3rd Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Countries was held in Havana, Republic of Cuba, from March 17 to 19, 1975, for the purpose of assessing compliance with the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 4th

⁴⁹ Made at the third Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries; partial English translation as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VII, 6 (June 1975), p. 1.

⁵⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VII, 6 (June, 1975) pp. 57, 64–66.

Conference of Heads of State or Government held in Algiers in September, 1973,⁵¹ and examining the international political and economic situation and the development of all forms of cooperation and solidarity among the nonaligned countries. Delegations from the following countries and organizations were also present as observers:

—Argentina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo, Cyprus, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Iraq, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Sierra Leone, Sudan, PRG of South Vietnam, PDR of Yemen, Republic of Zambia, Liberation Committee of the OAU, Palestine (PLO) and Puerto Rico (PSP).

II

The Situation in the Middle East and the Palestine Issue :

The Bureau has examined the context of the situation prevailing in the Middle East and has considered that all elements have concurred to produce an explosive situation that threatens to become an imminent armed confrontation, capable of endangering world peace and security.

This threat of the renewal of hostilities is due to the persistence of Israel in its aggressive, expansionist and occupational policy, as well as its refusal to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people and its contempt for the United Nations' Charter and Resolutions.

The Bureau of Nonaligned Countries has condemned more than once Israel's policy, and has denounced the behavior of some countries, particularly that of the United States of America, for the great amounts of arms which they continue to send to Israel. This massive support given to the Zionist state eliminates all misunderstanding which might emerge from the deliberate intention of the United States to make Israel a vanguard base of colonialism and imperialism within the Third World and use it to break the liberation movements, consolidate racist regimes, threaten peace and security in developing countries and steal their natural wealth.

Bearing the aforesaid in mind, the Bureau worries about the maneuvers and adventures of Zionism and colonialism, which tend to dilute the efforts displayed in the search of a just and

⁵¹ Docs. 118–120 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

lasting peace in the Middle East, when proposing partial solutions and individual gestures whose objective is none other than to prolong Israel's occupation of Arab territories conquered by force and deny the national rights of the Palestinian people.

The Bureau deems that the interest of security and peace in the world rests on the immediate application of Resolution No. 383 of the Security Council (1973).

The Bureau has affirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East ought to be based on the two following principles:

1. Unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Israel from all territories occupied from June 5, 1967;

2. The exercise by the Palestinian people of all their national rights including their right to return to their country and to their self-determination.

In the light of the analysis of the situation, the members of the Bureau unanimously agreed on the need to continue and intensify the efforts in order to apply Resolution No. 3236 (XXIX) of 11/21/73, approved by the United Nations General Assembly.

Aware of the seriousness of the situation, and worried about the preservation of peace and international security, the Bureau is convinced that the nonaligned countries must contribute in a positive and direct way to the efforts aimed at the restoration of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, by being represented in the Geneva Conference.

Owing to the recurrent aggressions, the occupation of the Arab territories and failing to withdraw from these, Israel has been isolated politically and in other ways from the majority of the members of the United Nations.

The Bureau believes the time is ripe for the nonaligned countries to consider broader measures against Israel, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, including such measures as the implementation of sanctions, the dismissal from the United Nations, etc.

The Bureau equally condemns the threats of aggression and military occupation by different representatives of the U.S. administration against the oil-producing Arab states, which, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, have used this energetic resource to defend their own national interests and the undelayable change of the unjust structure of international relations.

It censures the imperialistic maneuvers to provoke conflicts among the Third World nations with the aim to redistribute the control of the sources of raw materials and to deviate the attention from fundamental problems that affect our peoples: the struggle for development and against imperialism.

The Bureau has examined the Draft Resolution presented by the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the tense situation in the Middle East; has supported, in principle, the ideas contained in the Draft and has decided to submit it to the Lima Conference of Foreign Ministers of Nonaligned Countries for consideration.⁵² It also resolved that the agenda for the ministerial conference in Lima and the forthcoming 5th Summit Conference include a specific item on "the Palestine question."

60

Communiqué issued after the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers' meeting (excerpt)⁵³

Helsinki, March 21, 1975

The ministers expressed their concern over the serious and dangerous situation in the Middle East. They declared the full support of the Nordic countries for the efforts being made to create a basis for a lasting overall solution in the region. Such a solution should be founded on the principle of the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by force, the right of all states to live in peace inside secure and recognized boundaries and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The ministers stressed the special duty and responsibility of the UN in the Middle East and expressed their approval of the peacekeeping role of the UN and its efforts to uphold the ceasefire. They also noted the importance of the valuable work of UNRWA.

⁵² See docs. 143–145 below.

⁵³ Excerpted and translated from the Norwegian text, *UD-informasjon* (Oslo), no. 15 (March 25, 1975), p. 3; the foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden took part in the meeting of March 20–21, 1975.

61

Statement issued by US Secretary of State Kissinger announcing the failure of negotiations towards an interim Israel-Egypt agreement⁵⁴

Jerusalem, March 22, 1975

We have been seeking, in response to the desires of the parties, to help them achieve a further step toward a peace settlement. We believe both sides have made a serious effort to reach a successful outcome.

Unfortunately, the differences on a number of key issues have proven irreconcilable. We therefore believe a period of reassessment is needed so that all concerned can consider how best to proceed toward a just and lasting peace.

62

Statement by prime ministerial adviser Patir of Israel announcing the failure of negotiations with Egypt⁵⁵

March 22, 1975

The talks that were intended to open the way to achieve a peaceful agreement on controversial subjects between Egypt and Israel were interrupted this evening. In the initial stages of the negotiations Israel expressed its readiness to vacate the Jiddi and Mitla passes and the Abu Rudays oilfields in return for Egypt's ending the state of belligerency. Egypt refused to cancel the state of belligerency, insisting that it continue. In spite of this, Israel proposed a withdrawal of its forces from the existing separation lines in return for a less binding political formula.

[Announcer]: *A short break in the announcement occurs here, caused by one of the secretaries who amended something in the Prime Minister's adviser's statement. We shall hear the sequel immediately.*

[Patir]: I continue. In spite of this, Israel proposed in return for a less binding political

formula a withdrawal of its forces from the existing separation lines, including the western part of the strategically important Mitla and Jiddi passes, and their transfer to UN control. Israel also proposed transferring the oilfields to Egyptian administration. This proposal also has been rejected by Egypt. This rejection by Egypt precipitated the break in the talks. Israel is ready today as always to continue seeking a settlement with Egypt, and with this objective in mind, it will continue to maintain very close contact with the Government of the United States. The Government of Israel expresses profound appreciation to the US Government, and especially to the Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, for his untiring efforts to achieve peace. This ends the official statement.

63

Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel explaining the failure of the mission of US Secretary of State Kissinger (excerpts)⁵⁶

Jerusalem, March 24, 1975

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Members of the Knesset: unfortunately, the government of Egypt broke off the negotiations for an interim agreement which was intended to promote peace between the two states. The negotiations were suspended after the government of Egypt had rejected significant Israeli suggestions and presented instead extreme and exaggerated claims. Egypt's claims came to serve Egypt's belligerent disposition. By accepting the suggestions of the government of Egypt, the government of Israel would have accepted unjustified risks without any advance towards peace.

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I have explained more than once that Israeli policy does not aspire to change the present territorial status between us and Egypt into a permanent condition, but rather considers this status as one stage towards peace through the

⁵⁴ Text as published in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), July 21–27, 1975, p. 27230; the statement was read by US State Department spokesman Robert Anderson.

⁵⁵ Broadcast on Israel forces radio; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4862/A/3; reprinted by permission.

⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, Eighth Knesset, Second Session, March 24, 1975, pp. 2307–2308.

cessation of the state of war in theory and in practice. Israel is ready, on its part, to do what is required for the implementation of this change.

Within a framework of substantial advance towards peace, we expressed readiness for a withdrawal of the Israeli army to other lines. We demanded that in exchange for this withdrawal, tangible steps should be taken which would substantiate a change that would indicate a new status from the political point of view. Such steps would have affirmed that an advance towards peace had been actually achieved. We stated that the extent of Israeli army withdrawal would be in accordance with the steps taken by Egypt for an actual advance towards peace.

This attitude was the basis for all the suggestions which we presented during the negotiations. We proposed that Egypt should agree to a cessation of the state of war, and that Israel should, in exchange, evacuate the Mitla and Gidi passes in Sinai and the oil fields of Abu Rudais.

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Unfortunately, Egypt rejected the proposal without even feeling obliged to clarify its basic principles. Instead, Egypt demanded the evacuation of the passes in Sinai, and the evacuation of the strip along the coast from Suez to Tur.

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After considerable deliberations, we presented new unbiased suggestions which included Israeli concessions parallel to certain measures demanded by the Egyptian government.

The suggestions, which we presented during our talks with the US Secretary of State included, *inter alia*:

1. An actual termination of the state of war between Egypt and Israel. The two countries should commit themselves to refrain from any use of force without limitations or restrictions of any kind.

2. Egypt should be obliged to refrain from hostile activity in the fields of economic boycott and propaganda. A primary expression of co-operation with Israel should be given, such as granting permission for the transit of tourists between Egypt and Israel and vice versa, the transit of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal after its reopening, and other similar subjects.

3. Even within the framework of a limited

interim agreement we were not able to be content with a commitment to abstain from the use of force, which, in practice, was reduced to an obligation restricted only to a short period of time. Particular importance was attached to the period of time during which the agreement would be effective. The primary objective of our approach along this road towards peace was that we were on the threshold of an extended process which should be tested against real facts, both in terms of its military significance and its political consequences. This approach was rejected by the Egyptians. The lack of Egyptian readiness to consent to the long-term validity of the agreement prevented any possibility of achieving the primary objective, one which justified the risks involved in a withdrawal from the defensive lines which the Israeli army maintains now in Sinai.

Within a framework of a limited interim agreement, some of the items of which were mentioned above, Israel agreed to withdraw to the centre of the passes, and the area which Israel would have evacuated would have been demilitarized. UN forces would have been stationed in the resulting partition zone. The oil fields of Abu Rudais and its vicinity would have been handed over to an Egyptian civil authority. With this offer, Israel was risking a great deal but was ready for that, provided that actual, even though limited, progress towards peace was guaranteed.

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Members of the Knesset, we are being asked from all sides whether the suspension of talks portends a war. It is not my custom to foretell the future, nor do I come to make a bet and specify percentages of feasibility here and there. I am convinced that:

1. The suspension of talks aggravates the situation, and the information media in the Arab states are ringing the bells of war. In spite of this, we must not regard war as unavoidable. As long as war does not break out, we must make every effort to prevent it.

2. Israel is convinced that the use of arms is not likely to promote a solution. We will observe the ceasefire and disengagement agreements on a basis of reciprocity. It is the duty of every party which signed these agreements to act in accordance with his authentic obligation.

3. Advancement towards peace is a vital neces-

sity for all the peoples of the area. Israel was and is ready to participate in the effort to achieve peace in every possible way including the Geneva conference. Israel's readiness to work out an interim agreement with Egypt is still effective.

4. Threats of war from Arab states will not achieve anything, there is no point in frightening us. Israel is alert to all dangers. She stands firm and so do her armed forces.

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Press interview statements by US President Ford asserting that events in South East Asia affected the outcome of negotiations towards an Egypt-Israel interim agreement and discussing the USSR's Middle East policy⁵⁷

Washington, March 25, 1975

Q. I will start off by asking, do you think... that the action of the Congress, in effect, not sustaining our country's financial and military commitments made to Vietnam at the Paris peace talks at the end of '72 had any effect on the Middle East negotiations? Doesn't their failure to act cast some question on how good your commitments are as President?

A. I believe the failure of the Congress to fund the programs in Cambodia and in South Vietnam undoubtedly had some impact on the Middle East. It is my impression that some of the news media in Israel have indicated that was a factor. How big a factor it is, is difficult to measure.

Q. Mr. President, you have said you were going to reassess Indochina policy and today Ron (Nessen), speaking for you, said that there would be a re-examination of the Middle East policy.

In the light of these events and past events, where does this leave the Nixon doctrine? Is it dead or is it badly damaged, because that is a global doctrine, as we understood.

A. I think we have to continue to have a global doctrine. I strongly believe in the United States

having an international policy. I said that out in South Bend last Monday, and I reiterate it here, but within that framework, I think we have to take a new look at how our best interests can be protected and how we can continue to show leadership. Until we have had that opportunity, I can't give you any specifics.

But it is not going to be a retreat. It is going to be how we best utilize our resources to protect our own interests and maintain our world leadership.

Q. Mr. President, can you effectively pursue a global policy if Congress continues to tie your hands?

A. It makes it a great deal more difficult, but I happen to think that the Congress will respond. They have been slow, and they have hamstrung us in some instances, but as the circumstances develop in Southeast Asia and the problems we have had in the Middle East sink in, it is my judgment that the Congress will take another look and respond accordingly.

Q. And show a greater understanding of the realities of the world situation?

A. I am confident of that. It may be sort of a lull for the time being, but everybody who was realistic in Congress knows we cannot just pull in our horns and go back to the old concepts. They have to know that the United States must play a role on an international basis.

Q. The reports from the Middle East now, they are saying that Russia is expected to assume a much more active role in Middle East affairs, and possibly even launch a diplomatic offensive against Israel. Will you be in touch with Chairman Brezhnev in an effort to avert the danger of another war?

A. I will certainly be in contact with all parties in an effort to avert another war in the Middle East.

Q. Do you think that Israel should be prepared to take greater risks for peace in the long-term interests of its survival?

A. I would like to refer to the unfortunate developments of the last 72 hours. If they had been a bit more flexible, you can say a greater risk, I think in the longer run it would have been the best insurance for peace.

I think those kinds of actions would have been real insurance for peace in the short-haul as well as in the long pull.

⁵⁷ Excerpted from the partial text of the interview conducted by William Randolph Hearst, Bob Considine, William Theis and Kingsbury Smith, *San Francisco Examiner*, March 27, 1975, p. 8.

Q. Mr. President, on balance, even though an accord was not reached at this point, was or was not the prospect of war decreased by what has taken place in the last couple of weeks?

We were asking Ron (Nessen) this morning about it. Earlier you were pretty pessimistic about the imminence of war in the Middle East. Isn't the situation better than it was then?

That is what I am asking.

A. My reaction—and I don't know what Ron said—my feeling is that the potential volatility in that area has increased as a result of the non-agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Q. If the Soviet action in the Middle East now should encourage, consciously or otherwise, the Arabs to attack Israel, what effect would that have on detente?

A. The relationship that we have with the Soviet Union I think could be helpful in avoiding the stimulation of any parties in the Middle East to initiate any military activity. I think detente in this situation would be a benefit rather than a liability.

How it could be used to keep peace there is a matter as we move along in the months ahead.

Q. The Soviets, I believe, would like to have a summit meeting on the European security conference this summer, and that is directly tied, at least in the minds of the European allies, with the Soviets showing a great sense of responsibility in respect to danger spots in the area.

Wouldn't what they do in the Middle East have some effect on whether there is going to be a European security conference or summit meeting?

A. I don't see a necessary relationship between the problems of the Middle East and the European security conference. Hopefully, progress will be made and some time this summer there will be a signing and potentially a summit. But, I really don't see any direct linkage between the Middle East and the European security conference.

Q. Mr. President, if you can say, have you had any reason to be encouraged by the Soviet attitude in the wake of the Middle East failure? Have you had any kind of a sign that they are not going to take undue advantage of the situation?

A. As of this moment, Bill, I have seen no official action. I read of some Soviet newspaper account where they had listed the various problems we have had the last ten days, but there have been no official communications.

65

Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger assessing the circumstances and consequences of the failure to achieve an Egypt-Israel interim agreement⁵⁸

Washington, March 26, 1975

Kissinger: I would like to begin with a brief statement concerning the suspension of the Middle East peace talks.

The step-by-step approach pursued by the United States attempted to separate the Middle East problem into individual and therefore manageable segments. Now that approach has suffered a setback, and the Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively, under more difficult circumstances.

A moment of potentially great danger is not the time to assess blame between the parties or to indulge in recrimination. We need a calm appraisal of the situation and the U.S. policy best suited to the new conditions. Let me sum up the U.S. position:

—With the end of the step-by-step approach, the United States faces a period of more complicated international diplomacy. Consequently, a reassessment of policy is essential. This reassessment has been ordered by the President.

—The dangers which produced the need for progress toward peace are still with us. The United States therefore is determined to continue the search for peace in the Middle East. It is prepared to go to Geneva and will be in touch with the co-chairman of the conference, the U.S.S.R., in the near future.

—The United States is prepared to consider any other approach acceptable to the parties.

—The United States remains fully committed to the survival of Israel.

—The search for peace can be nurtured only in an atmosphere of calm. The parties involved in the Middle East conflict thus have a responsibility to moderate words and deeds and to refrain from threatening acts.

—All outside powers have a responsibility to exercise restraint and to follow a course of moderation.

We face a difficult situation in the Middle East and throughout the world. The times demand a

⁵⁸ Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1868 (April 14, 1975), pp. 461, 463–464, 466, 467, 469–470.

renewed sense of national purpose.

We must understand that peace is indivisible. The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere.

We cannot master our future except as a united people. Our energies should be directed, not at recriminations about the past, but toward a vigorous and constructive search for a lasting peace. And to this, the Administration is dedicated.

Now I'll take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the reassessment of U.S. policy toward the whole Middle East primarily aimed at prompting Israel to adopt a more relaxed or less intransigent negotiating posture?

A. At this moment, there are no negotiations going on, and therefore we would have no concrete proposals to make to Israel, even if Israel asked us what negotiating posture it should adopt.

The assessment of our policy that is now going on is made necessary by the new circumstances. Our policy had been designed, as I pointed out in this statement, to segment the issues into individual elements, to negotiate each element separately, and therefore to permit each party to adjust itself domestically and internationally to a process of a gradual approach toward peace.

Now that this approach has to be abandoned, we face an entirely new situation in which, in all probability, all problems will have to be negotiated simultaneously, and in which, instead of a forum in which Israel deals with one Arab country through the mediation of the United States, the strong probability is that Israel will have to deal with all Arab countries in a multilateral forum.

The assessment of our policy is not directed against Israel. It is not designed to induce Israel to alter any particular policy. It is designed to develop a position that the United States can take in order to prevent an increasing radicalization in the area and an increasing tension and, above all, in order to avoid a war in which inevitably the United States would be involved at least indirectly, given the international circumstances.

Q. A very quick follow up. You and your spokesmen have denied that this reassessment contemplates a cutoff, but I don't think anybody has denied that it might contemplate a reduction. Can you respond to that?

A. There is no level of aid right now that has been set for next year's—for the next year. And therefore the question of a reduction is an entirely academic one.

We have before us an Israeli request of rather large size which at this moment is being staffed on the entirely technical level and has been staffed on the entirely technical level for weeks. It has not yet reached either my desk or the President's desk.

We will make our decisions on aid to Israel on the basis of our national objectives and on the basis of the statement that I made here, that we remain committed to the survival of Israel.

Of course whatever conclusions we come to will be submitted to the Congress, and the Congress can make its independent judgment.

We are not approaching the reassessment with an attitude of cutting aid. And we are approaching it with the attitude of looking at the overall situation in the Middle East to determine what the best course might be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have written an obituary on step-by-step negotiating, does that mean that you are writing off the possibility of unilateral American action in the Middle East? Are you now going to be walking step-by-step with the Soviet Union? What will be your approach?

A. Our approach will be whatever is most likely to lessen the dangers of war and to produce steps toward peace.

As I pointed out in our statement, the United States is prepared to go to Geneva. The United States is prepared also to go along with any other approach that the parties may request of it. So, we are not insistent on any particular approach. We will follow whatever approach is most likely to be effective and is requested by the parties. The obvious forum that is now open is Geneva, but we are prepared to look at other approaches.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, could you say when you go to Geneva, would it not be likely that the talks would themselves become segmented into the various problems and that would provide an opportunity for the United States or other parties to play a role in each individual problem—Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, Israel-Jordan?

A. If that is the turn that the negotiations take, the United States will be prepared to participate in it. The United States has no fixed idea on which course to pursue.

At this moment, we have to consult with the other parties, and we of course also have to consult now with the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference.

The United States will do what is most likely to reduce the danger of war and to promote peace, and if it should turn out that separate negotiations develop at Geneva, the United States will certainly support them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Geneva Peace Conference ends in a stalemate, as everybody seems to think it will, how great will the danger of another war in the Middle East be? And in that connection, do you expect Egypt and Syria to allow U.N. troops to remain in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

A. Let me take this in two parts. The longer there is a stalemate in the Middle East, the greater the danger of war becomes. The danger of war can best be reduced in the Middle East if all of the parties see a prospect of peace somewhere down the road and some plausible means of attaining it. And this is why we pursued the previous approach.

When the United States goes to Geneva, it will not go there with the attitude that it will end in a stalemate, but rather with the attitude of seeing whether this forum can now be turned into an arena for constructive progress. And therefore the United States will go there with a positive attitude, and it will ask all parties concerned to go there with a similar attitude, keeping in mind the needs and requirements of everybody.

Was there another part to your question?

Q. What do you expect Egypt and Syria to do about the U.N. troops in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

A. Well, we believe that the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt and the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Syria were essential components of the disengagement agreements. We hope that the mandates of both of these will be renewed as a contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East and to permit the process of negotiations to go forward in a tranquil atmosphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Egypt, according to a senior American official, was willing to sign a pledge not to have recourse to force in the Middle East, that force was not the way to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, to refrain from military and paramilitary activities, and to

allow Israel the right to renew any agreement at the expiration of its one-year term. In your view, did those concessions by Egypt satisfy the military side of non-belligerency?

A. Well, the issue of nonbelligerency is a complicated legal position, because nonbelligerency is an international status which you cannot approach simply in components. I don't think any useful purpose is served for me to give an assessment of the various negotiating positions. Both sides made a serious effort, and they did not succeed in bridging their differences.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is there such a presumption in this country at this moment, in newspaper articles, in the meaning—in the interpretation—of the reassessment of Mideast policy, that Israel somehow was at fault for the breakdown of the talks and should somehow be punished by reduction in aid or some other manner?

A. Well, I cannot answer why people make certain assumptions. Many of you were on the plane with me, and you know how I attempted to explain the situation. We—the Administration has made no assessment of blame, nor will it serve any useful purpose to engage in that now.

Secondly, punishment of a friend cannot be the purpose of a national policy. We now face a new situation. No useful purpose is served by conducting it in a fit of pique or by encouraging even greater tensions in the area. We will make an assessment of the American national interest in relation to our long-term commitments, as well as the necessity of preserving the peace; and our policy will be based entirely on this. And in no sense is any consideration given to punishing any particular country.

Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS].

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, going back to step-by-step approach once again, since you started this approach, there was an agreement between Egypt and Israel in January of '74, an agreement between Syria and Israel in May of '74,⁵⁹ an enhancement of the American diplomatic position in the Middle East, and one setback. In light of the balance on the pluses and minuses, why so radical and dramatic a change, a need for a major reassessment of policy? Why not continue

⁵⁹ Docs. 50 and 115 respectively in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

along the old way, recognizing that there was one setback but a lot of pluses?

A. We obviously believe that there were large pluses. As I made clear before we went on this trip, it seemed to us that in any event, even if another step had succeeded, a reassembling of the Geneva Conference was the most likely next step, because we believed that the Geneva Conference would then have taken place under easier circumstances than will now be the case.

We have made the assessment that the step-by-step approach, as it has been conducted up to now, is not likely to be able to be continued. And therefore we have to assess where we go from here, under conditions in which some of the presuppositions are no longer valid. And I don't consider anything particularly dramatic about assessing American policy when it finds itself in a new situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have used the word "suspension" to describe the talks, and yet you said that the step-by-step approach is ended. Now, you just said it's not likely to be able to continue. Is there any chance whatsoever that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt on an interim settlement—that is, another step—can be revived?

A. My impression, from Egyptian public statements, is that this is extremely unlikely. Should, however, the parties request us, against our expectations, to undertake it, we would be prepared to do it. But we are making no effort to urge the parties to do so. We stand ready, if there should be any such request.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question was being raised after your briefing on the Hill—

A. Miss Berger [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post], and then you.

Q. A question was being raised yesterday after your briefing to Congressmen on the Hill as to who made that decision that the step-by-step approach is now finished. Was it your personal decision? Was it a decision of the parties? Could you tell us about how that decision was reached?

A. The Egyptian Foreign Minister announced, on the evening that he announced the suspension of the talks, that the step-by-step approach was now finished and that Egypt would return to Geneva. This is how the decision was reached.

The United States will do whatever it can—and whatever the parties agree to—to promote peace

in the Middle East, and if the parties should request us to do it, we would be willing to entertain it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it, in your view, enhance the prospects to go to Geneva if the United States would move beyond the role of intermediary and take a publicly stated position on the substantive issues being negotiated there?

A. Well, we have generally refrained from taking a position of our own because we felt that when the peace and security of countries is concerned that they have to make their fundamental decisions. On the few occasions when the issues between them had narrowed sufficiently, the United States took a position.

Now, whether in the evolution of the negotiations—at Geneva or elsewhere—a moment will come when the United States should take a position of its own, that remains to be determined. We have not yet made this decision.

66

Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Chang Chun-chiao of China condemning great power interference in Middle East affairs and expressing confidence in ultimate Arab victory⁶⁰

Peking, April 1, 1975

Our distinguished guests come from north Africa, the southern coast of the Mediterranean and from the great Arab world. There, on the one hand, the people's anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic struggle is developing in depth, and on the other hand, the superpowers are engaged in endless and intense rivalry. Every day the superpowers talk about "detente" and clamour for a settlement of the Middle East question, but actually each is doing its utmost to overpower the other, intensifying the contention and preparing for war. Each, for its own purpose of seizing oil and strategically important positions, is trying hard to restore the former state of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East. The superpower that claims to be the "natural ally" of the Arab countries and

⁶⁰ Made in a speech at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Nourira of Tunisia; excerpted from the English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 15 (April 11, 1975), p. 11.

the third world, with honeyed words on its lips but murder in its heart, is especially insidious. It goes even farther than the other superpower in bullying and plotting against others.

However, the heroic people of the Arab countries and Palestine are not to be bullied. Superpower aggression and contention will only stimulate the people to closer unity and arouse them to stronger resistance and struggle. We are convinced that nothing can stop the triumphant advance of the people of the Arab countries and Palestine with their long tradition of anti-imperialist struggle—no matter what tricks the superpowers may play and no matter what may happen. While the way ahead in their struggle is tortuous, they have a bright future. Victory will surely belong to the Arab and Palestinian peoples who persevere in their just struggle. The Chinese Government and people firmly support them in their struggle to recover lost territories and regain national rights, and firmly support the third world and the people of the whole world in all their just struggles against superpower aggression, subversion, control, interference and bullying of other countries.

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67

Radio interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel reiterating his preference for bilateral talks and explaining the failure to achieve an interim agreement with Egypt⁶¹

Early April, 1975

Q. Prime Minister, you have said that another Arab-Israeli war is not inevitable. How is it to be avoided?

A. Well, I believe that it can be done by two ways. First, to make it clear, and to drive home to the Arabs' mind and heart that Israel, militarily, is very strong, that it's not advisable to go to war, and second to keep the political option open; it is to say that Israel is ready to negotiate either an overall settlement, it is to say peace treaty, or to have a substantial move towards peace by steps.

Q. Is Israel also ready to go to Geneva?

A. The way that we look at the Geneva conference is as a framework within which many matters, many ways should be employed with the purpose to move towards peace. Basically I believe that the only way to move towards peace is negotiations on a bilateral basis, because I don't believe that Israeli-Egyptian relations can be compared, let's say, to the Israeli-Syrian relations. Therefore, there are less different matters and different solutions to the relations between Israel and each one of our four Arab neighbours. Therefore, I look at it as a framework. The plenary meeting normally is to bring in all the representatives of the Arab countries, the representatives of the two major powers, the representative of the United Nations, and especially it should bring in the representatives of the media. I think we find a kind of the rhetoric that is uttered mainly in the United Nations General Assembly. But we are ready to go there, even though I doubt to what extent it's going to be beneficial.

Q. Are you still adamant in your refusal to talk to the PLO, either at Geneva or anywhere else?

A. The answer is yes, and for the simple reason—or simple reasons. First, you have to bear in mind that Mr. Arafat in his speech in the United Nations General Assembly⁶² made clear three basic points that are the essence of his concept, or his philosophy. First, that Judaism is just a religion; second, that the Jews are not entitled to have their own right for self-determination, for nationhood; and third, the Jews are not entitled to have a state of their own.

Q. What if the PLO came to Geneva as part of a joint Palestinian-Syrian delegation. Would you talk to them then?

A. We will negotiate with the four representatives of the four Arab countries in the plenary meetings at Geneva but by no means with the Palestinians.

Q. If you go to Geneva and Geneva fails, do you think that's the last chance for peace gone?

A. Well, one should not give up hope, that once peace will be achieved. I believe that if Geneva, the Geneva plenary meeting, will be convened and if it will not succeed, I am sure that if the

⁶¹ Interview conducted by Martin Bell; monitored, excerpted and transcribed by the Institute for Palestine Studies from the BBC World Service, "The World Today," broadcast April 4, 1975, at 05.45 gmt.

⁶² Doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

major powers, if the European countries, if some of the Arab countries will continue to believe that the best way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict is by peaceful means, through political negotiations, many ways will be found and I hope will be exploited.

Q. Prime Minister, would you accept that, rightly or wrongly, Israel seems to have collected a lot of blame for the breakdown of the Kissinger talks?

A. Well, I don't believe that it is justified because I think Israel has put to Dr. Kissinger two basic positions, proposals. One, to have a big step, a real meaningful step towards peace. It is to say, that we are ready to withdraw east of the passes, the Mitla and Giddi passes, and south of the oilfields in return for the end of the state of war. After all, we look at the bulk of the Sinai Peninsula as an area which has to be used either as a calm [unclear] for peace with our neighbour, with Egypt, or in the absence of readiness on the part of Egypt, to use it as a means of defence of the country. Therefore, we have given, under such a proposal, practically the two most important parts in Sinai. The oilfields at the present supply Israel about half of our production, and the passes practically are the last defensive lines between the Canal and the former international boundary.

Q. Do you mean you couldn't trust the Egyptians, and that's where the whole thing—

A. No, the Egyptians rejected even the notion that they might agree to end the state of war. The mere fact that they have rejected the end of state of war stresses that they want to be, to keep the state of war, which gives them the right to use force whenever they decide.

Q. But couldn't it be argued that the Egyptian decision to open the Suez Canal⁶³ was exactly the kind of gesture of non-belligerency that you claimed they weren't making during the negotiations?

A. Not at all. I believe that in their decision to reopen the Canal is to serve their own purposes. They would like to earn money, and by reopening the Canal it will give them additional revenue

that otherwise they wouldn't get. Towards Israel it has practically no meaning. It's not a gesture towards Israel. It's a gesture towards Europe and other countries all over the world, especially if you bear in mind that the Egyptians declared that no Israeli ship or crew would be allowed to pass through the Canal.

Q. To go back again to the reasons for the failure of the Kissinger mission, how do you feel that your special relationship with the United States has now been affected?

A. Well, I believe that there are deep roots to the understanding and the sympathy between our two countries, even though the United States is a very big country, it's a major power, and Israel is a small country. But I believe that this relation between these countries is more than just relations. It's, it symbolizes in a way the basic American philosophy and policy. It is to say to support the countries that can give an example of a free democratic way of life, the kind of a life that the free world is preaching for and trying to defend.

Q. Can Israel continue to stand strong and stand alone if the level of American arms and aid and support is reduced?

A. We are not dealing with a conflict which is confined completely to whatever the people of the area and the region can accommodate. We face, as Israelis, the Arab world mainly supported by ample supplies of the Soviet Union—I'm talking about military supplies—and therefore Israel is in a need to get some supplies from the United States.

Q. And can you continue to take your own security decisions by yourselves without regard to whatever pressure the Americans may put on you to hand back occupied territories?

A. Well, I think Israel has to bear in mind the American interests and considerations. But by no means can we afford when it comes to our vital interests, especially Israel's security, to rely but on us ourselves. After all we are not part of any alliance. There are no commitments to defend Israel by somebody from the outside and therefore the decisions that are vital to Israel have to be taken by the Israelis.

⁶³ In a speech to the National Assembly on March 29, President Sadat said: "Some people may also expect me to give way to my emotions and keep the Suez Canal closed. I shall do the exact opposite; my decision is to open the Canal to maritime shipping on the date I had already appointed for its opening—next June 5, God willing." (*Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 4 (Summer 1975) p. 177.)

68

Statement by the government of Turkey supporting the restoration of legitimate Palestinian rights (excerpt)⁶⁴**Ankara, April 6, 1975**

Our Government, which definitely believes that the evacuation of occupied territories and the restoration of legitimate rights of Palestinians is essential for a final settlement of the Middle East conflict, will support every move to achieve this goal. We believe that a solution which takes into account realities will be in the interest of all the countries in the region without any exception. Fully conscious of the great dangers created by the present situation, we shall not refrain from contributing every assistance for the solution of the problem.

69

Foreign policy address by US President Ford made to a joint session of Congress (excerpt)⁶⁵**Washington, April 10, 1975**

The interests of America, as well as our allies, are vitally affected by what happens in the Middle East. So long as the state of tension continues, it threatens military crisis, the weakening of our alliances, the stability of the world economy, and confrontation with the nuclear superpowers. These are intolerable risks.

Because we are in the unique position of being able to deal with all the parties, we have, at their request, been engaged for the past year and a half in the peacemaking effort unparalleled in the history of the region.

Our policy has brought remarkable successes on the road to peace. Last year, two major disengagement agreements were negotiated and imple-

mented with our help. For the first time in 30 years, a process of negotiation on the basic political issues was begun—and is continuing.

Unfortunately, the latest efforts to reach a further interim agreement between Israel and Egypt have been suspended. The issues dividing the parties are vital to them and not amenable to easy and to quick solutions.

However, the United States will not be discouraged. The momentum toward peace that has been achieved over the last 18 months must and will be maintained.

The active role of the United States must and will be continued. The drift toward war must and will be prevented.

I pledge the United States to a major effort for peace in the Middle East, an effort which I know has the solid support of the American people and their Congress.

We are now examining how best to proceed. We have agreed in principle to reconvene the Geneva Conference. We are prepared as well to explore other forums.

The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either toward an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

70

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany outlining his country's attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and discussing a possible role for Europe in a settlement⁶⁶**Bonn, mid-April, 1975**

Q. From what the Minister has said about the good relations between Federal Germany and both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and in view of the immense importance that the Arab world and the world as a whole attach

⁶⁴ Part of the foreign policy programme presented to parliament; excerpted from the English text, *Dis Politika—Foreign Policy* (Ankara), IV, 4 (June, 1975), p. 169.

⁶⁵ Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1870 (April 28, 1975), p. 535.

⁶⁶ Interview conducted by Hassan Suliak; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 14, 1975.

to the conflict in the Middle East and the efforts being made to solve it, it can be assumed that this subject will form the centre of gravity of the talks he is to have on this subject in the two Arab capitals. What then has the Minister to say about Federal Germany's attitude to this important problem?

A. Certainly discussion of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East will be the centre of gravity of the talks we are to have. Naturally I do not want to anticipate the results of my exchange of views with those officials who have invited me, but I will not attempt to conceal the fact that the halting of the efforts made by Dr. Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, which were strongly supported by the government of Federal Germany, has gravely disappointed us. I cannot view the present stalemate without alarm, and in view of the fact that there has been no substantial change in the principal aspects of the Middle East conflict, there is no need for us to modify our attitude. Let me give a brief summary of the principal elements of this attitude:

—Any peaceful settlement must guarantee the existence of all the states in the area.

—We, along with our eight partners in the European Community, have made our attitudes clear in the statement on the Middle East issued by the Community on November 6, 1973.⁶⁷ Also, at the summit conference held in Copenhagen we declared our readiness to assist in the guarantees necessary for any peaceful settlement.⁶⁸

—It is essential that Israel should end her occupation of the territories she has held since the 1967 war. But it is also important that there should be guarantees that Israel and the Arab states in the area can exist within secure and recognized frontiers.

—In our view any peaceful settlement must take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. I cannot conceive of a peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East conflict being permanent unless these conditions are met.

Q. As a result of the intransigent attitude adopted by Israel during the recent Middle East mission of Dr. Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, the American leadership, as you know, decided to conduct a reappraisal of American policy on the Middle East conflict. In the light of this can a similar attitude be

anticipated on the part of the European side? By that I mean that the European side should advance from the stage of good intentions such as the forthcoming Arab-European dialogue and the statements on the Middle East conflict, such as that issued by the Nine after the October war, which we certainly welcome, to a stage of real action in the effort to solve the Middle East conflict.

A. I am sure you will appreciate that I do not at the moment want to go into the reasons for the cessation of Kissinger's mission. The American Secretary of State gave me a detailed account of his impressions and the efforts he made during his mission. I had hoped that his unremitting efforts would be crowned with the success they deserved. We shall be glad if the United States, now that it is in full possession of all the details of the contacts that took place, can find new ways and means of approaching a peaceful solution with the assistance of all the parties concerned. The European countries, including Federal Germany, are prepared to participate with practical efforts within the framework of available possibilities towards attaining this goal. At the same time it is desirable that the parties to the conflict should themselves define their ideas on what contribution Europe can make. Such ideas will make it easier for the community of nine European countries to reach a definite view.

Q. Shortly before Kissinger undertook his recent Middle East mission, President Sadat told a German magazine that he would like to see Europe playing a greater role in the Middle East conflict. In this context he stressed the importance of the role played by Federal Germany in Europe. Certainly, within the framework of the recently announced Egyptian proposal for French and British participation in the Geneva conference, Federal Germany was also borne in mind, in view of the important position she occupies in the European Community, and of the close relations that link her to these two major European countries. What possibility do you think there is of Federal Germany exerting greater influence in this field with a view to achieving a just and permanent peace in the Middle East?

A. I should like to start by pointing out that German public opinion has greatly appreciated President Sadat's statements and his great sense of responsibility. On our part we shall make a most careful study of all the ideas contained in this statement on the role that Europe could play in the settlement. This is because we believe both as a matter of conviction and because it is in our

⁶⁷ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁶⁸ Doc. 212 in *ibid*.

interest to do so that all stagnation in the Middle East situation is dangerous, and that for a state of uncertainty to continue as regards future developments is not in the interests of any of the parties concerned, because it increases the danger of a renewal of the conflict. We have made this point of view absolutely clear in the last few days, because our vital interests require that permanent peace should return to this area which is Europe's neighbour, and the peoples of the Middle East must be given another chance of unrestricted fruitful activity with a view to strengthening the economic, social and political structure of their social systems.

Q. In a statement on German television a few days ago you said that the rights of the Palestinian people must be respected in the solution of the Middle East conflict. Could you give some further explanation of your ideas on this point and, in this connection, it might be a good thing if you would say something about Federal Germany's general attitude to the Palestinians?

A. The problem of the Palestinians is a political one. As regards the human aspects of the problem, in 1968, as you know, West Germany set up a special fund for the Palestinian refugees, which has large sums at its disposal, in addition to contributions she pays to the budget of UNRWA. But here I want to talk about the problem of the Palestinians as a political problem.

In their statement issued on November 6, 1973, the nine European foreign ministers stressed that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be observed in the context of a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem, and this statement still reflects our political attitude to this problem. When the Palestine problem was debated at the United Nations General Assembly on November 19, 1974, West Germany quite unambiguously supported the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and their right to decide whether they want to set up their own national authority in the areas from which Israel withdraws, or to choose another solution. There is a close internal relationship between ensuring the existence of the state of Israel and observing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in the sense that I have explained very clearly in this context: both these rights must be taken into consideration without one of them being allowed to extinguish the other. What I mean is that this clearly declared attitude of ours

has not been changed at all by recent developments, and that its realization is in itself a step towards solving the problem.

71

Statement by President Ceausescu of Rumania calling for Israel's withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestine state⁶⁹

Amman, April 14, 1975

We are very much interested in the situation in the Middle East, Your Majesty, and from the recent development of events and since the failure of Kissinger's mission we have been aware of the situation and the possibility of its developing into a more critical and difficult one.

You know, my friend, that Rumania advocates the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, a peace based on a solution reached through political efforts, and in this field we regard the convening of the Geneva conference as an important element. We also believe that the framework of that conference should be expanded to include other countries which could play their part in reinforcing the hopes and the efforts that are being made to achieve a just peace in the Middle East.

In our view peace can be achieved through the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Arab territories Israel occupied in 1967 and through recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and their right to establish a national state.

Let me reaffirm what I have stated before that Jordan has a very important role to play in finding solutions to all these problems, and we believe that, through joint action and cooperation between peoples, we can achieve a just and permanent peace that will enable the peoples of the area to find solutions to the problems that confront them.

It may be impossible for many countries to solve their problems alone, but by cooperating with each other they will be able to find solutions for them.

⁶⁹ Made in a speech at a dinner in his honour; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), April 15, 1975. The Rumanian president was in Jordan April 14-17.

It is also essential to strengthen and expand the role of the United Nations not only in international affairs in general, but also in finding a solution to the Middle East problem.

72

Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China expressing support for the Arabs⁷⁰

Peking, April 18, 1975

In the Middle East, the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian peoples against Israeli Zionism has seriously frustrated the superpowers' plans of aggression. The reason why the Middle East question long remains unsettled is that Israel obstinately persists in expansion and aggression and that the superpowers are contending with each other in that region. Any and all solutions advocated by either superpower are aimed at extending its own force of aggression. We believe that the Arab and Palestinian peoples, relying on their own close unity and carrying on an unremitting struggle, will certainly recover their lost territories and regain their national rights. The Chinese Government and and people will, as always, firmly support the Arab and Palestinian peoples in their just struggle until complete victory is won.

73

Speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR stressing the danger of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories and expressing support for a Palestine state⁷¹

Moscow, April 19, 1975

It is quite understandable that matters which the two sides consider necessary to discuss

⁷⁰ Made in a speech at a dinner in honour of visiting President Kim Il Sung of North Korea; excerpted from the English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 17 (April 25, 1975), p. 13.

⁷¹ Speech made at a dinner in honour of visiting Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt; excerpted from the partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5782 (April 22, 1975), p. 137.

concern two fields: Soviet-Egyptian relations and the situation in the area of the Middle East as a whole.

The Soviet Union's policy with regard to Egypt had been set out clearly and explicitly more than once, and personally by Leonid Brezhnev to President Sadat.

This policy is aimed not only at preserving everything good that has been achieved in relations between our two countries up to now, but also at further deepening and enriching these relations.

I am availing myself of the opportunity to emphasise, on behalf of the Soviet leadership and of Leonid Brezhnev personally, that this political policy remains in effect.

It is, of course, possible to accomplish these tasks successfully only if Egypt and the Egyptian leadership pursue the same kind of policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

We believe that in the interests of the peoples of our two countries, the Soviet Union and Egypt must pay careful regard to all the success that have been achieved in the development of these relations and do their utmost to strengthen these relations, both in the political field and in the fields of economic co-operation, cultural ties and other areas.

It is necessary to emphasise that good relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, like relations between the Soviet Union and other Arab states, cannot be detrimental to any other states if they adopt positions of peace, détente and friendship among the peoples.

The other field on which we have begun to exchange views is the situation in the area of the the Middle East and the next possible steps which, in the opinion of the Soviet Union and Egypt, it would be expedient to take in the interests of the struggle to eliminate the aftermath of the Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union and Egypt also agree that the situation in the Middle East is not only complex, but also remains dangerous. The main danger arises from the fact that Arab territories remain occupied by Israel.

The main task therefore follows: to struggle for the complete liberation of Arab territories from the occupiers. The Soviet Union fully supports the Arab countries and continues to support the Arabs.

We also support the just demands of the Arab people of Palestine right up to the establishment of their own national state. We express satisfaction that the Palestine Liberation Organisation and its legitimate and just demands have already met with broad international support.

The Soviet Union continues to stand for a settlement of the Middle East problem which will ensure the right of all states of the area, including the state of Israel, to independent existence and development.

No one has been able to or can reproach the Soviet Union with the charge that its policy proceeds from any transitory or fortuitous considerations. Its policy is principled and consistent. The Soviet Union's Middle East policy was again reaffirmed in the resolution of the plenary session of the CPSU central committee which took place in Moscow on April 16. We shall go on pursuing this policy.

It is necessary to emphasise once again that in pursuance of its Middle East policy, the Soviet Union comes out for concerted action by all the parties concerned and that it is against any steps which would undermine unity and concerted action.

This applies to the Geneva Conference as well. The Soviet Union is for the resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference and for the participation in it of all the parties concerned which were agreed on during the calling of the forum. It stands for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the conference.

At the same time, we want to emphasise that we stand for the serious preparation of the conference so as to ensure its success. An early recall of the conference and serious preparation for it are quite compatible.

74

Address by Defence Minister Peres of Israel on "Europe and Israel: An Israeli viewpoint" (excerpts)⁷²

Tel Aviv, April 21, 1975

The state of Israel as an idea was born in the 19th century on European soil. Whereas in Europe the

idea of the Jewish State was seen as a solution to the problem of the Jews in Exile, in the Middle Eastern reality it is in fact a continuation of our long-interrupted statehood.

For Israel, Europe is a history rather than a continent—a history that occupies much of our imagination and fills so much of our memory. The greatest revolutions—the Industrial, the French, the Russian—took place in Europe. The greatest military confrontations took place on European soil. In a way, the rest of the globe was either discovered or governed from European centres: America was born in Europe, as were Australia and New Zealand; most of Asia, Africa and the Middle East were governed from Europe; most of the appurtenances and conveniences of modern life were invented by Europeans. Europe was the backbone of modern history.

European Jewry participated actively in all this, but at the same time continued to pray and long, and, finally, to act for the return to the homeland, for the departure from Exile and the return to national sovereignty. Europe was the centre of the activity that finally brought realization to those prayers and longings.

Today Europe—that has written the most important chapter in modern history—is tired of itself, has turned its back on its own history. Two of its most important progeny, the United States and Soviet Russia, have surpassed their motherland in size, and scope.

The tired Europe that emerged from World War II no longer considers war as an extension of policy, economy or religion. The young generation no longer considers tradition to be an undisputed vision of the future. We live in a world that is tired of memories. Europe has forsaken its past, but it has not yet shaped a future for itself.

For the Jewish People, this is a tragedy, as some of our profoundest memories are attached to European history: in Europe we were able to survive yet in Europe we suffered the greatest of all human holocausts.

Most of the countries of Europe voted for the creation of the State of Israel. Yet, when the still unborn State was attacked, the European reaction was a total embargo on the supply of arms to Israel: they refused to support the new

⁷² Made at an international symposium on "Germany and the

Middle East 1835–1939" held at Tel Aviv University; partial English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, April 25, 1975, p. 12.

reality which they had voted to create. We were at war before we had an army; we had to fight without having enough weapons; and no sooner had most of the members of the organized world recognized us than they abandoned us. Israel enjoyed the sympathy of most of the European people if not of the European Governments, and some of them expressed deep sympathy, and, on certain occasions, even gave us real support. There were periods of sunshine for us in the French and English attitudes towards Israel. Salutary sunshine also came from Holland and the Scandinavian countries; there was the period of warmth and light from the German Federal Republic.

Today, there is a state of mutual wondering between most European countries and Israel. I would list the Israeli doubts as follows:

a) Are there still two equal camps in our time, the democratic one and the Communist one? Or do we live in a world clearly divided between a Communist camp and a feeble democratic disorganization?

b) Does Europe have a strategy for its own defence, in face of the threats on its eastern and southern frontiers?

c) Are European policies decided only in terms of economic considerations? Do moral judgement and long-range political considerations also play a role?

d) Is there still a hope for a united Europe?

Now I will try to formulate the European doubts concerning Israel's policies:

a) Isn't Israel too preoccupied with territory and not enough with real political options?

b) Is there any real solution for the Arab-Israel conflict? If there is, where does it lie in territorial rearrangements, in political formulations, or in the creation of new structures in the Middle East?

c) Is Israel over-democratic, and as a result losing its ability to make crucial decisions, because of its own internal political divisions?

d) In the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs, aren't we overlooking the aspects of justice—too well-known to Jewish experience—in our approach to the Arab position?

I have few answers to the questions we are asking Europe. As to the questions Europe is asking Israel, I should like to make a brief preamble: Contrary to an existing impression, Israel is very sensitive to world public opinion, both morally and politically, and we certainly care very much

about what Europe has to tell Israel. Furthermore, I am aware of the fact that Israel is quite dependent on Europe in the international sphere. But we cannot take an outside judgement as our sole guiding light. We must maintain the highest possible degree of independence.

To answer the first question, may I say that no country has reportedly given back pieces of land that it won in a war of self-defence and while still under attack. Let us not forget that this is the third time that we are negotiating a withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Let us not forget that an otherwise moderate government in Trans-Jordan attacked us in 1948 and in 1967, both times in an attempt to conquer all of Jerusalem. In the War of Liberation, we conquered 30 odd villages from Lebanon, which we returned to the Lebanese without any conditions; and it took three attacks by the Syrians before we went up into the Golan Heights. And yet, even before the 1967 War in which those areas fell to us, one is hard put to remember a different Arab policy or European attitude towards Israel. Resolution 242, as a matter of fact, represents a recognition of certain territorial changes in the borders between us and our Arab neighbours. As a result of the experience gained in all those attacks on us, I do believe that it is not territorial changes that generated belligerency but, on the contrary, it is belligerency that resulted in territorial changes.

As to the second question: I believe that there is a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. I wonder, however, whether it lies in a piece of land or in some brilliant formula, or in an international structure. Peace will begin the moment peace becomes the primary consideration and ceases to be secondary in the Arab scheme of things. I do not believe that this can be achieved overnight but I do not believe that it is unattainable. There are obviously differences between the Arab countries. Some of them are more inclined to recognize the virtue of peace as a good in its own right. But this is a rather equivocal and reluctant recognition, because it is so strongly tied up with the considerations of the rest of the Arab world, where a leader like Gaddafi is trying to drag his Arab brothers back into the Middle Ages.

To answer the third question: It is true that Israel is fiercely democratic, never lacking for parties and factions; and it abounds with ideas, opinions and differing voices. I believe that on

three major issues our people are really united: the aspiration for peace; the aspiration to maintain our national sovereignty; the aspiration to remain free. These three commitments enable a mainstream to take decisions in the face of differing opinions.

As to the fourth question: we have never sought to become the masters of any other nationality, large or small. This is contrary to our philosophy and inclination. And I do not believe that the real problem is whether the Palestinian Arabs have the right to exist as a people or as a part of the Arab world. The real issue is the West Bank, and the problem is whether there will be an additional state on the West Bank run by a group of men who have gained more experience in using arms than in exercising democratic prerogatives maintaining a democratic process. A Palestinian State leaning heavily on Russian generosity will mean having to place ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles at the gates of Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv's approaches. In a way, it will mean not an additional state, but a limitation of Israeli independence to a point where no Israeli plane or vehicle will be able to move without being at the mercy of deadly weapons in the hands of irresponsible people situated along the main arteries of our existence. When two people meet on the very same land, they can either divide the land and live under separate roofs, armed and hostile, replacing a passing conflict with a permanent tragedy, or they can join forces under one roof and live in a federal structure. I, for one, do not see why a commitment to an impossible partition should be preferred over a chance for an open-minded federation.

To conclude, I cannot imagine that Europe will totally ignore its economic considerations. And no Israeli has ever asked that Europe should ignore the Arab world or cut itself off from Arab resources and markets. One may hope, however, that economic considerations will not time and again be translated into political prejudices, thus compounding the difficulties of a state which already has more than its share of them.

A fair-minded, objective attitude is the best one can hope for, and our basic hope is that Israel will be able to enjoy a moral support that is not outweighed by economic considerations. I believe that a strong and free Israel is not a disservice either to the security or to the destiny of

Europe. I do not believe that the suspension of the negotiations conducted by Dr. Kissinger mark an end to the possibility of a settlement between us and the Arab countries, especially Egypt. Neither do I believe that a reassessment should or can be concluded in a matter of days or weeks. The choice remains basically an Egyptian one. If President Sadat chooses the direction of settlement—and undoubtedly the opening of the Suez Canal is a step towards this—I can see the summer as a season for negotiations. If, on the other hand, traditional Arab militancy gains the upper hand, the Middle East may again sink into a morass of belligerency which will neither be a solution to the conflict nor a triumph for the Arab camp.

Israel does not have to be urged to seek peace. The urge is in our very blood, our feelings and thoughts. Neither does Israel demand that any other country fight for her. What we need is fair and profound understanding for a difficult period until the will for peace becomes a desire shared equally by all parties in this ancient and troubled area, which has known so many European entries—some of them positive and others mistaken—until Middle Eastern humanity learns to direct its own destinies by overcoming old conflicts and learning to share new interests.

75

Television interview statements by US President Ford discussing the reassessment of US Middle East policy and attitude towards the PLO⁷³

Washington, April 21, 1975

Cronkite: Can we move on to the Middle East now? Are you reconciled to a Geneva meeting now or would you still like to see some more direct diplomacy in the step-by-step Kissinger pattern?

A. I think, following the very serious disappointment of the last negotiations between Israel and Egypt, we are committed, at least in principle, to going to Geneva.

⁷³ Interview conducted by Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid and Bob Schieffer and broadcast by CBS; partial transcript published by the US embassy in Beirut on April 23, 1975.

Now, in the meantime, we are going through this process of reassessment of our whole Middle Eastern policy which, prior to the suspension of the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, had been a very successful one.

Now, there really are three options. You could resume the suspended negotiations without making a commitment to go to Geneva. You could go to Geneva and try to get an overall settlement—which is a very complicated matter. People advocate it, however.

But while you were going through this negotiation for an overall settlement, as a third option you might have an interim negotiated settlement between two of the parties, such as Israel and Egypt.

Now, those are basically the three options. We have not made any decision yet. We have had our ambassadors from the Middle East come back and report to me. We have undertaken a study under the leadership of Joe Sisco to bring together the best thinking and all of the options.

We have brought in, or Secretary Kissinger has brought in, some outside experts in the Middle East. Last week, I had a meeting with a former State Department official, Gene Rostow, who is an expert in this area. But right at the moment, we have made no firm decision as to what our next particular step will be in the Middle East.

Sevareid: Mr. President, can you foresee any possible circumstances in which you would feel it right to send American Armed Forces into the Middle East on land, or in the air? In other words, military intervention?

A. I can't foresee any, Eric, but—and I see no reason to do so. So, I think the answer is pretty categorically no.

Sevareid: What about a wholly different level, if there were agreement for a Russian-American peace patrol and the alternative to that was another Mideast war, would you go that far?

A. You put it on about the most extreme alternatives. We want peace in the Middle East and I think the Soviet Union does, too.

I would hope that there wouldn't be a need for either the United States or the Soviet Union having any peace-keeping responsibilities with their own forces in the Middle East.

Schieffer: Mr. President, does the reassessment now going on of the Middle East policy also include a reassessment of the U.S. position toward the Palestinians?

A. If you take the path of an overall settlement and going to Geneva, I think you have to have an analysis of what is going to happen there because the Palestinians are going to demand recognition.

But I don't mean to infer that we have made any decision. But the Palestinians have to be examined as a part of the overall Middle East situation.

I am not making any commitment one way or another but it has to be part of the problem that we are analyzing.

Schieffer: Let me ask you this just as a follow-up. Could the Palestinians be included if they refuse to deal with the Israelis?

A. I don't see how because the Israelis, in the first place, don't recognize the Palestinians as a proper party and the PLO doesn't recognize the existence of Israel. So, I think that is an impasse right there and it will be one of the most difficult things that will have to be worked out if it is worked out at Geneva.

Schieffer: Do you have any feel for when there will be a date for the Geneva Conference reconvening?

A. I have seen a lot of speculation early this summer, but no set time has been determined.

Cronkite: Mr. President, the Israeli Foreign Minister Allon is in Washington now, and there are reports out of Jerusalem today that he is going to suggest a summit meeting between you and President Rabin. Do you expect to have such a meeting?

A. I wouldn't expect that I would make any commitment on that until we are further along in our reassessment. It may be desirable at some point. It may be desirable to meet other parties, or other heads of state, in the Middle East, but I don't want to make any commitment tonight as to anyone or as to more than one.

Cronkite: Doesn't that sort of imply that we are still being a little bit hardnosed in our disappointment over the Kissinger mission?

A. No I think it is wise for us to take a look ourselves at the new options or different options. I certainly wouldn't rule out a meeting with Mr. Rabin, but I don't want to make any commitment to one until we have moved a bit further down in the process of a reassessment.

I reiterate that if we meet with one, we certainly ought to give others an opportunity, other heads of state, to have the same input.

Cronkite: So, there won't be any favored nation treatment of Israel in the future?

A. I think we have to, in this very division, where the possibility of war is certainly a serious one, if you have a war, you are inevitably going to have an oil embargo—I think we have to be very cautious in our process of a reassessment.

76

Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel discussing his talks with US officials⁷⁴

Washington, April 21, 1975

Q. Mr. Allon, do you believe that in your talk with Dr. Kissinger you succeeded in improving the atmosphere surrounding relationships between us and the United States?

A. I did not have high expectations of this talk, but I hope that it was useful. We have renewed the dialogue between the two countries, and we have agreed on bilateral talks between us and the United States, both on matters related to advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East, as well as those related to bilateral relations between us and the United States.

Q. Would you say that the relations between us and the United States have returned to a more normal course than they took last month?

A. I am glad you use the term "normal course" and that you do not talk of a crisis, as has been the tendency. There was no crisis. There was tension, tension based on misunderstandings. I cannot promise that all the misunderstandings have been eliminated, but I am convinced that the atmosphere has improved. In any case, we have agreed—and jointly to the communications media on this—that we have taken the course of a dialogue, and that the two sides will make a maximum effort to maintain co-operation, from the standpoint of both ideas and the necessary steps, in order to achieve political progress towards peace.

⁷⁴ Interview conducted by Yaaqov Ahimeir and broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4885/A/3; reprinted by permission.

Q. Did the two sides also forget what happened in the past, with the suspension of Dr. Kissinger's mission?

A. Such things are not easily forgotten. I hope that the two sides will overcome criticisms or disagreeable feelings linked to the past.

Q. Did you, during your talks, perhaps hear words of regret or repentance on the part of the Americans regarding their remarks in the past as to Israel's inflexibility?

A. When the talks opened, we promised each other that we would not report the details of the talk. I have faith, however, that in the course of the talk, which lasted for about three hours, through lunch, an easier atmosphere was created than existed, let us say, before this talk.

77

Statement by CPSU Politbureau member Suslov stating that the Geneva conference is the only way to a Middle East settlement⁷⁵

Moscow, April 22, 1975

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The Soviet Union is consistently coming out for the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. This calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, the satisfaction of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to the establishment of their own state, the granting to all states in that area the possibility of free existence and development. All these problems make up a single whole, and a genuine settlement requires a comprehensive approach to their solution. The way to this is the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference.

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⁷⁵ Excerpted from the English text of the speech made at the celebration of the 105th anniversary of Lenin's birth, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 17 (April 26, 1975), p. 7.

78

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt (excerpts)⁷⁶

Moscow, April 22, 1975

At the invitation of the Soviet leadership, Ismail Fahmy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, was in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from April 19 to 22, 1975.

During the examination of bilateral relations, the firm intention was expressed to continue building relations between the U.S.S.R. and the A.R.E. on the solid foundation of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁷⁷ The two sides are unanimous on the need to continue exerting efforts for the further deepening and improvement of these relations in the interests of both countries' peoples.

The participants in the talks stated that the situation in the Near East remains explosive as a result of the aggressive policy of Israel and the imperialist forces supporting it.

The two sides reaffirmed that there can be no just and lasting peace in the Near East ensuring the independent existence and development of all states in that region without the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the safeguarding of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to the creation of their own state.

Proceeding from their unvarying principled position on the question of a Near East settlement, the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt state they will continue to exert the most energetic efforts to achieve a radical settlement of the Near East problem on the basis of the complete implementation of the well-known decisions of the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly.

⁷⁶ *Pravda* (Moscow), April 23, 1975, p. 4; excerpted from the English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), XXVII, 16 (May 14, 1975), p. 7; translation copyright 1975 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

⁷⁷ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt are unanimous on the point that the Geneva peace conference on the Near East must resume its work at the earliest possible date. They also emphasized the importance of careful preparations for the conference, so that it will lead to the adoption of definitive and all-embracing decisions on the Near East problem. Any partial measures and decisions on them must be a component, inalienable part of a general settlement and must be adopted in the framework of the conference on the Near East.

The two sides reaffirmed that representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization should take part in the work of the Geneva conference with rights equal to those of its other participants.

In the two sides' opinion, the visit to the Soviet Union of the A.R.E. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs is of positive importance for the further strengthening of mutual understanding and the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

79

Speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR made at a dinner in honour of visiting Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria (excerpts)⁷⁸

Moscow, April 23, 1975

In the past few years, Soviet-Syrian relations have entered a special phase. They have been filled with new content, both in the field of political cooperation and in the field of economic and cultural ties.

From the very beginning, the Soviet Union took the side of the Arab states and the Arab people in the struggle against the Israeli aggressors. It did so because the Arabs' cause is a just cause,

⁷⁸ *Pravda* (Moscow), April 24, 1975, p. 5; excerpted from the partial English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), XXVII, 16 (May 14, 1975), p. 8; translation copyright 1975 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

because the Arab states that were victims of aggression are struggling for the liberation of their lands from the occupiers. The Golan Heights belong to Syria and the Syrian people, not to Israel, just as the other Arab lands Israel has seized do not belong to it. . . .

Israeli leaders like to claim that everything Israel does, it does for the security of its boundaries. But this thesis has been used by all aggressors, including Hitler's Germany, the 30th anniversary of whose defeat the Soviet people, together with the peoples of many other states, will be celebrating in a few days. Israel cannot, and has no right to, claim what does not belong to it—other peoples' territory.

If Israel's ruling circles were guided not by a craving to obtain other people's territory but by a genuine desire to ensure peaceful conditions for the existence and development of the state of Israel, this would be simple enough to accomplish. For this, all Israel needs to do is abandon its plan for the annexation of other people's land, set them free and embark on a path of peace with the Arab states.

Israel can receive, if it so desires, the strictest possible guarantees, with the participation—in an appropriate agreement—of the Soviet Union, guarantees that would ensure peaceful conditions for the existence and development of all states in the Near East region.

The safeguarding of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a component, organic part of the problem of a Near East settlement.

A great deal has been said, especially recently, about the need to resume the work of the Geneva peace conference on the Near East. This demand is justified. The Soviet Union also insists on this.

Experience has shown that partial deals divorced from the solution of the fundamental problems of a settlement do not bring such a settlement closer but rather create additional difficulties in solving the main problems.

Such a faulty method cannot lessen the critical nature of the situation in the Near East, which is fraught with the danger of a new explosion; on the contrary, it facilitates a still greater aggravation in the situation, with all the consequences stemming therefrom.

Speaking of the Geneva conference, it is not superfluous to emphasize that it must take up

serious problems. We are against reducing the conference, in which representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization must take part on an equal basis with the other interested parties, to some kind of action that is just for show—even if it is accompanied by declarations of a political nature—and is not followed by deeds. We think that the convocation of the conference at the earliest date can be combined with serious preparations for it, so that from the first day of its work the conference will deal with concrete questions of a settlement.

We are convinced that the core of the conference's program should be: first, an accord on the liberation of all Arab lands from foreign occupation; second, an accord safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine; and third, an accord ensuring and guaranteeing the right of all states in the Near East, including the state of Israel, to independent existence and development.

To put it briefly, this is our policy line in Near Eastern affairs.

We express satisfaction with the fact that on all the principal questions of a Near East settlement Syria and the Soviet Union take a common stand. This is of great importance not only for our cooperation in Near East problems but also for the further development of our relations as a whole.

80

Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Chen Hsi-lien of China praising Arab success against Zionism and "superpower hegemony"⁷⁹

Peking, April 24, 1975

The just struggle of the Arab people and the Palestinian people against Israeli Zionism has dealt a heavy blow to the plans of the superpowers for aggression and expansion. At present, the two superpowers, in order to expand their own forces of aggression, are trying by hook or by crook to undermine the unity and struggle of the Arab

⁷⁹ Made in a speech at a dinner welcoming Deputy Commander-in-Chief Shawarib of North Yemen; partial English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 19 (May 9, 1975), p. 7.

people and trying to create a new state of 'no war, no peace' in the Middle East. Particularly that superpower claiming to be the 'natural ally' of the Arab and the third world, is all the more greedy and hypocritical: it is stretching its hands everywhere and its behaviour is especially notorious. We believe that the Arab and Palestinian peoples, who have a rich experience in struggle, will certainly smash the superpowers' plots and sabotage and continue to march ahead valiantly to recover their lost territories and restore their national rights.

81

Statement issued by Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany welcoming the Arab League's decision to start a dialogue with Europe⁸⁰

Bonn, April 24, 1975

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany notes with great satisfaction the decision of the Arab League Council to begin with the Euro-Arab Dialogue.

Already in my conversations with my colleagues in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and with the General Secretary of the Arab League during my Middle East trip, I stressed the importance of a quick resumption of the dialogue on the basis of the Dublin decision of the Nine.⁸¹

Now with the decision by the League the way is open for future cooperation between Europeans and Arabs in full confidence, as has never been the case before.

The dialogue will strengthen the partnership between Europeans and Arabs, will contribute to the stabilization of the Middle East situation and serve the social and economic developments of

both European and Arab states. At the same time the Euro-Arab dialogue is in line with the even-handed Middle East policy of the FRG government which contributes to the stabilization of the situation in this area.

82

Press conference statement by Foreign Minister Antunes of Portugal regarding Portugal's Middle East policy and denying the use of Portugal's bases to individual NATO countries⁸²

Lisbon, April 24, 1975

Portugal's long history of cultural ties with Israel will not permit us to determine our foreign policy by material considerations. We have no reason whatsoever to be an enemy of this country. Nevertheless, we believe that the problems of the Palestinians must be solved according to a just formula and that the problems dividing Israelis from Palestinians must be solved by peaceful means.

Considering that Portugal is a member country of NATO then, in common with all other countries that are part of that alliance, the question of bases does not arise. We can say that with regard to the question of bases this presents for Portugal, as an effective member of NATO, no real problems. Whatever problem might arise out of the use of the Lajes base in the Azores in connection with the Middle East question, it should be taken into consideration that the Lajes base is intended for use integrated in the general strategy of NATO and not in the interest of an individual member country, as for example the United States. We believe that the Lajes base should only be used within the framework of Portuguese foreign policy.

⁸⁰ German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 54 (April 25, 1975), p. 516. The Arab League's decision was given to Genscher on April 18 during his visit to Cairo. *Arab Report and Record* (London), April 16-30, 1975, p. 263.

⁸¹ Progress in the proposed Euro-Arab dialogue had been held up by disagreements over the question of PLO participation as an observer. At the EEC summit in Dublin on February 13, 1975, a compromise was reached whereby each side would be free to nominate its delegates, with no national identification being made. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), May 19-25, 1975, p. 27131.

⁸² Excerpted and translated from the Portuguese text supplied, on request, by the Portuguese embassy in Beirut.

83

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of President Ceausescu of Rumania (excerpt)⁸³

Cairo, April 25, 1975

President Anwar Sadat and President Nicolai Ceausescu reviewed with close attention the developments that have taken place in the Middle East problem and expressed their profound concern at the continued dangerous and explosive situation in the area resulting from Israel's intransigence and continued occupation of Arab territories and her ignoring of the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine. The two Presidents stressed that a just and permanent peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the realization of the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and to establish a free, independent, sovereign state.

The two Presidents agreed that the Geneva conference should be convened as soon as possible and that invitations to attend it should be sent to all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, with a view to implementing the United Nations resolutions to that effect. They believe that this conference should be supported by all peace-loving forces and be backed by all countries capable of making a positive contribution to the achievement of a just and permanent peace in this area, and that such a peace must be in harmony with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law.

The two Presidents pointed out the close link between European security and stability and peace in the Middle East by virtue of its strategic position and the neighbourly relations linking the states of the two areas. They stressed the need for tangible progress to be made towards easing tension and ensuring a greater measure of security and stability in the two areas, and expressed the hope that the efforts being made to ensure that the conference on European security is successful would be crowned

with success, in the interests of stability and peace in both Europe and the world.

84

Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe appealing for peace in the Middle East taking into account a political solution to the question of Palestine⁸⁴

Strasbourg, April 25, 1975

The Assembly,

1. Recalling its Resolution 490 (1971), on the situation in the Middle East;⁸⁵

2. Deploring the resumption of hostilities in this part of the world in October 1973, and deeply disturbed by the repeated violations of the ceasefire established by the provisions of Resolution 340 (1973) of the United Nations Security Council, as well as by reports concerning the military build-up in the various Middle East states;

3. Welcoming the initial agreements reached in January and May 1974 between Israel, Egypt and Syria,⁸⁶ which have made possible the disengagement of troops on the Golan Heights and Suez Canal fronts, and represent the first constructive steps towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

4. Regretting the breakdown in March 1975 of the mission of the American Secretary of State, whose aim was a new agreement between Egypt and Israel;

5. Hoping that at the future Geneva Peace Conference new constructive steps will be taken towards a peaceful solution in the Middle East;

6. Condemning terrorist acts against the civilian population, and recalling in this connection the views expressed in its Recommendation 703 (1973), on international terrorism;

7. Fearing that such terrorist action will compromise hopes of peace and jeopardise the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East,

8. Issues a solemn appeal to the parties involved

⁸³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 26, 1975, pp. 1, 3. The Rumanian president visited Egypt April 22–25.

⁸⁴ Resolution 594 (1975) adopted at the 8th sitting of the 27th session; text supplied, on request, by the Council of Europe.

⁸⁵ Doc. 110 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁸⁶ Docs. 50 and 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

to avoid any military confrontation and to begin negotiations at every level, recalling that any lasting negotiated settlement must recognise the state of Israel and its right to live at peace within secure and recognised frontiers, must offer a political solution to the situation of the Palestinian people, ensuring their representative participation in a settlement valid for the entire region, and must guarantee to all states free passage through the international waterways;

9. Invites the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe to do everything in their power to promote the satisfactory outcome of the direct negotiations between the parties concerned.

85

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria⁸⁷

Moscow, April 26, 1975

In response to an invitation from the leadership of the USSR, Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Member of the Command of the Baath Party, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid an official and friendly visit to the USSR from April 23–25, 1975.

The General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, received Comrade Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who conveyed to him a friendly message from President Hafiz Asad, General Secretary of the Baath Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and had talks with him on the bilateral relations between the two countries and the present situation in the Middle East.

In an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic held discussions with Comrade Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In the course of these meetings and discussions there was an exchange of views on the bilateral relations between the two countries, and current international problems and developments in the Middle

East situation were passed in review.

The two parties expressed their satisfaction at the successful development of comprehensive co-operation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR and affirmed that the continued development and reinforcement of friendly relations between them is one of the most important aims of their historic policy. They expressed their determination to strengthen and enrich the relations between the two countries in political, economic, cultural, scientific and other fields. The two sides affirmed their determination to frustrate all attempts to destroy the relations of friendship and cooperation which exist between the two countries.

The two sides indicated the special and great importance of the meetings between President Hafiz Asad, General Secretary of the Baath Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and the effective contribution they have made towards strengthening and consolidating cooperation and friendship between the two countries in all fields.

In the course of their review of the present international situation, the two sides drew attention to the achievements of the peoples in their struggle for national liberation and international peace and security and for the establishment of international economic and political relations on a basis of equality. They stressed their common efforts to establish international détente and to ensure that it covers all parts of the world and that it does not suffer a setback. They stressed the importance of the victories won by the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia and expressed the view that the problems of these countries must be solved by their own peoples without any external interference.

The two sides reviewed the Middle East situation and affirmed that the reason for the explosive situation in that area is the continued Israeli occupation of occupied Arab territories and Israel's refusal to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. They affirmed that the interests of world peace required the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on the Middle East and that Israel's acts of provocation against the Arab countries be checked.

The two sides again declared their conviction that a just and permanent peace in the Middle

⁸⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 27, 1975.

East can only be achieved through Israel's total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to establish their independent national entity.

The Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR will continue to make every effort to ensure that these goals are attained.

86

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran (excerpt)⁸⁸

Riyad, April 29, 1975

With a view to strengthening the friendly and fraternal relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and to reinforcing the Islamic solidarity promoted by the late King Faisal and His Majesty the Shahinshah Aryamehr, at the invitation of his brother, His Majesty King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty Aryamehr Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shahinshah of Iran, paid a visit to Saudi Arabia from Rabi al-Thani 17–18, 1395 AH (April 28–29, 1975 AD).

Their Majesties had talks that were marked by a spirit of friendship, frankness and full understanding, covering world affairs in general and the problems that concern the two countries and the Islamic world in particular. These talks disclosed complete agreement of point of view on all the problems discussed, the most important of which was the problem of establishing peace in the Middle East.

The two rulers affirmed that there can never be security, stability and permanent peace in the Middle East unless Israel withdraws from the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Arab people recover their usurped rights and exercise their right to self-determination.

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87

Address by Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen of Canada surveying Canada's attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict⁸⁹

Ottawa, April 30, 1975

I am pleased to join with my distinguished Parliamentary colleagues in greeting you tonight on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the State of Israel. As this is the first time I have had the opportunity in my present portfolio to be present at such an occasion, let me add that I attach the highest importance to Canada's relations with Israel. The Canadian people have always had and will always continue to have special ties of friendship and respect for the people of Israel. I look forward to visiting Israel myself before the end of the year at the invitation of the Foreign Minister of that country.

The last two years have seen important and far-reaching changes in the Middle East, changes which have carried with them new responsibilities for Canada. Indeed, in this relatively short period, our commercial, economic and financial ties with all the states of the area have grown rapidly. We have provided some 1,100 logistic and administrative personnel for the UN forces in the area, and are the single largest contributor to the UN's current peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East.

With Israel an established market, we witnessed last year yet another substantial increase in our two-way trade. Of the 1972 Export Development Corporation agreement with Israel, I understand that the full \$100 million has now been committed for projects involving thermal-electric power-stations, hotels and the Ben Gurion Airport.

I have mentioned peace-keeping. We are glad to make a contribution to this vital UN activity, not only because it is indispensable to the peace of the area but because it is in the Canadian interest to strengthen the capacity of the UN to help preserve international peace and security. We believe, nevertheless, that peacekeeping operations are a means to an end—a peaceful settlement of the dispute. If the forces can help to maintain or establish a climate in which substantive negotiations can begin, and if these are carried

⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), April 30, 1975.

⁸⁹ Made at a Canada/Israel Committee dinner; *Canada: State-ments and Speeches*, no. 75/12.

on in good faith, it is that much easier for Canada to justify its participation. In view of the present efforts by the parties concerned to seek alternative methods of negotiations following the failure to agree to further disengagement in the Sinai, this task of the UN forces takes on a crucial importance.

The Government has not attempted to assert any preconceived notions about what might constitute the details of an eventual peace agreement. The parties themselves must work these out through negotiations on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, which, in the Government's view, continues to constitute a valid framework upon which to base the negotiations required to achieve a just and equitable peace settlement. Canada has consistently refused to interpret this resolution or to draw implications from it that were not immediately apparent from the very wording of the resolution. To do otherwise would, I think, prejudice the shape of any potential settlement. We have insisted, however on the necessity for all the parties to negotiate their differences. We know this is very difficult when the security and sovereignty of states are at issue. But is there any feasible alternative to negotiations if a solution is to be found that will be acceptable to all peoples of the area?

The Government has fully supported all initiatives to this end, including Dr. Kissinger's efforts to achieve a further partial settlement between Israel and Egypt. We regret the breakdown of these efforts and trust that new elements may allow their resumption. I understand that there has been a call for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East. For my part, I would hope that an acceptable formula can be found which would allow for the participation at the conference of all interested parties. What seems to me important is to build upon the stated willingness of each side to seek paths towards peace. To this end, and depending on developments, a return to Geneva—assuming that adequate detailed preparations have been made—might assist in the process towards a final negotiated settlement of differences.

It is clear that, in the continuing efforts to achieve an eventual negotiated peace, the Palestinians must play a role. Indeed, the re-emergence of the Palestinian factor in the Middle East equation culminated, as you are all aware, in a major debate

at the last session of the UN General Assembly.⁹⁰ I made clear at that time Canada's position on the issue. I reiterated Canada's support for the right of the Palestinian people to be heard and to participate in negotiations concerning their future status. At the same time, however, I firmly maintained the Government's refusal to comment on the form Palestinian representation should take in any such future talks. I trust I made clear the Government's view that this must remain a question to be resolved by the parties concerned. The Palestinian issue is not one that can be settled separately, but must be placed in the context of the efforts to work towards an agreed and acceptable peace settlement to all parties concerned.

Against this backdrop of profound change in the Middle East over these last two years, Canada's longstanding commitment to Israel's right of survival as an independent state in the area remains firm. It follows from this, as well as from our adherence to all the principles embodied in Security Council Resolution 242, that we remain opposed to any attempt to challenge the right of Israel or the right of any other state in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threat and acts of force. Canada's earnest wish is to see all the peoples of the Middle East live out their lives in peace and security without constant fear of further war. A just and durable settlement of Arab-Israeli differences must be arrived at by the parties themselves through negotiations, and not by a resort to violence. Terrorist activities of the kind that occurred at the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv last month must only be condemned.

From what I have said tonight, I think it is apparent that, despite greatly altered circumstances, the fundamental principles of Canada's policy on the Middle East remain unchanged. While the Government is prepared to evaluate developments in a rapidly evolving situation in terms of their impact on the search for a peaceful settlement, it firmly maintains that such developments must not be allowed in any way to prejudice the continued existence of Israel. What is important for Canada now, as it has always been in the past, is that Israel and its neighbours continue the process towards a negotiated peace,

⁹⁰ For excerpts of the debate see docs. 9–18 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

freely arrived at and acceptable to all. No effort should be spared, and no opportunity missed, in pursuit of this objective, which when achieved, would allow Israel, free from present constraints, and, in a climate of independence and confidence, to concentrate on the task it has always set for itself—the promotion of the social, cultural and economic development of its people.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO⁹¹

Moscow, May 4, 1975

From April 28 through May 5 a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation headed by P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat was in the Soviet Union on a friendly visit.

During the P.L.O. delegation's talks with A.A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, and B.N. Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee,—talks which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere—opinions were exchanged on the Middle East situation and on prospects for resolving the problems of the Arab people of Palestine within the framework of efforts to achieve a lasting and just peace in the Near East. In this connection, questions pertaining to the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East were discussed.

Y. Arafat informed the Soviet side of the P.L.O. leadership's position on the Middle East question, on the solution to the Palestinian problem and on the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their national rights.

The Soviet side affirmed its principled position in support of the Arab people's struggle for the return of all Arab land occupied by Israel in 1967 and for the realization of the legitimate national

rights of the Arab people of Palestine, up to and including the creation of their own national state.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the justice of the demands of the Arab people of Palestine for respect of their national rights is receiving increasing international recognition; the decisions of the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly are one example of this recognition. They expressed the firm opinion that without a solution to the Palestinian problem that corresponds to the interests of the Arab people of Palestine there can be no peace and tranquillity in the Near East. In this regard, the parties emphasized the importance of participation by representatives of the Arab people of Palestine on an equal basis with other interested parties in efforts—including the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East—to reach a Middle East settlement.

The participants in the meeting underscored the special importance in present-day conditions of coordinated efforts by Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the struggle for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and against any kind of bilateral separate deals divorced from a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization and all the Arab people of Palestine, Y. Arafat expressed gratitude for the Soviet Union's firm, consistent position in support of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and of all Arab peoples in their struggle to eliminate the effects of Israeli aggression.

During its stay in the Soviet Union, the P.L.O. delegation met and spoke with representatives of Soviet society in the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Members of the delegation attended the workers' May Day parade in Red Square. The delegation also visited Baku, the capital of the Azerbaidzhan Republic, where it met with Party and state leaders and with representatives of the republic's workers.

Both sides feel that the visit to the Soviet Union by Y. Arafat, P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman, and his delegation, as well as the meetings and talks held in Moscow, made a new useful contribution to the cause of expanding and strengthening friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab people of Palestine.

⁹¹ *Pravda* (Moscow), May 5, 1975, p. 5; English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), XXVII, 18 (May 28, 1975), pp. 17–18; translation copyright 1975 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

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Communiqué issued at the conclusion of a meeting of the heads of government of the Commonwealth (excerpt)⁹²

Kingston, May 6, 1975

Heads of government expressed concern at the renewed danger of conflict in the Middle East. They re-emphasized the need for the establishment of a durable peace in the area as a matter of urgency, and urged all parties to renew their efforts to achieve this objective. To this end heads of government affirmed their support for the relevant United Nations resolutions on the Middle East and their belief that to ensure success it was necessary that the authentic and legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people participate in the forthcoming peace negotiations in Geneva.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister van der Stoep of the Netherlands outlining his attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and relations with Egypt⁹³

Cairo, May 10, 1975

Q. Holland used to stand by Israel and did not sympathize with us. We are faced with a problem of aggression, the occupation of territory, the expulsion of a people, and in his speech in your presence Ismail Fahmi made it clear that those who hesitate to condemn aggression are not serving peace.

A. There is nothing wrong in our maintaining good relations with Israel as well as with the Arab

countries. This does not mean that we support one side rather than the other. We want our policy in this conflict to be balanced, not biased.

We have many times made it clear that we cannot accept the acquisition of territory by force, and it is not reasonable that we should support the occupation of territories by invasion, this is in our own interest. We have said this many times and I have also said that we want solutions to all the problems, which we define as follows:

1. The forcible occupation of territories must come to an end;
2. The right of every state to live in peace within secure frontiers;
3. Finding a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people.

Q. Then why did you take that attitude at the United Nations, where your stand was the weakest in the community of the European Common Market countries at the voting, when your attitude was less positive than that of West Germany, Italy and France?

A. We do not regard the problem of the Palestinians as a problem of refugees but as a political problem. I have said many times and in the Common Market statement issued on November 6 that these countries should participate in finding the way to attain this goal.⁹⁴ I cannot understand why Holland is always singled out. Her attitude is:

1. That Europe must share in solving the Middle East problem that has been going on for so long and that European security can only be ensured if this problem is solved;

2. She is in favour of the Geneva conference being expanded to include England and France in such a way as to allow Europe to play a role in guaranteeing and implementing such agreement as may be reached on the Middle East problem. The Copenhagen conference held in December, 1973, spelled out the need and the importance of Europe participating in guarantees of peace.⁹⁵

Q. Do you agree to the Palestine Liberation Organization opening an office in Holland?

A. I state frankly that the Palestinians must have a part in any solution of the Middle East problem. We recognize that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the largest, most important

⁹² Excerpted from the text as published in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), June 30-July 6, 1975, p. 27207. The Commonwealth meeting took place April 29-May 6 with the participation of Australia, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Western Samoa and Zambia.

⁹³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Hamdi Fuad, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 11, 1975.

⁹⁴ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁹⁵ Doc. 212 in *ibid*.

and strongest Palestinian organization representing the Palestinians, but we do not intend to make contact with it at present.

Q. Why have our relations been governed by misunderstanding in the past?

A. The President [Sadat] stated that this meeting will help to remove the causes of misunderstanding and I for my part shall strive to achieve this. During my meeting with the President and with Mr. Ismail Fahmi I dealt with everything, and in particular bilateral relations. The President was good enough to analyse the situation in the Middle East since the failure of Dr. Kissinger's mission and I expressed my regret at that failure and stressed the need to find a way to renew contacts. The President also spoke of the forthcoming meeting in Salzburg with President Ford.⁹⁶ It is difficult to foresee what this meeting will lead to, but I express the hope that it will help to reactivate the situation.

As regards our relations: today, Saturday, we shall sign several agreements for cooperation in the economic, technical and cultural fields, which will be a prelude to stronger relations, so that, as the President said, we may turn over a new leaf in our relations.

I have invited Mr. Ismail Fahmi to visit us, and we shall raise the level of visits in the hope that President Sadat may visit our country.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Foreign Minister van der Stoep of the Netherlands (excerpts)⁹⁷

Cairo, May 11, 1975

At the invitation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Mr. Ismail Fahmi, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Max van der Stoep, paid a visit to Egypt May 7–11, 1975.

As regards the situation in the Middle East, the

Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs put forward his government's view which is based on the complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), of resolution 338 and of later resolutions of the Security Council; this attitude is manifested in the declaration of the governments of the European Communities of November 6, 1973.⁹⁸

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Statement by Defence Minister Peres of Israel expressing concern over recent military redeployment by Jordan along the River Jordan⁹⁹

Moshav Patsa'el, West Bank, May 13, 1975

We are definitely worried by several unclear moves, both in Jordan's policy and in the Jordanian Army's movements. There is an atypical Jordanian deployment of forces: it is in fact a move closer to the Israeli border. The aim has not yet been interpreted but the change is evident—in the terrain as well as in the deployment of the Army. Also, the latest flirting between Syria and Jordan does not mean that Syria is moving in Jordan's direction, but the reverse, that Jordan is moving in the Syrian direction, and I think we are lucky that the Jordanians are not here, otherwise they would probably have advanced their forces towards Jerusalem. Today they can only move them closer to the Jordan river.

⁹⁶ See doc. 112 below.

⁹⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Dutch text, *Jaarboek van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1974–75* (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1975), p. 110 B.

⁹⁸ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁹⁹ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4904/A/1; reprinted by permission. Moshav Patsa'el had just been established near the Arab hamlet of Fassal (Fasayil) between Jericho and the Damia Bridge in occupied territory.

Press conference statements by Foreign Ministers Khaddam of Syria and Genscher of West Germany outlining their disagreements over the EEC-Israel trade agreement¹⁰⁰

Bonn, May 13, 1975

Khaddam: I was very pleased to hear the foreign minister of the Federal Republic talk about the German position in the Middle East conflict, a position which is documented in the EEC declaration of November 6, 1973.¹⁰¹ We regard this position as positive and constructive.

Nevertheless, we believe that the principles underlying this declaration should be concretized. This is especially so because Israel is acting daily in clear contradiction to it.

Furthermore we discussed in detail the prospects of the Euro-Arab dialogue. We spoke of the increasing interdependence between the Arab nation and the states of Europe. We must make great efforts in order to have a fruitful development of this dialogue. I stress this especially, because lately certain positions have been taken which have not left positive impressions in the Arab countries. In this context I only want to refer to the EEC-Israel trade agreement.¹⁰² I do not regard the timing of this accord as favourable and I believe that it only can lead to an increase in the stubbornness and inflexibility of the attitude of Israeli leadership.

I have, however, listened carefully to the position of the Federal Government with regard to this question and I hope it will lead Europe to correcting this step.

Q. Can you specify what you regard as a European correction of the EEC-Israel agreement?

Khaddam: This agreement was signed at a time when the Arab states had asked Europe to take a constructive position vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict in order to support the efforts for a just

peace. I believe that this agreement gives to Israel very many preferences at the expense of the occupied Arab states. By correction I mean either a suspension of the accord or taking measures in order to neutralize the damages caused by this agreement.

Q. How do you, Mr. Genscher, regard this request to suspend or neutralize the agreement?

Genscher: I have presented to the foreign minister the motives of the Federal Government which caused it to support this accord with Israel. They correspond to our evenhanded, balanced Middle East policy. Not only are we now at the point of concluding a similar agreement with the North African states, but we also support within the Community the idea that the Commission of the EEC as soon as possible receive a mandate to negotiate with four other states (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt). This means for us evenhandedness, and I believe that the second alternative mentioned by the Syrian foreign minister will correspond to this policy; namely, that we not only conclude preferential trade agreements with one side in the Eastern Mediterranean but with the other side as well.

Statement by USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko calling for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and a Middle East settlement at the Geneva conference¹⁰³

Moscow, May 14, 1975

The socialist countries are coming out firmly for a lasting and just peace in the Middle East, so that all countries in the area may benefit from it. Israel, too, may obtain sufficient guarantees of its security interests if it genuinely wishes to obtain them, but that is only possible along the road of peace with the Arabs and not of hostility and clashes with them.

¹⁰⁰ Excerpted and translated from the German text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy, Beirut.

¹⁰¹ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁰² The EEC-Israel trade agreement was signed on May 11, 1975; see also doc. 104 below.

¹⁰³ Made in a speech at the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact; excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5786 (May 20, 1975), p. 180.

To that end Israel's policy-makers should do just one thing: Israel must abandon its plans to appropriate the territories of other countries seized by force and must recognise the right of the Palestinian Arab people to set up their state. The success of the settlement and the security of Israel would depend on what lies at the basis of its policy—ambitions of territorial aggrandisement or peace.

From time to time one sees a return in Israel and certain western capitals to the idea of separate deals on the withdrawal of the occupiers from particular pieces of captured Arab territory divorced from a solution of the problem as a whole. But these ideas are obviously, and needless to say, erroneously, based on the assumption that the Arab peoples would suddenly forget their just demands.

The adherents of such tactics in certain capitals extol this policy, describing it with the phrase "step-by-step settlement," which is clearly a misnomer. In fact, in all fairness, it should be called the tactic of "step-by-step further away from settlement."

There is, after all, special machinery called upon to work for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. This is the Geneva Peace Conference and the Soviet Union, as one of its co-chairmen, proposes to resume its work. Needless to say, we have in mind serious preparation for the conference and a serious approach to its task, although we are not yet sure that all the participants in the conference have the same aim.

We can express satisfaction over the fact that the policy of the Warsaw Treaty states on the Middle East is meeting with understanding and broad international support.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Libya of Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR (excerpt)¹⁰⁴

Tripoli, May 15, 1975

A.N. Kosygin, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was on an

official visit in the Libyan Arab Republic at the invitation of the Member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic, Major Abdel Salam Jalloud, from May 12 to May 15, 1975 (from 30 rabi'a at-tani to 3 djumada al-awwal, 1395 hijra).

The two Sides exchanged views on questions of the present international situation. They paid special attention to the explosive position in the Middle East. The two Sides strongly condemn the continued Israeli-Zionist aggression and declare that it presents a grave threat to peace and international security. They confirm that genuine peace in that area can be achieved only on condition of the complete vacation of all Arab territories occupied by the aggressor and the ensuring of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of a national state of their own. The two Sides declare their support and assistance for the struggle of the people of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization. They affirm once again that the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine is part and parcel of the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

The Sides expressed their firm belief that Arab unity was necessary to realize the aspirations of the Arab peoples fighting for the elimination of colonialism and Zionism in the Middle East and to further the Arab peoples' economic, social and cultural progress, and that Arab unity would be a contribution to the cause of peace.

The Sides took special note of the importance of Arab-Soviet friendship and the Arabs' friendship with the community of socialist nations. They appeal for strengthening and deepening it on the foundations of mutual respect and will work for strengthening this friendship in all spheres, regarding it as one of the major factors contributing to the success of the liberation struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

The Soviet Side voiced its unshakable determination to continue giving all-round support to the Arab peoples fighting for greater national independence, for economic and social progress.

The Sides stand for dismantling foreign military bases in the Mediterranean to make it an

¹⁰⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 21 (May 24, 1975), pp. 2, 3-4.

area of peace, which would accord with the interests of peoples in the region and the interests of international cooperation. It was pointed out that the continuing Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and NATO's subversive activities were the main cause behind tensions in the Mediterranean. The elimination of these factors would make an important contribution to the relaxation of international tension.

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Press interview statements by US Secretary of Defence Schlesinger discussing actual and potential US military involvement in the Middle East¹⁰⁵

Washington, mid-May, 1975

Q. Turning to the Middle East: Have the dangers of war in this area receded?

A. Not notably. There have been periods of greater immediate tension than the present one, but I would not say that generally the prospects of war have receded. I do think that all parties in the Middle East recognize the advantages of avoiding a new conflagration.

Q. Do the Israelis have the equipment they need to withstand another Arab attack?

A. At the present moment, the military balance is far more favorable from Israel's standpoint than it was in October, 1973.

Q. Would the U.S. be able to resupply the Israelis fast enough in event of war, despite the possible loss of plane-refueling stations such as the Azores?

A. Yes. Assuming there is a policy decision to do it and Congress votes the funds, we are capable of starting to deliver supplies into Israel about 36 hours after an order is given by the President.

Q. In view of congressional caution after Vietnam, what are the prospects of continued help for Israel?

A. The historical attitudes of Congress toward

requests for Vietnam and Israel are as different as night and day. Congress has shown signs of approving any requests made by the Administration—and, in fact, some propensity to augment requests of some Administrations—for aid to Israel.

Q. If another Mideast war breaks out, is there anything the U.S. could do about another Arab oil embargo?

A. The United States could, of course, take action in response to a hypothetical embargo. And I think that we are less likely to be tolerant of a renewed embargo than we were of the initial one in 1973.

Q. What do you mean by "less tolerant"?

A. That implies that we might not remain entirely passive to the imposition of such an embargo. I'm not going to indicate any prospective reaction other than to point out there are economic, political or conceivably military measures in response.

Q. With reopening of the Suez Canal, do you expect a major Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean?

A. I would expect that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean will expand. Reopening of the Canal reduces their lines of communication by something like 6,500 miles, and that would undoubtedly have some effect.

The Soviets are building a major facility at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden—so expensive a facility that it's obviously not intended purely for show purposes or designed to provide a demonstration project for the Somalis.

Q. What sort of installation is it?

A. It consists of port facilities, an expanded airstrip. They are constructing barracks. They are building a rework facility for either air-to-surface missiles or surface-to-surface missiles. That kind of expansion suggests that they are more than interested in their military power astride the lifeline of the industrialized world to the Persian Gulf. I don't think there's any other reading.

Q. How will the United States respond?

A. We will have to maintain a military balance and be prepared to offset any expansion of Soviet military or naval capacity in the Persian Gulf area.

We still have our request for expansion of our communications facility at Diego García. We would plan to enlarge that facility, increase the

¹⁰⁵ Excerpted from the text of the interview, *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington), May 26, 1975, pp. 26–27; copyright 1975 U.S. News and World Report Inc.

size of the airstrip, provide berthing facilities to the extent necessary.

Q. Then the U.S. is still determined to keep a strong force in the Mideast—

A. I think that the United States has got to hold the ring in the Middle East. There's just nobody else who can stand up to the Soviet Union. Some Americans want to go off in a sulk for five years. But if we do, we'll wake up some bright day and discover that the Soviets have achieved paramount power in the Eastern Hemisphere. We just are not in a position to indulge in that luxury.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Tunisia of Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR (excerpts)¹⁰⁶

Tunis, May 17, 1975

Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, paid an official visit to Tunisia from May 15 to 17, 1975, at the invitation of President of the Tunisian Republic Habib Bourguiba.

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Special attention was devoted to examining the situation in the Middle East. It was noted that the situation in this region continues to be complicated and explosive through the fault of Israel, which carries on the policy of aggression, occupies Arab lands and violates the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Soviet Union and the Tunisian Republic declare that a just and stable peace in the Middle East can be established only on the condition of the complete liberation of all occupied Arab territories and the satisfaction of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own national state. They urge the need for the speediest settlement of the Middle East crisis on the basis of the full implementation of the well-known decisions of the Security Council

and the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union and the Tunisian Republic intend to further exert all their efforts in this direction.

The two Sides consider it very desirable to resume the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East in the shortest possible time; it should be thoroughly prepared and include all the sides concerned, among them representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing with other conference participants. In this respect they proceed from the fact that any partial measures should be a component and integral part of a general settlement.

The Tunisian Republic values high the assistance and support rendered by the Soviet Union to the just cause of the Arabs. The Tunisian Side noted the importance of the Arab peoples' cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community for ensuring success in the struggle against Israeli aggression and the complete restoration of the Arabs' legitimate rights usurped by the Israeli aggressor.

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98

Resolution of the World Peace Council on the Middle East crisis¹⁰⁷

East Berlin, May 20, 1975

The World Peace Council expresses great concern regarding the situation in the Middle East, which continues to represent a grave threat to world peace. Those responsible for this situation are the war-mongering Israeli ruling circles who, supported by Zionism and the most aggressive elements of US imperialism, are manoeuvring to oppose all efforts in favour of peace on the part of the forces of peace and progress the world over, are refusing the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and persist in refusing to recognise the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

They are the same people who are obstructing the holding of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, in which all interested parties should participate, the task of this conference being to reach a just settlement of the Middle East crisis.

¹⁰⁶ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 21 (May 24, 1975), pp. 5, 6.

¹⁰⁷ English text as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VII, 7 (July, 1975), pp. 61–65.

Imperialist and Zionist circles are conspiring in order to impose partial solutions and to avoid a global settlement of the problem which would be in accordance with the UN decisions on the Middle East.

Moreover, they are continuing to intensify their threats and their acts of aggression. The provocative statements made by the Israeli President, to the effect that Israel could possess the atomic bomb and use it against the Arab countries, are a serious threat to peace and have aroused general indignation.

If we do not block these pretensions of the Israeli rulers, there will be a risk of the region becoming the scene of an atomic arms race. These pretensions are a challenge to the world-wide efforts being made for disarmament and the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The Israeli authorities are continuing to follow their savage policy of repression against the Palestinian population in the occupied Arab territories and their response to the legitimate claim of these people for the implementation of the resolution of the recent UN General Assembly on the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine is violence, butchery and expulsion. There is a daily recurrence of their murderous raids on the Palestinian camps and on the innocent inhabitants of southern Lebanon, thereby completely flouting international standards and laws.

The WPC welcomes the decisions and the stand taken by governments, political forces, national and international organisations and movements directly linking the Palestinian issue to the settlement of the Middle East crisis as a whole.

The World Peace Council wants to underline the historic importance and great significance of the decision taken by the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly, dated 22nd November, 1974, concerning the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The WPC also underlines the importance of the decision of the same session, according to which the Palestine Liberation Organisation will become a permanent observer at the UN.

The WPC considers that these two resolutions of the General Assembly, which refer to the Arab people of Palestine, represent a great contribution to the efforts being made to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They have dealt a serious blow to the aggressive policy of Israel,

and to Zionism and imperialism which support it.

The WPC welcomed with great satisfaction the decisions of the Arab Summit in Rabat,¹⁰⁸ which contributed to strengthening unity of action by the Arab countries for a just peace in the Middle East and recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Arab people of Palestine, and the decision concerning the establishment of a national Palestinian authority under the leadership of the PLO in the territories which will be liberated through the withdrawal of Israeli troops, in accordance with the UN resolutions.

In order to foil the manoeuvres of Israeli aggressive circles and to promote the cause of peace in the Middle East, the WPC calls for strengthening the mobilisation of international public opinion so that it will take vigorous and rapid action in all possible ways for:

- the holding of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East with the least possible delay and with the participation of all interested parties, particularly the PLO, on the basis of equal rights for the implementation of the Security Council resolutions; for the total withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories and the implementation of the most recent decision of the United Nations concerning the rights of the Arab people of Palestine with a view to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region; the denunciation and condemnation of all attempts which aim at creating obstacles to the Geneva Conference or aim at substituting partial solutions;

- full support to the struggle and uprising of the Palestinian popular masses in the occupied territories and for broad solidarity actions; an immediate end to barbarous acts of repression which are being carried out by the Israeli authorities against the population of the occupied Arab territories and the barbarous raids against the civilian population of Lebanon; support for the democratic forces in Israel who are courageously opposing the aggression and occupation;

- the vigorous condemnation of the open threats of Israeli aggression, particularly those uttered recently against the Syrian Arab Republic and against its progressive regime and anti-imperialist stand; a massive riposte by all peace-loving forces to the provocative statements of the Israeli

¹⁰⁸ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

leaders, concerning their possible possession of the atomic bomb.

The dangers of the situation in the Middle East are not limited to Israeli aggression. Although this is the fundamental cause of the Middle East crisis and its most obvious and most violent manifestation, imperialism and particularly the most aggressive elements in the United States, have been recently intensifying their efforts with a view to creating areas of tension in all regions, notably the Gulf, in collusion with reactionary forces. They are strengthening their bases and stepping up their large-scale military "assistance", plotting against the liberation movements and against the progressive regimes with a view to holding back and breaking their forward thrust, in order to protect the oil interests. The threats uttered by the US Government to occupy the oil fields in the Gulf area are an illustration of this policy of aggression, constitute another threat to peace in the region and in the world, and demand increased vigilance on the part of international public opinion.

The World Peace Council highly appreciates the untiring efforts of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the assistance which the USSR particularly is giving, notably to the Arab people of Palestine. The WPC considers that the forthcoming visit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, to certain Arab countries at the invitation of Arab leaders, will be an immense contribution to the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

Very great progress has been made in unity of action of the forces of peace and independence, both in the Arab world and in the rest of the world, where the settlement of the Middle East crisis and of the Palestinian problem are concerned. The WPC warmly greets this increase in unity of action and calls for the intensification of concerted joint efforts of these forces in favour of a just peace in the Middle East.

The great victories which have been won by the peace forces throughout the world during recent years give rise to an unshakable faith in the power of these forces to force the Israeli aggressors and the imperialist and Zionist forces which support them, to withdraw from all occupied

Arab territories, to restore all the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and to quench the fire of war in that region by establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

99

Joint communiqué issued after a meeting between US Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR¹⁰⁹

Vienna, May 20, 1975

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on May 19–20, 1975, in Vienna between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A.A. Gromyko.

The two sides were unanimous in emphasizing their determination to continue to adhere firmly to the course of further improving and developing U.S.-Soviet relations in the interests of the peoples of both countries and of strengthening peace.

An exchange of views took place on bilateral relations including those pertaining to a further limitation of strategic offensive arms. Also discussed were a number of international problems of mutual interest—the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its speedy conclusion; the situation with regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference; and other matters. In these discussions both sides proceeded from the agreements and understandings reached as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings held in Moscow, Washington and Vladivostok.¹¹⁰

The conversations which proceeded in a constructive spirit were, in the opinion of both sides, useful.

¹⁰⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1877 (June 16, 1975), pp. 810–811.

¹¹⁰ Docs. 88 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*, 102 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and 182 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

100

Letter from 76 US Senators to President Ford urging renewed US support for a strong Israel¹¹¹

Washington, May 21, 1975

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

You will recall that last December a substantial majority of the Senate wrote you urging a reiteration of our nation's long-standing commitment to Israel's security "by a policy of continued military supplies and diplomatic and economic support".¹¹²

Since 1967, it has been American policy that the Arab-Israel conflict should be settled on the basis of secure and recognized boundaries that are defensible, and direct negotiations between the

nations involved. We believe that this approach continues to offer the best hope for a just and lasting peace.

While the suspension of the second-stage negotiations is regrettable, the history of the Arab-Israel conflict demonstrates that any Israeli withdrawal must be accompanied by meaningful steps toward peace by its Arab neighbors.

Recent events underscore America's need for reliable allies and the desirability of greater participation by the Congress in the formulation of American foreign policy. Cooperation between the Congress and the President is essential for America's effectiveness in the world. During this time of uncertainty over the future direction of our policy, we support you in strengthening our ties with nations which share our democratic traditions and help to safeguard our national interests. We believe that the special relationship between our country and Israel does not prejudice improved relations with other nations in the region.

We believe that a strong Israel constitutes a most reliable barrier to domination of the area by outside parties. Given the recent heavy flow of Soviet weaponry to Arab states, it is imperative that we not permit the military balance to shift against Israel.

We believe that preserving the peace requires that Israel obtain a level of military and economic support adequate to deter a renewal of war by Israel's neighbors. Withholding military equipment from Israel would be dangerous, discouraging accommodation by Israel's neighbors and encouraging a resort to force.

Within the next several weeks, the Congress expects to receive your foreign aid requests for fiscal year 1976. We trust that your recommendations will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs. We urge you to make it clear, as we do, that the United States acting in its own national interests stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations, and that this premise is the basis of the current reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Respectfully yours,

¹¹¹ Text as inserted by Sen. McGovern (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), May 22, 1975, p. S 8933. The signatories were, according to *Near East Report* (Washington), XIX, 22 (May 28, 1975), p. 9, the following:

James B. Allen (D-Ala.), Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R-Md.), Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), Bill Brock (R-Tenn.), Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.), James L. Buckley (C-N.Y.), Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.), Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), Frank Church (D-Idaho), Dick Clark (D-Iowa), Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), John C. Culver (D-Iowa), Robert Dole (R-Kans.), Pete V. Domenici (R-N.Mex.), Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.), Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii), Wendell H. Ford (D-Ky.), Jake Garn (R-Utah), John Glenn (D-Ohio), Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), Gary W. Hart (D-Colo.), Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), Vance Hartke (D-Ind.), Floyd K. Haskell (D-Colo.), William D. Hathaway (D-Me.), Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.), Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (D-La.).

Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.), Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.), Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.), George McGovern (D-S.Dak.), Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.), Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), Joseph M. Montoya (D-N.Mex.), Robert Morgan (D-N.C.), Frank E. Moss (D-Utah), Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.), Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), James B. Pearson (R-Kans.), Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.), Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), William V. Roth, Jr. (R-Del.), Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), Robert T. Stafford (R-Vt.), Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Adlai E. Stevenson, III (D-Ill.), Richard Stone (D-Fla.), Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio), Herman E. Talmadge (D-Ga.), Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), John Tower (R-Tex.), John V. Tunney (D-Calif.), Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-Conn.), Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-N.J.).

¹¹² Doc. 193 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

101

Statement by US Senator McGovern (Dem.) explaining his signing of a letter from Senators to President Ford calling for support for Israel¹¹³

Washington, May 22, 1975

Mr. President, I have signed a letter, along with three-fourths of my Senate colleagues, urging continued U.S. support for Israel. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, I want to make clear what my signature means and what it does not mean.

It means that I believe continued U.S. support for Israel is in both our interest and Israel's.

But it does not mean that I accept as either defensible or justifiable the present occupation of Arab territories held by Israel since 1967.

Israel's right to exist as a permanent independent state must be recognized by both the Arabian governments and by the PLO or whichever group ultimately speaks for the Palestinians.

But in return for that agreement of recognition, Israel must agree to return the occupied territories and must accept Palestinian self-determination, including the right to a political entity of their own.

It would be folly for Israel to assume that American support means approval of the existing boundaries in the Middle East. The present boundaries are not defensible; they are a virtual assurance of continued conflict. And the nonrecognition of Palestinian rights by Israel would be as dangerous to peace as Palestinian nonrecognition of Israel.

So let us support Israel's right to security and independence. But let us recognize that present arrangements in the Middle East mean more war and that only a reasonable compromise on both sides can produce the peace settlement that is in the vital interest of Israel, Arabian, and American interests.

The true friends of Israel will offer her the continuing hand of friendship and support. But they will also make clear that Israel cannot survive and flourish in a world of 100 million Arabs, including 3 million Palestinians unless the issues of recognition, boundaries, and Palestinian rights are

quickly resolved. The step-by-step approach to Middle East peace failed because the various parties had not agreed on the basic outline of a final settlement toward which they could proceed step by step.

Geneva may be the last opportunity for peace before the dogs of war go mad. If either side should launch a new war in the name of "prevention," the United States should repudiate that action with appropriate force.

It is in our interest to back Israel's independence and continued freedom; it is not in our interest nor in Israel's to back an occupation which if continued will spell doom for Israel and possibly for millions of others.

I have recently returned from a 3-week study tour of the Middle East. In a few days, a carefully prepared report of my findings and recommendations on the Middle East will be issued by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

I am very hopeful that that report, which involves a considerable amount of study, thought, and investigation, will be carefully read both by Members of Congress and by our policymakers in the executive branch.

102

Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of CENTO (excerpts)¹¹⁴

Ankara, May 23, 1975

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held its 22nd Session in Ankara on May 22-23, 1975.

The delegations were led by:

Iran	H.E. Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Pakistan	H.E. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs;
Turkey	H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglay- angil, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
United Kingdom	The Rt. Hon. Roy Hattersley, M.P. Minister of State, For- eign and Commonwealth Of- fice;

¹¹³ Statement made to the Senate, *Congressional Record* (daily), May 22, 1975, p. S 8933. The letter is doc. 100 above.

¹¹⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1877 (June 16, 1975), pp. 818, 819.

United States The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State.

Having reviewed the situation in the Middle East, the Ministers agreed that the prolonged conflict in the area continued to constitute a grave threat to world peace and emphasized the urgent need for the establishment of a just, honourable and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22, 1967 and 338 of October 22, 1973.

103

Statement by Foreign Minister Frydenlund of Norway surveying the Middle East situation and outlining Norway's attitude to it¹¹⁵

Oslo, May 23, 1975

The other protracted conflict—the Middle East—appears as deadlocked as before. However, it also seems clear that this situation cannot last much longer. If there is no progress through negotiation, the situation will become very serious in the foreseeable future.

This was made clear to me during the visits I recently had cause to make to the Middle East—in Cairo this was particularly clear.¹¹⁶

The main impression in the conversations was that both sides desire and need peace. Four wars in a period of 27 years and the maintenance of a high state of military preparedness throughout this period has become an unacceptable burden to the parties and an obstacle to their further economic and social development. In this common desire for peace and for a political solution to the conflict lies a common basis which is a ray of light in an otherwise difficult situation.

But from the common desire for a lasting peace the way forward to a peace settlement will be

both long and hazardous. The parties stand far apart. This goes for so basic a question as what kind of peace to aim for—absence of war or normalization and cooperation. It goes for the question of borders. Egypt wants the lost territories back *in toto*. Israel is equally stubborn on the demand for defensible borders. The situation of the Palestinians is a third unresolved question. This question can perhaps be pushed aside to begin with, but it will reappear and demand a solution at the next stage. The distance between the parties' attitudes to these questions is so great that it is hardly realistic to believe that a final settlement can be achieved in one set of negotiations.

Much therefore suggests that the way forward lies through interim solutions which can be carried out over a period of time and form the basis for increased confidence between the parties. A condition for such a strategy leading to progress is, however, that it takes place according to a timetable the last step of which is a conclusive peace. Isolated partial solutions outside such a framework are regarded with suspicion by both parties, as they feel they must make concessions without getting nearer to the ultimate goal. Emotions and psychological attitudes play a dominating part in this conflict.

How to achieve such a framework seems unclear at the moment. It is probable that the Geneva conference may be convened soon but all parties appear receptive to any new initiative before then. There is intense diplomatic activity to explore the possibilities of a new initiative. We have had the meeting between the American and the Soviet foreign ministers.¹¹⁷ Together with the meetings between Presidents Ford and Sadat in Salzburg on June 1¹¹⁸ and between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford on June 12 this gives some reason for hoping that negotiations may soon recommence in a new Geneva conference or in some other way. It is difficult to imagine a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict without the involvement of the superpowers.

During my visits to Cairo and Jerusalem I also had occasion to present the Norwegian government's view of the Middle East conflict. This view is, as you know, based on an impartial stand and the three principles that conquest of

¹¹⁵ Made in a foreign policy speech to parliament; excerpted and translated from the Norwegian text, *UD-informasjon* (Oslo), no. 27 (May 26, 1975), pp. 3–6.

¹¹⁶ Foreign Minister Frydenlund visited Egypt May 4–6, 1975, and Israel May 18–21, 1975.

¹¹⁷ Doc. 99 above.

¹¹⁸ Doc. 112 below.

land by force is unacceptable, that secure and recognized borders must be found for all states in the region, and that a just solution must be found for the Palestinians. This view was understood and accepted by both parties.

In Israel anxiety was expressed concerning what they regard as attempts to prevent the country from participating in the international community as a full and equal member.

The view of the Norwegian government is unequivocal. We regard it as an essential principle in international cooperation that all states must be represented on an equal footing. Therefore we shall oppose attempts to expel Israel from international organizations.

104

Statement by Foreign Minister FitzGerald of Ireland to the Arab League declaring that the EEC-Israel economic agreement does not apply to the occupied territories¹¹⁹

May 24, 1975

The Declaration of 6 November 1973¹²⁰ remains the policy of the Nine Member States of the European Community with regard to the situation in the Middle East and is in no way affected by the agreement between the E.E.C. and Israel signed on 11 May 1975.

This agreement is intended to replace the previous agreement of 1970, which itself replaced an earlier agreement of 1964. The area of application of the new agreement in relation to Israel is exactly the same as that covered by the earlier agreements viz. the State of Israel, and it does not include any of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.¹²¹

The new agreement does not open any possibility either at present or for the future that it could

¹¹⁹ Text supplied, on request, by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ireland; Garret FitzGerald made the statement in the capacity of Chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers.

¹²⁰ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹²¹ Article 29 of the agreement says:

The Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community applies under the conditions laid down in that Treaty and, on the other, to the State of Israel." *Official Journal of European Communities* (Brussels), vol. 18, no. L 136 (May 28, 1975), p. 8.

be applied to the occupied territories. There is, for example, no possibility that industrial cooperation between the E.E.C. and Israel could be extended to include the occupied territories.

105

Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing President Ford's forthcoming meeting with President Sadat of Egypt and the current US reassessment of Middle East policy¹²²

Washington, May 24, 1975

Kissinger: Let me say a word about the meeting with President Sadat.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, as indeed we have not been permitted to forget, we are engaged in a reassessment of American policy in the Middle East.

This is an effort that is not directed against any country or on behalf of any country. It was made necessary by the suspension of shuttle diplomacy and of the last attempt to achieve an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. In the new circumstances that that fact created, with a high probability of the Geneva Conference being reconvened, it has been imperative for the United States to assess its policy in the light of these new conditions.

This process is going on, and in this process, personal meetings between the President and various of the leaders of the area play an essential role.

We intend to discuss with President Sadat, as we shall do later with Prime Minister Rabin, our conception of the alternative routes toward peace as they present themselves to us.

We will be eager to hear President Sadat's view as to what he considers the most effective means of promoting peace in the Middle East.

After we have completed these discussions, one of two things is likely to happen. Either it will appear that the view of the two parties about method and perhaps about substance is sufficiently close so that negotiations can be encouraged, or it will appear that they are still so far apart that

¹²² Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1877 (June 16, 1975), pp. 801, 802, 805-808.

it may be necessary for the United States to suggest a procedure or a way to proceed.

In either event, the President has repeatedly stated that the United States believes that a stalemate in the Middle East cannot lead to anything other than a catastrophe for all of the parties concerned, and the United States is determined that diplomatic progress be resumed. The principal purpose of the reassessment is to devise means and to explore approaches that might facilitate this progress.

This, then, is the basic purpose of the President's trip. It is part of a foreign policy which, whatever recent disappointments, is based on the proposition that a major American role is essential to maintain the peace and to promote progress in the world. And the United States will play this role both in a general sense and in a particular sense in certain regions.

This is the attitude with which the President is undertaking this trip, and he is hopeful that it will contribute to the objectives that I have outlined here.

Now, if you agree, let us take the questions in the sequence that we suggested—first about the trip, the West European part of the trip, then about the Middle East part of the trip, and then any general questions that you might have.

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Now, to the Middle East. The question, as I understood it, was whether reassessment has developed a life of its own and whether it is not conceived or intended as a pressure upon Israel.

Well, as I have said before, my friend Abba Eban used to say that Israel considers objectivity a hundred percent support of its position.

We did not intend this assessment either as pressure or as support for any party. It was made inevitable by the suspension of the negotiations and by the potential collapse of the interim approach. With Geneva becoming a probable outcome, it was imperative for the United States to consider procedures and substance—all the more so as it is the view of the Administration, which we have certainly not kept secret for years, that progress toward peace in the Middle East is in the interest of the parties concerned, in the interest of the West, and in the interest of the United States.

As such, it is not directed against any country. It is not intended as a pressure upon any country. It is as objective a look as we can get from our

best conception of the American and world interest in this matter, of what is required to promote peace, and of course the United States has been committed to the existence of Israel as part of such a just peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as I understood you, you said the United States will be willing to put forward new proposals if neither of the principals came up with their own proposals for establishing progress.

A. At least as to procedures.

Q. Well, that was part of the question, actually. Do you mean to suggest that the United States will produce proposals in terms of its bilateral or multilateral relationships with the parties themselves or for Geneva, or in what context?

A. That depends on which route is chosen. It will be impossible for the United States to be at Geneva without expressing some view on the subject at some time.

Q. What are the chances of your renewing shuttle diplomacy, then?

A. We cannot judge which method will be most appropriate until the President has had an opportunity to talk to some of the parties principally involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the letter from the Senators¹²³ giving the broad-base support for Israel have any effect on your dealings with President Sadat or Prime Minister Rabin?

A. We will take seriously expressions from many quarters. At least some of the statements in that letter contain the ambiguities that have been at the heart of Middle East negotiations for many years, and therefore, as we move more deeply into these negotiations, we will have to discuss with the Senate as precisely what meaning is to be given to phrases such as "secure and recognized frontiers," which are also part of Security Council Resolution 242.

Q. If President Sadat brings up this letter, queries what effect it has on you and American policy, what is your answer?

A. Our answer will be that we are taking into account the views of many groups and, of course, congressional views with considerable seriousness, that after we have made a decision, we will discuss it at great length with the Senate and with the

¹²³ Doc. 100 above.

whole Congress, and that in the meantime we have to proceed according to our best judgment of the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you believe the Syrians moved to extend the U.N. mandate for six months which puts them out of synchronization with the Egyptians, and what will the impact of that action be on the next three to six months?

A. I will answer that question, but if we could leave non-Egyptian-and-Israeli questions out until I get through the second part of my answers—but I will answer that question.

Q. On the Egyptians?

A. The impact is that it gives some more time for a development of peace initiatives less closely geared to imminent deadlines than seemed possible a few weeks ago, and therefore we welcome this step.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the two super-powers will inevitably impose a settlement on the sides in the Middle East if both sides will not come with new proposals?

A. We have not thought it wise to impose a settlement, and our policy has been designed to enable the parties concerned to negotiate the structure of a just and lasting peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the President plan mainly to listen during the Sadat and Rabin meeting, and if so, what is your expectation for any new position, new concessions, being made by either man? The reason I ask the question is that it suggests that the reassessment may hinge on the outcome of those talks.

A. No, I think the President will both talk and listen. He will give to both sides our assessment of the situation, and it will be as close to identical to both sides as we can make it.

He will then obviously ask their views on their assessment of the situation; and our reassessment, or at least the conclusions we will draw, will depend obviously to an important extent on the answers we receive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Sadat has said publicly now several times that he intends to press President Ford for an answer to what the American position is on supporting Israel, either in the present situation or back to the 1967 borders.¹²⁴ What will the President say to

President Sadat, or what do you think about that question?

A. If I tell you that, maybe President Sadat won't come to the meeting. [Laughter.]

I think we are in no position to give answers to final settlement until we have completed the assessment we are now making.

Q. Since we have already had no assessment on Mr. Gromyko, can you tell us a little bit of what he indicated to you was the Soviet position on the Middle East?

A. I think that the Soviet Union realizes that it is one thing to start a conference, it is another to bring it to a conclusion. And I think every party concerned so far has realized that it was less complicated to talk about Geneva than to bring it off.

Now that Geneva has become a very probable outcome, I think it behooves the two co-chairmen to discuss what steps they can take to bring about the best atmosphere for talks and the best possible outcome for such talks, and this is the spirit within which we had our preliminary exchanges.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko and I plan to meet again in July, and I think at that time, after we have substantially completed our assessment, we will be in a position to be more specific.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say Geneva is a probable outcome, but as you also point out, it is a lot of trouble getting it off the ground. First, we thought it was going to meet early in the summer. Now it appears that it may not be until late in the summer, and the Egyptians are saying possibly not until the end of the year. Do you have any estimate of when Geneva will be?

A. I think I will be in a better position to answer that question in July, after I meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and after the President has met with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Rabin and after we have talked to some of the other interested Arab parties.

Q. When you talk about Geneva, are you talking about it in the context we understood it when it first began, that this would be a negotiation, or would it simply be a framework within which some variation of shuttle diplomacy might be able to work?

A. I don't think I can add anything to the three possible options that the President outlined yesterday.

Mr. Nessen: Why not take just a couple more minutes, Mr. Secretary? You have been at it for about an hour.

¹²⁴ See docs. 248, 251 below.

A. I haven't even gotten started yet. I will take two or three more questions.

Q. How would you define the main stumbling block to an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt? Is it the issue of nonbelligerency?

A. The issue of the last interim negotiation has taken on the form of the Japanese movie "Rashomon"—there are so many versions of it around now that I don't want to add to the general confusion.

I don't think there is any purpose served by reviewing the last negotiation, which takes on more epic proportions the longer one hears the various accounts. The major problem now is to focus on the future. That requires some stock-taking as to what the parties now conceive to be the essence of the problem as they now see it.

Once we understand that, then we can make some suggestions as to whether or how the deadlock might be broken, rather than go over again the last positions they had at that time, which under the pressure of events may now look somewhat different.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that we have not thought it wise to impose a settlement. Do you have any reason to believe that we could impose a settlement that would be accepted unless it was acceptable to both sides?

A. We believe that a settlement must emerge out of a process of negotiation between the two sides in some form, either directly or indirectly.

106

Press interview statement by Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran calling on Israel to obey Security Council resolutions and denying any intention of participating in a new Arab-Israeli war¹²⁵

Tehran, late May, 1975

The situation is very delicate and might be explosive because one party [Israel] does not apply

and implement the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. When one does not obey the resolutions of the Security Council, then you have the law of the jungle. Anything might happen. I see the security of Israel in international guarantees. A few more kilometers eastward or westward will not add to its security. Even the Soviet Union is saying that if Israel goes back to the pre-1967 borders, it is ready to guarantee the borders of Israel. Morally, we have got to support our Arab friends, not only because of religion but really because of international right and law. We don't see any wisdom in Israel's policies. We have always recognized the existence of Israel, but we have got to say that the Israelis are becoming impossible. If *you* cannot, we cannot exert additional pressure on Israel. We have no embargo on anybody. We don't mind where our oil goes once it is in the tankers. Iran is not going to take part [in any Arab-Israeli war].

107

Speech by Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Schröder of West Germany discussing the Middle East problem (excerpts)¹²⁶

Kyoto, May 30, 1975

What are the conditions for and prospects of a peace settlement? Let us consider first of all the demands of both sides. The Arabs insist that Israel vacate the territories she has held since the 1967 war—in other words the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the eastern part of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip—and that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians find expression.

Israel for her part demands recognition as a state and the right to live within secure boundaries.

If we weigh up the demands of the two sides there emerges one fact of great significance: The ones who carry most weight on the Arab side are

¹²⁵ Excerpted from the partial text of the interview conducted by Henry Grunwald and Kestern Prager, *Time* (New York: international ed.), June 9, 1975, p. 29. Reprinted by permission from *Time*, The Weekly Newsmagazine: Copyright Time Inc.

¹²⁶ Made at a meeting of the Trilateral Commission, first published in German in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), no. 13 (1975), pp. 405–410; English translation supplied, on request, by the West German embassy in Beirut.

prepared to recognise Israel's existence as a state. That will, I am sure, also be the case one day—or better on the day a peace agreement is signed—with the PLO under the terms that would be agreed. Let us leave aside the question of how the change of attitude on the part of the Arabs came about, except to say that the approach of the United States and the Soviet Union has played a big part. I shall be taking this matter up again a little later on.

The second cardinal point concerns the question of secure boundaries. I am inclined to the view that boundaries are only secure if they are accepted and respected by one's neighbours, though we leave open the question as to why this happens. We must realise that we shall have to create conditions which will lead to such attitudes and the corresponding behaviour, and maintain them. It must surely be clear then—but perhaps only after some discussion—that in the age of intercontinental missiles "safe" boundaries can only be preserved by creating the right attitudes and thus evoking the corresponding conduct. Anyone who tries to assess the present psychological situation of those concerned sees Israel in a besieged fortress and developing a corresponding mentality: still more cement bastions, still more weapons of the very latest design, then one lives in security and is respected. That respect is enhanced by the occasional successful sortie against the besieger. I will not take the description any further for everyone will know and agree that life under these conditions cannot be a permanent basis for future generations, only a temporary arrangement. I would mention another point which is perhaps metaphorically comprehensible. Arab propagandists have from time to time contended that they would drive the Israelis into the sea, but against this the Israelis can defend themselves.

The proportions and potential development weigh so heavily in favour of the Arabs that Israel, rather than be driven out, might one day simply be flooded, like an island by a tidal wave. The population of the Arab countries is increasing at the rate of 3 to 4 million a year—in Egypt alone the rate is one million. If we imagine the situation only ten years hence the Arab population will be 200 million, 50 million belonging to Egypt.

Israel's population—not counting the territories occupied since 1967—is 3.3 million. 2.8 million of these are Israelis, about 500,000 Arabs. The

birth rate of this Arab community in Israel, Palestinians, is twice as fast as that of the Israelis. If this rate continues Israel's Arab population will double every 15 years or so. These are alarming demographic prospects for Israel, for if immigration stagnates or becomes retrogressive—it having accounted for two thirds of Israel's population growth in the twenty years up to 1968—the Israelis could become a minority in their own country within the space of a few decades. For this very reason it is important to prepare for possible but certainly necessary co-operation.

The tactics with regard to a peace settlement have not yet been finalised apparently. Or should one say single elements are being cautiously tried out first. It will be possible to establish and co-ordinate tactics when agreement has been reached on the strategic objective. Do the Arabs want peace as quickly as possible? Is Israel playing for time? Is she awaiting the outcome of the US presidential election? Do the Israelis intend to wait for the bigger results in the creation of new sources of energy as an alternative to oil? Will Israel's position improve if the oil weapon is blunted or no longer usable? What is the point of Israel seeking partial progress in the Sinai but discussing neither the inevitable withdrawal from Golan nor a realistic and feasible solution to the Palestinian problem?

I pose these questions because here at least they might find an answer, or an attempt may be made to answer them. I feel that through their intervention the superpowers have assumed the responsibility for creating stable conditions for peace in the area as soon as possible. They alone, not individually but together, have the strength to achieve that goal if it is approved by both sides. The US Administration has been accused in various quarters of the mistake of operating alone without first co-ordinating with the Soviet Union. Well, that may be a fair charge, but I think the United States realises how much a tenable and constructive peace settlement depends on Soviet participation. It is also suggested occasionally that the United States wishes to avoid any charge from "anti-communist" quarters at home of joining hands with the Soviet Union to put pressure on Israel. Be that as it may, a Geneva conference without American-Soviet accord could

hardly work. We shall see. But the nations concerned who are watching on will have only limited patience.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Foreign Minister Chavan of India (excerpts)¹²⁷

Cairo, May 30, 1975

At the invitation of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.E. Mr. Ismail Fahmy, the Minister of External Affairs of India, Mr. Y.B. Chavan paid an official visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from May 27 to May 30, 1975.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Egypt reviewed the recent developments in the Middle East. Both sides agreed that the continued intransigence of Israel was solely responsible for the prevailing dangerous situation in the area. Both sides agreed that Israel must withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied by it through aggression and war and that no just and lasting settlement was possible without the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to form their own state.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Egypt and the Minister of External Affairs of India called upon the international community to exert all pressures to secure Israel's compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions on the rights of the Palestinians adopted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. They held that the non-aligned states who had consistently supported the just cause of the Arab peoples should closely coordinate their actions with those of the Arab states in order to ensure the success of the Geneva conference.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Chavan of India calling for total withdrawal by Israel and restoration of Palestinian rights¹²⁸

Damascus, May 30, 1975

With so much in common it is hardly surprising that we have supported the just Arab cause in tackling the problem in West Asia. This problem has been created and persists because of Israel's obstinate refusal to withdraw from Arab lands occupied by force in defiance of the United Nations Charter and the will of the world community. This situation could not long be tolerated and led to the explosion of the October 1973 war in which the Syrian armed forces and the Syrian people gave a heroic account of themselves. It is our firm conviction that there cannot be a peace dictated by force and occupation. There cannot be peace in this region unless Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories it has occupied by force and till the Palestinian people are restored their legitimate national rights. Recent events in Asia show that if peace is not established through the negotiating process then dangers of conflict increase until justice and national independence and dignity are achieved. It is for this reason that we believe that a resumed Geneva Conference by the parties concerned occupies an important place in the peace making process.

My awareness of the need for just and early settlement in the region has been heightened by my visit to the town of Quneitra. The arrogant and deliberate destruction of this town is a glaring example of uncivilised behaviour. I look to the day when peace prevails and the occupation undone; when out of its debris and ashes, a more beautiful Quneitra is rebuilt by the determined people of Syria to adorn the historic hills in which it is located.

¹²⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), XXI, 5 (May, 1975), pp. 145, 146.

¹²⁸ Made in a speech at a dinner given in his honour; excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), XXI, 5 (May, 1975), p. 164.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Chavan of India (excerpts)¹²⁹

Damascus, June 1, 1975

At the invitation of Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Chavan, the Foreign Minister of India, visited the Syrian Arab Republic from May 30–June 1, 1975.

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The two ministers expressed their extreme concern at the dangerous situation in the Middle East area resulting from Israel's aggressive policy, her refusal to implement United Nations resolutions and her intransigent attitude which thwarts all peaceful political efforts aimed at establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

The two sides affirmed that Israel's intransigent attitude alone is responsible for the dangerous situation in the area and agreed on the need for effective measures to put an end to this explosive situation.

The two sides called on the international community to exert every pressure on Israel to ensure that she implements the Security Council resolutions and the resolutions on the rights of the Palestinian people adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session, and in particular resolution 3236.

The two parties agreed that no just and permanent peace can be achieved unless Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories occupied by force and unless the Palestinian Arab people recover their legitimate national rights, including their right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty.

The two sides expressed their concern at Israel's continuing violation of international pacts and human rights and condemned Israel's deliberate and total destruction of the town of Quneitra, of the Geneva Conventions and the principles of international law and civilized conduct.

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Announcement by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel of the thinning out of forces along the Sinai front with Egypt¹³⁰

June 2, 1975

1. With the renewal of the operation of international shipping in the Suez Canal which is due to take place in accordance with the disengagement of forces agreement between Israel and Egypt of January 1974,¹³¹ the Government of Israel has decided to take steps which it trusts will contribute to the relaxation of military tensions in the area.

2. These steps do not replace the existing disengagement of forces agreement which, of course, remains in force, and which the Government of Israel will continue to observe on a basis of reciprocity with Egypt. Likewise, the measures are not meant to be a substitute for the continuation of the efforts to achieve a further agreement between Israel and Egypt. The readiness of the Government of Israel to cooperate in the continuation of these political efforts remains constant, as made clear on various occasions to the Government of the United States.

3. The Government of Israel has decided to reduce the forces of the IDF deployed in the forward area of the canal sector as detailed below:

a) Tanks:

In the area 30 kms from the canal, the Israel Defense Forces will reduce by half the number of tanks presently deployed there. (Under the disengagement of forces agreement it is permitted to deploy 30 tanks in the area of limited armaments some 20 kms from the canal. There are no restrictions beyond that area.)

b) Artillery:

Up to a distance of 32 kms from the canal and parallel to it no Israeli artillery whatsoever will be positioned.

(Under the disengagement of forces agreement six batteries are permitted up to a line some 20 kms from the canal. Beyond that line no prohibitions exist under the agreement other than the restriction not to position artillery in a manner as to bring it into range of the Egyptian lines.)

c) Other forces:

¹²⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 2, 1975.

¹³⁰ English text as released by the Tel Aviv Government Press Office on June 3, 1975.

¹³¹ Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

The IDF will maintain in the area of limited armaments only half of the permitted forces. (Under the disengagement of forces agreement a force of 7,000 men is allowed.)

d) Missiles:

No missiles will be deployed up to a distance of 40 kms from the U.N. line. (Under the disengagement of forces agreement anti-aircraft guns alone are prohibited in a 30 kms area parallel to the U.N. line.

4. The Government of Israel considers the renewal of international shipping through the Suez Canal as an important and constructive development in consonance with the disengagement of forces agreement between Israel and Egypt of January 1974 and hopes that it will serve the interest of all maritime nations.

5. The Government of Israel is interested in the safety of international shipping and trusts that an atmosphere of tranquility will prevail in the area of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez.

It is self-evident that the forces of the IDF will honor the freedom of international navigation through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez.

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Press conference statements by US President Ford and President Sadat of Egypt commenting on their meeting, US reassessment of its Middle East policy and the next step in peace negotiations¹³²

Salzburg, June 2, 1975

Ford: President Sadat and myself have concluded extensive discussions. It has been a pleasure for me to personally meet President Sadat, and I am appreciative for the opportunity of establishing a relationship with him.

I explained the considerations that are important, from our point of view, of the dedication that we have for a permanent peace based on a fair and equitable settlement.

The meetings were conducted, I think, in a very constructive manner.

After leaving here, in the weeks ahead I will have further consultations that I trust will lead to the overall objective that I seek of a permanent

peace that will be in the best interests of all of the parties.

Sadat: Well, ladies and gentlemen, if I may add some words, I consider that the big achievement in this meeting is that I have made the acquaintance of President Ford. I have always said, before I met him and when I saw Congress receiving him, that he is an honest and a straightforward man.

Now I must add that he is peace-loving and a peace-struggler, also. Added to what I said before, we had intensive talks and a complete survey of the whole situation, and we have discussed lots of considerations.

I shall be going back to my country, and we shall be discussing all the various aspects, and at the same time I shall be always in contact with President Ford.

And may I seize this opportunity to extend an invitation for President Ford to visit our country and to meet with our people, and we shall be very happy to have him among us.

Thank you.

Q, I would like to address my question to both Presidents, and it is a two-part question.

Mr. President, first, did you reach any kind of an agreement on a second-stage disengagement which would involve step-by-step diplomacy? And two, did you discuss in any way the final form of a peace settlement within the context of the prewar 1967 borders?

Ford: As I said in my opening statement, we took into consideration all of the circumstances that are necessary for any agreement, whether it was step-by-step or a comprehensive agreement. The considerations were on the broadest basis so that we could have a complete and total picture of what the problems are in seeking the solution that is what all of us want, which is peace on a fair and equitable basis, that being in the best interests of not only those in the Middle East but the world at large.

Q, My question is to Mr. President Ford. How do you expect the reaction in the Senate after the reassessment of the U.S. policy in the Middle East? And don't you consider the letter of the Senators¹³³ to be—delivered to you before this meeting with President Sadat—as a sort of pressure?

¹³² Transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1879 (June 30, 1975), pp. 900–901.

¹³³ Doc. 100 above.

Ford: The reassessment that I have been conducting for the last several months has included a great many suggestions from within the United States—experts in both political parties. It has included the observations and suggestions of those from other nations throughout the world, of course including the Middle East.

I have never felt that the suggestions that have come from any source in the context of pressure. We have sought to assemble all of the information that would be aimed at seeing all of the difficulties, all of the benefits. There is a wealth of information that is vitally important, and on the benefit of those recommendations my reassessment will be concluded with a plan that I will submit at the appropriate time.

Q. President Sadat, if I may, sir, I believe you have said that real peace between Egypt and Israel is not possible in this generation. Have you changed your mind or, in fact, has Egypt changed its position in any way since last March?

Sadat: Well, I didn't say, for the first thing, that peace cannot be achieved. On the contrary. In my speech I said—in spite of the fact that it is a very complicated and difficult problem—but it is very easy to reach a solution when we solve the very simple, fundamental basis of the whole conflict.

I said, and I say always, that the biggest achievement we can do is that we end the state of belligerency that has already taken more than 27 years up till this moment. The peace process will be a long one, so it should be clear, and I think I made myself clear.

Q. President Ford, just to follow up your answer to Miss Thomas, what do you envisage the next step to be in the movement toward the settlement of the Middle East crisis?

Ford: We have not made any decision as to the next step. There are, of course, a number of alternatives. I think it is premature at this time for me, not having concluded the full consultation that I had programed, to indicate in any way whatsoever that a final decision has been made. The objective is clear—it has been from the outset—and it will be the aim of whatever recommendation that I make as a result of the reassessment.

If I might, I would like to add, the discussions between President Sadat and myself have reaffirmed the bilateral relationship between

Egypt and the United States, a bilateral relationship that I feel has been constructive, and the discussions that we have had for the last day or so have reaffirmed the continuity of this relationship.

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Decisions of the Israel government regarding the possibility of renewed negotiations towards a Middle East peace¹³⁴

Jerusalem, June 8, 1975

1. The Israel Government is striving for peace agreements with the neighbouring Arab states. It will co-operate in any political negotiations to promote this aim, whether in the framework of the Geneva conference or outside it, or through peace treaties or an interim settlement which would pave the way for peace.

2. At this stage, in view of the stand of the Arab states on the question of an overall peace, the Israeli Government regards an interim settlement with Egypt through the good offices of the United States as a realistic possibility in moving towards peace.

3. Government decisions not to accept Egyptian conditions put forward in negotiations in March are still valid. The Israeli Government will be prepared to re-examine its attitude in line with changes in Egypt's stand.

4. During the discussions with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and Administration officials Israel will aspire to reach understanding and agreement regarding continuation of the political process for achieving peace and to see whether an interim agreement with Egypt can be achieved.

5. Israel wants negotiations on peace within defensible borders with each of her neighbours. In his discussions with the President of the United States and in presenting Israel's attitude to peace in every aspect and as regards an interim settlement the Prime Minister will be guided by the

¹³⁴ Broadcast on Israel radio in English; transcript, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4925/A/3; reprinted by permission. The decisions were adopted after the cabinet had rejected a joint proposal by the Mapam and Independent Liberal ministers (see Appendix B) to put forward a plan for peace with all the Arab states.

basic guidelines of Government decisions and statements approved by the Knesset. In the negotiating process on peace treaties the Government will have the authority to make explicit decisions regarding each one of her neighbouring countries.

6. The Government authorizes the Prime Minister to discuss questions concerning peace with the President of the United States and issues regarding bilateral relations. It hopes for fruitful talks in the spirit of the existing friendship between the United States and Israel.

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Statement issued by the newly formed Israel Council for Israel-Palestine Peace¹³⁵

June 10, 1975

We believe

1. That this country is the homeland of two peoples—the Jewish and the Palestinian people.

2. That the core of the conflict between the Jewish people and the Arab world lies in the historical confrontation between the two peoples of this country, which is so precious to both of them.

3. That the only road to peace is through the co-existence of two sovereign states, each of which will be the national home of its people—the state of Israel and the state of Palestine.

4. That establishment of the sovereign state of Palestine alongside the State of Israel will be the outcome of negotiations between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the recognized national representation of the Palestinian people.

5. That the border between Israel and Palestine should coincide with the line that existed before the war of June 1967, and that minor adjustments to this borderline would be possible on the basis of mutual agreement only.

6. That Jerusalem, being sacred to both peoples, deserves a special status: it should remain undivided as a municipal unit, accessible to members of all nations and of all faiths, while the Jewish section of Jerusalem will serve as the capital of Israel and the Arab section as the capital of Palestine.

7. That the border between Israel and Palestine

should be open to the free movement of people and goods throughout the country. No Palestinians will settle in Israel and no Israelis in Palestine other than by the mutual consent of the two governments.

8. That the national and human tragedy of the Palestinian refugees will find its solution by repatriation to the state of Palestine, and that a reasonable and agreed number of them would be absorbed in the State of Israel, with the help of extensive international assistance.

9. That the early stages of Israeli-Palestinian co-existence will require security agreements that will be arrived at by mutual agreement. No foreign army shall enter the territory of either of the two stages.

10. That the two states will be sovereign in every respect, including matters of immigration and repatriation. The State of Israel will preserve its links with the Jewish people throughout the world and the State of Palestine its links with the Arab world.

11. That the two states should engage in a continual dialogue in order to form closer ties, and solve common problems for the good of both the peoples of the country. Any change in the basis of the co-existence of the two states is possible only through free agreement between them.

12. That the relationship between the peoples of Palestine and Jordan is a problem that concerns these two peoples exclusively and that Israel is not a party to it so long as the basis of Israel-Palestinian co-existence is not undermined.

13. That for the good of all the nations of the region it is vital that there be an overall regional organization—political, economic, cultural and for security—in which both the States of Israel and of Palestine will be integrated.

We call upon

All Israelis who regard the above principles as the best way to consolidate the sovereignty, integrity, security and prosperity of the State of Israel, to join us in establishing

The Israel Council for Israel Palestine Peace

This Council will explain, in Israel and throughout the world, the vital need for co-existence between Israel and Palestine, and take part in a dialogue with all Palestinian elements who are

¹³⁵ English text, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XVIII, 5 (July-August, 1975), pp. 51–52; the statement was signed by Uri Avneri, Yossi Amitai and Amos Kenan.

ready to promote contacts between the two peoples of this country.

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Joint statement issued after a meeting between delegations of the Communist Party of France and the PLO¹³⁶

Beirut, June 10, 1975

A prominent feature of the international situation is the important victories that are being won by peoples in their struggle for national independence, social progress and liberation from all kinds of imperialist oppression and for the achievement of peace and socialism. This development is best illustrated by the historic victories won by the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos against the American imperialists and their allies.

In the Middle East area also there have been the positive changes brought about by the October 1973 war, and the Arab liberation movement has won important victories. World solidarity with the just cause of the Palestinian people has increased, and this has been embodied in the positive resolutions adopted by the Arab summit conference in Rabat, in the increasing manifestations of support by world public opinion for the cause of the Palestinian people and their just struggle for that cause, which is led by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in the many international conferences and resolutions in support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the just rights of the people of Palestine. This support culminated in resolution 3236 adopted by the 29th session of the General Assembly recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, their right to return to their homeland and their rights to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty.

However, imperialist and Zionist circles still refuse to implement United Nations resolutions and are making obvious efforts to nullify the gains achieved by the Arab national liberation movement. These same circles refuse to accept even that Israel should withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 aggression and oppose

the right of the people of Palestine to establish their national authority in the liberated Palestinian territories, continuing to make unremitting efforts to dismember the front of the Arab confrontation forces by involving some of its members in the step-by-step policy and in partial and unilateral solutions.

American imperialist circles are supplying Israel with immense quantities of arms and supporting her financially so as to encourage her to engage in aggression against the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples.

American imperialism is making every effort to increase tension in the East Mediterranean and the Gulf areas thereby perpetuating a dangerous situation in the Middle East which has today become the theatre of the principal conflict of the world.

Similarly the Israeli occupation authorities are continuing to pursue their policy of aggression and repression against the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied areas.

It is to be observed that the conspiracies against the Palestine Liberation Organization have recently been stepped up through the imperialist schemes concocted by the government of the United States with a view to winning over certain Arab regimes so as to weaken the forces of the Palestine revolution. In this field Palestinian national unity and the close cohesion between the Palestine revolution and the Arab, and particularly the Lebanese, nationalist and progressive forces, are playing a fundamental role in resisting and frustrating these schemes.

In Europe the imperialist countries, at America's behest, are closing their ranks in NATO and through the monopolistic combine of the European Common Market, are doing their best to place obstacles in the way of the peoples of Europe and the developing countries so as to control their destinies.

The French Communist Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization believe that the working class and its labour and communist parties which are linked by the unity of common struggle to the peoples of the world who are struggling for their national independence are playing a principal role in mobilizing public opinion in support of the struggle of the Arab national liberation movement and the Palestine revolution against imperialism and racism and on behalf of social progress,

¹³⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), June 15, 1975, p. 19.

democracy and the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

In this connection the Palestine Liberation Organization greatly appreciates the important role played by the French working class and its Communist Party in support of the struggle of the Palestinian people and their just cause.

In condemning the campaigns and manoeuvres directed against the progressive countries, and the USSR and the other socialist countries—campaigns aimed at fragmenting and weakening the nationalist and democratic forces—the Palestine Liberation Organization and the French Communist Party declare their common intention of playing an effective part in strengthening the unity of all anti-imperialist forces.

The French Communist Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization regard their meeting as an event of the greatest importance, express their satisfaction at the friendly relations existing between them and resolve to strengthen solidarity and cooperation between them.

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Speech by UK Foreign Secretary Callaghan made at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Fahmi of Egypt (excerpt)¹³⁷

London, June 10, 1975

One of my purposes since the Labour government took office in March last year has been to encourage an understanding between the British labour movement and the Arab world. We have welcomed increased contact between the Arab Socialist Union and the Socialist International, and I have discussed with Mr. Jack Jones, Chairman of the International Committee of the T.U.C., who visited Egypt last year and who is with us tonight, prospects for improved and expanded trade union contacts.

I am glad to announce that I and my colleague, the Secretary of State for Trade, on the one side, and Mr Fahmi on the other, will tomorrow be giving fresh proof of the interest both our countries have in developing economic cooperation between us when we sign an agreement on economic co-

operation establishing a joint commission to be chaired by ministers of the two countries, and also an agreement on the protection of investment.

We also look forward to the practical work of the Euro-Arab Dialogue as a means of furthering our economic relations. European and Arab experts are holding their first meeting in Cairo today. Both Egypt and Britain are parts of larger groupings of states, the Arab world and Europe, which have close historic links. We want the dialogue to be a means of tightening those links and a demonstration of our inter-dependence.

But if the Suez Canal symbolises the ambitions of the Egyptian government for the economic development of Egypt, it also demonstrates in a positive fashion the determination of Egypt to work for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East dispute which has been the cause of so much bitterness and suffering for many years.

I know that Egyptian policy is firmly founded on the permanent realities of the Middle East situation, as well as on the requirements of national honour and interest: an end to foreign occupation and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

We accept that if there is to be a lasting peace settlement, these aspirations must be fulfilled.

The search for peace has been a slow and difficult one, and there have been setbacks. We in this country have been anxiously following the activities of those immediately involved and have kept in close touch with the governments concerned.

I have in particular been greatly encouraged by the continuing determination of the United States to use its influence for peace. I regard continuing United States involvement as an indispensable condition for a peaceful solution, and welcome the recent meetings at Salzburg between President Ford and President Sadat as a contribution to that end.¹³⁸ The American Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, and I regularly exchange views. Neither of us has any doubt of the serious obstacles to be overcome if the process of finding peace is to be achieved, but I believe that with your active and positive help the conditions are being created for a further advance.

You and I have today had the advantage of a long discussion on the situation in the Middle East as it now faces us. I should like to say to you

¹³⁷ Text supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

¹³⁸ Doc. 112 above.

publicly how much the British government appreciate the confidence in us which the Egyptian government displayed when they suggested that the Geneva conference should be widened to include certain additional countries, Britain amongst them.

We do not seek to thrust ourselves forward, whether at Geneva or elsewhere, but I wish to assure the Foreign Minister that we are ready to assist in the search for peace in any way that may be generally acceptable and helpful.

This, as we have made clear on a number of occasions, was part of a determined policy to expand and improve our relations. I am pleased that you, in turn, have invited the General Secretary of the Labour Party to visit Egypt later this year. From such contacts can come nothing but good.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger reviewing his recent meetings with Middle Eastern leaders¹³⁹

Washington, June 12, 1975

Kissinger: I really don't have a very long statement to make. As we pointed out after the meeting between President Sadat and the President,¹⁴⁰ the purpose of these meetings is not to reach any definitive conclusions or to engage in any detailed negotiations but, rather, to enable the President to establish a personal contact with the principal leaders in the area, to review the alternatives, and to clarify the positions.

The meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was conducted in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluate the results as very constructive. I think the alternatives have been brought into sharper focus, the implications of the various roads that can be pursued are seen more clearly.

We will now continue consultations with other interested parties. As you know, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. And we

will of course be in touch with other parties in the area. We will stay in close touch with the Government of Israel. And we hope that within the next few weeks we can reach a final clarification of the best course that could be pursued, on the basis of consensus among all the parties concerned.

Now I will take some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the President does not yet know enough to go forward with his policy statement as he said he would?

A. I think the President is not likely to make a policy statement within the next week or two. But I do believe that the meetings that have just concluded mark a considerable step forward, and we evaluate them in a positive manner.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you evaluate the chances for a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Egypt on another partial settlement in the Sinai?

A. I think there are chances, but we cannot yet make a final decision.

Q. The tendency seems to be becoming aware that an interim settlement is a preferred solution, rather than a return to Geneva. Is that correct?

A. No. As I pointed out at Salzburg,¹⁴¹ the States is not pushing any one particular approach. The United States is committed to progress in the negotiations. The United States believes that a stalemate in the diplomatic process in the Middle East would not be in the interest of any of the parties or in the interest of world peace.

We have found in the talks that this conviction is shared by all of the principals, and it is clearly and emphatically shared by the Prime Minister of Israel.

So, we are not pushing any particular approach, but we will support whichever approach seems most promising.

Q. Have you found in your talks with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that either or both are willing to adjust their positions that existed at the end of March?

A. We have told both sides that if an interim agreement is to be reached, both sides would have to modify their positions.

I call your attention to the decision of the Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the Israeli Cabinet

¹³⁹ Made after a meeting between US President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel; transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1880 (July 7, 1975), pp. 11-14.

¹⁴⁰ See doc. 112 above

¹⁴¹ On June 2, 1975, after President Ford's talks with President Sadat, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1879 (June 30, 1975), pp. 911-914.

pointed out the Israeli willingness to modify their position if Egypt were prepared to modify its own position.¹⁴²

We have the impression that therefore there is a certain parallel approach on both sides. What remains to be seen now is when one goes into the details, whether that permits a sufficient concreteness.

Q. You really haven't gotten into the details yet?

A. We have gone into the parameters, but not into the details.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of touching base with other representatives, other groups, do you include the Palestinians?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you able to assure Mr. Rabin that the United States will continue its military and economic aid to Israel?

A. There has never been any question about the United States continuing economic and military aid to Israel. The question has been within the framework of the very large request that we have before us, how to relate it to all the other considerations.

So, about the principle of economic and military aid, there is no debate at all. But there were some discussions on that issue, and I will continue them at lunch, if you let me get there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been—

A. This will keep the Israeli journalists from asking questions. [Laughter.]

Q. There has been a reported holdup of deliveries of certain military equipment, including the Lance missiles, and I think the F-15. Has the decision been made to go forward?

A. No. The F-15 was a question of a technical evaluation team coming over here. It had not been a question of holding up any equipment. But the point is, it has always been clear that these particular items were related to the whole process of a free assessment. And as this process is coming to a conclusion, these decisions will be made with respect to these items.

Q. Will you make another trip to the area before the reassessment is completed, or how soon do you plan another trip to the area?

A. Whether I make another trip to the area depends on which of the approaches that are open to us is going to be pursued. But a trip is not excluded.

Q. Do you have any opinion, Dr. Kissinger, as to what they would prefer? Do you get a feeling from either one or both that they would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy again?

A. I think it is too soon to say this precisely, but I would say that nothing that has happened in the discussions between President Sadat and President Ford and between Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford, has made the prospect less likely, and much that has happened has made it perhaps more possible.

Q. So you sort of expect to resume sometime?

A. That would be premature to say. But certainly neither side has precluded a reexamination of the interim approach.

Q. How will you get into details—through diplomatic channels, or do you have to go out there yourself?

A. I think through both, if we go beyond a certain—We will start through diplomatic channels, and at that point we will decide whether—

Q. You just want to know whether there is enough for agreement before you go out, so you have to know the details?

A. That is correct. As I pointed out, we will now stay in close consultation with the Government of Israel, and we will also be in close touch with the other interested parties. And after we have all their views, we will then be in a position to make the decision whether they are close enough for me to take a trip to the area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the other parties that you have been talking about that you are going to consult with before you make a decision?

A. Well, as I said before, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. We are obviously going to be in touch with the Government of Egypt. And we will be talking to other Arab countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you know very well what the particular issues were that held up the March agreement. Are you really—

A. After I read a lot about it, I didn't know any more whether I knew. [Laughter.]

¹⁴² Doc. 113 above.

Q. Are you really telling us you are no further along on understanding whether either side has changed its position to make an agreement possible?

A. No. I am saying that obviously there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. I am saying that we are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail for me to be able to say whether an agreement is possible and that we have not been engaged in an actual detailed process of negotiation. Neither side has been asked to put forward a specific position at this moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has stated that he was going to make a definitive statement or a statement about this when the reassessment is complete. Could you tell us how definitive that is likely to be, how long? Does it include reexamination of the whole question?

A. I think it depends in part on which of the options before him, of those that he has described, he is likely to pursue. And I think obviously when the President states the direction in which we are going, he will do it with sufficient concreteness to explain what we hope to achieve and where it is likely to take us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President made reference to the desirability of Israel being more flexible. I have asked several times at the White House and can get no definition of any specific of how Israel could be more flexible. I was wondering if this request that it be more flexible means that Israel should give up Mitla and Giddi in exchange for nothing but Egyptian words, not even guarantees of shipping in the canal or diplomatic recognition.

A. Well, you are way ahead of me in the precision of the negotiation. I don't believe that the President has said that Israel should be more flexible. There was one reference to his evaluation of the March negotiations.¹⁴³

I don't think that it would serve any purpose now to apply adjectives to the various positions of the parties. The issues that led to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS News] said, are clearly understood. I think the two sides know in which area the major concerns of the other are. We have done our best to explain the positions of each side to the other as we understand it. We have found a general receptivity to looking at the prospects for making progress. And I can assure you, as someone who has negotiated with Israeli negotiating teams, the danger of their giving away

something for nothing is extremely remote.

Mr. Koppel [Ted Koppel, ABC News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, I can understand why it was necessary for President Ford to establish some kind of personal contact with Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. I'm a little harder pressed to understand why it is necessary with Mr. Rabin, who he knows quite well. Is it then a fact that this is the only need for that meeting, to establish personal contact?

A. No. The need for this meeting was the necessity of reviewing the positions and options of all sides in the Middle East and of the American relationship to it.

Since this involves rather fateful decisions for Israel and very crucial decisions for the United States, it was imperative for the Prime Minister and the President to meet, not just to exchange ideas on technical details but to gain an understanding of their perception of the Middle East situation. I think the meeting was extremely important from that point of view as well as from others. And I don't believe either of these two leaders would have been prepared to make the decisions that need to be made without having a full opportunity to understand not only the technical but also the intangible aspects of the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night that if step-by-step does not work, he would have a comprehensive plan of his own to present possibly at Geneva. Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines of that comprehensive plan would be?

A. The two leaders had an extremely frank and detailed review. The President's habit is always to put forward his thinking as fully as he can, and he did put before the Prime Minister his best judgment of the situation in some detail, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown there was a widespread impression—and I can understand your unwillingness to engage in use of adjectives—there was a widespread impression left as a result of official statements on the record and background record, that the Israelis were stubborn and arch and were responsible for the breakdown. As a result of today's meeting, is that impression not justified any more? Has that been wiped off?

A. Well, an Israeli friend of mine has once defined objectivity as a hundred percent approval of the Israeli point of view. And maybe some of these impressions that you describe arose from that

¹⁴³ Doc. 64 above.

particular definition of objectivity. Be that as it may, we are now looking to the future; and we believe, as I pointed out before, that all the parties with whom we have talked are interested in making progress toward peace.

As the Prime Minister pointed out in his toast last evening, no country can have a greater interest in peace than Israel. Therefore we will work with the parties concerned with the attitude of seeing how we can help ease tensions and help them to achieve what is above all in their overwhelming interest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken to both sides now, and it has been made public by the Israelis that they would like an agreement of long duration, defined as three to five years. Now that you have spoken to both sides, is this a likely prospect?

A. I don't want to go into any of the details of the various aspects. But as I pointed out, from what I have seen of the positions of the parties, the possibility of progress is by no means precluded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question. When will the aid program be presented to the Congress on the Middle East?

A. We don't have a precise date yet, but I have stated our general view with respect to aid.

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Television interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel discussing Israel's conditions for a settlement with the Arab states¹⁴⁴

Mid-June, 1975

Q. What would you regard as the conditions upon which Israel could look forward to a permanent settlement and a permanent peace in the area?

A. Peace, for us, is not just the end of a state of war. Peace between neighbouring nations must include building the kind of relations in which people can talk to each other, can move to open boundaries, can have commercial and other ties. As you know, for the Arab leaders, especially the President of Egypt, the overall settlement is just

the end of the state of war. He might call it peace, but what he means is just the end of the state of war. And what he calls normalisation of relations, which I call the real meaning of peace, has to be postponed, according to his view, to the coming generations. Therefore, the first issue to be discussed when we are talking about an overall settlement, when we talk about peace is: what does it mean to have peace?

Q. But there are certain problems that have clearly got to be solved before there can be peace, by anybody's interpretation, and I would like to know what the Israeli position is about these. First of all, the United Nations resolution 242 calls upon Israel to withdraw from territories occupied as a result of the war in 1967—not all territories, but territories. How many territories, and how much, are you prepared to give up in the interests of a lasting peace?

A. Well, as you know, Israel's policy is that we are ready for territorial compromises. In the context of a real peace, I would say that Israel would be ready to give the bulk of Sinai, but not to return completely to the 1967 lines, because we have to have a defensible boundary, because our basic conception is that, even in the context of peace, Israel should rely on its own capability to defend itself.

Q. But, in the north, are you ever prepared to give up the Golan Heights?

A. No. I have said, and this is our position, that, even in the context of a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, we cannot go down from the Golan Heights. I am not now drawing exact maps, and therefore all that I would like to stress is that, even in the context of peace, we have to be on the Golan Heights.

Q. You would not, for example, accept a United Nations presence on the Golan Heights?

A. No, I do not believe that the United Nations, in the context of a real peace, have much part to play. What does it mean if you decide to have this? It means that you want to build new kinds of relations between the two sides, not to have somebody to serve as a buffer between you and the other side.

Q. What about the West Bank and Palestine? What solution are you prepared to envisage for that?

A. The way that I see it is that we have to bring

¹⁴⁴ Interview conducted by Lord Chafont for BBC television's "Tuesday Documentary" broadcast June 17, 1975; monitored and transcribed by the Institute for Palestine Studies.

about the solution of the Palestinian issue by having, within the form of the original Palestine of 1918—which then included the East and the West Bank as one political entity, because, before that, there was no political entity that was called Palestine—within this area, to have two states. One is going to be a Jewish state; it does not mean that all the Jews, or only Jews, will have to live there, but this is going to be Israel. East of it, a Jordanian-Palestinian state. As you know, this government is committed to go to elections. If, in the process of the negotiations with Jordan, we reach a point where we can have a peace agreement that will call for giving back parts of the West Bank, I think we will get a majority, but I don't believe that I am in a position now to draw exact lines.

Q. No, not to draw exact lines, but what you have said is already very encouraging: that you are prepared to envisage territorial concessions on the West Bank of the Jordan as a part of a final peace settlement.

A. Well, if we reach a peace agreement, and it includes the kinds of alliance that I consider acceptable, then I will recommend it.

Q. Now we come, of course, to the final question, which is Jerusalem, because this has always, it seems to me, to be one of the keys to the final settlement of any Middle East conflict. Are you ever prepared to give up again your sovereignty over Jerusalem?

A. No. The answer is a clear no. I believe that Jerusalem should remain a united city and the capital of Israel. Jerusalem is a living city of about 330,000 people, out of which about 75 per cent are Jews, the others are non-Jews. It is a city in which people live. When it comes to the question of the holiness of Jerusalem, allow me to remind you that Jerusalem is the Holy Place of Judaism. For 2,000 years, whenever a Jew was praying, and is praying, he turns his face to Jerusalem. For the Moslems, Jerusalem comes third, after Mecca and Medina. When a Moslem prays, he does not turn his face to Jerusalem, he turns his face to Mecca. Allow me to remind you that, in the last 150 years in Jerusalem, there has been a Jewish majority, it is not something new. Now, of course, the majority is much bigger—as I said, about 75 per cent, and therefore it should be part of the Jewish state, the capital of the Jewish state, and you cannot just divide it from the body of the Jewish state—for us, it is the heart of the Jewish state.

Q. King Hussein once said to me that Israel had a choice: that she could live as a fortress in a sea of hatred, or could become a part of the Middle Eastern area. Do you accept that Israel can live as a fortress for very long?

A. Well, for the last 27 years, we have lived as a fortress in a sea of hatred. I would not say that the same amount of hatred was shown on each side of our borders, but, in the long run, the desire to move towards peace on our side is not to live as a fortress, that is what we hope in our efforts to bring about peace. Unfortunately, till today, I have not seen a real readiness on the part of the Arab leaders, or most of them at least, to reconcile with Israel as a Jewish independent and viable state, and, unless they reconcile—not recognise, reconcile—we will still continue to live in a sea of hatred.

Q. But can Israel survive in that kind of climate if you are going to have years and years of attacks by Palestine Liberation Organisation guerrillas? Can that go on? Can a nation really survive in that kind of atmosphere?

A. The real threat to Israel is not by the so-called PLO. They, by no means, can endanger Israel. The real problem that we face is the Arab countries' hostile attitude towards Israel, and, once we have an understanding with the key Arab countries, or two key Arab countries, then we will start the real move towards peace. I believe that the Palestinian issue is secondary in the efforts to move towards peace, and the real issue—the key, as a matter of fact, either to peace or to war—lies in the Egyptians' hands.

I believe that we are now in a more relaxed Middle East than it was in March. During the negotiations in March, we were told that, unless Israel would withdraw its forces from the present line, the Suez Canal could not be reopened. The Suez Canal was reopened. Secondly, it is preferable, in my opinion, to explore through normal diplomatic channels the various aspects of the interim agreement, and not to do something that creates great expectations, and, when it doesn't succeed, brings about disappointment. Therefore, I expect the continuation of a quiet exploration through diplomatic channels about the possibility of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Q. Do you think that it is a good thing, at this special moment, for Israel to have a soldier Prime Minister?

A. What do you expect me to say? I believe

it is not essential, but I believe that it adds to the capability of the Prime Minister whenever he discusses defence methods; and, after all, one of the most crucial issues that Israel is still facing is a question of our defence. But I hope that my generation will be able to see not only wars, but also to see the end of them, and when I say the end of them, I really mean the end of them. To bring about peace: this is the dream, and I hope it will be fulfilled.

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Press interview statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia pointing to the advantages of a Middle East settlement¹⁴⁵

Kranj, Slovenia, late June, 1975

Q. What do you think of the situation in the Middle East and the efforts of Mr. Kissinger to render a settlement possible? Does the coexistence of a Palestinian state and Israel seem conceivable to you?

A. The situation in the Middle East remains extremely worrying. We are convinced that the principal reason for this is the obstinate refusal of Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories and the fact that the Palestinian people are prevented from exercising their sovereign rights. If these fundamental problems were resolved, one could create real preconditions for the coexistence and peaceful and constructive collaboration of all countries and peoples of the region, without exception. All the countries of the region, obviously including Israel, would be provided with real and equal guarantees for their integrity and independence. Better yet, it would be possible to coordinate, in the interests of all, the existing Israeli industrial and technological potential with the developmental requirements of the other countries of the region.

History provides us with a number of examples of countries, who previously having been at war, have found it possible to collaborate and establish relations of mutual confidence. Failing this, it will be difficult to conceive of long-term security for any country. The realization of these goals in the

Middle East would contribute in a significant way to the peace and stability of the whole world. As to the means of attaining this objective, it is necessary to hold in good faith all that effectively leads to its realization and prevents the prolongation or perpetuation of a situation in which major problems remain unsolved.

We are profoundly convinced that the other countries, beginning with the non-aligned countries and those of Western Europe can and should contribute even more to the realization of this goal. For all that, we are not minimizing the primary responsibility of the parties directly concerned and the great powers. But we have not the right to remain passive in face of a situation the consequences of which affect the great majority of countries.

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Message from Foreign Minister Allon of Israel replying to UK Foreign Minister Callaghan's note protesting the state funeral of the assassins of Lord Moyné¹⁴⁶

Jerusalem, late June, 1975

The participation of people representing a wide spectrum of Israeli political life in the funeral of Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet-Zuri is part of an ongoing effort of national reconciliation aimed at the healing of wounds and scars of a generation ago.

The principles which animated the responsible leadership in Israel at the time of its struggle for national liberation have neither been discarded nor overlooked and are as valid today as they were then. The fact that the Government of Israel has sought the return of the bodies of Hakim and Bet-Zuri and was represented at their reinterment service in no way implies a change in the attitude of the Government of Israel towards assassination as a political instrument.

Mr. Allon fails to understand why Mr.

¹⁴⁵ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by André Fontaine, *Le Monde* (Paris), June 26–27, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ English text as published in *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London), July 4, 1975, p. 7. The UK note said in part, "that we very much regret that an act of terrorism should be honoured in this way." (*ibid.* p.6.) The British embassy in Beirut was not able to acquire a full text of the note for inclusion in this volume.

Callaghan should see the slightest link between an act of grace involving the distant past and present terrorism in the Middle East to which, as Mr. Callaghan rightly says, we are all anxious to put an end.

It is regrettable that this gesture of human decency towards men who died over 30 years ago should be the cause of criticism in Britain—a country which has earned respect for its balanced and dispassionate assessment of its own colonial past.

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Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China warning of “superpower hegemonism” in the Middle East¹⁴⁷

Peking, July 4, 1975

In the Middle East, the struggle of the people against imperialism and hegemonism is developing in depth following the valiant war of resistance waged by the Arab and Palestinian peoples in October 1973 and the use of the oil weapon, which dealt heavy blows at Israeli Zionism and superpower hegemonism. But the superpowers definitely will never halt or give up their aggression and contention in this region. They seek to restore the “no war, no peace” stalemate in the Middle East, with each aiming at expanding its own forces and influence. We feel certain that the peoples of the Arab countries and Palestine, who have a long tradition of anti-imperialist struggle, will frustrate all devilish manoeuvres of the superpowers and recover their lost territories and national rights so long as they strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian peoples.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to China of Vice-President Maaruf of Iraq (excerpt)¹⁴⁸

Peking, July 7, 1975

Chairman Mao Tsetung met Vice-President Marouf, and they had a cordial and friendly conversation. Chairman Mao requested Vice-President Marouf to convey his regards to President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr upon returning to Iraq.

Premier Chou En-lai also met Vice-President Marouf. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and Vice-President Marouf held talks in a sincere and friendly atmosphere. The two sides exchanged views on major international issues of common interest and on further developing the friendly relations and co-operation between China and Iraq. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks.

The two sides were glad to note that in recent years the friendly relations and co-operation between China and Iraq had grown daily and friendly exchanges between the two countries had steadily increased. Both sides were resolved to make joint efforts for the continued development of the friendly relations and co-operation between the governments of the two countries and the friendship between the two peoples.

During the visit, the two sides signed some documents on developing the trade and economic and technical co-operation between the two countries.

The two sides pointed out with satisfaction that the visit of the Iraqi Government Delegation headed by His Excellency Vice-President Marouf to the People's Republic of China was a complete success as well as a new contribution to the furtherance of the friendship and amicable co-operation between the two countries.

¹⁴⁷ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 28 (July 11, 1975), p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Partial English text, *Peking Review*, XVIII, 28 (July 11, 1975), p. 4; the visit took place July 4–7.

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Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany evaluating relations with Israel and his talks with Israel's Prime Minister Rabin¹⁴⁹

July 9, 1975

Q. In spite of the establishment of diplomatic relations ten years ago, the foreign relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Israel have been influenced in a special way by two factors: On the one hand, by the special moral character of the relationship between Jews and Germans arising from the extermination of nearly six million Jews, and, on the other hand, by the permanent conflict situation in the Middle East, which appears to make a balanced policy of good relations with all states in this area of tension impossible. Is it, under these conditions, not at least incorrect to speak of normal relations?

A. I think one should first say that it has been a long road from the establishment of diplomatic relations to the present stage which these relations have reached. This is understandable with regard to the past, which neither side wants to suppress or forget. Now it is a question of shaping the future together, and we as Germans have an interest in making a peace settlement in the Middle East possible, in which the right of Israel to exist in recognized and secured frontiers is possible. I believe this is the decisive point for the talks that will be held here in Bonn.

Q. Do you regard the moral phase in the policy towards Israel, the reparation, as concluded?

A. I think a policy without morality towards another state is impossible, also not towards Israel. In reparation legislation and reparation payments, agreement has been reached in the past, and the Federal Government has done what it agreed to do. Now it is a question—I repeat this once again—of shaping the future together, with Israel together with other states in the area.

Q. The Federal Government is to outline clearly to its guest the policy of balanced relations—you have just referred to this. What do you mean concretely by this balance in relations?

A. Now, I do not think that it is a question of clarifying this policy with the Prime Minister.

He knows all about it. A number of meetings have taken place, and not least I have met the Israeli Foreign Minister twice this year. In fact, it is for us a question, when we talk of a balanced policy—as I already mentioned—of a lasting peace settlement being achieved in the Middle East. This includes Israel's right to live in recognized and secured frontiers, and also account being taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the necessity of the occupied areas being cleared, as was expressed in the resolution of the Foreign Ministers of the European Community in November 1973.¹⁵⁰ And this resolution is based, too, on the relevant United Nations resolutions. There is growing recognition on both sides, both on the Israeli and the Arab side, that this view of the nine European states is a very constructive one that can lead somewhere. This does not exclude the fact that we vigorously support all efforts towards the solution of part questions prior to a final and lasting settlement. Thus the Federal Government has never had any doubt in assessing the value of the American Secretary of State's efforts very highly. We have done everything—and we shall do everything in the future—to promote the efforts of the U.S. Secretary of State in relations with both sides.

Q. Let us stay with the Middle East conflict. Does the Federal Government intend to adopt a special function, perhaps even play a mediatory role?

A. A role as mediator would be wrong. But as Europeans we are neighbours of the Middle East region. We are therefore directly interested that the centre of conflict be removed. Peace in the Middle East is also our peace, and vice versa. And this alone makes it clear that we—like the other European states—are called on to engage ourselves in the interests of securing peace in the Middle East, and to promote any readiness to seek understanding, and any responsible attitude. And we see, for example, such a responsible attitude in the readiness of Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, on the other, to arrive at solutions, to partial questions. For that reason, also our vigorous support for American efforts.

Q. Bonn has spoken about flanking measures by the EEC. What ideas does the Federal Foreign Minister have about this?

¹⁴⁹ Granted to Deutschlandfunk; English text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy in Beirut.

¹⁵⁰ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

A. There are two different things to consider here. For one thing, as the European Economic Community, we have just concluded, as you know, a contract in the economic sector with Israel.¹⁵¹ It is extremely important for Israel. We are seeking the same thing with Israel's neighbour states in the Middle East, which also underlines our balanced policy even in the economic sector. Within the framework of European political co-operation, we are trying to realize the principles of the resolution of 6 November 1973 I have just mentioned.

Q. Could flanking measures also mean EEC participation in the setting up of a peace-keeping force from the European countries?

A. The European states will quite certainly not rule this out, but I think it is still too early to ask such a question. There are other problems at present.

Q. Israel's status in the U.N. is also problematical. Is the Federal Republic ready to give Israel support against Arab considerations of chasing Israel out of the U.N.?

A. We are unconditional supporters of the universality of the United Nations, i.e. the membership of all states. And this alone calls on us quite naturally to resist the exclusion of any state, no matter which, and quite naturally Israel.

Q. Relations between France and Israel are problematical. Will the Federal Government try to mediate here to place Franco-Israeli relations on a new basis?

A. I do not think that there is any need for mediation by the Federal Government. The French attitude is part of the attitude of the Nine, but, on the other hand, no observer could have failed to note that at times there have been critical voices. I believe the fact that the Federal Government today maintains relations with Israel, on the one hand, and with Israel's Arab neighbours, on the other, that are absolutely free of tension shows that our balanced policy does not mean standing to one side, nor neutrality, but on the contrary a constructive contribution to a sensible solution, also with the aim of supporting those in both camps who seek understanding.

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Joint communiqué issued after a meeting between US Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)¹⁵²

Geneva, July 11, 1975

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on July 10-11 in Geneva between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Andrei A. Gromyko.

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In reviewing the international issues of interest to both sides, they held a thorough discussion, in particular, on questions concerning the holding of the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the summit level in Helsinki. They also continued their exchange of views on matters of achieving a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference.

The talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and both sides believe that the exchange of views was constructive and useful from the standpoint of further developing US-Soviet relations in conformity with the course they have embarked on together and the concrete agreements reached during the US-Soviet summit meetings.

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Remarks by US Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel regarding the possibility of a Sinai interim agreement¹⁵³

Bonn, July 12, 1975

Rabin: Well, Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, I am very thankful to the Federal Republic of Germany for making it possible to use my visit for another purpose, not just visiting the

¹⁵² Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1884 (August 4, 1975), pp. 188-189.

¹⁵³ Made to the press after talks held at Schloss Gymnich, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1884 (August 4, 1975), p. 189.

¹⁵¹ See docs. 93 and 104 above.

Federal Republic. I thank the Secretary, who found the time to have this meeting with me. In the meeting we have discussed in the way that normally we discuss between Israel and the United States—in a friendly atmosphere—the problems we face today.

We discussed various elements and aspects of the interim agreement with Egypt. We received—the Israeli part has received—certain clarifications. With these clarifications I am going tonight to Israel. We will have to discuss it there, and the Ambassador of Israel to the United States will bring our reaction to what we have heard and we have discussed in this meeting.

I am still hopeful that an interim agreement will be reached, but we have to overcome certain difficulties in the road to its achievement. Thank you very much.

Kissinger: I also would like to express the appreciation of the U.S. Government to the Federal Republic for making this meeting possible. The Prime Minister and I had a very friendly and very constructive talk. We reviewed all the elements of a possible interim agreement, and we attempted to answer the questions that Israel had put to us earlier in the week and additional questions that the Prime Minister raised this morning.

I believe that we have made progress in achieving understanding of the elements that are needed, and the Prime Minister will now return to Israel and communicate with us through his Ambassador later in the week. But from our point of view, I consider the talks constructive, and the atmosphere was friendly and warm as befits the relationship between our two countries.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what are the major difficulties you referred to?

Rabin: I am not going to elaborate about details. I believe for the time being the statements that have been made are enough. You are going on the plane; you'll get an opportunity to—
[Laughter.]

Kissinger: It may produce a senior official familiar with the Middle East. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think an interim agreement is closer now than it was prior to your meeting with the Prime Minister?

Kissinger: Well, I always believe that some progress in clarifying issues was made, and this can only be helpful. But, of course, it depends on all

of the parties, and we will have to see later on in the week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] do you plan a trip to the Middle East now?

Kissinger: I said the next event will be the return of the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, and after that, we will make the decisions of how to carry the process forward.

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Resolution of the Sixth Session of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers (excerpt)¹⁵⁴

Jidda, July 15, 1975

In the Political Field:

The Conference resolved to form a permanent follow-up committee on the Jerusalem question whose task shall be to implement such resolutions in that regard as have been adopted or shall be adopted by the Islamic Conference and to follow up the implementation of the resolutions of other international bodies that support Arab rights and the stand of the Islamic Conference. The Conference authorized the Committee to make such recommendations as it sees fit to the member countries and resolved to support the Arab right to Palestine and the legitimate struggle to recover the rights of the Palestinian people. It called on the other countries to support this struggle against colonialism and Zionism by all available means.

The Conference condemned Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories and regards all human, geographical and social, cultural and economic changes that have been made as invalid.

The Conference condemns the countries that provide Israel with military, economic and manpower support and calls on the member countries to sever their diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with Israel and to expel her from the United Nations.

¹⁵⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), July 17, 1975.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing current developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the UN and warning of the dangers of a continued stalemate¹⁵⁵

Minneapolis, July 15, 1975

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to be more specific about your speech last night about the United Nations¹⁵⁶ and your reference again today. Specifically, if the General Assembly should vote to exclude Israel in the coming General Assembly session, is this the sort of thing that might cause the United States to withdraw from the General Assembly?

A. Well, we have not said exactly what we will do if the Charter of the United Nations is violated, in our view. We believe that the expulsion of member states by the General Assembly, which is a responsibility under the charter of the Security Council, would be an act which would affect American participation in the activities of that body. To what degree and in what manner remains to be determined. But we believe that the charter should be strictly observed and should not be used for punitive purposes that are incompatible with it.

Q. If I could just follow that up. You say it would affect American participation. Are you referring to the reaction that probably would occur in Congress or are you talking about action by the executive branch?

A. The executive branch would undoubtedly take some actions. But what these actions would be I am not now prepared to say. But above all we are trying to prevent that situation from arising.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned in response to an earlier question today that what the United States says to Israel is in the press more than what the United States says to Egypt. Is there anything that the United States has said to Egypt that hasn't made the news as of yet?

A. The individual steps by which the negotiation proceeds are, in the nature of the governmental system in Israel, likely to be more public. The basic point that I made was that the United States attempts to advance the negotiating process

and it makes its best judgment to each side as to what is needed to make progress. And we have done this with Egypt. As the negotiations come to a conclusion, if they come to a conclusion, then it will be apparent what each side has conceded.

But the United States cannot, as an intermediary, announce on its part what each side is going to say or what it says to each side at each stage along the way.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech you apparently said that no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs. And my question is how actively do you feel the United States must participate in world affairs in order to achieve stability in power relationships, for instance, in Korea or in the Middle East?

A. That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. In many parts of the world no stability is possible without an American effort. On the other hand, the situation of the United States has changed as compared to the immediate postwar period, in which all the efforts had to be carried out almost exclusively by the United States. Other parts of the world have now developed some strength and self-confidence and can assume larger responsibilities.

As a general rule, the United States is reluctant to undertake new commitments for the long-term stationing of military forces abroad and looks rather for the local capacity to defend itself if necessary and, if we think it is in our own interests, with our support.

In the Middle East we are in the position that we are the only country that both parties can talk to or have been willing to talk to. And also we are the country that has been the major source of support for Israel. Therefore we have an obligation to see what we can do to bring the parties closer together and to see whether some momentum can be created for peace.

In Korea we have a mutual security treaty which obliges us to the common defense, which is also in our interest because of the importance Japan and other countries attach to it.

So I would say our role is changing. It is less direct than it was in the past, and it is less military than it has been in the past. But it still has to be significant.

¹⁵⁵ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1884 (August 4, 1975), pp. 173-178.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 158.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what area, in your estimation, poses the greatest threat to our U.S. security today?

A. Well, without answering the question of what is a threat to U.S. security, obviously the greatest immediate threat of war is in the Middle East.

The action to which my attention was called, which I have not officially heard yet, of the nonrenewal of the UNEF¹⁵⁷ mandate in the Sinai is just one example of the precariousness of the situation in the Middle East if no progress is made towards a peace settlement. If there is a war in the Middle East, it is bound to have consequences outside of the Middle East. I think that is the area that is most complicated.

Of course, the nature of modern weapons is such that there are always dangers of technological breakthroughs and of one side getting ahead of the other, which is one reason why we attach so much importance to the strategic arms negotiations.

But the single most complicated area in the world and the single area most likely to produce a conflict, if no progress is made, is the Middle East.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, if U.S. troops are committed as a buffer in the Sinai, need we be afraid that that might be a military foot in the door that will be hard to extract, as the foot in Viet-Nam was hard to extract many years ago?

A. There is no possibility of committing American forces as a buffer. And whatever may be done in the Sinai will not be to involve the United States in any possible military operation.

Now, I have seen some of the newspaper speculation on what might or might not be done. But I want to make clear that nothing that is being considered or even generally talked about involves a possibility of an American military involvement in any military conflict in the Middle East.

We are now conducting reconnaissance flights for both of the parties.

The issue that has been informally raised is whether some of these functions that are performed occasionally by reconnaissance flights could be done on a more permanent basis; that is to say, warning and so forth. But that would be done for both sides. It would not be done for the United

States, and it would not involve any possibility of military combat.

Q. Mr. Secretary, please, sir, in light of the recent and ever-continuing terrorist acts in Israel, is it a vital step still that Israel must negotiate with the Palestinians en route to the Geneva Conference?

A. The United States has never recommended that Israel negotiate with the Palestinians. The U.S. position is that the question of any negotiation between Palestinians and Israel presupposes the acceptance by the Palestinians of the State of Israel and of the relevant Security Council resolutions, neither of which has yet been done by the Palestinians. So we have never taken the position which you have described.

Q. Mr. Secretary, first, we are very happy that you are here. Second, why do you insist on Israel to pull back; and if they do not, you say that you will not sell them any armaments?

A. Well, both of these propositions are incorrect.

We believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is essential. It is essential in the interests of Israel; it is in the interests of the other countries; it is in the interests of the United States.

As long as the United States is in the position in which it finds itself in the Middle East, we cannot escape the consequences of either a stalemate or of an explosion. And therefore we, having been first invited by both of the parties to participate in the negotiations, have given our own judgment as to what is required to make progress.

There has never been any question of embargoing arms to Israel. The questions have been the normal discussion of the scale of the support and some items of a particular kind of technology which are rather long-lead-time items.

So the two basic assumptions in your question are not correct.

But the United States believes—the President has repeatedly said it, and I have repeatedly said it—that a stalemate in the Middle East will in time have consequences that will be extremely unfortunate for all of the parties.

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¹⁵⁷ Doc. 263 below.

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Declaration issued by the EEC summit meeting affirming the universality of the United Nations (excerpt)¹⁵⁸

Rome, July 1, 1975

1. The Heads of State and Government, having reviewed the situation of the United Nations, which celebrates its 30th anniversary this year, and having taken into consideration the forthcoming sessions, extraordinary and ordinary, of the General Assembly, emphasize that the increasing interdependence of countries and peoples multiplies problems requiring solutions on the world level.

2. The Nine reiterate their confidence in the United Nations, the principal organ of international cooperation. They affirm the necessity of reinforcing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations, the universal and indispensable instrument for dialogue and cooperation at the world level.

3. The Nine intend to defend and promote respect for the Charter, the rights of member states and current rules of procedure. This respect is the basis of the confidence that people have in the organization. The Nine also consider that all attacks on this principle prevent the United Nations from playing its true role.

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Resolution of the US Senate calling for retaliatory action if Israel is expelled from the UN¹⁵⁹

Washington, July 18, 1975

Whereas the United Nations Charter implores its members to "practice tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and...to employ international machinery for the promotion of the

economic and social advancement of all peoples," and

Whereas any action to expel members for political reasons violates the spirit of the United Nations Charter: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the United States Senate looks with disfavor and concern over persistent attempts by some nations among the so-called nonaligned nations of the Third World to expel Israel from membership in the United Nations; and be it further

Resolved, That if Israel is expelled from the United Nations the Senate will review all present United States commitments to the Third World nations involved in the expulsion, and will consider seriously the implication of continued membership in the United Nations under such circumstances.

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Statements by Agriculture Minister Uzan of Israel expressing concern over the amount of land leased to Arabs¹⁶⁰

July 21, 1975

The amount of land that is being leased is extremely alarming. We are at present witnessing a return to the period of leasing land that existed more than fifty years ago. Every possible means must be employed to put an end to this phenomenon of illegal leasing of land to foreign elements, and every person or body caught leasing land to Arabs will be penalized.

The first step to be taken against [those who lease land to Arabs] will be to stop all government aid-credits, development loans and grants, and water supplies will be cut off from those who lease state lands. Then the state will confiscate the land of the person who leases it.

The Ministry of Agriculture is drafting an amendment to the Settlement Law to make it possible to confiscate land from settlers, and even their houses, on condition that other housing units are made available to them so as to put a stop, by all available means, to this dangerous phenomenon.

¹⁵⁸ Excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the EEC.

¹⁵⁹ Adopted without objection; *Congressional Record* (daily), July 18, 1975, p. S 13008. A similar resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on August 1, *Near East Report* (Washington), XIX, 32 (August 6, 1975), p. 134.

¹⁶⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), July 22, 1975.

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Statement by Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen of Canada announcing postponement of the UN Conference on the Prevention of Crime, to be held in Canada, due to intended PLO participation¹⁶¹

Ottawa, July 21, 1975

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, earlier the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Munro) asked me about my visit to the Secretary General at the United Nations on Friday. I confirm that the visit did take place and my main purpose in seeing the Secretary General was to discuss the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. In the course of that discussion I advised the Secretary General of the United Nations that Canada does not wish to proceed with the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders this year.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

MacEachen: I have sought the Secretary General's co-operation in obtaining a postponement of the congress, and he has undertaken to study the situation in order to clarify the position. In the government's view, this congress cannot be held successfully anywhere this year.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

MacEachen: Hon. members will recall that at the fourth congress held in Kyoto in 1970, the Government of Canada, in consultation with the province of Ontario, proposed that the venue of the next congress be Toronto, in September of 1975. This proposal was accepted by delegations and subsequently confirmed by the General Assembly. Since that time, however, there has been a steady deterioration of the atmosphere in which international conferences are held. I need hardly mention the discord which marred the sixth special session and the last regular session of the General Assembly, the recent conferences of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, UNIDO, and of the International Labour Organization, ILO, as well as the International Women's Year conference in Mexico a few weeks ago.

Whereas a minimum of co-operation is essential to any progress in the international field, we have

witnessed lately excessive confrontation on issues that were not related to the subject matter of conferences. The ingredients are well known: racialism in Southern Africa, the Middle East conflict, producer-consumer relations and the full range of economic development problems subsumed under calls for a "New World Economic Order". Canada believes that these are very real and difficult problems which must be dealt with urgently, in the appropriate international institutions, before they poison the body politic of the United Nations family; and let there be no doubt that we consider it necessary and desirable that political factors take their proper place even in the most technical of conferences. But they must meet some test of relevance, and in recent United Nations conferences this has clearly not been the case.

Hon. members are well aware that in respect of the Toronto congress on crime prevention, which was to take place next September, one of these issues had already become paramount. It arose from the resolution adopted in November, 1974, by the General Assembly, with Canada dissenting, inviting the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO, to attend its sessions as a permanent observer and, in a similar capacity, conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly or other organs of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Government of Canada was informed by the United Nations secretariat some time ago that observers from the PLO had been invited to attend the fifth congress on crime prevention and that the Canadian authorities were expected to allow entry, sojourn and exit to these participants.

Needless to say, it is with reluctance that the government has decided to seek postponement of the congress, but we concluded that it would not be possible, in present circumstances, to hold a successful congress on crime prevention in Canada or anywhere else. We are all aware of the public outcry for or against the admission to Canada, for this congress, of observers from the Palestinian Liberation Organization. We have all been worried by its divisive effect upon Canadian public opinion. We could not ignore the risk of public disorders. These factors would have led any government to reconsider a decision to host an international conference. But in the final analysis, two factors dominated in our discussions. The first was the inevitable intrusion of unrelated political

¹⁶¹ Text supplied, on request, by the Canadian embassy in Beirut.

considerations into the proceedings of the congress. The second was the re-escalation of violence in the Middle East and the consequent spread of its bitterness into Canada and subsequently into the congress itself.

It is obvious that such intrusion of the Middle East conflict, by adding to the already hopeless confusion between civil crimes and acts of war, would distort and subvert the purposes of what has essentially been up to now, and should remain, a technical meeting of experts from all countries, striving to develop international cooperation in a field of vital importance to the rule of law and to public order everywhere. As host country, we felt that Canada had assumed a major responsibility for the success of this congress, and in such an unfavourable political climate we did not see how we would possibly carry out our responsibility. I should add that we were also concerned about the coincidence of the congress with the seventh special session of the General Assembly on development and international economic co-operation, since the contentious atmosphere of one would in all likelihood seep into the other.

However, after an extensive review of the government's domestic and international obligations, we decided to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations that we did not want to be relieved of the responsibility for holding this congress but, rather, wished to postpone it. We did not want to withdraw our invitation to the United Nations, and we tried to avoid any steps which might have called into question our long-standing commitment to the principles of the United Nations. I emphasize that Canada's willingness to participate in and contribute to the operations of United Nations agencies remains undiminished.

The respite obtained by postponement must be effectively used by all to bring about sufficient improvement in attendant political conditions so that we may have reasonable assurances that technical conferences such as the fifth United Nations congress on crime prevention will be useful and productive. We hope that current negotiations for the reduction of tensions between some of the parties to the Middle East conflict will prove successful in coming months, and we will actively support the continuing efforts of the parties directly involved and of the United States government toward that goal.

Furthermore, the next General Assembly of the

United Nations will provide an opportunity to affirm the principle of universality as a fulfilment of what ought to be a basic aim of the United Nations. More specifically, we will resist any attempt to exclude Israel or any other country from the proceedings of the General Assembly.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

MacEachen: Acceptance of this principle would guarantee the status of Israel within the community of nations and thus remove one cause of instability in the area. So that in requesting the postponement of the congress, Canada is not shirking its responsibilities but actually taking on new ones. Through new initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, the government will try to improve the political situation in the Middle East and in the United Nations, notably through our participation in the next session of the General Assembly which may be crucial for the future of the organization, given the fundamental character of the issues on which debates are expected to focus. Canada will consult with other interested countries on the ground rules governing technical discussions in United Nations arenas. Either independently or in co-operation with others, we will attempt to formulate and seek support for an effective resolution in the General Assembly on this question.

I also intend to accept, during the autumn, outstanding invitations to visit a number of countries in the Middle East. These visits, which the government already considered most useful for strengthening our relations with this region of the world, have taken a new urgency following the difficulties we encountered in holding the U.N. congress on crime prevention. The House can be assured that I will take this opportunity to solicit the views of my hosts on these difficulties and seek their views on the United Nations as a universal forum and an effective international instrument.

Hon. members should note that our decision to seek the postponement of the congress for the reasons stated is consistent with the policy of the government on the Middle East. We will continue to cultivate, as we have done in the past, friendly and co-operative relations with all states in the region and to attach great importance to the development of these relations. Likewise, Canada has tried in the past to maintain a balanced and objective approach to the Middle East conflict and will continue to do so. We have always supported and defended the right of the state of Israel

to exist in peace with its neighbours, behind secure and recognized borders. We have stated our conviction that no peaceful and stable solution to this regional conflict can be found without the participation of the Palestinians and the just settlement of their claims.

We have condemned the use of violence as a political instrument or as a means of retribution. We have participated in all UN peacekeeping and cease-fire supervision missions in the Middle East and contributed to the United Nations relief operations for Palestinian refugees. We have advocated, and continue to advocate, the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242. All of this, therefore, continues to be government policy.

We are confident that the initiatives to be taken by Canada and other countries on the future of the United Nations and the Middle East will lead to a different atmosphere in which the postponed Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders can be held in Canada, at a time to be decided upon, with sufficient assurances of success. It was agreed with the Secretary General of the United Nations that we should consult further on this question, and I expect to be in touch with him later this week.

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Speech to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel reacting to attempts to expel Israel from the UN (excerpts)¹⁶²

Jerusalem, July 23, 1975

I do not make light—and I do not propose that any of us make light—of the threat recently posed to Israel's status in the UN as a member of equal standing in all respects.

Admittedly, the expulsion of Israel from membership of the United Nations does not appear imminent at this time, so long as such a decision is in the hands of the Security Council. But in the light of the current composition of the General Assembly and the motives that determine the position of most of its members, there does exist a concrete risk that a decision will be taken which

may adversely affect our status in the UN, whether by preventing our participation in the General Assembly's debates or by some other means.

Israel will regard any such decision, any measure prejudicial to its status, if passed, as an extremely grave step, utterly incompatible with the UN Charter, a step which in fact undermines the UNO itself and its declared purposes.

Israel has been a member of the UN for 26 years—since May 11, 1949—and we cannot complain that we have been spoiled by it. Even the positive and historic resolution of November 29, 1947—when it was violated and put to the test by the invasion of the Arab States—left Israel on its own in the war for its existence, with the UN to all intents and purposes, standing aloof.

At that time, all we had was our own strength and the stability of our Zionist enterprise and without them the resolution for the establishment of the Jewish State would have been no more than a dead letter.

Since those distant days, we have suffered much from a discriminatory attitude. We have experienced a lengthy chain of disappointments from the UN, whether as an instrument for preserving peace in the region, or as the international organisation meant to give expression to new criteria of relations marked by peace, respect and mutual cooperation among its members.

Nonetheless, we have not despaired of the UN which, as it stands, still constitutes the sole political framework for all the nations of the world. We cooperated to the utmost of our ability in the constructive operations carried out by various bodies in the economic, social and cultural spheres and the provision of aid to developing countries.

We also gave our consent to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as establishing, as they stand, the only bases on which we would negotiate with our neighbours, whether on an overall peace or on interim settlements on the road to peace.

It is noteworthy that the UN—as the body that countersigned the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria, as the body that helped to convene the Geneva Conference and whose Secretary-General chaired its first session, as the body in charge of the emergency force in Sinai and the Golan, and responsible for its financing, and as the body one of whose agencies is responsible for the welfare of the Arab refugees—is involved in our region to a far greater degree than in any other region in the world.

¹⁶² Partial English translation, *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London), August 1, 1975, pp. 10–11.

As I have noted, the UN has very little left of its original aims but even this little is absolutely conditional upon the observance of the fundamental principles underlying its foundation and inscribed in its Charter.

Primary among these are the principles of the universality of membership in the organisation and sovereign equality of all its members. Article 2 of the UN Charter clearly establishes that "the organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members".

Anyone who robs the UN of these fundamental principles not only robs it of its last remaining breath but opens a door which must lead to the final collapse of the entire organisation.

From this decisive point of view, the machinations of the Arab States against Israel's status in the UN constitute more of a test for the UN itself than for Israel. Should it surrender to these machinations, it is the UN that will suffer by bringing about its own self-liquidation not only as an international forum which can claim to possess any sort of moral validity, but also as a means—however flawed and defective—for the promotion of peace in the Middle East and the world.

It would, therefore, be advisable for all the UN member States—and in this connection, perhaps, especially the countries numbered among the Third World—to remember well the fate of the first international organisation, the League of Nations, when it estranged itself from the fate of another small nation—Ethiopia—which was then struggling for its survival.

Israel is of course aware of the stubborn attempt of the Arab countries to isolate us and to ostracise us from, what is termed, "the family of nations". This is a cunning and continuous effort, which had its beginnings several years ago and which pins its hopes on the hypocrisy, the cynical selfishness and the cowardice which, to our regret, characterises the behaviour of a large number of countries in the international sphere.

Against these repeated machinations, we are engaged in an unremitting struggle, both vis-à-vis enlightened public opinion and in every international forum—and, as the experience of our struggle against Unesco demonstrates, not always without success.

The same applies to the abortive attempt of the Arab States to suspend Israel from the Assembly of the World Health Organisation and to the

courageous decision of the Government of Canada, which refused to host the UN conference on crime prevention in Toronto.¹⁶³

At this time, too, we are in the midst of a difficult campaign in this sphere, the efforts of the Arab States now being directed—as expressed in the decision of the Moslem Foreign Ministers in Jeddah on July 16¹⁶⁴—towards undermining our status and depriving us of our rights in the United Nations Organisation itself.

Indeed, in recent days, a number of enlightened countries have made important and unequivocal statements against the Arab scheme. Of these, I shall note the statements by the American Secretary of State,¹⁶⁵ the resolution of the heads of Government of the European community,¹⁶⁶ the forceful resolution of the American Senate and the official declarations of the Governments of France, Holland, Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway and Canada.

In this sphere, Israel will, of course, continue, extend and deepen its struggle, both in the diplomatic arena and on the information front.

However, I am obliged in all candour to tell the House that we must not delude ourselves. However positive and unequivocal the declarations made and yet to be delivered by enlightened countries, whatever promises we have received from a whole list of countries—these alone, I fear, will not suffice.

The issue confronting us is not a matter of justice and law. If that were the case, had these been the determining criteria, we would have had nothing to worry about.

The trouble is, that with the unrestrained tyranny of the artificial majority which rules the UN by its votes, there is no idea which cannot be assured of an automatic majority—however twisted, illegal or crazy it may be. If this effort is not vigorously nipped in the bud, the automatic hands will always be raised.

The aim of the ramified activity that we are developing in a systematic effort to preserve our rights in the UN to the full is not so much to prevent a majority after the resolutions are presented and the machinations carried out in the Assembly itself—here, I am afraid, the countries of oil and

¹⁶³ Doc. 131 above.

¹⁶⁴ Doc. 126 above.

¹⁶⁵ Doc. 127 above.

¹⁶⁶ Doc. 128 above.

fanaticism will always achieve a technical majority. The aim is to deter the plotters even before they arrive at the Assembly.

In order to achieve this, the enlightened countries, which are devoted to the destiny of the UN, will have to take more vigorous measures than they have done so far in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the US Senate.

In other words, the responsible countries will have to make it crystal clear to those who are plotting the attack on us, as well as to their potential partners, that the fate of Israel in the UN will determine the fate of the UN itself and that if Israel is suspended from the deliberations of the Assembly, or if its status is affected in any way, its friends, through their solidarity with it and through their concern for the fate of the UN itself, will see to it that Israel shall not find itself alone in this position.

If there is a time and a place at which the specific influence of the responsible countries can finally put an end to the irresponsible tyranny of the automatic majority in the UN, this is the time and this is the place.

Israel is entitled to expect such support, not only from those countries which are its outspoken friends but also from those countries that still hold dear what remains of the image of the UN.

For, without Israel as a member with equal rights, there will be no universality and equality in the UN. And without universality and equality, the UN will not be the United Nations. The matter is in their hands.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to France of Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)¹⁶⁷

Paris, July 24, 1975

In response to an invitation from His Excellency M. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of the French Republic, His Royal Highness Emir Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, paid an official visit to France

from July 21–24, 1975 AD—Rajab 12–15, 1395, AH.

His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud had talks with His Excellency Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic and His Excellency the Prime Minister M. Jacques Chirac. The talks were conducted in an extremely friendly atmosphere and covered important international issues, first and foremost among which were the problem of Palestine and the Middle East, the question of Arab-European dialogue and that of dialogue and cooperation between the industrial countries and the developing countries. The two sides also discussed bilateral relations between their countries.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction at the results of these talks and at the agreement of their views, and resolved to continue to cooperate in developing Arab-European dialogue and cooperation between the industrial countries and the developing countries. His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz expressed the appreciation of Saudi Arabia, the Arab world and the Islamic world for France's attitude of support for right, justice and peace in the Middle East.

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Press interview statements by newly-appointed Permanent UN Representative Herzog of Israel discussing Israel's role in the UN¹⁶⁸

Late July, 1975

Q. Why do you call your new job "unenviable?"

A. Because of organized hostility at the U.N. The dice are loaded against Israel in all those one-sided votes by the Arab-led bloc. The most unpleasant aspect is when the representatives come around to you in the evening outside the U.N. chambers and say: "Please understand, we are behind you, but we had to vote that way."

¹⁶⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), July 25, 1975.

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted from the interview conducted by Jay Axelbank, *Newsweek* (New York-international ed.), August 4, 1975, p. 52.

Q. How concerned are you about the Arab attempts to have Israel ousted from the U.N.?

A. They can't boot us out. Only the Security Council can do that—and I think a veto would be used in our favor. In any case, it is less an Israeli issue than one involving the U.N.'s future. If we are suspended from the General Assembly by a Third World majority, that will be the death of the U.N. And there is another great danger. If we were ousted from the U.N., how could we collaborate with all the peace-keeping and buffer forces in our area? This would raise the possibility of an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the Arabs.

Q. How will you fight Israel's case at the U.N.?

A. At the beginning I am going to play it by ear and try to learn what is going on. I will bear in mind Palmerston's words about British policy in the nineteenth century. A country has no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.

Q. Do you think you can get Israel's case across?

A. Yes. All this Arab pressure is boomeranging. The oil boycott failed. And the Sadat threat not to extend the U.N. mandate and the move by Arabs to expel us from the U.N. have aroused indignation and sympathy for Israel. Once again we are coming to be the underdog.

Q. At this point, how do you see the future of the U.N.?

A. The move to oust us is only a symptom of what I see as the Idi Aminization of the U.N. Soon people will be voted out of the U.N. because of the color of their skin or the kind of regime in their countries. And to see 70-odd nations voting the same way on any given issue is utterly ridiculous, a travesty of democracy. Each country has its own interests and independence. Yet they raise their hands together.

Q. How about the charge that Israel has been intransigent in the latest peace talks with Egypt?

A. Most certainly not. We sincerely want an accommodation and nonbelligerency. We have shown flexibility. But we are not prepared to bargain away our assets for nothing. The world must remember that the territory we hold fell into our hands as a result of Arab aggression in 1967 when the Arabs surrounded us and called for our extinction.

Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation—questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean¹⁶⁹

Helsinki, August 1, 1975

The participating states,

Conscious of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean states,

Convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area,

Believing that the strengthening of security and the intensification of co-operation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region, and expressing their intention to contribute towards peace, security and justice in the region, in which ends the participating states and the non-participating Mediterranean states have a common interest,

Recognizing the importance of their mutual economic relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states, and conscious of their common interest in the further development of co-operation,

Noting with appreciation the interest expressed by the non-participating Mediterranean states in the conference since its inception, and having duly taken their contributions into account,

Declare their intention: to promote the development of good neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on which their relations are based, and with the U.N. Declaration on Prin-

¹⁶⁹ Excerpted from the English text as published in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), September 1-7, 1975, p. 27308. The following countries took part: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, the Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA, USSR, West Germany, Yugoslavia.

ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and accordingly, in this context, to conduct their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States [see above];

To seek by further improving their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole; to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean states the development of mutually beneficial co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, especially by expanding commercial exchanges, on the basis of a common awareness of the necessity for stability and progress in trade relations, of their mutual economic interests, and of differences in the levels of economic development, thereby promoting their economic advancement and well-being;

To contribute to a diversified development of the economies of the non-participating Mediterranean states, whilst taking due account of their national development objectives, and to co-operate with them, especially in the sectors of industry, security and stability in the Mediterranean area a better utilization of their resources, thus promoting a more harmonious development of economic relations; to intensify their efforts and their co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the non-participating Mediterranean states directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean, especially the safeguarding of the biological resources and ecological balance of the sea by appropriate measures, including the prevention and control of pollution; to this end, and in view of the present situation, to co-operate through competent international organizations and in particular within the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP); to promote further contacts and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean states in other relevant fields.

In order to advance the objectives set forth above the participating states also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean states to include all the states of the Mediterranean with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security,

lessening tensions in the region, and widening the scope of co-operation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives. The participating states would seek in the framework of their multilateral efforts to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes.

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Resolution of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU concerning the Middle East and the occupied Arab territories¹⁷⁰

Kampala, August 1, 1975

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session from 28 July to 1st August 1975 at Kampala, Uganda,

Having heard the statements delivered during the session of the Council of Ministers by the representatives of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the PLO¹⁷¹ and other delegations,

Having received the report of the OAU Administrative Secretary-General (CM/660 and 660 Add.I (XXV)),

Recalling resolutions AHG/Res.67(IX), AHG/Res.70 (X), CM/Res.332 (XXIII), as well as the resolution CM/Res.393 (XXIV), and the declaration concerning Palestine and the Middle East, CM/St.14 (XXIV),

Guided by the principles and objectives of the Charter of the OAU and the UN and by the common destiny of the Arab and African peoples, as well as their continuous struggle for their rights, freedom, peace and independence,

Noting with deep concern the constant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East as a result of Israel's persistent policy of aggression and refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions, together with its continued aggression on the Arab people within and outside the occupied Arab territories, and its continuous obstruction of every effort to

¹⁷⁰ English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Dahomey on October 13, 1975, and published October 16, 1975, in UN doc. A/10297, Annex II, pp. 6-8. Reservations were expressed by Sierra Leone, Senegal and Liberia, while Zaire opposed it.

¹⁷¹ Doc. 274 below.

achieve a just and durable peace, with the aim of gaining time and imposing a fait-accompli to establish aggression and occupation,

Reaffirming that just and permanent peace in Palestine and the Middle East can only be attained on the basis of complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the exercise by the Palestinians of their full national rights to sovereignty, national independence and self-determination,

Asserting that continued Israel occupation of Arab lands by force and violation of the national rights of the Palestinian people are, in themselves, a continued aggression and a serious threat to the security, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Arab countries and peoples,

Deeply concerned by the invalidity and illegitimacy of the measures taken by Israel to alter the human, geographical and cultural features in the occupied Arab territories with the aim of Judaization of Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied Arab territories,

Convinced that owing to Israel's continued violation of the principles of the UN Charter and its continued aggression against Arab countries and the Palestinian people, it is time to apply the sanctions stipulated by the Charter of the UN against Israel,

Further convinced of the necessity for the OAU to adopt adequate and practical measures to confront the Zionist enemy's continued aggression and violation:

1. *Reaffirms* its total and effective support for the frontline States and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore all the occupied territories and usurped rights by every possible means;

2. *Condemns* Israel's policy of aggression, expansion and annexation of Arab territories by force, and its attempts to alter their demographic, geographic, and cultural features;

3. *Condemns* Israel's continued refusal to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations and its deliberation, obstruction by all means of manoeuvring of every effort exerted to establish a just and permanent peace in the area;

4. *Further condemns* the persistent policy of repression pursued by Israeli occupation authorities against Arab inhabitants in the occupied Arab territories, as well as its persistent violation of their human rights, and its violation of the 1949 Geneva

Convention, in particular the fourth, concerning the protection of civilian inhabitants, and its barbaric attacks and raids on refugee camps and bombardment of civilian targets in the towns and villages of Southern Lebanon in violation of all principles of international and human laws;

5. *Strongly condemns* the attitude of the States supplying Israel with assistance, arms and means of killing and destruction and holds that the real purpose under-lying the flooding of Israel with such enormous quantities of weaponry is to establish it as an advanced base for racism and colonialism in the heart of the Arab and African World and of the Third World, and further considers that any aid or support to Israel is actually an encouragement and participation in the consolidation of the Israeli occupation and persistent aggression;

6. *Reaffirms*, once more, its resolution CM/Res.20 of the Eighth Extra-Ordinary Session;

7. *Invites* all African States to extend all possible potentialities available in the African World to the Arab confrontation powers so as to reinforce their struggle against the Zionist aggression;

8. *Calls upon* all OAU Member States to take the most appropriate measures to intensify pressures exercised against Israel at the UN and other Institutions, including the possibility of eventually, depriving it of its status as member of these Institutions;

9. *Considers* Zionism a danger to world peace, and decides to organize an information campaign in which all African information media would participate to unmask the racist aggressive nature of the Zionist entity in a continuous and planned manner, and to confront and refute all Zionist misleading propaganda campaigns aimed at arousing hostility against both the Arab and African Worlds;

10. *Requests* the OAU Administrative Secretary-General to closely follow up developments in the Middle East and to report thereon to the 26th Session of the Council of Ministers, and decides to keep the situation in the Middle East as one of the important items on the agenda of the next session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

Resolution of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the question of Palestine¹⁷²

Kampala, August 1, 1975

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session from 28 July to 1 August 1975 at Kampala, Uganda,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers at its Twenty-fourth Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa from February 13 to 21, 1975,

Guided by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the OAU and the UN, and noting with appreciation the heroic sacrifices of the Palestine people in the face of the Zionist aggression for the liberation of Palestine,

Having studied the developments of the Palestine cause and the grave situation arising from the continued occupation by Israel of Arab territories, its usurpation of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people, its refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions in this respect, particularly United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 3236 adopted at its 29th Session, its denial of the national rights of the Palestine people in Palestine, including their return to their homeland, their right to recover their property and to self-determination without any foreign intervention, and having likewise condemned the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestine and the dispersal of its people,

Considering that this situation constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolutions as well as of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and that its continuation represents a grave threat to international peace and security,

Considering that the Palestinian question is the root cause of the struggle against the Zionist enemy,

Reasserting the legality of the struggle of the Palestinian people for the restoration of their full national rights,

Considering that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being,

Considering that support of the Member States of the OAU for the people of Palestine in their struggle for the restoration of their national rights in Palestine and for their right to self-determination is a duty imposed by Afro-Arab solidarity,

Expressing its conviction that the military, economic, political and moral support of Israel by a number of States, notably the US, enables it to persist in its policy of aggression and to further reinforce its usurpation of Palestine and its occupation of Arab territories,

Considering that maintaining relations with Israel in the political, economic, trade, communications and other domains assists it to reinforce its usurpation of Palestine and to persist in its expansionist policy of aggression,

Considering that the continuation of the membership of Israel in the United Nations contradicts the principles and Charter of the United Nations and encourages Israel to ignore United Nations resolutions and to collude with various racist, expansionist and aggressive regimes,

1. *Decides*

a) to provide full and effective support to the Palestine people in their legitimate struggle to restore their national rights, including:

- Their right to return to their homeland, Palestine, and to recover their property,
- Their right to self-determination without any foreign intervention,
- Their right to sovereignty over their territory,
- Their right to establish their independent national authority.

b) To work in all domains to concretise recognition of these rights and ensure respect for them. The Member States of the OAU also undertake to adopt all appropriate measures towards that end;

c) That the OAU Liberation Committee and the Palestine Liberation Organization should jointly lay down a strategy aiming at liberating Palestine, considering that the cause of Palestine is an African cause;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to support the

¹⁷² English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Dahomey on October 13, 1975, and published on October 16, 1975, in UN doc. A/10297, Annex II, p. 9–11. Reservations were expressed by Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Liberia, while Zaire opposed it.

people of Palestine by every means in its struggle against Zionist racist colonialism to restore their full national rights. Member States, moreover, assert that restitution of their rights is an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Calls upon* the United Nations to work for the application of Resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly at its 29th Session;

4. *Reasserts* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legal representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle;

5. *Requests* Member States to implement the pertinent resolutions of previous OAU Summits and Foreign Ministers Conferences on the Palestinian cause as soon as possible;

6. *Reiterates* that it is desirable, in order to ensure the success of the PLO in its struggle to concretize the future of the Palestinian people's State, to provide it with all facilities and opportunities to intensify its contacts with the Governments of Member States;

7. *Condemns* Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories and its refusal to implement the Geneva convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians in times of war, its policy of judaizing the physical and cultural aspects of the occupied territories and considers that such acts and behaviour are war crimes and a challenge to mankind at large;

8. *Considers* that all the measures adopted by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and designed to alter their demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic aspects—including those aiming at judaizing the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and that under no circumstances can these measures or their consequences be recognized;

9. *Condemns* all States that provide military, economic and human support to Israel, and calls upon them to desist from doing so forthwith;

10. *Calls upon* all countries that have not yet done so, to sever political, cultural and economic relations with Israel;

11. *Calls upon* all OAU Member States to take all appropriate measures to intensify pressure against Israel at the United Nations and the other agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its status as a member of these agencies;

12. *Decides* to inscribe the item of the "Question of Palestine" on the agenda of the 26th Session of

the Council of Ministers;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the developments of the question of Palestine to the next session.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Israel of President Echeverria of Mexico (excerpts)¹⁷³

Jerusalem, August 10, 1975

At the invitation of the President of the State of Israel, Ephraim Katzir, the President of the United States of Mexico, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, paid a visit to the State of Israel August 7–10, 1975.

Reviewing the international situation, both the President and the Prime Minister agree that all states must intensify their efforts to bring about an era of peace for the world. In this sense, they reaffirm their countries' adherence to the Charter of the UN and reaffirm their support for the principles therein.

With regard to this world organization the two signatories reiterate their conviction that it must be strengthened with the active participation of all its members, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality for all states, and consequently the signatories pledge their support for the principle of universality of the UN.

President Echeverria expressed to Prime Minister Rabin his government's profound concern about the continued conflict in the Middle East and stated that in accordance with Mexico's love for peace and its belief that international law should govern the relations among states, his country supports the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The President and the Prime Minister agree that the conflict must be resolved on the basis of these resolutions. At the same time, they believe it necessary that all states show their good faith and solidarity and that the parties to the conflict undertake the steps necessary to settle their differences, abstain from the use of force and violence, put an end to the

¹⁷³ Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text supplied, on request, by the Mexican embassy in Beirut.

state of war and inaugurate a permanent and just peace in the region.

President Echeverria agrees with the point of view of Prime Minister Rabin that the present time is appropriate to install peace immediately between Israel and its neighbours.

Prime Minister Rabin expressed to President Echeverria his country's continued efforts to establish understanding and peaceful coexistence with the neighbouring countries.

President Echeverria reiterated the Mexican government's firm support for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The said zone could be established along the line of the Treaty of Tlatelolco¹⁷⁴ and within the framework of a Regional Middle East Conference in which all states of the area participate.

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Speech by President Echeverria of Mexico made at a dinner in his honour (excerpt)¹⁷⁵

Amman, August 10, 1975

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan can have a major share in the peace of the Middle East and in world peace. Because it is a country which combines ancient blood and modern Arab peoples, the sedentary and the Beduin, it has a great capability to put an end to the difficult situation it is living in as a result of the war. No country has lost more than Jordan in this conflict, and no country has been able to stand up so rapidly and with such great faith in its future as you have.

In fact there are no local conflicts properly so called, for they all revolve in the orbit of the conflict for world domination. Security can only be achieved in this area after study of the fundamental causative factors in the light of the intricate

network of conflicting local and international interests. Solutions for the problems of this area must be found on the basis of the just demands of the Palestinian people being met, the return of the occupied territories and the termination of the state of war. To sum up, the solution must take into consideration the interests of the conflicting parties, and this must be within the framework of the United Nations, which has effective ways of reaching peace. The specialized organs of the international community must analyse and study these conflicts impartially and devise a formula aimed, above all else, at solving the conflict on the basis of right. It is urgently necessary that the United Nations be strengthened and it must use all available means to ensure the enforcement of its resolutions so that the problems of the world may really be solved.

If, on the other hand, this organization—the most important international organization we have—is weakened, through decreasing economic support for it, or breaking down its membership, this will give the policy of the great powers the upper hand over the policy of principles that civilization so urgently requires.

Your Majesty;

Jordan has deep roots in the past which give it great strength for the future. The only product of this ancient Arab region is human effort, for although it has no major natural resources the greatest treasure Jordan possesses lies in its human resources.

All this is known to Your Majesty and this is the significance of your preoccupation with modern economic planning, aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in certain basic industries and expanding the sector of services and the people's productive activities.

The River Jordan is the only one of its kind, not because of its length, breadth or depth but because, unlike other rivers with abundant waters, it bears a great load of history. In spite of this its most important chapter has not yet been written—the history of fraternal peoples who after thousands of years find ways of coexisting. I want to stress that the diplomatic relations recently established between our two countries will strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between Jordan and Mexico and will be attentive to the implementation of joint programmes in the sectors of economics and culture.

¹⁷⁴ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed on February 14, 1967; see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bristol), February 3–10, 1968, pp. 22505–22507.

¹⁷⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 11, 1975.

I want to assure you and your people that Mexico is friendly to you and is working energetically for justice and peace.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of President Echeverria of Mexico (excerpts)¹⁷⁶

Amman, August 13, 1975

President Luis Echeverria Alvarez, President of the Mexican Republic, paid an official visit to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan from August 10–12, 1975.

The two heads of state devoted particular attention to the Middle East problem and expressed their profound concern at the dangerous situation in the area.

They affirmed that Israel's continued occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 constitutes a situation of permanent tension that threatens peace and security in the area and the whole world.

They agreed that the achievement of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East requires the immediate and total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the recovery of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

The President called attention to the need to safeguard the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all states in the area.

His Majesty expressed his support for the establishment of a nuclear free area in the Middle East, and the President congratulated His Majesty the King on this proposal and declared Mexico's resolute support for this initiative.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Israel cabinet announcing the continuation of talks with US officials aimed at achieving an interim agreement with Egypt¹⁷⁷

Jerusalem, August 17, 1975

The government heard the report from the team of ministers on recent contacts with the US government concerning an interim agreement with Egypt.

After discussing the report, the government approved of the ministers' attitude on the interim agreement, as it was revealed to the US government, including the points of great significance on which, as yet, no accord has been reached.

The government authorized the team of ministers to continue the talks in accordance with the attitudes approved by the government.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the prospects of his forthcoming Middle East visit and possible terms of a Sinai interim agreement¹⁷⁸

Vail, Colorado, August 17, 1975

Mr. Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: Let me read you two statements, and then Henry will be here to brief.

Secretary of State Kissinger will travel to the Middle East next week, leaving Washington on August 20. The discussions the United States has been conducting with the parties concerned, looking toward an interim agreement, have progressed to the point where the parties and the President believe it would be useful for the Secretary of State to travel to the area in an effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. The Secretary's visit to the Middle East will include several Arab countries and Israel.

The President has asked me to read you a statement.

¹⁷⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 14, 1975.

¹⁷⁷ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), August 18, 1975.

¹⁷⁸ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1890 (September 15, 1975), pp. 405–409.

I have worked many hours with the Secretary of State analyzing and assessing the situation in the Middle East, and I have now directed him to return to that region in an effort to bring the discussions to a successful conclusion.

I am hopeful that the parties will successfully conclude an interim agreement, which not only would be in the best interest of the parties involved but also in the best interest of the entire Middle East region and indeed of the whole world.

I am sure all Americans join me in wishing the Secretary of State success on this critically important mission.

Kissinger: We will go straight to the questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us some of the issues that remain outstanding that you are going to be working on?

A. We have made good progress on many of the issues. We have agreement in principle on some of the lines, but some details remain to be negotiated.

We still have to work out the protocols and the details of the various disposition of forces after another interim agreement has been made.

There will be complicated issues of civilian administration, and there are one or two issues of principle there remaining outstanding. However, it is the President's judgment, the judgment of the parties, and my own that in the light of the good will that has been shown by both parties in recent weeks, in light of the progress that has been made, the remaining differences are surmountable; and this is the attitude with which I am going there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that peace is at hand in the Middle East?

A. I haven't used that line for four years. [Laughter.]

Q. Where are you going, exactly?

A. Wait a minute. You don't think I am finished with a 30-second answer. I haven't even placed my verb yet. [Laughter.]

This, of course, is not a peace agreement. This is an interim step toward peace between Egypt and Israel, if it should succeed. The issues between Israel and the other countries remain to be resolved, and the United States remains committed to a just and lasting peace, as called for by the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Both the United States and Israel and all the other parties that we are in touch with agree that this will not be the end of the process, but a stage in the process. Nevertheless, if it succeeds, it will

be, and it can be, a very big step. It would be the first agreement that has been made between an Arab state and Israel not under the immediate impact of military hostilities, the first one that will require some complicated arrangement of cooperation.

Therefore we hope that it will be a step toward that just and lasting peace which we are committed to try to bring about.

I think, Fran [Frances L. Lewine, Associated Press], you had a question.

Q. What countries are you going to, exactly?

A. I am going first to Israel. From there I will go to Alexandria, where President Sadat will be. Then we will have a shuttle, which we do not think should be as extended as the recent shuttles have been, because many issues of principle have already been settled; but while I am in the Middle East, I expect to visit Damascus, Amman, and Saudi Arabia to discuss with the other Arab countries our conception of progress toward peace in the Middle East.

Q. Can you tell us who suggested a U.S. monitoring team in the Middle East, and isn't this fraught with danger, and I would like to know if it is tied to any money agreements of aid to Israel?

A. The idea of a possible monitoring team has as yet not been finally decided. It is an issue that was first raised and which we have made clear we would agree to do only if both of the parties join in.

We have also made clear that the American participation would be of an entirely technical nature; that is to say, we would man certain kinds of warning equipment whose results would be given to both sides and the United Nations.

In other words, it would be an extension of the U-2 flights we are now undertaking at the request of both parties. Any Americans that are going to the Middle East would go only if approved by the Congress. It would be volunteers. They would have no military mission of any kind; and their primary function, their exclusive function, would be to give warning information to both sides and to the United Nations; and their numbers would be very small.

Q. Who suggested it, and is it tied to any aid?

A. The issue of warning stations depends on the issue of the aid. The issue of the aid in turn to

Israel has been discussed with Israel for many months, as we have, for that matter, discussed aid programs with Arab countries for many months.

We will submit in September, I would expect, an aid package for the entire Middle East, including Israel and those Arab countries that have been the recipients of aid last year; and this has been entrained as part of the reassessment in any event.

Q. How much money does it entail?

A. The President has not yet made the final decision about the amount that we will request from the Congress, but this grows out of technical studies that we are undertaking jointly as to the needs of the parties and particularly the needs of Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, alongside whatever agreements may be reached between Egypt and Israel, will there also be third-party agreements between the United States and both of these parties, and what will their nature be?

A. We still do not have any actual documents that have been agreed to between the parties. All we have are certain agreements in principle about the outlines of a possible agreement.

In the disengagement agreements, there was a formal agreement, then there was a protocol that was attached to that agreement, then there was separate understanding between the parties in which the United States acted as an intermediary and transmitted assurances from one party to the other.

Everything in which the United States is involved will be submitted to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, and to the House International Relations Committee. There will be no secret understandings that are not submitted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you set yourself a time limit for this particular trip?

A. I have to be back on September 1 or 2 to speak at the special session of the General Assembly. That I have to do in any event no matter what the state of the negotiations is.

Now, it is theoretically possible I might go back to the Middle East from there, but I hope that we can make sufficient progress in 10 days. But I don't want to operate against a deadline. These issues—even when there is agreement in principle, the issues are enormously complex and there are so many different aspects of civilian as well as military

arrangements that have to be made that I would hate to tie myself too closely.

Mr. Beckman [Aldo B. Beckman, Chicago Tribune Press Service].

Q. I have two questions. One, can you tell us if the American volunteers will be armed, and secondly, when your earlier shuttle failed, I seem to recall your saying you wouldn't go back unless there was a 90 percent chance of success. Is there a 90 percent chance of success?

A. You have to remember even if you say there is a 90 percent chance of success, if it fails, it fails 100 percent. We think there is a good chance of success—whether you express it at 80 percent or 90 percent, that is just guessing at it—we think there is now a good chance of success, or the President would not have authorized my return.

What was the other question?

Q. Will the American volunteers be armed?

A. We have not yet worked out this arrangement. If they are armed, it would be only for self-defense. It would not be for military operations. It would only be personal arms for really very immediate self-defense. They will not be authorized, under any circumstances, to conduct military operations or to defend themselves against military forces. If they have arms, it would be against marauders, but they are not there for a military function, and we are talking about very small numbers of about 100 or so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will this force be a unilateral American force or will it be part of a U.N. force?

A. It is very difficult for me to talk about something that has not yet been agreed to and finally worked out. In any event, there will be a U.N. force standing between Israel and Egypt in a zone of a greater depth than has ever existed between the hostile forces in the Middle East.

So these would not be in direct contact with either of the hostile parties. They would work more closely with the United Nations.

Q. Has the United States agreed in principle to compensate Israel for the loss of the Sinai oilfields?

A. We are discussing with Israel not so much compensation for the Sinai oil, but arrangements for alternative supplies of Sinai oil if Israel has difficulty arranging them for itself. We will take into account, in arriving at the economic aid figure, the additional foreign exchange requirement for Israel in the purchase of oil.

Q. So we are going to pay for the replacements? That is what it amounts to?

A. It isn't going to be done exactly on that basis, but it will be taken into account.

Q. Can we get a kind of outline of what the accords have been in terms of what has been printed? Is that the passes and the oilfields?

A. I don't think I can go into something in which there are so many items that have only been agreed in principle and so many items that are not yet agreed to at all. Some of the things that have been printed are roughly accurate. Some of the things that have been printed are not accurate. I would not go firmly with any one of them.

Q. I was going to ask the same question. Are the reports of the agreement in principle for a pullback from the passes and the oilfields in exchange for a guarantee of nonbelligerence accurate? Is that the general scope of the agreement?

A. I do not think the issue of a formal issue of nonbelligerence is now before us, and I think it would be better not to go into the precise details of the geographic separation until we are a little further ahead in the negotiations.

But it is known, of course, that the negotiations have involved the passes and the oil-fields, and as I have already pointed out in answer to another question, that some of the economic discussions with Israel involved the problem of how to deal with Israel's foreign exchange problems in the absence of the oilfields; so that is a speculation that would be proper.

Q. Are you going to see Mr. Gromyko on this trip?

A. I don't expect to see him, no, not on this trip. I expect to see Mr. Gromyko next when he comes to the General Assembly in the middle of September.

Q. Between now and then, will there be any special arrangements or efforts to keep the Russians posted?

A. We will stay in touch with the Soviet Union and keep them generally informed.

Q. As you pointed out, if there is an interim agreement, can you give us a more specific idea of the territories Israel may have to give up?

A. As I pointed out on other occasions, in a lasting peace, a lasting peace will have to settle the frontier of Israel not just with Egypt but with

all of its neighbors. It will have to take into account the Palestinian problem. It will have to spell out in great detail the reciprocal obligations for peace on the part of the Arab countries. And it will have to include guarantees—international, multilateral, bilateral, whatever may be devised for the final arrangements.

This interim agreement which we are now talking about is a step, we hope a significant step, toward this, but it will still be only a partial—we will only have traveled a part of the road.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in answering Jim Haughton's question, you said the formal issue of nonbelligerency, which is not a question here, but what is Israel going to need in the way of some guidance, and what is Israel going to get? You have talked about the oilfields and the passes.

A. I do not think I ought to be into the provisions of an agreement which has so far been negotiated in a rather cumbersome process through Washington in which there are no documents yet agreed to by both sides, but only some concepts and general lines, and that will all be apparent when the agreement is negotiated, hopefully in the not too distant future.

Q. On the question of compensation or whatever it may be called for the loss of the oilfields, are you talking about American compensation, American aid? Are you talking about Arab aid or some other form?

A. I have the impression, but I have to confirm that when I get out there, that the Arabs are not yet ready to compensate Israel for any loss of oil revenues. We are talking about the fact that in setting the aid level for Israel, we will take into account the foreign exchange losses that Israel will suffer if, as a result of the agreements, it gives up the oilfields.

I think I will take one more question.

Q. Can you give us any idea of whether you heard from the Israeli Cabinet this morning?

A. This announcement is based on the decision of the Israeli Cabinet to invite me to come to Israel.

Q. Is there any question about it? This morning there was a question about it.

A. Yes, there was in the sense that the Israeli Cabinet had to approve what the negotiating team and we worked out during the course of last week,¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Doc. 141 above.

and until the Israeli Cabinet had formally approved the results of last week's negotiations, we could not announce that a shuttle could, in fact, take place.

Q. When are you leaving here?

A. I am leaving here tomorrow afternoon, and I am leaving Washington Wednesday around midnight.

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Resolution of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries concerning the Middle East and the occupied Arab territories¹⁸⁰

Lima, late August, 1975

The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Lima, Peru from 25 to 30 August 1975.

Having heard the statements delivered during the Conference by various delegations,

Noting with deep concern the constant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East as a result of Israel's persistent policy of aggression and refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions, together with its continued aggression on the Arab people within and outside the occupied Arab territories, and its continued obstruction of every effort to achieve a just and durable peace with the aim of gaining time and imposing a *fait-accompli* to establish aggression and occupation,

Reaffirming that a just and permanent peace in Palestine and the Middle East can only be attained on the basis of a complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the exercise by the Palestinians of their full national rights to sovereignty, national independence and self-determination,

Asserting that continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands by force and violation of the national rights of the Palestine people are in themselves a continued aggression and a serious threat to the security, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Arab countries and peoples,

Deeply concerned by the invalidity and illegitimacy of the measures taken by Israel to alter the human,

geographical and cultural features in the occupied Arab territories with the aim of Judaicizing Jerusalem and the other parts of the occupied Arab territories,

Convinced that, in view of Israel's continued violation of the principles of the UN Charter and its continued aggression against Arab countries and the Palestinian people, it was time to apply the sanctions stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations against Israel,

Further convinced of the necessity for the Non-Aligned Countries to adopt adequate and practical measures to confront the Zionist enemy's continued aggression and violations,

1. *Reaffirms* its total and effective support for the frontile States and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore all the occupied territories and usurped rights by every possible means;

2. *Condemns* Israel's continued policy of aggression, expansion and annexation of Arab territories by force and its attempts to alter their demographic, geographic, economic and cultural features;

3. *Condemns* Israel's continued refusal to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations, and its deliberate obstruction by all kinds of maneuvers of every effort exerted to establish a just and permanent peace in the area;

4. *Further condemns* the persistent policy of repression pursued by Israeli occupation authorities against Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories as well as its persistent violations of their human rights and its violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular the Fourth Convention on the protection of civilians, and its barbaric attacks and raids on refugee camps and bombardment of civilian targets in the towns and villages of Southern Lebanon, in violation of all principles of international and human laws;

5. *Denounces* the attitude of the States supplying Israel with assistance, arms and means of killing and destruction and holds enormous quantities of weapons is to establish it as an advance base for racism and colonialism in the heart of the Arab and African World, and of the Third World in general, and further considers that any aid or support to Israel is actually an encouragement and a participation in the consolidation of Israeli occupation and persistent aggression;

6. *Invites* all Non-Aligned Countries to extend all available forms of assistance to the Arab con-

¹⁸⁰ English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Peru on September 1, 1975, and published September 5, 1975, in UN doc. A/10217, Annex I, pp. 14-16.

frontation powers so as to reinforce their struggle against the Zionist aggression;

7. *Requests* Non-Aligned Countries to take the most adequate measures in order to strengthen their exerted pressure on Israel in the UN and its specialized agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its membership in these institutions;

8. *Considers* Zionism a danger to world peace and decides to organize an information campaign in which all information media of Non-Aligned Countries should participate to unmask the racist and aggressive nature of the Zionist entity in a continuous and planned manner and to confront and refute all Zionist misleading propaganda campaigns aimed at arousing hostility against the Arab world.

9. *Requests* the Bureau of the Non-Aligned Conference to closely follow up developments in the Middle East and to report thereon to the Summit Conference and *decides* to keep the situation in the Middle East as one of the important items on the Agenda of the said conference.

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Resolution of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Palestine¹⁸¹

Lima, late August, 1975

The Fifth Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Lima, Peru from 25 to 30 August 1975,

Guided by the principles of Non-Alignment, and noting with pride and appreciation the heroic sacrifices of the Palestine people in face of the Zionist aggressors for the liberation of Palestine,

Having studied the developments of the Palestine cause and the grave situation arising from the continued occupation by Israel of Arab territories, its usurpation of the rights of the Palestine people, its refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions in this respect, particularly General Assembly resolution No. 3236 adopted at its 29th Session, its denial of the national rights of the Palestine people in Palestine and their return to their home-

land, their right to self-determination without any foreign intervention, and to national sovereignty over its territory, and the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestine and the dispersal of its people,

Considering that this situation constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolutions as well as of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and that its continuation represents a grave threat to international peace and security,

Considering that the Palestinian question is the basic cause and core of the struggle against the Zionist enemy,

Reaffirming the legality of the struggle of the Palestine people for the restoration of their full national rights,

Considering that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and those of Zimbabwe and South Africa are of one imperialist origin and organically linked in their policies aiming at suppressing the freedom and dignity of man,

Expressing its conviction that the military, economic, political and moral support of Israel by a number of states notably the U.S. enables it to persist in its policy of aggression and to further reinforce its usurpation of Palestine,

Considering that maintaining relations with Israel in the political, economic, trade, communications and other domains assist it to reinforce its usurpation of Palestine and to persist in its expansionist policy of aggression,

Considering that the continuation of the membership of Israel in the United Nations contradicts the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and encourages Israel to ignore its resolutions and to collude with various aggressive racist and expansionist regimes,

1. *Decides* :

a) To reaffirm total and effective support to the Palestine people in their legitimate struggle to restore their national rights in Palestine, including :

Their right to return to their homeland and property

Their right to self-determination without any foreign intervention

Exercise of their right to sovereignty over their territory

Establishment of their independent national authority

b) To work in all domains to concretise recognition of their rights and to adhere to them. Non-

¹⁸¹ English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Peru on September 1, 1975, and published September 5, 1975, in UN doc. A/10217, Annex I, pp. 17-20.

Aligned Countries also undertake to adopt all appropriate measures towards that end.

c) To work in Co-ordination between the Non-Aligned Movement and the PLO to lay down a strategy aiming at liberating Palestine, considering the question of Palestine an important one to Non-Aligned Countries.

2. *Calls upon* all States to support the people of Palestine by every means in its struggle against Zionist and racist colonialism, to restore their full national rights, and asserts that restitution of these rights is an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

3. *Calls upon* the United Nations to work for the application of Resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly at its 29th Session,

4. *Reasserts* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legal representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle,

5. *Requests* all Non-Aligned Countries to abide by all the relevant resolutions of the Non-Aligned Summit and Foreign Ministers' Conferences on the Palestinian Cause and to implement them as soon as possible,

6. *Deems* it advisable, for the success of the Palestine Liberation Organization in their struggle for the establishment of the future state of the Palestinian people, that they be given all opportunities to increase their contacts with the Governments of Non-Aligned Countries and that this may take the form of representation in their respective capitals,

7. *Condemns* Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied Arab territories and its refusal to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians in times of war, its policy of Judaizing the physical and cultural aspects of the occupied territories and considers that such acts and behaviour are war crimes as being a challenge to mankind at large,

8. *Considers* that all measures adopted by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and designed to alter their demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic aspects including those aiming at Judaizing the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and that under no circumstances can these measures or their consequences be recognised,

9.

a) *To condemn* the attempts of the Israeli occu-

pation authorities to Judaize the occupied territories and desecrate the holy sanctuaries, in particular the recent desecration of the sanctity of the Haram al Ibrahimi in Hebron and to consider such acts as null and illegal;

b) *To call upon* the nations of the world to oppose such violations and to refuse to recognize any geographic, cultural and demographic alterations effected in the occupied territories,

10. *Condemns* all States that provide military, economic and human support to Israel, and calls upon them to desist from doing so forthwith,

11. *Calls upon* all those countries that have not severed political, cultural and economic relations with Israel to do so,

12. *Requests* Non-Aligned Countries to take the most adequate measures in order to strengthen their exerted pressure on Israel in the United Nations and specialized agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its membership in these institutions,

13. *Decides* to inscribe the item of the "Question of Palestine" on the Agenda of the Summit Conference held in Sri-Lanka in 1976,

14. *Requests* the Bureau of Coordination of the Non-Aligned Countries to submit a report on the developments of the question of Palestine to the next Non-Aligned Summit Conference due to be held in Sri-Lanka in 1976.

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Political declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries (excerpt)¹⁸²

Lima, late August, 1975

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the IVth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers and the decision taken by the Bureau at its meeting held in Havana from 17 to 19 March 1975, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries took place in Lima (Peru), from 25 to 30 August 1975.

¹⁸² Excerpted from the English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Peru on September 1, 1975, and published September 5, 1975, in UN doc. A/10217, pp. 2, 12-15.

48. The situation in Palestine and the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. Israel's obstinacy to pursue its occupation of the Arab territories and its disregard of the national rights of the Palestinian people, constitutes a permanent aggression and a systematic violation of the principles which govern the International community, the Charter and the Resolutions of the United Nations, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

49. The maintenance of "no war no peace" situation does not allow for a just and equitable solution since this conflict is being dealt with by a small group of countries without the positive participation of the Non-Aligned Countries.

50. The Conference affirms that between the aggressor and its victim there is no place for neutrality, for neutrality in such cases is tantamount to condoning aggression. The Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs strongly condemns all those powers and in particular the United States of America which continues to afford military, economic, political and moral support to Israel, and calls for the immediate cessation of such aid. This massive support to the racist Zionist regime eliminates all doubts as to the deliberate intention of United States and other imperialist powers to make Israel a base of colonialism and imperialism within the Third World, and use it to break the liberation movements, consolidate racist regimes, threaten peace and security in the developing countries and plunder their natural resources.

51. In this regard, the Conference expresses its deep concern at these maneuvers of Zionism and Colonialism, which tend to dilute the efforts exerted in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and whose objective is none other than to prolong Israel's occupation of Arab territories conquered by force and to deny the national rights of the Palestinian people.

52. The Conference expresses that any steps that may be taken by way of partial or interim solution should by no means prejudice the national and legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to return to its homeland and exercise its self-determination or to a total and immediate withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories.

53. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs reaffirm their conviction that the Non-Aligned Countries must contribute directly and positively to the

efforts for the establishment of an equitable and durable peace in the Middle East.

54. The Conference considers that the interest of security and peace in the world rests on the immediate implementation of relevant United Nations resolutions and reiterates that a just and durable peace in the Middle East must be based on the two following principles:

1) The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967;

2) The exercise by the Palestinian people of all their national rights, including their right to return to their country and to self-determination and political independence.

55. In the light of the analysis of the situation, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs agreed on the necessity to continue and intensify the efforts in order to implement resolutions 3236 (XXIX) of November 22, 1974, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and request—in that context—the Security Council to adopt a resolution embodying the principles and provisions of the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution.

56. By its continuing aggression against Arab countries and by its persistent violations of the UN Charter and Resolutions, Israel has isolated itself from the International community. The time has come for the Non-Aligned Countries to consider other measures against Israel, in conformity with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

57. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries demand therefore, that the United Nations Security Council, in compliance with its responsibilities, take all necessary measures, including those contemplated in Chapter VII of the Charter in order to force Israel to cease its aggression and its violations and implement all UN Resolutions concerning the Palestinian and the Middle East question.

58. The Conference most severely condemns Zionism as a threat to world peace and security, and calls upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialistic ideology.

59. The Conference reaffirms its satisfaction on the recognition by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and welcomes the resolutions which grant the PLO the status of Observer

in the United Nations Organization and reaffirm the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which must be taken into account in any solution to the Middle East problem. It welcomes the admission of the PLO as a full member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which constitutes a new expression of the firm solidarity of the Non-Aligned Countries with the heroic struggle of this people for its inalienable national rights.

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Statement issued by the Israel cabinet agreeing to the interim agreement with Egypt¹⁸³

Jerusalem, September 1, 1975

The Cabinet gives its approval to the recommendation of the ministerial team regarding the agreement with Egypt and it decides,

A. To bind itself to the documents submitted to the Cabinet by the ministerial team, documents consisting of the agreement between Israel and Egypt—inclusive of the supplement and the map, and of the document termed “proposal” pertaining to the United States’s civilian presence in the area of the Mitla and the Giddi passes.

B. The Cabinet resolves to initial these documents and the Prime Minister will appoint the persons to sign them.

C. The Cabinet will present the two documents to the Knesset, asking it to approve the agreement.

D. The final signing of the agreements will take place after the Knesset grants its approval to the agreement with Egypt and to the supplement and the map accompanying it. The Prime Minister will appoint the persons to sign them.

E. The Prime Minister expressed on behalf of the entire Cabinet esteem and appreciation to the President of the United States for the good offices of his country, and to the Secretary of State and to his team for their efforts to bring about the agreement.

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Statement by US President Ford announcing agreement between Egypt and Israel on a new interim agreement¹⁸⁴

Camp David, Md., September 1, 1975

The interim agreement being initialled by Egypt and Israel this evening reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.

Under the agreement Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai passes and oil fields, both parties agree not to resort to force, and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace settlement. I have consistently worked for this outcome. I am deeply gratified by it and proud of the contribution America has made. By reducing the dangers of military and economic warfare this agreement is of great significance for the well-being of every American.

The parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long hard road to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America’s effort to continue. Following my meetings with President Sadat in Salzburg and with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, the United States intensified its active mediation.

The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.

The United States does not consider this agreement as an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.

I will be speaking personally with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to congratulate them on their leadership and statesmanship which in large measure made the agreement possible. I commend Secretary Kissinger for his tireless efforts in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

¹⁸³ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4997/A/1; reprinted by permission.

¹⁸⁴ Text published by the US embassy in Beirut on September 2, 1975.

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Interim agreement between Egypt and Israel on redeployment of forces in Sinai¹⁸⁵**September 1, 1975**

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974,¹⁸⁶ within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

2. All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

3. The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

4. The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

5. The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

6. In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.¹⁸⁷

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.


ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its

¹⁸⁵ Text as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1892 (September 29, 1975), pp. 466-470. The agreement was initiated by the parties on September 1 and signed in Geneva on September 4. The agreement came into effect on October 10, 1975; see doc. 169 below. See also docs. 164, 166 and 167. The map was published in UN doc. S/11818/Add.3 on September 8, 1975, and is printed on p. 262. Other UN documents in the series S/11818 and Add. 1-4 deal with technical matters relating to the meetings of the Military Working Group in Geneva.

¹⁸⁶ Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹⁸⁷ Doc. 164 below



mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at _____ on the _____	
1975, in four original copies.	
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt	For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. *Definitions of Lines and Areas*

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other desig-

nated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. *Buffer Zones*

a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

c) In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. *Area South of Line E and West of Line M*

a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area

shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. *Aerial Surveillance*

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7–10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. *Limitation of Forces and Armaments*

a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e. with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

1) Neither side will station nor locate any

weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

2) The Parties will not place antiaircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. *Process of Implementation*

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Govern-
ment of Israel

WITNESS

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a) There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by

Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b) In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Milta and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

a) At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a) above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b) At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b) above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c) The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are rea-

sonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

Accepted by: _____

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Memorandum of agreement between the US and Israel stating US commitments to Israel in the context of the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹⁸⁸

Jerusalem, September 1, 1975

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on September 1, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full United States support.

United States-Israeli Assurances

1. The United States Government will make

¹⁸⁸ Text as released by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 1975. The text of the agreement is doc. 148 above.

every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.

2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the United States and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate United States-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within 3 weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.

a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the

International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:

a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).

b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfils its undertaking under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.

7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.

8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement.

9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

10. In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.

14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.

15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations

organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the United States role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Secretary of State for the Government of the US.

YIGAL ALLON

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of Israel.

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Memorandum of agreement between the US and Israel regarding the reconvening of the Geneva conference¹⁸⁹

Jerusalem, September 1, 1975

1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the

¹⁸⁹ Text as released by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 1975.

participation at a subsequent phase of the Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and each one of its neighbors.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Secretary of State for the Government of the United States.

YIGAL ALLON

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of Israel.

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Statement of the US government assuring Israel of continual military and economic assistance¹⁹⁰

Jerusalem, September 1, 1975

On the question of military and economic assistance to Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments what the Memorandum of Agreement states.

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint

¹⁹⁰ Text as released by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 1975.

study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

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Statement of the US government providing Egypt with assurances in the context of the interim agreement with Israel¹⁹¹

Alexandria, September 1, 1975

1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to help bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance through diplomatic channels.

2. In the event of an Israeli violation of the Agreement, the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States.

3. The United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian Early Warning Station.

4. The U.S. reaffirms its policy of assisting Egypt in its economic development, the specific amount to be subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger and President Sadat of Egypt made following the conclusion of the Sinai interim agreement¹⁹²

Alexandria, September 1, 1975

Q. How will we, Mr. President, know, during the next three, four, or five months, that both sides are genuinely and honestly living up to the specifics of the agreements? What should we look for?

¹⁹¹ Text as released by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 1975.

¹⁹² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1892 (September 29, 1975), pp. 461-465.

Sadat: Well, for our side, there has been a previous agreement that took place in 1974,¹⁹³ and we were up to our word, and more than that, even after March—last March, we have proved on the ground, by opening the Suez Canal and taking the measures we took, that we are aiming at peace. I think this is the guarantee that you asked for.

Let us look forward for a new era, because I think this agreement that we have concluded today marks a turning point in the conflict—in the Arab-Israeli conflict—and that is really what has always concerned me. It is not a bit of land there or here or a few kilometers there or here, but what concerned me always is that we should hit to peace. I think this is a very important turning point in the history of this conflict.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the importance of this agreement to the American Government and the American people and to the peace in the world?

Kissinger: I agree with the President that this agreement can mark a turning point in the conflicts of this area and could be a very important step toward a just and lasting peace.

The U.S. Government has a very profound interest in contributing to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in this area because of its interest and longstanding friendship with all of the people of this area and because the conflicts in the Middle East have affected the peace and the well-being of many other parts of the world. It is for this reason that the United States is glad that it was able to contribute to this agreement and stands ready to continue its efforts until a just and lasting peace is achieved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can the outcome of the Congress' deliberations on the agreement hamper it and is the United States committed to the peace movement in the Middle East irrespective of the outcome of Presidential elections?

Kissinger: The congressional deliberations can of course have an effect on the immediate situation, but we have consulted with enough congressional leaders to be confident that they will support the agreement that was made today. Secondly, the foreign policy of the United States is conducted on a bipartisan basis, and we expect that the main lines of the foreign policy would be continued no matter what Administration is in office.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about the clause concerning the annual renewal of the U.N. mandate? A U.S. official was quoted this evening as saying it is understood that Egypt would agree to at least two renewals of the mandate. Can you comment on that please, Mr. President?

Sadat: Will you please repeat the question?

Q. Yes, sir. The question, Mr. President is, the agreement refers to annual renewals of the mandate. Have you given an understanding to Dr. Kissinger that there will be at least two renewals during the period of the life of the agreement?

Sadat: Well, we have agreed upon the yearly renewal of the mandate of the U.N. forces. The first year starts from the 24th of October. It will end on the 24th of October, 1976. This will be a few weeks before the elections. We know that the year of the elections, especially those few weeks at the end of it, is very critical. So there is really an understanding that we shall appreciate and renew for another year to give the American President the opportunity to prepare the—what we call—the home inside.

Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, does this new disengagement agreement help Egypt in the open-door economic policy and development?

Sadat: [Translated.] Egypt has actually begun, ever since the first disengagement agreement, has begun implementing the open-door economy. We have begun building the new basis of the society as stipulated by the October paper. We have begun reconstruction on the Canal Zone, and we have begun repairing and renovating the destroyed and damaged utilities—

Sadat: [Interrupts translation.] infrastructure.

Sadat: [Translation continuing.]—infrastructure. Certainly this agreement is a new push to help this matter.

Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, could you please clarify the early-warning points run or operated by American technicians? Do they serve one side or both sides and, hypothetically, if Egypt should launch an attack on Israel, would Israel be warned and, vice versa, if Israel should launch an aggression on Egypt, would we receive a warning?

Sadat: [Translated.] When I met with U.S. President Gerald Ford in Salzburg, we discussed the matter, and I take this opportunity to say that my theory or my view lies in two points that have

¹⁹³ Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

been achieved. Optimism. I have always been optimistic; I was before and after March and now, and before and after Geneva. Secondly, I said that the cards of this game, if not all, but at least 99 percent of them, are in the hands of the United States. Some cried against this, but today it is clear that I was proven right. We discussed—that is, myself and U.S. President Ford—we discussed the early-warning positions or bases at Salzburg. And the idea behind the early warning is that the United States is a witness to test—

Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] It started like this. I added first the U.S. President to be witness between me and Israel. This is before raising the whole question of the stations—

Sadat: [Translation continuing.] —to be a witness between us. Israel has an early-warning station, but we do not have or did not have, and I do not even have or did not have a place to find someone to sell me a base. I previously asked for it but I did not get it—

Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] No, I was denied, I asked something on a very low level, but I was denied this.

Sadat: [Translation continuing.] I asked for something much less than that, but I was denied that.

Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] Quite right.

Sadat: [Translation continuing.] U.S. President Ford agreed to sell me a station like the one Israel has. And the one that we have, if I may point out, is at the highest technological level, and it is very costly. But the U.S. President Ford agreed to sell this station to me to be a witness between us and Israel. Now the early-warning station in Israel, it has Israeli technicians and U.S. technicians. In Egypt, it is manned by Egyptians plus U.S. technicians. Now in case of attack on Israel, the U.S. technicians would warn the Israelis, would warn us, and would notify the United Nations. The same thing applies to the base in Egypt. Some have claimed that this is an American electronic base. But it is an Egyptian station sold to Egypt, and it is stipulated in the agreement that should Egypt wish to withdraw the civilian American technicians, then it can do so. Thank you.

Q. Mr. President, can you see a day, in your lifetime, in which there might be peaceful trade, tourism, or the exchange of government officials between and among all the states of this region?

Sadat: Well, we repeat again, the same theory

—as I told you before, we cannot jump to conclusions. This problem is a very difficult and complicated problem and needs time. You cannot come suddenly, after 27 years of hatred, violation, blood, wars, bitterness, all this, and ask me for tourism and economic relations or so.

What I say is this—let us create a new atmosphere. Up to this moment, neither of us have any confidence in the other, and I assure you, Dr. Kissinger had a hell of a time, here and there—really. Because of this, let us create a new atmosphere, and let us reach the state of nonbelligerency officially and with guarantees. Am I to live to reach the day you asked for, I do not know. This is in the hands of God.

Q. Can I ask you to clarify two of your previous answers? First the one on the surveillance—are you saying that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system? As I read the proposal, it would require an agreement by both Israel and Egypt to have a withdrawal from the surveillance system. The other clarification—I am still not certain—is Egypt promising to guarantee the U.S. mandate for another two years beyond the present current year?

Sadat: For the second question, I have already answered, and I have answered quite clearly. We shall be renewing the mandate for a year starting next October up till October '76, and I said it will be a few weeks before the election and for that we are planning to renew another year.

Q. Excuse me, sir, what would be the termination date for the U.N. mandate under that formula?

Sadat: Twenty-fourth of October, 1976.

Q. The first year. Then what happens after the first year in the question. Will there be another automatic renewal?

Sadat: It will be. There is an understanding between us and the United States—not between me and Israel, because I do not know their conduct—but between me and the United States. Yes.

Q. And then on the surveillance system, do you understand that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system if it chooses?

Sadat: It is a matter of sovereignty. Sure. It is a matter of sovereignty. How could I ask this when I asked first President Ford to be a witness. Didn't you hear the question I answered before?

Q. Yes, Mr. President, I did. I was referring, however, to the proposal which says "if both parties to the

Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such request conclusive"—the operative word being "both parties."

Sadat: My agreement is with the United States. I have nothing to do in this matter with Israel.

Q. *Mr. President, a few days ago you said you would like to see the Geneva Conference reconvene at the earliest possible date. Would you name specifically those parties that you would like to see participate in the Geneva Conference and the maximum amount of time that you think could pass before the Geneva Conference must be convened to consider an overall settlement in the region?*

Sadat: Well, I had a telephone call from President Ford this afternoon, and I thanked him, and I showed our gratitude. I commended also the sincerity and tireless efforts of Dr. Kissinger. I told him that, in spite of the fact that I am not completely satisfied with what we have already reached, I consider this a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict and a step toward peace based on justice.

And I told him to keep the momentum that he has already done his best, with Dr. Kissinger, to regain it after it has been delayed last year because of the incidents, the domestic incidents there in the United States. To keep the momentum, parallel step should be taken on the Syrian front. And then I urged him—I have great esteem and confidence in him—I urged him to start a dialogue with the Palestinians, because it is a fact that without the Palestinians we cannot reach the final peace that we are still after.

President Ford himself has proved to me in Salzburg that he dedicated himself to this cause. Have I answered your question?

Q. *Yes, Mr. President, but is there a maximum period of time that you believe can go by before Geneva could be or should be reconvened?*

Sadat: Well, as I told you, now we must keep the momentum. To keep the momentum, there should be a parallel step on the Syrian front. After that comes Geneva.

Q. *Secretary Kissinger, did your negotiations in the area this time contain any talk about another disengagement in the Golan Heights, and if not, what are your plans?*

Kissinger: I visited Syria and had extended talks with President Asad. As I pointed out earlier, the United States will continue its efforts to

promote a lasting peace in the area. We will be prepared to help to contribute to another step between Syria and Israel, and we will begin explorations with the parties as soon as both are ready to begin talking.

Q. *Secretary Kissinger, what are the guarantees you feel that the United States can give to keep this momentum concerning peace in the Middle East, particularly if you have further steps concerning Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, and how long do you think this operation will take?*

Kissinger: Of course, we are talking about a process and, as President Sadat pointed out, the distrust is deep, and as we have been in this negotiation, the issues become progressively more complicated. The United States has been in the position of being able to talk to both parties and being trusted by both parties. And that is the best guarantee we can offer for a continuation of the process.

Q. *Mr. President, if I can pick up two questions that emerged as a result of your replies. Number one, could you share with us some of the views that President Ford may have replied to you when you suggested that the United States start a dialogue with the Palestinians? And number two, you have made a central point of describing the American presence in the Sinai passes. You have used the word "witness." As you know, this issue is now under debate in the United States. Would you, sir, like Congress to pass, to approve that concept so that the American presence can be established as quickly as the protocols stipulate that this happen?*

Sadat: On the second question, yes. Yes, I should like that the Congress not raise any problems concerning it. Because, after all, it is for the sake of peace. And the United States is the superpower that is responsible for peace, especially in this region, where she has, as I told you, all the cards in the game. What was the first question?

Q. *It dealt with—did President Ford in any way respond to your suggestion that he initiate a dialogue with the Palestinians?*

Sadat: Well, President Ford replied to me that the United States will do its best to reach a just and peaceful solution in the area—and he had dedicated himself to this.

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Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel presenting the interim agreement with Egypt (excerpt)¹⁹⁴

Jerusalem, September 3, 1975

For my part, I share President Sadat's opinion when he said immediately after signing the agreement—I quote: “let us look forward to a new era, because I think that the agreement signed today constitutes a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict”¹⁹⁵ end of quote. The realization of the commitment hidden in these words is, of course, dependent on both sides. The Israeli side is determined to act completely for the sake of peace and has also given proof of this determination by the risk we undertook.

In the exhausting course of the negotiations one could have felt most keenly the tension, the suspicion and estrangement permeating the climate of relations between ourselves and Egypt. These identification signs [as heard], the source of which lay in the refusal to recognize the very existence of Israel within any frontiers whatsoever, became more prominent because of the wars and because of the lack of any human contact between Israel and Egypt. This agreement and what it entails as regards its implementation—for example a joint Israeli-Egyptian, committee, the joint use of a road—constitutes, perhaps, an opportunity for the appearance of the seeds of relations which have not existed until now and a beginning of the creation of a different atmosphere. I should stress here what is desirable, what is possible as far as we are concerned, but which, to my regret, does not yet constitute an assured reality.

Members of the Knesset, I stand on the Knesset rostrum not as a celebrant and not as one who takes off his armour. I present the agreement to the Knesset and the people in sober and considered terms, with both the hopes and risks entailed in it. I present the agreement as a possibility and not a certainty and therefore the security vigilance will continue; our readiness to return any attack will not be abandoned.

¹⁹⁴ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4999/A/6; reprinted by permission.

¹⁹⁵ Doc. 153 above.

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Radio interview statements by Defence Minister Peres of Israel assessing the military implications of the interim agreement with Egypt¹⁹⁶

September 5, 1975

Q. Mr Defence Minister, in the year of work which is ahead of the IDF, where do you see the central emphasis?

A. There are a number. First, we must take into consideration that the terrorist action will continue and perhaps intensify. We shall have to improve further our counter-action against terrorism. Secondly, we must pay attention to what happens on the northern-eastern front, where a flare-up can always take place. I do not say this with certainty, but it will be a mistake on our part if we think all the tension has gone. Thirdly, we shall have to organize a new line in Sinai and perhaps also according to a new rationale. It is not necessary to organize the line each time according to the previous example. We shall have to complete our fortifications along the Jordan river. Inside the IDF itself, I think the central problem is manpower... We shall also have to increase battle drills in the IDF. It seems to me we shall have to place a special emphasis on re-equipping our defensive set-up, mainly regional defence, regional units and civil defence...

Q. Have you seen fit to mention equipment for civil defence and regional defence because you estimate that if a war breaks out the rear is likely to be hit?

A. I would want us to prepare with the maximum degree of seriousness, and not to take a war as a repeat of previous wars. I want to be convinced that we can really mobilize everything we have and that everything that is mobilized is equipped with the best weapons...

Q. The past year has seen greater rapprochement between Syria and Jordan.¹⁹⁷ How real is this rapprochement and to what extent can it create an eastern front?

A. From a military point of view, I would take this rapprochement seriously. I shall again make the pessimistic assumption that it is possible Syria will be able to set up a new coalition that will

¹⁹⁶ Interview conducted by Roni Daniel and broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew on September 6, 1975; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5001/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

¹⁹⁷ See doc. 258 below.

include Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, the PLO and Syria. From a political point of view, I have doubts to what degree this represents a full, serious and binding move. It seems to me that the Jordanian King, in nature and from experience, has learned to be cautious. I am not sure every Jordanian statement is also a Jordanian action. Often it seems to me there is a gap between the two. I would say this: We have to prepare for this as if it were something very serious, and we have to analyze this as if it were an action which involves an element of making an impression.

Q. Regarding the northern border, Mr. Defence Minister, is it possible to say what the guidelines were in the past year of Israel's policy in its war against the terrorists?

A. Yes. Our policy is as follows: (1) It is based on initiative. In other words, we prefer to hit the terrorists while they are still in their bases and camps, before they move. If you have paid attention, indeed, in the past few weeks there have been almost daily actions by the IDF on land, in the air and on sea in order to hit the terrorists while they are still in their bases; (2) We do not act indiscriminately, and mainly we act on the basis of reports; (3) We try very much not to harm civilians — women, children, old people or innocent men; (4) We make a distinction between Lebanon and the terrorists. Although the terrorists are in Lebanon, we try to hit the terrorists and not the state. (5) If the terrorists do infiltrate into Israel, not to submit in any way to their blackmail. Israel is the only country in the world in which there have been eight attempts, and all of them were foiled, without exception. I hope this will have results, and I hope the terrorists will learn that we do not engage in bargaining.

Q. Nevertheless it seems that the terrorists along the northern border are more and more becoming a real military challenge. Doesn't this place a question mark beside the policy of action against them?

A. I do not know. If you consider the statistics from the time the Jews came to the country up to today, the changes have not been basic. Of course they have acquired more sophisticated weapons, but we have also been adopting more sophisticated actions. This is a serious nuisance, but we shall have to live with it for a long time. It takes on one form and takes off another. But we can defend ourselves from this nuisance.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Mexico of Executive Committee member Qaddumi of the PLO (excerpts)¹⁹⁸

Mexico City, September 5, 1975

Following the talks between the President of Mexico and Mr. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization during their meeting in Alexandria on August 5, a delegation representing the PLO headed by Mr. Faruq Qaddumi, Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization and including Mr. Said Kamal and Mr. Isam Kamil, visited Mexico at the beginning of September at the invitation of President Echeverria. President Echeverria received the PLO delegation and the delegation had talks with senior officials on the opening of a PLO information office in Mexico by virtue of the agreement concluded during the talks held in Alexandria.

At the same time the two parties reviewed Mexican-Palestinian and Mexican-Arab relations, and the Mexican government stressed its attitude that the solution of the Middle East problem must be reached within the framework of the United Nations, in conformity with its Charter and in accordance with its principles and goals, through the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions thereon and through recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. At the end of the talks it was agreed that a PLO information office should be opened in Mexico. It was also agreed that contacts between the two parties should continue.

¹⁹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), September 14, 1975, p. 7.

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Television interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel discussing the US involvement in the interim agreement with Egypt and considering options for further progress¹⁹⁹

Early September, 1975

Clark: Mr. Prime minister, the provisions for the use of American technicians as observers to help keep the peace between Israel and Egypt is coming under heavy criticism in our Congress. If Congress rejects this, what will be the effect on the Peace Accord? Does it all collapse?

Rabin: Well, I believe that Israel has agreed to the terms of the agreement as they are today on the assumption that there would be an early warning system, especially in the strategic passes, in which there will be a participation by American civilian technicians. Without this element, it is doubtful if the present terms of the agreement can be maintained.

Clark: Why is it essential to Israel to have Americans rather than a U.N. Force, or a multi-national force?

Rabin: First, allow me to remind you that the idea of having Americans in the strategic early warning stations in the buffer zone, the Israeli one and the Egyptian one, was brought up by the Egyptians in June when President Sadat met with President Ford in a rejection of the idea that these two strategic early warning systems would be manned by Israelis alone and Egyptians alone, the idea of American presence came up.

Now later on it was brought up that tactical early warning stations would be integrated with the Israeli-Egyptian strategic early warning systems; that the Egyptian condition to their existence was also that Americans will attend both and by that to have much more complicated and more reliable early warning system. The purpose of having Americans and not the U.N. is because the U.N. can first be expelled without the decision of the parties to the agreement.

The U.N. mandate is for one year. We hope the Americans will stay as long as the agreement is in effect.

Clark: Even though the idea for the use of Americans, as you note, was first raised by the Egyptians, you still regard the use of Americans as critical to the success of the Accord?

Rabin: Because the U.N. is unreliable. If you just remember what happened at Geneva when the agreement was signed and the Russians didn't want to appear, they attacked the agreement, and they can undermine the agreement through their activities in the area.

What we want is to add ability to the agreement. It is service for peace. We don't need anyone, any American, including the United Nations. If there would be a violation of the agreement, then there would be war. We don't need Americans in case of war. We want the Americans to do a service in the name of the two parties; by the agreement of the two parties, Egypt and Israel, to give credibility to the agreement and by that to encourage the prospects of peace.

Seamans: Now, it has been said that the American observers would be withdrawn in case of a threat of war. If that is the case, wouldn't they be removed at a time when their function is most essential?

Rabin: Well, I believe once one of the sides that will ask for their removal, it will be a clearcut sign who wants to break the agreement, and we want to make clear in the future which is the side that tries to violate the agreement, and it is very essential, for the sake of peace in the area, that the side that will decide to do so will have to bear in mind that he has to do it, not just reserve it to the U.N., which no one pays too much attention to it, but also we submit it to the United States because the United States was the power that, through its good offices, this agreement has been reached.

Seamans: Now, when the agreement was initiated, both you and President Sadat called it a great step toward peace here in the Middle East. This weekend the Syrians are calling it a major drawback, a major setback. Since the Syrians are the next problem in future negotiations, what is the situation now? Is it a step toward peace or is it hung up by this Syrian reaction?

Rabin: The way that I see it, I hope, and I stress, I hope that it would be an important step towards peace.

I believe that the peace-making process is a process and not an act, and the key to the change to the realities in the Middle East lies in the relations between Egypt and Israel. What we hope is,

¹⁹⁹ Interview conducted by Bob Clark and Bill Seamans for ABC's "Issues and Answers" broadcast September 7, 1975; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by ABC.

through the implementation of this agreement, maintaining it for a few years will create a change of attitudes and realities in the relations between Egypt and Israel and then it will facilitate movement towards a real peace because, after all, peace is not peace between diplomats.

Clark: Mr. Prime Minister, you have said, since the agreement with Egypt was signed, that you see no possibility for a similar interim agreement with Syria or Jordan. Does this mean what has been called the momentum for peace grinds to a halt?

I just heard you talk about a period of several years.

Rabin: Because I believe that momentum towards peace cannot be measured in the Middle East in terms of months, but years. We have to change realities and realities in terms of attitudes of people cannot be changed by weeks or by months, but to be more specific, when it comes to Jordan, allow me to remind you that Jordan is not empowered by the Arab world to negotiate with Israel.

The Arab Summit Meeting in Rabat last October practically denied the right of Jordan to negotiate with Israel. Israel will never negotiate with the so-called PLO. Therefore, we have no partner to negotiate peace eastward of Israel.

When it comes to Syria, one has to bear in mind the more extremist position of the political party of Syria, the Baath party. The attitude of the Government, the size of forces, the small dimension of the area that we keep is the Golan Heights.

Therefore, I don't see, for all practical purposes, enough room to maneuver for an interim agreement with Syria.

Clark: But, Mr. Prime Minister, are you then, in effect, predicting a new stalemate in peace negotiations in the Middle East for several years?

Rabin: I didn't say so. I didn't say so. I believe that we could start negotiations on an overall settlement with each one of our neighbors—I am not talking about Egypt—

Clark: With an overall settlement years off?

Rabin: I didn't make it a condition to wait several years to start negotiations about an overall settlement with Syria.

Clark: But you are ruling out an interim agreement with Syria or Jordan which has been looked on as the second step in a long—

Rabin: I don't know by whom it was looked on; not by us.

Seamans: Well, what do you see, Mr. Prime Minister, as the next initiative?

Rabin: Well, first, the agreement will enter into force until it will be superseded by another agreement, only after signing the protocol. The protocol was signed after the Egyptian and the Israeli nations will meet next week for at least two weeks at Geneva. Then it will take five months after the signature of the agreement until it will be implemented on the ground. Then we have to see to what extent this agreement will prove, will show that expectations that were put to it will be materialized.

Now, at the same time, in a few months we can start negotiations about overall settlement with Syria in the context of the Geneva Conference, or elsewhere. But if somebody thought that our agreement, or Israel's understanding that by having an interim agreement would start a total withdrawal on all fronts, he has got a great illusion.

Clark: Mr. Prime Minister, you talk about starting a new initiative in several months toward this long-term overall agreement.

Rabin: Why not?

Clark: Who initiates it? You say Israel would not. Should Henry Kissinger return to shuttle diplomacy or, who takes the initiative?

Rabin: Whoever wants.

We state today our readiness, as we have stated in the past, that we are ready to enter into negotiations about overall settlement with each of our neighbors.

Clark: Are you ready to make the overtures to Syria, Jordan and the other Arab countries? Who does it? They are not going to make them to you, are they?

Rabin: This is a decision, that we have the Geneva Conference. There are two co-sponsors to the Geneva Conference. What is the purpose of having co-sponsors? To take some initiatives?

Clark: Mr. Prime Minister, you mention the Geneva Conference as a possible forum for new initiatives towards peace in the Middle East.

Do you look on that seriously as the next step, the most likely place for new initiatives to come?

Rabin: Well, after all, it is not up to us to decide. It depends very much what will be in the coming months. We will see through September, this month, how everything will be developed between Egypt and Israel, how it will be implemented,

what will be the reactions of other Arab countries, what will be the reaction of the Soviet Union.

We have started a process. You have to make your judgment in accordance with the development of this process.

Clark: But would you like to see the United States and the Soviet Union the co-sponsors of the Geneva Conference, call a new conference when they feel the initiative should be taken?

Rabin: As we have done in the past, we have always preferred the good offices of the United States for the simple reason—for negotiations—for the simple reason that we have done better with—

Clark: Well then, are we back to saying you would like to see Henry Kissinger take the next initiative rather than the Geneva Conference?

Rabin: First, there are various options. Either the Geneva Conference, either the initiative that will be taken by the United States—

Clark: And what is your preference?

Rabin: We prefer to coordinate beforehand everything with the United States.

Seamans: Mr. Prime Minister, in an interview in one of Israel's major newspapers this week-end you said that you think a measure of Russian/American cooperation is essential to reach peace here in the Middle East.

Rabin: Did I say so?

Seamans: At the same time, President Sadat has criticized the Russians very strongly as blatantly interfering and trying to split the Arab front. What is the effect on Russian influence here in the Middle East in this interim agreement?

Rabin: Well, as you are aware, the Soviet Union in my mind has played a most negative role in the Middle East before the Six Day War in 1967 and since then. As you know, Israel has no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union because they cut it. The Soviet Union has encouraged all extremism in the Arab world and supplied them with the means to continue their belligerency. The Soviet Union is the major supplier of arms to the Arab countries. Practically, the Soviet Union offers only the military option and not the peaceful one. Therefore the role of the Soviet Union would be to interfere with any real movement towards peace, and this is what they have done lately. I think they will continue in doing so.

Seamans: Well, to what degree? Do you feel that this agreement will be the catalyst to even more intensive Russians efforts?

Rabin: Yes.

Clark: By that, Mr. Prime Minister, would you be concerned that the Soviets would step up arms shipments to Syria?

Rabin: To Libya, to the—to Syria, and to everyone in the Arab world that will be interested in getting it.

Clark: There is, as you know, Mr. Prime Minister, a concern in our country among many elements that our deepening commitment in the Middle East could lead to a big power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet.

Are you indicating that the danger of that might be increasing with the Soviets taking a more active role with the more militant states and our siding perhaps more with Israel and Egypt?

Rabin: I am in no position to judge the United States' interests but, after all, it was the United States' initiative to play the role of offering good offices to bring about the agreement between Egypt and Israel. Therefore, I tend to believe that the United States Government has taken into its considerations the consequences, but, may I add, I don't believe that if Israel had been strengthened economically and militarily there can be, as a result of a breakout of the war in which the Americans will be out—I am talking of the civilian technicians—that in case of such an outbreak of war, there is any real threat to a confrontation between the two major parties.

Clark: Mr. Prime Minister, the evidence that Israel has at least a small number of nuclear weapons is one of the things that disturbs many Americans. The danger of nuclear weapons being used in the Middle East.

Would Israel be willing to renounce the use of nuclear force as part of an overall peace settlement in the Middle East?

Rabin: Well, first, your assumption is wrong. I have stated time and again Israel is a non-nuclear country.

Clark: Are you stating flatly that Israel has no nuclear weapons—

Rabin: I have stated that Israel is a non-nuclear country. We will not be the first to introduce

nuclear weapons into the area, and in the case that there would be an overall settlement, that is to say a peace agreement, we will sign every agreement about a non-proliferation treaty.

Clark: In the interim, Mr. Prime Minister, with the new American commitment in the Middle East, would you renounce the use of nuclear force if you were sure the American nuclear umbrella sheltered you against any possible nuclear attack?

Rabin: Well, since such a proposal has not been put before Israel and I would not advise any Israeli to ask for it from the United States, because, if you first talk about the possibilities of confrontation between the two major powers, that causes worries in the United States, by asking it, we increase the threat that there would be a confrontation between the two major powers.

We are not interested in escalating the relations between the two major powers in the Middle East.

Clark: Would you be receptive to such an offer by the United States? If we said, "If you will renounce the use of nuclear force, we will cover you with our nuclear umbrella?"

Rabin: What does it mean to renounce? We have said that we are non-nuclear; that we will not introduce. What do you want more?

Clark: Of course, you have never said you do not have any nuclear weapons.

Rabin: I believe their interpretation of what we have said is exactly what you said.

Clark: I still didn't hear a denial, Mr. Prime Minister, of whether you do indeed have nuclear weapons.

Rabin: I have said we are a non-nuclear country, that we will not be the first to introduce. I don't know whether you want any more.

Clark: I want you to say that you do not have nuclear weapons if indeed you do not.

Rabin: This is the interpretation of what I have said.

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Resolution on the Middle East and the Palestine question adopted by the 62nd conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union²⁰⁰

London, September 12, 1975

The 62nd Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling the previous resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the Middle East, especially the resolutions adopted by the 59th, 60th and 61st Conferences and at the 113th session of the Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Recalling the resolution of the UN Security Council and General Assembly concerning the Middle East and Palestine, particularly Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX),

Referring to the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on Jerusalem, the holy places and the legitimate rights of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories,

Welcoming the recent interim agreement between Egypt and Israel and considering it as a potential step towards a definitive and overall solution of the conflict in that part of the world,

Considering that security and peace in the Middle East form an indivisible whole and that, if an equitable and urgent solution is not found to the problem of the Middle East on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the guarantee of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, the situation will continue to worsen thereby constituting a permanent danger in the Middle East,

Expressing its deep concern at the policy of repression pursued by Israel within the occupied Arab territories, its violations of the human rights of the population, its violations of the Geneva Conventions and of all the principles of international law, the intensification of raids and acts of aggression against the refugee camps and the towns and villages of Lebanon, as well as the continuation of its operations aimed at transforming the historic, demographic and cultural nature of the occupied Arab territories, particularly as regards the city of Jerusalem, in violation of all the principles of international law,

²⁰⁰ 62nd Inter-Parliamentary Conference doc. CONF/75/Moyen-Orient/DR. dated September 11, 1975; the resolution was adopted by 483 votes to 215.

Confirming the resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights of February 18, 1975, which condemns the total destruction of the town of Quneitra by Israel and considers this act as a serious violation of the Geneva Convention,

Noting with regret that the steps towards peace made in application of UN Security Council resolution 338 always encounter difficulties by reason of the attitude of Israel which persists in hindering efforts made to establish a just and lasting peace in the region,

A. *The Middle East*

1. *Calls for* the immediate implementation of the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Middle East, especially the total withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to put an end to the acts of repression and the violation of human freedoms in the occupied Arab territories;

3. *Requests* the Parliaments of the world and all members of Parliament to take steps with their Governments and respective peoples to oblige Israel to apply the UN resolutions on the Middle East and to commit the United Nations to take the necessary measures to that end, in conformity with its Charter;

4. *Requests* the resumption, as early as possible, of the Geneva Peace Conference, in application of Security Council resolution 338 with a view to the implementation of UN resolutions on the establishment of a lasting peace based on justice in the Middle East.

B. *The Palestinian Problem*

1. *Requests* the full guarantee of the national rights of the Palestinian people, in conformity with UN General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of November 22, 1974;

2. *Reaffirms* its support for the above-mentioned resolution of the UN General Assembly which makes provision for the Palestinian people represented by the PLO to be a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, particularly:

- a) Its right to self-determination;
- b) Its right to national independence and sovereignty;

4. *Affirms* also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and to recover

their property after having been expelled and uprooted, and *calls for* the return of their homes and their property;

5. *Recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to recover its rights, in conformity with the principles and objectives of the UN Charter;

6. *Urges* the Parliaments of the world to make all possible efforts to offer the Palestinian people the means of recovering its full national rights, to refuse to provide any aid and any assistance likely to enable Israel to maintain its occupation of the Arab territories and continue to disregard the national rights of the Palestinian people;

7. *Also calls upon* the Parliaments of the world to exercise pressure on Israel to put an end to all the measures taken to transform the historic, demographic and cultural nature of the city of Jerusalem, the town of Hebron and other places within the occupied Arab territories.

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Statement by a senior government official of Israel pointing out that Israel's policy on the Middle East conflict is aimed at gaining time²⁰¹

Jerusalem, mid-September, 1975

Given non-acceptance of Israel by the Arabs, we have been maneuvering since 1967 to gain time and to return as little as possible. The predominant government view has been that stalemates are to our advantage. Our great threat has been the Rogers plan—and American policy to move us back to the old [pre-1967] armistice lines. The current agreement with Egypt is another nail in the coffin of that policy.

We realize that the entire world is against us on the issue of borders and that we are terribly dependent on one nation for sophisticated arms. Nevertheless, we have been successful for the past seven or eight years, and we may have to go on maneuvering another ten. If the present interim agreement were to give us only six months rather than three years, we would still buy it because the

²⁰¹ Made by an unnamed official to Martin Levin, *Time* (New York—international edition), September 22, 1975, p. 13. Reprinted by permission from *Time*, The Weekly News-magazine; Copyright Time Inc.

alternative is Geneva. And Geneva means more pressure to go back to the 1967 borders. The interim agreement has delayed Geneva, while at the same time assuring us arms, money, a coordinated policy with Washington and quiet in Sinai. Relatively speaking, we gave up a little for a lot.

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Letter from US President Ford to the Speaker of the House of Representatives defending the proposed sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan²⁰²

Washington, September 17, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., September 17, 1975.

THE HONORABLE SPEAKER,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: With respect to the sale of HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan, I am writing to inform you of the following:

Initial deliveries will consist of one battery each in October, November and December of 1976. Deliveries of the next three batteries will be made during the period of January-March of 1978. Deliveries of the remaining eight batteries will begin approximately 30 months from the date of the Jordanian signature of the Letter of Offer and will be made over a period extending into 1979.

The Government of Jordan has informed us that it intends to use the HAWK missiles solely for the defense of the Amman-Zerka complex and other fixed sites, that is, air bases and radar stations located generally to the east and south of Amman. The batteries will be permanently installed at these locations as fixed, defensive and non-mobile anti-aircraft weapons. The geographic situation of these sites and the planned configuration of the HAWK installations will clearly demonstrate the intent of the Jordanian Government to use the weapons for purely fixed defensive purposes. The training to be provided by the United States

Government will be training appropriate to non-mobile weapons.

As you know, pertinent legislation and agreements obligate the Government of Jordan to use arms supplied by the United States Government only for purposes of the legitimate self-defense or internal security of Jordan and to refrain from transferring or subjecting the arms to the control of a third party without prior written United States consent. We consider that the latter provision would prohibit the placement of the HAWK weapons under any bi-national or multi-national command structure or military force of which Jordan might become a part, if such an arrangement would have the effect of transferring title or control outside the Jordanian Government without prior written United States Government consent.

I want to assure you that the Executive Branch will seek to implement the sales contract consistent with the principles expressed in this letter. We will monitor the situation closely to this end. I wish to recall to you that the Letter of Offer will contain a provision that "under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interests of the United States require it, the United States Government reserves the right to cancel all or part of this order at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles or performance of services."

Moreover, if at any time the employment of the HAWK batteries by the Jordanian Government appears to depart from this pattern of defensive deployment or national control, the State Department will so inform the appropriate committees of the Congress and will consult with them concerning any action which should be taken in consequence.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

²⁰² Text as inserted by Representative Bingham (Dem.) in the *Congressional Record* (daily), September 17, 1975, p. H 8781. A similar letter was sent to the President of the Senate.

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General declaration of the twelfth session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (excerpts)²⁰³**Moscow, September 19, 1975**

The 12th Session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, held in Moscow from September 17 to 19, 1975, attended by delegations of mass movements of the two continents, representatives of solidarity committees of the socialist states and international democratic organizations, notes that in the past few years the national-liberation movement of the Afro-Asian peoples has gained substantial achievements. A positive process is taking place within it, which is of historical importance. They are connected first and foremost with the further consolidation of the ranks of the anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces, the growth of unity of world socialism and the national-liberation movement, the deepening of its social content and the major victories of the newly independent and fighting peoples of Asia and Africa.

Frustrated by their defeat in Indochina through direct aggression, US imperialists are now engaged in more subtle and subversive methods, supporting and encouraging reactionary and neo-fascist forces and destabilizing progressive regimes in many regions of the third world. It is therefore imperative for the AAPSO to draw the attention of the democratic and progressive forces of the whole world to these tactics of US imperialism and to exercise positive vigilance to frustrate these neo-colonialist attempts. The peoples of the Arab countries, subjected to Israeli aggression, are waging a determined struggle for the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East. As a result of the struggle of the Palestinians and the other progressive Arab forces and the active development of the wide international solidarity movement with the Arab peoples, the Israeli aggressors, backed by international Zionism and imperialism, are becoming more and more isolated. We must be vigilant to safeguard the proper line for an unconditional, total, not fragmented solution based on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all

the Arab lands occupied by them and ensuring the lawful, national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. We are against any partial or individual settlement or agreement, which might favourably serve US imperialism in exercising political or military pressure in the area.

An important task of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization is to mobilize the world public for further support of the struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism and Zionism and for a just settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Afro-Asian solidarity movement will continue to persistently support the universal and complete settlement of the conflict within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference attended by all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and according to the last resolution of the 29th General Assembly of the UN.

The Council calls upon all peace-loving, progressive and democratic forces to support the forces and states of Arab confrontation, i.e., the PLO, Egypt, Syria and others and to give them military, political and economic aid for the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Arab Palestinian people, including their right to return to their homeland and to practice their right for self-determination therein.

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Television interview statements by US Secretary of Defence Schlesinger discussing the supply of arms to Israel, US Department of Defence involvement in manning the Sinai early warning system and assessing Israel's nuclear capability²⁰⁴**September 21, 1975**

Herman: Secretary Schlesinger, from your point of view, is it a good idea to provide Israel with Pershing missiles?

A. I think that that is a question that will be

²⁰³ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 39 (September 27, 1975), pp. 10, 11.

²⁰⁴ Interview conducted by Ike Pappas, George C. Wilson and George Herman for CBS's "Face the Nation"; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by CBS. Copyright © CBS Inc. 1975.

—have to be reviewed in the course of an NSC-ordered review. As I think is widely known, the Israelis have, for some period of time, been requesting the provision of Pershing missiles, and that will have political effects. It is also true that our Pershing line is closed. Any equipment would have to be taken out of inventory, and at the present time we are not inclined to provide inventory out of—equipment out of inventory, as opposed to production. So I think that that will have to be reviewed in the course of the next few weeks.

Herman: Secretary Schlesinger, in response to my opening question about whether it is a good idea to give Pershing missiles to Israel, you answered in large part on the basis of whether we should strip our own inventory of these missiles. It seems to me a Secretary of Defense has to make some assumptions about the world, if he's going to serve in his job properly. What is your feeling—not from the point of view of stripping America, but of arming Israel—of providing them with these long-range, or fairly long-range missiles?

A. I think that that has to be reviewed in the context of our long-term supply relationship to Israel, which has been reiterated frequently. That long-term supply relationship was, of course, under review during the period of the reassessment. But since the agreement, the long-term supply relationship is once again renewed. Consequently, we will have to evaluate all of the elements with regard to the development of—further development of Israel's military capability, in order to see to it that Israel has a substantial military capability, retains its ability to operate, but is not in a position in which it over-awes its neighbors.

Wilson: Mr. Secretary, on that point, were you specifically informed of the secret addendum,²⁰⁵ and specifically, about the promise to give a consideration with a view toward a, quote, positive response about the Pershing missile? And if you were not informed, should you have been informed?

A. I was, I believe, informed in due course. The whole question of the policy considerations with regard to military assistance, of course, rests under the purview of the Secretary of State. The role of the Department of Defense is to implement policy in, hopefully—in an effective manner. So it seems to me that the position that was taken here was that we would give sympathetic considera-

tion to all of Israel's prior requests, but no commitments were made at that time. If commitments had been made, I am sure that there would have been extensive discussion throughout the government in advance.

Pappas: Well, when you say due course, Mr. Secretary, does that mean ten days ago, does that mean two months ago, that you were informed? The implication is that Kissinger kept you in the dark about this, that he was promising our missiles without your knowledge, and that this was an annoyance to the Pentagon.

A. I think that there has been a tempest in the teapot over this particular issue. The Pentagon was not kept in the dark on this issue. No commitments have been made, no promises have been made. All that we have at this point is an NSC-ordered review which applies to a set of Israeli requests. Incorporated in those requests is a long-standing desire to have Pershing missiles.

Herman: Mr. Secretary when I asked you whether you thought that Israel should have it, you gave me rather a lengthy answer which, I gather, boiled down to no comment at this time. How much time are we talking about? If we do not strip our own battalions of Pershing missiles, how long would it be before we could ship any to Israel in any case? So how much decision time do we have?

A. Well—

Herman: How far ahead are we talking about?

A. I do not believe that you could have that line reopened and equipment shipped until, say, 1978. I would have to check the dates more carefully than that. But it would take—if we were not to draw these missiles out of inventory—an extended period of time to produce and to ship those missiles.

Herman: Will we draw them out of inventory?

A. I do not believe it's the intention of the Department of Defense or the administration to reduce our equipment inventories.

Wilson: Which would you prefer—to wait for the Pershing Two, which is under development, or to restart the production line on the Pershing 1-A?

A. Well, that, of course, is a hypothetical question. It would seem to me that the costs of reopening the line on a missile whose production is completed would be greater than the benefits; therefore, to the extent that we must decide on Pershing Two at an early date, we should go in that

²⁰⁵ Doc. 149 above.

direction. But that should not imply—that should not imply that in the course of this review the Pershing missile will or will not be authorized for delivery to Israel.

Wilson: Do the weapons buy us anything? I mean, we armed Israel considerably before the Yom Yippur War, and the Arabs attacked anyhow. Is there peace with weapons? How do you come down on that?

A. The answer, I think, to that is very clear in the general case, that there is no peace without weapons if there is aggressive intent on the part of anybody. Of course, there is—there may be occupation without conflict, but that is not the end that we desire. Clausewitz put it very well—the conqueror is always a lover of peace; he would like to enter our country unopposed. Without appropriate weaponry, one has no deterrent.

Pappas: I have a two-part question. One is, the fear is that these Pershings will be taken by the Israelis and, with their technology, they will be able to fit them with nuclear warheads. What assurances can we offer the world that this will not happen? What will we insist on? And secondly, we've never, ever found out about—officially, at least—what's on the Israeli shopping list, the current requirements, the arms that'll be released now to the Israelis. We hear the Lance missile, we hear the F-15, we hear that there's a possible commitment on the F-16. What exactly is on that list? Can we finally discover that?

A. I think that the precise details of the list remain a matter for diplomatic negotiation. I think, in general, you know what is on the list. There are—there is the F-15, frequently advertised, the F-16, a number of more modern munitions—those kinds of items—and of course, the traditional items—tanks, APC's, artillery, and the like. The list is not all that surprising. And at the present time the Israelis have a notable military edge.

Pappas: How about the possibility that the Pershings will be used for nuclear purposes?

A. Oh, I'm glad you reminded me of that issue. The United States, whenever it has delivered any weapon system capable of nuclear delivery, requests, and has requested, and will continue to request, ironclad guarantees that those weapons' delivery capabilities will not be employed for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Of course, the—Israel has repeatedly stated that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. So I think—

Herman: —That guarantee would cover second use, I presume, as well as first use.

A. Our guarantee.

Herman: Yes, the guarantee that we insist we be given.
A. Yes.

Herman: Mr. Secretary, if we send technicians to enforce or to help police the Sinai accords, who will they be? Who should they be?

A. I think that they undoubtedly will draw on retired personnel of the intelligence community or of the Department of Defense, that we probably will continue to believe that DOD active duty forces should not in any way be involved in such an assignment. And for that reason, I would expect that there would be some kind of contract or arrangement.

Herman: When you say retired personnel, personnel have been known to retire one day and go to work the next day in a job of this kind. Does that really mean they're retired?

A. Yes, that really means that they've retired.

Pappas: Is the Pentagon working at all currently on the technicians—on what they'll do, on the sensors? Is the Pentagon involved in any way?

A. This whole matter of the monitoring arrangements has been reviewed within the intelligence community, and of course, the National Security Agency has been a part of that review.

Wilson: On the nuclear question, Mr. Secretary, does Israel have the bomb?

A. We do not know. The Israelis have repeatedly stated that they do not have such capability.

Wilson: What is your own view, since you were in the Atomic Energy Committee and you—Commission—and you probably know more about it than any other public official at this point?

A. I think that I would prefer to take Israeli assurances at face value.

Wilson: Which states that they do not have a deployable nuclear weapon.

A. That's right; as you know, the effect of careful R & D work is to shorten lead times. I'm sure that lead times have been somewhat shortened by—

Wilson: So just to nail it down, do you think they're under development but not in a deployable situation? Is that your view?

A. I think that there has probably been some kind of research going on.

Herman: You don't want to leave it in—

A. I'm sorry—

Herman: You don't want to exactly leave it there, do you, that—just simply that there's been some research going on? One of the usual statements is that it's within screwdriver range, that they're got the pieces and they're ready to put it together when they need it. Is that what you mean by research?

A. I think that I—I could not say how far that research has gone, but we are going to rely upon Israeli assurances that they will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

Pappas: When you say ironclad guarantees—I've heard the reaction to that this way—well, ironclad guarantees go out the window when our country is about to be lost, that those guarantees don't mean a thing. What else can we ask for from the Israelis that will solidify that guarantee? Will they be mechanically fixed so they can't do it, or what are we thinking about?

A. There is no way of mechanically fixing delivery systems so that they cannot deliver nuclear weapons. The Israelis have aircraft of origins other than American manufacture, and of course they have indigenously produced—they now have indigenously produced aircraft as well as indigenously produced missiles. In the hypothetical circumstances that you mention, there is the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons without the use of American equipment. We are going to insist repeatedly on those ironclad guarantees.

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Speech by US Secretary of State Kissinger made before the UN General Assembly (excerpt)²⁰⁶

New York, September 22, 1975

The world community must find a way to contain or resolve regional conflicts before they

spread into global confrontation. Nowhere has the danger been greater than in the Middle East. Nowhere has the need for persistent and imaginative negotiation between suspicious rivals been more evident. Nowhere is there greater promise of moving from perennial crisis towards peace. Nowhere has the United Nations Security Council established a clearer framework of principles than in its Resolutions 242 and 338.

The road toward a lasting peace stretches long and hard before us. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But the conclusion of the recent Sinai agreement²⁰⁷ marks a major step forward. It is the first agreement in the long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict which is not the immediate consequence of hostilities. It could mark a turning point.

The agreement deserves the support of all the countries assembled here because every nation here has an interest in progress towards peace in the Middle East. It is another step in the process launched by Security Council Resolution 338. The alternative was a continuing stalemate which would have led over time to another war creating a serious threat to world peace and the prospect of broad global economic dislocation.

Neither fear of the future nor pride should obscure the fact that an unusual opportunity for further progress on all issues now exists. But opportunities must be seized or they will disappear. I want to emphasize that the United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace but to give it new impetus.

President Ford has stated that we will not accept stalemate and stagnation in the Middle East. That was true before the Sinai agreement was signed; it remains true today. The objective of our policy is not merely to create another temporary truce but to sustain the momentum of negotiations. The United States is determined to take every feasible step to help promote further practical progress towards final peace.

As a first step, it is essential that the Sinai agreement be carried out impeccably, within the terms and the time frame that are stipulated.

In the improved atmosphere thus created, the United States stands ready to participate in any

²⁰⁶ Middle East excerpt published by the US embassy in Beirut on September 23, 1975.

²⁰⁷ Doc. 148 above.

promising initiative towards peace at the request of the parties concerned.

We have made clear that we are prepared to make a serious effort to encourage negotiations between Syria and Israel.

We also intend to consult over the coming weeks with all concerned regarding the reopening of the Geneva Conference which met at an early crucial phase. As co-chairman of the Geneva Conference together with the Soviet Union, our two countries have special responsibilities in this regard.

We are prepared also to explore possibilities for perhaps a more informal multilateral meeting to assess conditions and to discuss the future.

The United States seeks no special benefit; we do not attempt to exclude any country. We will cooperate with any nation that is willing to make a contribution. We have no preference for any particular procedure. We will support whatever process seems most promising. Our approach will continue to be both flexible and determined.

The search for final peace must be conducted on a wide basis. We are in frequent touch with governments in the Middle East. We have already begun discussions with the Soviet Union with a view to assessing the current situation in the Middle East and weighing possible diplomatic approaches to bring about a just and durable peace in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union, our two countries have held parallel views that the situation in the Middle East poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of and contribute to progress towards a comprehensive settlement.

The role of the World Organization remains essential. If this organization had no other accomplishment than its effective peacekeeping role in this troubled area, it would have well justified itself. These soldiers of peace, wearing the blue beret of the United Nations, as members of UNTSO, UNEF, UNDOF have become indispensable to the maintenance of the two 1974 disengagement accords as well as the Sinai agreement. I want to take this occasion to salute Secretary-General Waldheim and his staff, and General Siilasvuo, the chief coordinator of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, and all the men and women from many countries who have served in the forces without an enemy.

The deliberations of this assembly regarding

the Middle East also play a central role. They can encourage progress or exacerbate tensions.

Procedural decisions can be based on the recognition that dialogue requires universality of membership, or they can fuel a futile, self-defeating effort to discriminate—in violation of the Charter—against a member state whose participation is vital for a solution.

The Middle East will continue to be an area of anguish, turmoil, and peril until a just and durable peace is achieved. Such a peace must meet the principal concerns and interests of all in the area; among these are territorial integrity; the right to live in peace and security and the legitimate interests of the Palestinians.

In the Middle East today there is a yearning for peace surpassing any known for three decades. Let us not doom the region to another generation of futile struggle. Instead, let the world community seize the historic opportunity before it. The suffering and bravery of all the peoples of the Middle East cry out for it; the hopes and interests of all the world's peoples demand it. The United States promises its full dedication to further progress towards peace.

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Protocol to the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel regarding implementation of the agreement (excerpts)²⁰⁸

Geneva, September 23, 1975

The Parties to the present Protocol,

Having met in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva under the Chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East,

²⁰⁸ Excerpted from the text as published in UN doc. S/11818/Add. 5 on October 10, 1975, Annex, pp. 1–2, 5–14. The protocol was agreed on at meetings of the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference and was signed by General Taha Magdub for Egypt and initialled by Ambassador Mordechai Gazit and General Herzl Shafir for Israel with General Ensio Siilasvuo as witness (UN doc. S/11818/Add.4 of September 23, 1975). The protocol came into force when Avraham Kidron and General Shafir signed for Israel on October 10, 1975. For the text of the agreement see doc. 148 above.

Taking into account that the preparation of a detailed Protocol is essential for the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel in all its parts which constitutes a significant step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 of 22nd October 1973,

Conscious of the fact that the Agreement enters into force upon the signature of this Protocol,

Having been guided by principles contained in the Annex to the Agreement,

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Redeployment of forces

ARTICLE II

Southern area (area south of line E and west of line M)

1. *General*

a) The armed forces or any other armed personnel of either Party or of any other third party other than Egyptian policemen and the UNEF may neither enter, stay nor pass through the area or the airspace above the area.

b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oilfield personnel shall have the right to enter, exit, work and live in the area.

c) Entry to and exit from the area by land, sea and air shall be only through UNEF checkpoints.

d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area. A limited number of Egyptian civilian helicopters and civilian transport planes may be stationed within the area for emergency cases and for the operation of the oilfields.

2. *The Functions of UNEF in the Area*

a) UNEF will perform its responsibilities in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, the provisions of the Agreement, the Annex and Protocol. The Force shall enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks.

b) UNEF will assure that no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations are in the area. The

UNEF shall allow entry to and exit from the area by land, by air or by sea, through UNEF checkpoints to authorized persons and cargoes only.

c) In order to perform its functions, UNEF—

i) will establish checkpoints and observation posts

ii) will patrol throughout the area by land, coastal and air patrols.

d) UNEF will carry out verification at the checkpoints through the Egyptian civilian police in the presence and under the supervision of UNEF personnel.

e) UNEF will report its findings to both Parties to the Agreement.

3. *Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and UNEF posts in the Hammam Faroun Area*

a) The zones designated on the Map attached to the Agreement as Zones 2A and 2B will be Buffer Zones. In these zones UNEF shall be stationed and shall perform the same functions as determined in Buffer Zone 1.

b) The UNEF posts in Hammam Faroun area are as indicated on the Map attached to the Agreement. Egyptian personnel and civilians will not enter UNEF posts in this area.

c) UNEF shall maintain permanent checkpoints on the routes leading into the Buffer Zones and on the Buffer Zone lines.

4. *Egyptian Civilian Police*

a) Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area, to perform normal police functions among the civilian population.

b) This police unit will be equipped with revolvers, sub-machine guns, rifles and light vehicles marked with the distinctive marking of civilian police.

c) The police unit will be composed of 700 policemen: 500 of them armed and 200 are Police Administrative personnel.

5. *Road Sections for Common Use*

a) The sections for common use on the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez are as indicated on the Map attached to the Agreement and will be opened to traffic as detailed in the Statement of the Chairman.

b) The maintenance of the common sections of the road within Buffer Zones 2A and 2B and West of Line M shall be maintained by UNEF. Other sections of the common road East of Line M shall be maintained by Israel.

c) Egypt and Israel will have access to these

road sections within Buffer Zones 2A and 2B from all directions, i.e. also from the side roads West and East of these sections as indicated on Map 'C' attached to the Protocol and this in accordance with an established time schedule—to and from their respective areas. Vehicles entering the side roads will be accompanied by UNEF.

d) UNEF will assure, through checkpoints on the road sections for common use and through patrols along these sections, that the traffic on these sections will be conducted in accordance with paragraph (c) above and as detailed in the Statement by the Chairman.

6. *Transfer of Oilfields, Installations and Infrastructures*

a) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing oilfields, installations and infrastructures.

b) Egypt will be represented in the transfer:

i) with respect to the Ras Sudar area by Mobil
ii) with respect to the Abu Rodeis area by IEOC.

c) The technicians introduced to the area will have the necessary vehicles for their movements and have the necessary means of communications with Egyptian authorities.

d) The transfer will be carried out by a procès verbal to be signed by Israel and the above-mentioned representative of Egypt and to be witnessed by the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative.

e) The third party technicians will be responsible for whatever oilfield installations and infrastructures they receive.

ARTICLE III

The northern area

1. *Buffer Zone 1*

a) The zone between the lines designated on the Map attached to the Agreement as Lines E and J will be a Buffer Zone. In this zone the UNEF shall be stationed and continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18th January 1974, and carry out other activities as detailed in the Agreement, Annex and Protocol.

b) UNEF will maintain checkpoints, observation posts and reconnaissance patrols along the lines of the Buffer Zone and within the area, in order to prevent any unauthorized entry into the area of any person. Access will be only through the checkpoints controlled by UNEF.

c) In Buffer Zone 1 there will be established an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel.

d) UNEF shall have complete freedom of movement within Buffer Zone 1, except that UNEF personnel shall not enter the perimeter of the Surveillance Stations.

2. *Limitation of Forces and Armaments*

a) The major limitations on Forces and Armaments are as provided for in article IV B of the Agreement and paragraph 5 of the Annex.

b) *UNEF supervision*

i) UNEF will conduct inspections as follows:

(a) In areas between Lines E and F and Lines K and J as regards limitations of forces and armaments.

(b) In the area between Line E up to ten (10) kilometres West of Line F and in the area between Line J up to ten (10) kilometres East of Line K to assure that anti-aircraft missiles are not placed in the areas.

ii) UNEF shall conduct bi-weekly inspections in the areas referred to in b) (i) (a) and b) (i) (b) above in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

iii) UNEF shall inform both Parties of the results of such inspections.

iv) UNEF inspection teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Parties.

v) UNEF shall carry out additional inspections within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of such a request from either Party, and will promptly furnish both Parties with the results of each inspection.

3. *Early Warning System*

a) The Early Warning System, based on the Agreement, the Annex and the accepted Proposal which constitutes an integral part of the Agreement, will include:

i) Two (2) Surveillance Stations operated by each Party respectively.

ii) Three (3) U.S. Watch Stations and four (4) unmanned electronic sensor fields.

b) The location of the system and the approach roads are indicated on Map 'A' attached to the Protocol.

c) *Surveillance Stations*

i) *General*

(a) Each Party shall maintain a Surveillance Station in Buffer Zone 1, to provide strategic early warning.

(b) UNEF personnel will not enter the Surveillance Stations of each Party.

(c) Each Party may visit its respective Surveillance Station and may freely supply and replace personnel and equipment situated therein, in accordance with the following procedures:

—UNEF will escort from its checkpoints to the perimeter of the Station and back.

—From that point escort and verification will be as described in paragraph 3. d) (ii).

(d) Each Party will be permitted to introduce into its Station items required for the proper functioning of the Station and personnel.

ii) The Stations

(a) Each Surveillance Station shall be manned by not more than two hundred and fifty (250) technical and administrative personnel, equipped with small arms (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades and ammunition) required for their protection.

(b) Each Party will be permitted to maintain in its respective Surveillance Station, fifteen (15) administrative vehicles, two to three (2-3) mobile engineering equipment for the maintenance of the site and the road and fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment. All vehicles shall be unarmed.

iii) Access to and exit from the Stations

(a) Access to and exit from the Surveillance Stations shall be as follows (as indicated on Map 'A' attached to the Protocol):

—To E-1: From West of Line E to the Giddi Route, through the UN Alpha checkpoint, to the junction leading to the Um Hashiba, and thereafter South-Eastwards on the route to E-1.

—To J-1: From East of Line J to the Um Hashiba Route to J-1.

(b) Each Party will inform UNEF at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the respective Surveillance Station. UNEF will co-ordinate with the appropriate Watch Station.

(c) As to escort arrangements of personnel to the Surveillance Stations, see paragraph 3. d) (ii).

(d) Such movement to and from the respective Surveillance Stations shall take place only during daylight.

(e) Each Party shall be entitled even during the night to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams after

giving immediate notice to the nearest Watch Station and UNEF.

iv) Maintenance of Communication Cables and Water Lines

Communication cables and water lines passing through Buffer Zone 1, to the respective Surveillance Stations, shall be inviolable. Both Parties will be permitted to carry out maintenance and repairs along the routes of the communication cable and water lines. Notification of such maintenance team shall be given four (4) hours in advance, through the UN Alpha and Bravo checkpoints respectively, to the nearest Watch Station. UNEF personnel will accompany each team in the same manner as detailed in paragraph 3. d) (ii).

v) Communication and Co-ordination between UNEF and the Parties

Technical arrangements, including the laying of telephone lines, will be arranged in order to facilitate communication and co-ordination between the UN checkpoints, the Watch Stations and each of the Parties.

d) U.S. role in Early Warning System

i) The U.S. role in the Early Warning System will be as provided for in the U.S. proposal attached to the Agreement.

ii) The UNEF will escort Egyptian and Israeli personnel to the perimeter of each Surveillance site where U.S. civilian personnel will verify that access by the Parties is in accordance with the provisions regarding access to the Surveillance sites.

iii) If experience suggests changes in locations or procedures, the U.S. shall be able to work out such changes in consultation with the Parties.

e) The establishment of an Egyptian Surveillance Station at E-1

i) As of 28th December 1975, Egypt may introduce a Working team into the Buffer Zone for the construction of a Surveillance Station at E-1, as detailed in the Statement of the Chairman.

ii) The building site at E-1 will be guarded at all times by UNEF whilst construction work is in process.

ARTICLE IV

Joint Commission

1. The Joint Commission, referred to in Article VI of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel

signed on the 4th September 1975, shall function in accordance with the following rules:

a) The Commission shall meet under the Chairmanship of the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East or his representative and shall be composed of representatives of each Party to the Agreement.

b) For the duration of the Agreement, the task of the Commission is to consider any problem arising from the Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Forces in the execution of its mandate.

c) Ordinary meetings of the Commission shall be held at agreed dates. Invitations for the meetings shall be issued by the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative. In the event that either Party, or the Chief Co-ordinator, requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

d) The Commission shall hold its meetings in the Buffer Zone under the Chairmanship of the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative where liaison officers of the Parties will be available.

e) The Parties to the Agreement shall consider problems before the Commission in order to reach agreement.

f) The Commission may supplement these rules as it deems necessary.

g) It will hold its first meeting not later than one month after the signing of the Protocol.

ARTICLE V

Flights and aerial reconnaissance

1. Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party (Lines E and J respectively).

2. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the Median Line of Buffer Zone 1 (designated on Map 'D', 1/500,000, US edition, attached to the Protocol) in accordance with the following principles:

a) Reconnaissance flights will be carried out by planes at a height of not less than 15,000 feet and on a straight course (along the median line of Buffer Zone 1). No manoeuvre should occur in the Buffer Zone that may involve the crossing of lines of the other Party.

b) Each reconnaissance flight shall not be made by more than two (2) planes.

c) There shall be seven (7) reconnaissance flights every week for each Party.

d) For these flights each Party will have at its exclusive disposal periods of 24 hours beginning at 1215 until 1145 the following day. The Parties will alternate in the use of the allocated periods. No flights will be carried out between 1145 and 1215 daily.

e) Egypt will be the first to exercise the right of carrying out flights on 22nd February 1976, starting from 1215. Israel will carry out its first flight on 23rd February 1976, starting from 1215, etc.

f) Notice shall be given to a representative of the Chief Co-ordinator not less than six (6) hours before each reconnaissance flight.

g) For reasons of weather limitations or other technical reasons, notice of a reconnaissance flight will specify a span of four (4) hours, during which time the reconnaissance flight will take place. (For example: a reconnaissance flight will take place on date, between 1000 and 1400).

ARTICLE VI

General

This Protocol and the Maps attached thereto are an integral part of the Agreement. The Statement of the Chairman is equally binding on the Parties.

The present Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by both Parties.

Done at Geneva on the 22nd of September 1975, in four original copies.

TAHA EL-MAGDOUB

*Major-General For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt*

AVRAHAM KIDRON
HERZL SHAFIR

Major-General For the Government of Israel

WITNESS
General Ensio Siilasvuo

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Resolution of the Golan Regional Committee of youth sections of the National Religious Party of Israel refusing to contemplate any Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights (excerpts)²⁰⁹

Hagolan, September 24, 1975

The Golan Heights are an integral part of the state of Israel and are vital to the security of the state and the safety of Galilee.

The Golan settlements and the Israeli army are the basis of Israel's control over the Heights.

Control by the Israeli army over all areas of the Golan Heights that are today in our hands is vital to ensure the security of the Golan settlements.

Any withdrawal in the Golan Heights will in itself inflict grave harm on the Golan settlements and endanger the military control of the Heights and everything related thereto.

In the light of the above an interim solution with Syria is out of the question.

The process of settlement in the Golan Heights must be stepped up. In the first stage four new settlements must be established in the area between the south and the centre of the Heights, top priority must be given to the rapid building of the town of Katsrin.

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Letter from US President Ford to Speaker Albert of the House of Representatives urging approval of the US role in the Sinai interim agreement²¹⁰

Washington, September 29, 1975

DEAR MR. SPEAKER:

I am writing to emphasize the importance of a Congressional decision in the coming week on U.S. participation in the Early Warning System which is an integral part of the Agreement signed

between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on September 4 in Geneva.²¹¹

Over the past two years, our Government has played an essential role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East. We have chosen this course because we recognized, as has every American Administration over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that troubled area are central to the American national interest.

The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States. The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environment in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agreement is in the overall national interest of the United States.

There would have been no Agreement without provision for American participation in the Early Warning System. That System is designed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties to the Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the United States. The special American role was the only one in which both sides had adequate confidence.

I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress fully understand the consequences of further delay in acting on this important matter.

The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement under the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in Geneva on September 22²¹² is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process will not begin, however, until the Congress has acted on the proposed United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the Agreement should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.

The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been proposed for it. There are other issues which the Congress

²⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Hatzofeh* (Tel Aviv), September 25, 1975.

²¹⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1896 (October 27, 1975), pp. 613–614. Identical letters were also sent to Representatives William S. Broomfield, Thomas E. Morgan, and John J. Rhodes and to Senators Clifford P. Case, Mike Mansfield, Hugh Scott, and John J. Sparkman.

²¹¹ Doc. 148 above.

²¹² Doc. 164 above.

must eventually consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and programs in the Middle East—particularly our programs of military and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues.

In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago to describe what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its implementation. This question has been under intensive discussion in the Congress for nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments related to the Agreement have been submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. If action is not completed in the coming week, the United States will be in the position of holding up implementation of an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern countries have signed as a significant step towards peace. The Middle East is an area where American policy has long had broad bipartisan support. The issue presently before the Congress offers an opportunity to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate how the Executive and Legislative branches can work together on a foreign policy matter of high importance to the national interest and for the benefit of world peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed as early as possible and no later than Friday, October 3.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

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Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger explaining the importance of the Sinai interim agreement²¹³

Washington, October 7, 1975

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to testify on the recent agreement

between Israel and Egypt.²¹⁴ That agreement—if carried out in good faith by both parties—may well mark a historic turning point, away from the cycle of war and stalemate that has for so long afflicted Israelis and Arabs and the world at large. I am here to urge prompt and positive congressional action to help further the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

For more than 30 years the issues in dispute in that troubled region have been recognized by successive American Administrations as having profound consequences for America's own interests. The U.S. diplomatic role in the Middle East is a matter of vital national importance:

—We have a historic and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel.

—We have important interests in the Arab world with its 150 million people and the world's largest oil reserves.

—We know that the world's hopes, and our own, for economic recovery and progress could be dashed by another upheaval in the Middle East.

—We must avoid the severe strains on our relations with our allies in Europe and Japan that perpetual crisis in the Middle East would almost certainly entail.

—We face the dangers of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, with its attendant nuclear risk, if tension in the Middle East should increase.

The October war of 1973 brought home to every American, in concrete and dramatic ways, the price we pay for continued Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil embargo triggered by that war cost us 500,000 jobs, more than \$10 billion in national production, and a rampant inflation. The 1973 crisis put our alliances with Western Europe and Japan under the most serious strain they had ever known. And it brought us to the verge of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, requiring us to place our military forces on a global alert.

Thus for the most basic reasons of national policy we owe it to the American people to do all we can to insure that the Middle East moves toward peace and away from conflict.

If the past two years of vigorous diplomatic endeavor have promoted the prospects of peace—as I believe they have—the United States has made the difference. We have maintained our special relationship with Israel, while at the same

²¹³ Made to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1896 (October 27, 1975), pp. 609–613.

²¹⁴ Doc. 148 above; see also docs. 149–152 and 164 above.

time dramatically improving our relations with the Arab world. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that both Israel and its Arab neighbors have been prepared to trust. This link of confidence must be maintained. Without it the Middle East will have lost the key element of its stability. Without it the period ahead—difficult at best—may well grow unmanageable.

It is our strong conviction that the Sinai agreement is indispensable to the process of peace. Were I here today to report that we had failed to obtain a Sinai agreement, I would have to tell you as well that the prospects of still another Arab-Israeli war were infinitely and eminently greater. Instead, I can state that the prospects for peace in the Middle East have been significantly advanced and that good chances exist for even further progress—if we have the wisdom and the national will to seize the opportunity before us.

Hailed by both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat as a possible turning point, the Sinai agreement represents the most far-reaching, practical test of peace—political, military, and psychological—in the long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in more than two decades, Israel and an Arab state have agreed not just to disentangle their forces in the aftermath of war but to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of the differences that for so long have made them mortal enemies.

Thus, what we are proposing to the Congress—as we seek approval for the stationing of no more than 200 technicians in the Sinai—is an investment in peace. But we must never forget that the most precarious part of the road toward a just and lasting peace still lies ahead. We will require national unity and a sympathetic understanding for the delicacy of the process if we are to continue the journey.

With these considerations in mind, Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee and the Congress to respond promptly and sympathetically to the President's request for approval of the stationing of up to 200 Americans in the Sinai—a request that has now been before the Congress for more than four weeks.

The proposed American presence is a limited but crucial American responsibility. It is not a role we sought; it is a role we accepted reluctantly, at the request of both sides—and only when it was clear that there would be no agreement without

it. The American personnel will be volunteers, and they will be civilians. Their function is to assist in an early-warning system in the small area of the Sinai passes in the U.N. buffer zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers for one side; they will serve both sides, at their request. They will complement the U.N. military contingents already there from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, and Finland whose responsibility it is to protect the buffer zone. Nor is our own presence in the area new—36 Americans are serving there at this moment with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The proposal we ask you to approve provides that the President may withdraw these volunteer technicians if we believe them to be in jeopardy or no longer necessary. We are prepared as well to accept the congressional proposal to make withdrawal mandatory in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of, and respect, this committee's desire to be certain that it has before it all undertakings relevant to its consideration and approval of the proposal for U.S. participation in the Sinai early-warning system.

We have made an unprecedented effort to meet the committee's concerns. Within days of my return from the Middle East we voluntarily supplied to the committees of Congress, on a classified basis, highly sensitive material relevant to the negotiation of the Sinai accord. Included in this material was information from the record of the negotiations of the very category which President Washington declined to furnish to the House of Representatives in 1794 and which no Administration has supplied since.

Four weeks ago, we provided four sets of documents to the appropriate congressional committees. They are:

—First, the U.S. proposal for stationing technicians in the Sinai.

—Second, the unclassified agreement between Israel and Egypt, and its military annex.

—Third, the classified documents which the Administration has certified include all of the assurances, undertakings, and commitments which we consider to be legally binding upon the United States. These documents also contain many provisions which are not considered legally binding; they were submitted because they were contained in documents which include binding clauses

and which were initialed or signed by the United States and one of the parties.

—Fourth, extracts from other classified documents in the negotiating record which the Administration believes are legally binding assurances, undertakings, or commitments. We have included in this category certain provisions which, although not regarded by the Administration as binding, might be so regarded by others.

Finally, the Legal Adviser of the State Department submitted yesterday to this committee on a classified basis a memorandum which provides his assessment of the legal character of all the documents previously given to the Congress.

We presented these classified documents on the assumption that they would be treated as if they had been transmitted under the Case Act [Public Law 92-403], which provides for submission of executive agreements to the Congress, but with “an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.”

Mr. Chairman, the executive branch has complied with both the letter and spirit of the committee’s resolution requesting the President to inform the committee “of all the assurances and undertakings by the United States on which Israel and Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai Agreement. . . .” I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that there are *no other* assurances or undertakings, beyond those already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon the United States. We will make no contrary claim in the future; nor can any other government.

Mr. Chairman, if there has been a disagreement between this committee and the executive branch over the past several weeks, it has concerned not disclosure to the Congress—which has been complete—but the *form* of disclosure to the public.

We had hoped that a summary could be worked out with the committee which could have been certified as containing all commitments so that the full Senate would feel free to vote unreservedly on the U.S. technicians. This procedure was intended as a means of satisfying the needs of the Congress and the rights of the American people to know, while at the same time maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the diplomatic process. We believed that we were following the precedents set in previous negotiations in the Middle East, when classified documents were submitted to the

Congress but not made public. Our purpose was to avoid a situation in which other governments would feel compelled to take a public position and to protect our ability to act as a mediator in the future.

This plan became problematical when the confidential documents were leaked. This created a new and very difficult situation. The Administration disagrees with the decision of the committee to publish these documents and maintains that it in no way sets a precedent. We consider that the provisions of the Case Act regarding classification remain valid; they should be respected in the future.

We recognize that the committee faced an unusual problem to which no good answer existed. We are prepared to work with this committee to develop procedures for future negotiations which will permit ground rules to be clearly established in advance so that all parties will know what to expect.

With regard to the U.S. undertakings, the Administration is particularly concerned about two points:

—First, that congressional approval of the proposal on the technicians not link the Sinai agreement to the U.S. undertakings—which are distinct and separate; and

—Second, that U.S. statements of intention not be given a legally binding character which was never intended and is not inherent in them.

The Administration is convinced that congressional approval of the proposal to station technicians in the Sinai does not import or imply approval of anything more.

The United States is not a party to the Sinai agreement. That agreement is between Israel and Egypt; they are the only signatories and the only states bound by it. The agreement repeatedly speaks of the obligations of “the parties”; it is beyond dispute that “the parties” are Egypt and Israel, and *not* the United States.

The agreement provides, in an annex, that in the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel—in which the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions—there will be established an early-warning system entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel. The proposal of the United States, for which approval of the Congress is being sought, provides details of that early-warning system. That proposal is described as a *part* of the

agreement between Egypt and Israel, but that does not imply that the United States is party to this agreement. By the same token the U.S. assurances and undertakings before this committee, while given on the occasion of, and concordant with, the conclusion of the Sinai agreement between Egypt and Israel, are not in any sense part of the Sinai agreement.

Thus, even if the United States were unable to fulfill all of the intentions we have expressed, the parties—Egypt and Israel—would nonetheless remain bound by the Sinai agreement. The obligations of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement are clear, direct, and unqualified; they stand on their own.

A vote in favor of the specific, limited U.S. role in the early-warning system will not thereby commit the Congress to a position on any other issue—whether it be the question of undertakings and assurances to the parties involved, our continuing relations with various countries of the area, a given level of budget support, or our policies and programs in the Middle East. Those are separate issues which you will want to consider carefully at the appropriate time. Many will come up in the normal authorization and appropriation process; they are not an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

Let me turn now to the question of the nature of American assurances and undertakings to Israel and Egypt.

The special position of trust enjoyed by the United States inevitably means that both sides attach great significance to our views. Statements of our intentions, therefore, served as a lubricant in this most recent negotiation just as they have in every previous mediation effort. But they must be seen in perspective and in the light of historical practice. It is extremely important, therefore, that in approving the sending of U.S. technicians the Congress should take care not inadvertently to create commitments that were never intended.

We have submitted all documents containing U.S. commitments. Not all provisions in these documents amount to binding undertakings. They include:

—First, assurances by the United States of our political intentions. These are often statements typical of diplomatic exchange; in some instances they are merely formal reaffirmations of existing

American policy. Other provisions refer to contingencies which may never arise and are related—sometimes explicitly—to present circumstances subject to rapid change.

—Second, undertakings or assurances by the United States which are conditional on existing or prior authorization and appropriation by the Congress or which fall within the constitutional authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.

Thus to speak of memoranda of agreement as executive agreements is by no means to say that each of their individual provisions is binding upon the United States. That depends entirely upon the content of the specific provisions in question. Moreover, nothing in these particular documents constrains congressional action in any issue involving the future legislative process.

The fact that many provisions are not by any standard international commitments does not mean, of course, that the United States is morally or politically free to act as if they did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States so long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue. But they are not binding commitments of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude with this thought: the Sinai accord could prove to be a historic milestone. It is not a peace agreement, but it can be an important step in that direction.

The United States remains committed to helping bring a just, durable, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East. We do not consider the Sinai agreement as permitting stagnation in the process of negotiation; its purpose is to give impetus to that process. We are prepared to work with *all* the parties toward a solution of *all* the issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.

Whether the Sinai agreement fulfills its promise depends crucially on the confidence and trust America inspires. Yet we cannot gain—nor retain—confidence abroad if we lack it at home. Whether there will be peace or war in the Middle East depends importantly on whether America is at peace with itself, whether America is united in its purpose.

The challenge now is to build on the progress that has been made. So let us get on with the job, for there will be no Sinai accord unless the Congress

of the United States takes positive action to approve the proposal to place up to 200 technicians in the Sinai. And if there is no accord, then all that America has worked for, and all that the Middle East has hoped for, may well be lost.

So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully ask that this committee act now to approve the resolution before it so that Israel and Egypt can get on with the business of implementing the Sinai accord and so that the march toward peace can be resumed in the Middle East.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)²¹⁵

Moscow, October 10, 1975

On the invitation of the Soviet leaders, Hafis al-Asad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (ASRP), President of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union on October 9–10, 1975.

The current situation in the Middle East and its influence on the international situation was discussed. The sides stressed their resolution to do their utmost to restore and secure the legitimate rights of the Arab states and the Arab people, including the Arab people of Palestine.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and Syria declared their firm resolve to continue strengthening friendship between the two states and their peoples. It was also stressed that no one will be allowed to disrupt or damage this friendship.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship, cordiality and complete understanding.

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Joint resolution of the US Congress authorizing the stationing of US nationals in the Sinai as part of the Egypt-Israel interim agreement²¹⁶

Washington, October 11, 1975

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel²¹⁷ may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East;

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early-warning system,²¹⁸ the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombatant functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai": *Provided, however,* That United States civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between

²¹⁵ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, no. 42 (October 18, 1975), p. 3.

²¹⁶ Passed by the House of Representatives on October 8 by 341 votes to 69 (*Congressional Record* (daily), October 8, 1975, pp. H 9861–9862), by the Senate on October 9 by 70 votes to 18 (*Congressional Record* (daily), October 9, 1975, p. S 18010) and signed by President Ford on October 11, 1975; text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XIX, 42 (October 15, 1975), p. 181.

²¹⁷ Doc. 148 above.

²¹⁸ Included in doc. 148 above.

Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

Sec. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5 (c) of Public Law 93—148 is privileged under section 7 of such law.

Sec. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have volunteered to participate in such system.

Sec. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall, so long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once every six months, on (1) the status, scope, and anticipated duration of their participation, and (2) the feasibility of ending or reducing as soon as possible their participation by substituting nationals of other countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate committees of the Congress shall promptly hold hearings on each report of the President and report to the Congress any findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Sec. 5. The authority contained in the joint resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai" does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.

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Policy statement on the Arab-Israeli conflict adopted by the UK Liberal Party²¹⁹

London, October 16, 1975

Mr Russell Johnston, Liberal M.P. for Inverness and the Party's Foreign Affairs Spokesman, today issued an agreed statement on the Middle East, prepared in consultation with the Liberal Foreign Affairs Panel, which advises him.

Introduction :

The aim must be to achieve in the Middle East a lasting peaceful settlement based on the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution Nos. 242 and 338 in line with the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in November 1973.

Peaceful agreement should be based on the following points :

1. The recognition by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist.

2. The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967.

3. The right of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza to determine their own future through their own chosen representatives.

4. Jerusalem is an intractable problem that can only be solved at a later stage. Any solution must guarantee rights of freedom of access for all to the Holy Places under internationally agreed arrangements.

5. A Peace Treaty underwritten by the USA and USSR to guarantee the common Arab/Israeli frontiers and make provision for demilitarised zones and international peace-keeping forces.

General Policy

1. The U.K. should pursue these principles in co-operation with her EEC partners and together with France present the Community view to the Security Council. The U.K. should also be ready to participate in peace-keeping operations in support of a peaceful settlement in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

2. Liberals have always supported both universal membership of the UN and the right of self determination. We therefore insist on Israel's right to be a member of the U.N. and other inter-

²¹⁹ Text supplied, on request, by the UK Liberal Party.

national organisations and the Palestinians' right to settle their own future.

3. The Liberal Party will make efforts to increase its contacts with the Arab and Israeli world.

Mr Johnston said: "All Liberals greatly welcome the agreement reached between Egypt and Israel, even if its effect is still relatively limited. One is sharply aware of the intense difficulty of making progress in negotiations where memories are long and feelings are deep but we believe that this statement represents a fair basis for continuing dialogue."

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the UK of Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)²²⁰

London, October 22, 1975

At the invitation of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, OBE, FRS, HRH, Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia paid an official visit to London between 20th and 23rd October 1975.

In considering other international issues of mutual concern, the two sides noted with satisfaction favourable changes in the international situation which have contributed to the process of detente and to increased cooperation between states. As regards the Middle East, they underlined the need for early progress towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement in the region, which must include a just solution of the Palestinian question, and they will welcome any steps towards this goal.

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Statement by US President Ford deploring the UN General Assembly draft resolution characterizing Zionism as racism²²¹

Washington, October 24, 1975

It has been a general principle of the United States to take grave exception to any action that weakens the United Nations as an effective forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

We deplore in the strongest terms the recent vote in the Social Committee characterizing Zionism as a form of racism. Such action undermines the principles upon which the United Nations is based.

The spokesmen for the United States in the United Nations have expressed well and forcefully the views of this Administration and the American people on this issue.

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Article by USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko reviewing USSR foreign policy (excerpt)²²²

Moscow, late October, 1975

Seeking to eliminate the hotbeds of war and prevent new crises, the Soviet Union continues its persistent efforts aimed at bringing about a just settlement and lasting peace in the Middle East. For many years now the situation there has remained explosive militarily. From time to time, as in October 1973, war erupts in the area. The underlying cause of such a situation is Israel's continued occupation of the Arab lands and her constant acts of provocation against the neighbouring Arab states.

And yet, anyone who takes an impartial view of the Middle East situation and prospects there is bound to see that Israeli aggression is doomed to failure. This is borne out convincingly by historical experience and by the recent events in Indochina. It is certain that so long as Israel

²²¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1901 (December 1, 1975), p. 790.

²²² Russian text, *Kommunist* (Moscow), no. 14, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 12 (December, 1975), pp. 8-9.

²²⁰ Excerpted from the text supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

pursues a policy of aggression and expansion, there will be no peace in the Middle East and, accordingly, no security for Israel. Israel's policy-makers must at long last understand that so long as they entertain the ambitions of territorial aggrandizement, the very existence of the Israeli state cannot be safely guaranteed.

Tel Aviv is not loth to vaunt before the world its alleged commitment to a "step-by-step settlement". However, realistic-minded people understand that such a course, prompted by obviously time-serving considerations and involving limited hand-outs to the Arabs, is designed to lead astray from a real and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem.

The Soviet Union takes a principled stand on the Middle East. It is for a settlement in the Middle East, yet not an illusory one, but one that is real and comprehensive, that would ensure a just and durable peace in the area. If that is to be achieved, Israel must completely, I repeat, completely withdraw from the Arab lands seized in 1967, the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine including the right to form their own state be safeguarded, and an independent existence and development for all the countries in the area be ensured.

The attainment of such a settlement is to be furthered by a special mechanism set up for the purpose not without much difficulty—the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East—which is being stubbornly ignored by Israel and supporters of her expansionist and aggressive policies. As a co-chairman of the Conference, the Soviet Union wants to see its work resumed. It proceeds, of course, from the assumption that the Conference should be preceded by thorough-going and serious preparation. Most important, all the conferees without exception must display a genuine and not token wish to work toward solving the tasks facing it.

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Radio interview statements by President Senghor of Senegal reviewing his country's attitude to the Middle East²²³

Riyad, October 30, 1975

Q. Your Excellency, Mr President, we have been informed that your tour will take you to a number of Arab countries... Can you tell us about the nature of these visits? [Follows translation of the question into French and recording of Senghor's answer in French]

A. [From translation into Arabic]... Relations with the Arab countries have a prominent place in Senegal's foreign policy. As far as I am concerned this is not a new idea... Even before Senegal had achieved its independence and when I was a Deputy in the French National Assembly, I always used to advocate the strengthening of relations between Senegal and the Arab countries... I have received many invitations from Arab countries... Hence my current tour, which I have begun with a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with which Senegal as you know, has old-standing relations...

My visit has three aims. Politics: I wanted to help my brothers, the Arabs, in solving the Middle East problem. Culture: I want to strengthen the cultural relations and co-operation between Senegal and the Arab countries. Economy: I am determined to strengthen Senegal's economic relations with all the Arab countries, especially in the Middle East.

Q. On the problem of the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is anxious to preserve international peace and stability. Therefore, it regards its oil wealth as a source of prosperity for the entire world, and not as a weapon threatening the world. But Israel's attitudes and intransigence are pushing international peace towards a dangerous abyss... How does Your Excellency see the future of peace in the region?

A. I have always tried to promote peace in the Middle East... I am making every effort to to help my Arab brothers to liberate their land occupied by Israel, and to help any Palestinian brothers to regain their rights. But we must be realistic. The super-powers will never agree to the destruction of (?Israel). Therefore, I would like to

²²³ Broadcast on Riyad radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5048/A/4-5; reprinted by permission.

say that we should work first for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and the recovery of the rights of the Palestinian people. But in addition to this, there should be an official dialogue between the Arab states and Israel, and between the PLO and Israel. But this state—Israel—is always refusing to recognize the Palestinian people and their right. So long as this continues there will be no peace. Israel should recognize the fact that no peace and stability can be achieved in this region unless the Palestinian people regain their rights. The Jews should then be prepared to live in this region as (?Semites) and not as representatives of European states. Peace and stability in the region cannot be achieved unless these aims—the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinian people's rights—[are recognized]... to enable this region to become a region of peace, security and prosperity...

Q. Your Excellency, Mr President. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is anxious to help the friendly African countries in all stages of development and to stand up for the justice of their causes. However, at present (?we are facing) Israel's intransigence and its refusal to recognize the Palestinian people's rights... Such [word indistinct] may obstruct the Kingdom in carrying its task to the best of its ability. What is your Government's attitude to this question?

A. Economic problems interest me a great deal... Since the Ramadan War, the prices of the raw materials we sell to the industrial countries have risen, on average, by 57 per cent while the prices of the manufactured goods we import from the advanced countries have gone up by 197 per cent. As countries rich in raw materials, we should therefore work for the development of our economies... In this connection, I should like to point out an important issue—the triangular co-operation between the Arab world, the African world and Europe. For example, we can, as rich States, co-operate with the technologically advanced countries and also with [words indistinct] the oil-rich countries, and thus supply the fraternal countries with raw materials [words indistinct] and agricultural products. Through this triangular co-operation we can escape from the impasse in which we, the countries of the Third World, find ourselves. I believe that in this way we can (?bring about) Arab-African co-operation... which I and

my colleagues are striving to accomplish... But as I have said, we cannot achieve this co-operation until the Middle East problem has been solved—and it cannot be solved except through an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. As I have said before, there should be a dialogue between the PLO, which we recognize as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and Israel. It is essential that Israel should recognize the PLO and the Palestinian people's rights.

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Message from US President Ford to the US Congress requesting security assistance to the Middle East²²⁴

Washington, October 30, 1975

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I sent to the Congress on May 15 draft legislation to authorize foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and for the transition period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1976. At that time, because of uncertainties caused by changing events, particularly in the Middle East and Indochina, I was unable to propose specific amounts for security assistance programs. I said I would return to the Congress with specific proposals for these programs as soon as possible.

The review of security assistance programs now has been completed and my revisions to the draft legislation are being transmitted today. My initial legislative proposal was printed in the House of Representatives as House Document No. 94-158 and was introduced in the Senate as S. 1816. The revisions transmitted with this message will supersede sections 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of that proposal.

The world is different and far more complex than the world we knew in the 1950's. So are the problems confronting it. However, the United States Government still has a primary responsibility to take the lead in creating conditions which will insure justice, international cooperation and endur-

²²⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1900 (November 24, 1975), pp. 739-740.

ing peace. The program of security assistance I am transmitting today will contribute significantly toward meeting this responsibility.

Nothing so underscores how essential the American peacekeeping role is than our current efforts in the Middle East. Since the October 1973 War, our Middle East policy has been based on the following three principles:

—First, a firm resolution to work for a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict taking into account the legitimate interests of all states and peoples in the area, including the Palestinians.

—Second, a commitment to the improvement of our relations with all the states of the Middle East on a bilateral basis, maintaining our support for Israel's security while strengthening our relations with the Arab countries.

—Third, continued dedication to avoiding great power confrontation in the Middle East.

The October 1973 War was the fourth, and most devastating, round of hostilities between Arab and Israeli forces. Moreover, the impact of this last collision between opposing forces was not confined to the Middle East. The spectre of armed confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union hung over the crisis. Disruption of the economies of Western Europe, Japan and other nations was an important by-product of the conflict. In addition, the likelihood existed that the period immediately after October 1973 would merely represent a pause between the fourth and fifth rounds of conflict.

The quest for peace in the area was of the highest priority. Our most immediate objective was to encourage the disengagement of the contending military forces. Disengagement was accomplished in 1974. This year, we dedicated ourselves to the goal of withdrawal in the Sinai—and an agreement was negotiated as a result of the efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger. We believe that the step-by-step approach to negotiations offers the best prospects for establishing an enduring peace in the region. We expect to proceed on an incremental basis to the next stage of negotiation within the near future.

I believe the hope for a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute is stronger today than at any time in the previous quarter century. A new era also is opening in our relations with Arabs and Israelis. This security assistance program will give substance

to these new relationships and help preserve the momentum toward peace.

My proposals have three basic purposes:

—First, to provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain security and to persevere in the negotiating process.

—Second, to give tangible expression to our new and fruitful relations with the Arab nations most directly involved and to encourage those which are seriously prepared to work for peace.

—Third, to encourage the peaceful development of the area, thereby reducing the incentives to violence and conflict.

The Security Assistance Program I am transmitting to Congress is heavily weighted with requirements to sustain the peace in the Middle East. Fully 70 percent of the program for fiscal year 1976 is to be concentrated in this region.

It proposes:

—For Israel, \$740 million in security supporting assistance and \$1,500 million in military credits. Israel's ability to defend herself and to relieve some of the burdens of her defense reduces the prospect of new conflict in the Middle East.

—For Egypt, \$750 million in supporting assistance. Egypt has made the bold decision to move from confrontation to negotiation as a means of resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Its leaders also must cope with serious economic problems whose resolution the United States is in a position to assist.

—For Jordan, \$100 million in military assistance grants, \$78 million in security supporting assistance, and \$75 million in military credit sales. This assistance will strengthen Jordan's ability to hold to the course of moderation it has consistently followed.

—For Syria, \$90 million in security supporting assistance. This assistance will enable our development cooperation with Syria to go forward, furthering our efforts to reestablish more normal bilateral relations.

—In addition, I am recommending a Special Requirements Fund this fiscal year of \$50 million. The fund is to be used to reinforce the peace process in the area and, in particular, to defray the costs of stationing American civilian technicians in the Sinai area.

All of this aid will contribute to the confidence that Middle Eastern nations must have in the United States if we are to maintain our momentum toward peace.

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Speech by President Senghor of Senegal made at a dinner in his honour (excerpt)²²⁵**Damascus, November 1, 1975**

Mr President, you will undoubtedly have realized that the official visit I am paying to the Syrian Arab Republic in response to your kind invitation gives me pleasure for more than one reason. First there is the fraternal reception which we have been accorded since our arrival in Damascus, your great capital. The Syrian people, rallied behind a great socialist party—the Ba’th Party—and a well known leader who enjoys the respect of the world, have received me and my delegation with all the traditions of Arab hospitality.

Undoubtedly this friendly gesture is directed to all the Senegalese people who feel that they are close to your people despite the distance separating the two countries. The Syrian and Senegalese knew each other even before they obtained their independence. To be sure of this, it is sufficient to see that an important community of Syrian nationals in Senegal has merged in the national family and is contributing to the country’s economic and social development.

On the other hand, a large number of Senegalese citizens who were attracted by the image of a country which preserves a precious heritage of the Islamic civilization have been coming to Syria for a very long time. This shows that the relations between our peoples are not new. We must now raise these relations to the standard of dynamic co-operation which will take into consideration the present requirements represented in the solidarity of the Third World, particularly the solidarity of the Arab and African peoples. My visit, and this is the second reason for my pleasure, will assuredly consolidate the foundations for the realization of this aim.

I have often said that Arab-African co-operation in all fields has been one of the pillars of Senegal’s foreign policy since the independence of our country in 1960. When I suggested during the colonialist era that the Arabic language be

taught in Senegal’s secondary schools, the aim was not only to provide an opportunity for getting acquainted with the rich Arab culture which yielded numerous immortal philosophical and literary works but also to strengthen the spiritual ties which bind the east and west with black Africa.

Senegal, which has always been an open country for the fertile contributions of the Arab civilization and which lies on the borders of the two worlds—the African negro and the Berber Arab—surely realizes the importance of this position and therefore works for the realization of Arab-African co-operation which must cover the cultural and economic fields simultaneously.

I am happy, Mr President, to know for sure that the boosting of this co-operation is also the aim of the Syrian Arab Republic under your wise leadership. . . .

For nine years we have been ceaselessly declaring from various platforms that it is necessary to establish an independent and sovereign state for the Palestinians on the land of Palestine and that there can be no hope for establishing peace in the Middle East if a direct dialogue is not conducted between the Israelis and the PLO.

Mr President, Senegal follows with interest the progress achieved in all fields in your country. This progress is achieved under your wise leadership by the discipline and courage of the sons of this country and the dynamism of the Ba’th Party. I am confident that the discussions we will hold during my visit will bolster the ties of friendship between the Syrian Arab Republic and Senegal and lay down the foundations of a fruitful co-operation between our countries.

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Speech by Permanent UN Representative Vinci of Italy outlining the attitude of the EEC to the Palestine question²²⁶**New York, November 5, 1975**

It is in my capacity as representative of the country which presides over the European Com-

²²⁵ Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5050/A/3; reprinted by permission. President Senghor came from Saudi Arabia and visited Syria November 1–4 as part of a tour of the Arab world which also included Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Egypt and Qatar.

²²⁶ Made in French in the UN General Assembly’s debate on the question of Palestine; English translation, UN doc. A/PV. 2393, pp. 48–50.

munity, and on behalf of its nine component States, that I wish to make known our views on the all-important question of which the Assembly is seized. That our Community should be concerned with the fate of the Palestinians should surprise no one in view of the fact that that problem affects a region near to us and with which in the course of history we have maintained close ties founded on an obvious need for complementarity, and the fact that the settlement of the question is at the very heart of the Middle East crisis.

Moreover, it is obvious and cannot be denied that the situation in Palestine in the past few years has acquired decisive weight in the search for peace in the Middle East. As is clear from the debates in various international forums, notably this one, it would appear to be vain to seek a general settlement of the conflict that does not include a solution of the Palestinian problem.

This preoccupation of the States members of the Community was formally voiced for the first time in their joint declaration of 6 November 1973, contained in document A/9288—S/11081 of 7 November 1973²²⁷. The members of the Community continue to insist in particular on the need to implement resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) to which they have always been strongly attached. Similarly, they continue to believe that special attention must be given to the Palestinian problem, which appears to be the most complex of the various fundamental aspects of the settlement of that question. These aspects of the position of the States members of the European Community remain valid and cannot be dissociated from the question as a whole.

It is in this spirit and on the basis of the position that I have just outlined that the Nine continue to be ready to contribute to the search for and the implementation of a definitive global settlement of a situation which continues to hold great dangers for international peace and security.

In conclusion, the nine members of the European Community consider that a peace settlement which takes account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must, on the one hand, respect Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders, on an equal footing with other States in the region, and, on the other hand, recognize the right of the people of Palestine to expression of their national identity.

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Joint statement issued by the governments of the USA and Egypt announcing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy²²⁸

Washington, November 5, 1975

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the United States of America have agreed in principle to conduct a program of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy pursuant to a proposed agreement for cooperation in accordance with the following principles:

1. The agreement is expected to cover cooperation in fields pertaining to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including design, construction and operation of research and power reactors, desalinization, the beneficial uses of radio-isotopes and radiation sources, the exploration and development of uranium resources, and related health and safety considerations.

2. The agreement for cooperation will enable Egypt at the outset to purchase from the United States nuclear power reactors having an approximate total electrical capacity of 1200 MWe and the slightly enriched uranium necessary to fuel these facilities.

3. Such cooperation will be under the terms fully compatible with the non-proliferation objectives of the two governments including their desires to assure that the introduction of nuclear power for civil uses into the Middle East will occur under carefully safeguarded conditions. These conditions will be designed to assure that the US-supplied facilities, materials, and their products, as well as the associated relevant technology, are used for peaceful purposes only and will include the following main provisions to ensure that:

- a) None of the assistance provided will be employed for any military purposes, including the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

- b) The materials and facilities to be supplied as well as the produced plutonium will be subjected to international safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, designed to assure their continued uses for peaceful purposes.

- c) The plutonium produced in the agreed upon 1200 MWe power reactors under the agreement or derived from the US fuel supplied for these

²²⁷ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²²⁸ English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1900 (November 24, 1975), p. 732.

facilities will be reprocessed, fabricated and stored outside Egypt.

d) Facilities utilizing relevant nuclear technology obtained from the United States will be under effective safeguards.

e) The government of Egypt guarantees to apply effective physical security measures to the facilities and nuclear material covered by the agreement.

It is the intention of the United States that at such time as negotiations are completed the same safeguard provisions and special measures will be included in both the US Cooperation Agreements with Egypt and Israel respectively. If certain provisions are modified or altered in one agreement, it is the intention of the United States Government to introduce such modifications or alterations in the other agreement.

Both Governments will consult closely with their respective legislatures on the nature and details of their proposed new agreement, bearing in mind the importance that such an arrangement will hold for their peaceful nuclear cooperation, and their respective non-proliferation policies.

After finalization of the text of the Agreement for Cooperation, it will enter into force after the completion of statutory and constitutional requirements of both parties.

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Speech by Permanent UN Representative Malik of the USSR made before the UN General Assembly (excerpt)²²⁹

New York, November 5, 1975

The decisions taken at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly further strengthened the international authority of the PLO and increased the significance and the role of the Palestine question in settling the whole of the Middle East problem. But in the tragic fate of the Arab people of Palestine little has changed since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, we have to note that, as clearly emerges from the

report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, document A/10265,²³⁰ and from the extremely detailed and cogently argued statement of the head of the PLO delegation, Mr. Kaddoumi,²³¹ the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), supporting the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, remain unfulfilled, and practically no genuine steps towards the implementation of that resolution have been taken.

Now, wherein lies the reason for this continuing deadlock? Primarily in the aggressive policy of Israel, in the stubborn refusal of the Israeli leaders and their protectors to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinian people affirmed in that resolution and in other decisions of the United Nations or to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people. The reason, too, lies in the sabotaging by Israel of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Middle East and in its refusal to hold constructive talks on a Middle East settlement, including a settlement of the Palestine problem, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference and with equal participation of the PLO as the acknowledged representative of the Palestinian people.

While making statements on every possible occasion about the rights of Israel to an independent and secure existence, the leaders of Israel at the same time have been flagrantly flouting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to their own independent existence. Israel's policy of aggression and expansion directed against the Arab countries and peoples and pursued by those leaders and their Zionist protectors has been represented to us as, so to speak, an international good deed, while the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable rights is portrayed by them as what they describe as terrorist activity. But this is deliberate slander.

The irrefutable fact is that the stubborn resistance of Israel and its protectors has been aimed at preventing implementation of the historic decisions of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine. This has been arousing growing indignation throughout the world. The just struggle of the Palestinian people and its heroic vanguard, the PLO, headed by that distinguished son of the

²²⁹ Made in Russian in the debate on the question of Palestine; excerpted from the English translation, UN doc. A/PV.2394, pp. 8-16.

²³⁰ Doc. 6 above.

²³¹ Doc. 321 below.

Palestinian people Yasser Arafat, is enjoying increasing sympathy and support from the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations and their peoples. An additional proof of this can be found in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly. Almost all representatives who spoke emphasize that no lasting settlement in the Middle East, no just and durable peace is possible in the absence of an equitable solution to the Palestine problem in accordance with the terms of resolution 3236 (XXIX) of the General Assembly.

Thus the Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mr. Bouteflika, speaking at this session stated:

The recognition and satisfaction of the rights of the Palestinian people are the fundamental elements in any true solution to the Middle East crisis. It took a long time for international opinion to accept this truth, and the General Assembly finally enshrined it in its resolution 3236 (XXIX). (2382nd meeting, pp. 58–60)

Many representatives have pointed out that the PLO has adopted a properly responsible attitude to the decisions of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly and has manifested a readiness to co-operate constructively with the United Nations. This was not true of Israel and its supporters.

The consistent position of principle of the Soviet Union on the question of the Middle East settlement, including the question of Palestine, has been repeatedly expounded and is well known. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, expressing the essence of the Middle East policy of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, stated:

The Soviet Union has been, still is and will continue to be vitally interested in the earliest possible achievement of a lasting and just peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

He also stated:

The Soviet Union will strive to attain this goal in contact and in close joint action with brother socialist countries, Arab friends, jointly and co-operatively with all States which display the sincere wish to make their contribution to the attainment of this extremely important goal for the cause of universal peace.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly stressed that in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in the interest of all States of the area and the peoples inhabiting it, Israeli armed forces must be withdrawn from all the Arab

territories they occupied in 1967; the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish their own State, must be ensured, and there must be a guarantee of the rights of all countries of the Middle East to independent existence and development.

As was stressed by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement in the general debate at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly:

A Middle East settlement cannot make headway if those crucial problems are left unsolved. Without their solution a settlement in the Middle East can only be delayed indefinitely, with increasing dangers for the situation. No palliative measures or camouflaging can change the substance of the matter. (2357th meeting, p. 51)

For the consideration of all the questions of the Middle East settlement, there is, as we know, an appropriate machinery: the Geneva peace conference. The Soviet Union favours the resumption of its work with the participation of all interested parties including, of course, the representatives of the PLO.

In its desire to eliminate hotbeds of war and to prevent new crises arising, and in its desire to strengthen and spread the process of détente to all parts of the world, the Soviet Union has been making and is still making consistent efforts to bring about a just settlement and the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East.

Friendly and fraternal relations have been established between the Soviet Union and the Palestine Arab people. The USSR is affording the Arab people of Palestine comprehensive support and help in their struggle for the restoration of their lawful rights, and for development through national independence and progress. The development of these relations has recently become particularly active. The firm and consistent support of the Soviet Union for the legitimate interests of the peoples of Arab countries has met with profound gratitude on the part of their public opinion and leadership. A telegram from the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, addressed to Mr. Brezhnev, stated:

Our people will never forget the position of principle taken by you and the people of the great Soviet Union in our support in this time which is so difficult and troublesome for us, when we must withstand the blows of imperialism and Zionism, which are striving to liquidate its national existence.

A very deep appreciation of the comprehensive assistance given by the Soviet Union to the Arab peoples, including the Palestine Arab people, is contained in an official communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Yasser Arafat this spring.²³² The delegation of the USSR would also like to express its gratitude to the head of the Palestinian delegation at this session of the General Assembly, Mr. Kaddoumi, for his very deep appreciation of the support given by the Soviet Union to the PLO.

The Soviet Union believes that in order to bring about a settlement in the Middle East there must be joint efforts on the part of all those who cherish the fate of the peoples of the Middle East, and above all the solidarity and joint efforts of all Arab countries and their peoples.

The duty of the United Nations, and of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, is to come out decisively in favour of the immediate and unconditional implementation of the fundamental decisions of the United Nations on the Palestine question and the questions of the Middle East settlement as a whole, and to compel Israel to comply with these decisions and thus provide support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their rights and the struggle of all Arab peoples for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

To summarize the position of the Soviet Union on the Palestinian problem and on the question of a Middle East settlement as a whole, the Soviet delegation would like to stress the following point. The Soviet Union firmly and unwaveringly supports the struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinian people, and is in favour of the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the well-known decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

In order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in the interests of all States and peoples of the area, it is essential to solve three fundamental problems: first, Israeli forces must be withdrawn from all the Arab territories they occupied in 1967; secondly, the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their inalienable right to establish their own State, must

be ensured; thirdly, the rights of all the countries of the Middle East to independent existence and development must be guaranteed. This position of the USSR with regard to the Middle East settlement and its support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable rights, was once again confirmed in the course of a reception on 30 October by the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Union of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Podgorny, in connexion with the visit to the Soviet Union of the Special Representative of the President of the Iraq Republic, the Minister of Information of Iraq, Mr. Aziz. In the course of that meeting both States confirmed their intention of continuing to grant comprehensive support and assistance to the Palestinian resistance movement, which they view as a constituent element of the Arab national liberation movement. They also stressed the need to strengthen the unity of Arab countries in the interests of their just struggle for the common cause.

Now, obviously, no one has any doubts about the fact that the question of the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people can be resolved only within the framework of efforts to bring about a general political settlement in the Middle East and only with the full, unreserved participation of representatives of the Palestinian people at all stages of talks affecting the Palestine problem. The representatives of the Palestinian people, as embodied in the delegation of the PLO, must take an independent part in the efforts to bring about a peace settlement in the Middle East on an equal footing with all other participants in the Geneva Conference.

It is impossible to achieve a lasting settlement in the Middle East by means of partial measures, behind the backs of the Palestinian people and in disregard of their interests. It is the duty of the United Nations not only once again to confirm the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own State, but also vigorously to condemn those who are sabotaging and undermining the implementation of United Nations decisions on this question.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have based themselves and continue to base themselves firmly on the premise that aggression should be halted resolutely and that

²³² Doc. 88 above.

countries which have been the victims of aggression should have restored to them the lands which lawfully belong to them and that every State and every people has the right to a free, independent development and existence. And this is really not just a question of the Middle East; it is an international question of fundamental principle.

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Speech by Permanent UN Representative Huang Hua of China made before the UN General Assembly²³³

New York, November 5, 1975

Over the past year the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, holding high the banner of united struggle in the October war, have continued to march forward in their struggles against Israeli Zionism and hegemonism. Defying brute force, the Palestinian people have persevered in armed struggle under difficult conditions and have dealt incessant blows at the Israeli aggressors. At its twenty-ninth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution by overwhelming majority, reaffirming the Palestinian people's right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty. This is a heavy blow at the conspiracy of the super-Powers and the Israeli Zionists to strangle the liberation cause of Palestine in disregard of the right of the Palestinian people. It forcefully shows that the Palestinian people are gaining increasingly extensive support in their just struggle for the restoration of their national rights. Supporting and assisting each other and strengthening their co-operation, the Arab countries have also made marked successes in defending their national independence and state sovereignty, developing their national economy, increasing their national defence capabilities and getting rid of super-Power control and interference. The historic initiative of the Arab countries in using oil as a weapon during the October war to deal heavy blows at hegemonism and Israeli Zionism has continued to exert a far-reaching influence. The super-Powers have never succeeded in their scheme

to divide and undermine the unity between the Arab countries and other oil-exporting countries by a combination of hard and soft tactics and of inducement and duress. Meanwhile, the Gulf States have been strengthening their unity against super-Power infiltration and expansion. The mutual support between the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the rest of the third world has been further strengthened in their struggles against imperialism and hegemonism. A series of important international conferences, such as the Foreign Ministers' Conference of Islamic States, the Organization of African Unity Summit Conference and the Foreign Ministers' conference of non-aligned countries²³⁴ held this year have given further support to the just struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Certain second-world countries have also started a dialogue with Arab countries. The above facts vividly show that the whole situation is developing in a direction favourable to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and unfavourable to Israeli Zionism and the super-Powers.

The question of Palestine is an important integral part of the whole Middle East question. The Chinese delegation has pointed out on many occasions that the essence of the Middle East question lies in the Israeli Zionist aggression and the two super-Powers' contention for hegemony in the Middle East versus the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against aggression and hegemonism. The crucial reason why this question has remained unsolved over a long period lies in the frenzied contention between the two super-Powers in this region. The development in the Middle East over the past two years has further testified to the correctness of this analysis. Since the October war, the Middle East has reverted to a state of "no war, no peace". This is something imposed forcibly on the Arab and Palestinian people by the two super-Powers for their own selfish interests. Despite the existing desengagement agreements of one kind or another, the Middle East question is far from being settled. One super-Power proposed a "comprehensive solution" and the other a "step-by-step solution", yet in fact neither of them has any intention or sincerity of bringing about a thorough settlement of the Middle East question. What each of them has

²³³ Made in Chinese in the debate on the question of Palestine; English translation, UN doc. A/PV.2394, pp. 16–25.

²³⁴ Docs. 126, 136–137, 143–145 above.

in mind is none other than to boost itself and denigrate the other. Both of them have the need to maintain a state of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East—brief fighting followed by a period of truce, with both war and peace kept under control, or in their own words "tension under control". For only the maintenance of such a state of affairs will facilitate their contention for spheres of influence, places of strategic importance and oil resources in the Middle East, their sale of munitions in order to reap fabulous profits and alleviate their own economic difficulties and the testing of their new weapons in preparation for a new war on a larger scale. All this is done at the expense of the fundamental interests of the people in the Middle East.

The focus of contention between the two super-Powers is in Europe. Situated on the flank of Europe, the Middle East abounds in natural resources and constitutes an important link in their contention for world hegemony. Even they themselves could not help admitting openly that whoever controlled the Middle East would be able to control Europe and then the rest of the world. This has driven each of them to leave no stone unturned to overpower the other in their contention over the Middle East. One super-Power has thus far refused to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people and has kept on sending large quantities of advanced weapons and other aid to Israel to boost the Israeli Zionists. And that super-Power which styles itself the "natural ally" of the Arab people is even more sinister in its design with honey on its lips and a dagger in its heart. In its attempt to control the Arab countries and expand its spheres of influence, it has even surpassed the other super-Power in bullying and black-mailing others and in playing tricks and manoeuvres.

It has been daily talking about how sincere it is in supporting the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people. However, it may be recalled that when the October war in the Middle East was at its most critical juncture and thereafter, it even withheld the shipment of arms already promised to the Arab country and people who were fighting courageously and even pressed for the repayment of debts. While professing its opposition to the Israeli policy of aggression, it sent large numbers of emigrants to Israel to supply Zionism with sources of military recruitment when Israel

was facing a great shortage of manpower, which constituted a most timely assistance earning the gratitude and applause of the Israeli aggressors. During the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, it sanctimoniously declared its readiness to give resolute support to the Palestinian people's struggle for regaining their national rights, but in the twinkling of an eye, it issued a joint statement with the other super-Power, altering the "national rights" of the Palestinian people into their "legitimate interests".²³⁵ Subsequently, it has openly stressed on many occasions the need to guarantee the so-called security of Israel. The public opinion of some Arab countries has solemnly pointed out: in the present circumstances in which Israel is still occupying large tracts of Arab territories and wantonly trampling upon the national rights of the Palestinian people, the treacherous nature of the above words and deeds of the said super-Power has become all the more transparent. Furthermore, after the October war, many third-world countries severed their diplomatic relations with Israel one after another, thus landing Zionism in unprecedented isolation. But it was precisely at this juncture that this super-Power, motivated by its need to contend for hegemony, has made frequent contacts with the Israeli Zionists, extending from covert flirtation to open exchanges and from contacts between the so-called "people's" representatives to official contacts and even secret talks between the Foreign Ministers. Are these irrefutable facts not sufficient to reveal the true nature of the doublefaced and perfidious manoeuvring employed by this super-Power against the Arab and Palestinian peoples? How can one expect such a country to support in earnest the Arab peoples in their just struggle for the recovery of the lost territories and the restoration of the Palestinian national rights? As a matter of fact, the Arab just opinion and some Arab leaders have lucidly exposed and sternly condemned it. The perverted acts of the super-Powers in the Middle East have educated the Palestinian and other Arab peoples by negative example, enabling them to realize that the contention between the super-Powers is the root cause of the prolonged situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East and the continued rampancy of Israeli Zionism and that to regain their national rights and recover the lost

²³⁵ Doc. 128 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

territories, it is imperative to link the struggle against Zionism closely with that against hegemonism. Only by firmly removing super-Power meddling, intervention and contention, will it be possible for the Arab and Palestinian peoples to win final victory in their just struggle.

History is made by the masses of the people. The future of the Middle East can only be determined by the great Palestinian and other Arab peoples and by their unity and struggle, but not by Israeli Zionism or the one or two super-Powers, nor by a piece of United Nations resolution. The victory of the October war and the application of the oil weapon constitute a brilliant example of the Arab and Palestinian people winning victory over the enemy through their close unity and coordinated endeavours. It eloquently proves that unity is strength and that victory can be won by persevering in struggle. The super-Powers are most afraid of the unity and awakening of the people. What calls for close attention and vigilance now is that a super-Power is taking advantage of the present situation to sow discord and undermine Arab unity in order to serve its purpose of contending for hegemony in the Middle East. We are convinced that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who have been tempered through the tests of protracted struggles will see through the disruptive schemes of the super-Powers and refuse to be taken in and that they will heighten their vigilance, bear the over-all interests in mind and persevere in unity and struggle.

The Chinese Government and people have always supported the just struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We are firmly opposed to the contention and expansion of the two super-Powers in the Middle East. We hold that the restoration of Palestinian national rights is closely and inseparably linked with the struggle for the recovery of lost Arab territories. Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories it has occupied, and the Palestinian people must regain their national rights. Although the struggle will be long and tortuous and the Arab and Palestinian people will encounter temporary difficulties and obstacles of one kind or another on their road of advance, we are deeply convinced that so long as the heroic Palestinian and other Arab peoples grasp their destiny firmly in their own hands, persevere in unity and struggle, they will certainly carry through to the end the struggle against aggression and hege-

monism and bring their just cause to victory with the support of the world people.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Pakistan of Crown Prince Hasan of Jordan (excerpts)²³⁶

Islamabad, November 6, 1975

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, His Highness Prince Hasan ibn Talal, Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, paid an official visit to Pakistan from November 1-5, 1975.

The two sides stated their conviction that a just and permanent peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through non-recognition of the annexation of territories by force.

They called for the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and for recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

The two sides stressed the need to intensify diplomatic efforts aimed at dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict as this alone can ensure the establishment of a permanent peace in the area. The two sides expressed their indignation and resentment of the distortion of the cultural and demographic character of the occupied territories consequent upon the repeated Israeli measures to desecrate the holy places in Jerusalem and the Mosque of Abraham at Hebron, and called for these Israeli measures to be stopped immediately. The two sides affirmed that the return of Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty is an established and urgent necessity if there is to be permanent peace in the Middle East.

²³⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 7, 1975.

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Speech by UN Representative Nunez of Costa Rica made before the UN General Assembly²³⁷**New York, November 6, 1975**

We are dealing here with the question of Palestine, the same question that year after year has taken so many of the precious hours of this Assembly. But this year the situation is different. In all those years much was said of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and few knew what that actually meant. And the fact is that it is very difficult for anyone to understand, in the abstract, the legitimate rights of a people.

My country has given sufficient proof that it is always ready to support the liberation efforts of any country or people on earth. And yet yesterday, 5 November, on the same day and at the same time that President Sadat, speaking before the United States Congress in Washington about the Palestinian Arabs, was handing out olive branches, here in New York the official representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization was telling us frankly and in no uncertain terms what this legitimate right of the Palestinian people actually meant. He said:

This Israeli solution not only ignores the crux of the Palestinian problem but insults the intelligence of the Member States in this Assembly and defies the principles of the Charter. The crux of the problem is the liberation of geographic Palestine now totally under Israeli occupation. (239th meeting, p. 41)

If there is any insult to the intelligence of the Members of this Assembly it is to be found in an assertion such as the one made by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is enough to open any history book to see that the territory held today by Israel is an infinitesimal part of the historic Palestine, and that the territory that the League of Nations put under the Mandate of the United Kingdom for the creation of the Israeli State represented only one part of the historic Palestine, 110,000 square kilometres, and that, of those 110,000 square kilometres, the British Government, in a first partition, took 80,000 square

kilometres of a sovereign political entity called TransJordan and left only 30,000 square kilometres west of the Jordan, which was again divided in 1947 when the United Nations decided to recommend the creation of a Jewish State and an Arab State.

Some Governments now want to put the clock back and distort the situation. I do not want to distract the attention of representatives by speaking of the historic, age-old rights of the Jewish people over the land of Israel. That is also to be found in history books. What is being called for now? The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization told us on 5 November: "... the liberation of geographic Palestine now totally under Israeli occupation." (2394th meeting, p. 41)

If we analyse the falsity of that argument, regardless of the territory to which it refers, we can have no doubt that what is being sought is the elimination of the State of Israel, and this explains why the Palestine Liberation Organization does not accept—refuses to accept—Security Council resolution 242 (1967) because that resolution recognizes the existence of a State which it wishes to eliminate, a State which must have secure boundaries. That also explains why in the proposed draft resolutions that are circulating around this room—I do not know whether they have yet been introduced—no mention is made of resolution 242 (1967). That is rather strange. I remember how devotedly, years ago, those same Arab Governments which today support the Palestine Liberation Organization supported that resolution.

However, on the other hand, reference is made to the creation of a committee which would establish bureaucratic machinery the only purpose of which would be to eliminate Israel from the map of the world and remove it from the United Nations. Mention is made of sanctions and of suspension or expulsion and, what is even more serious, the cancellation of that small step towards peace that was made by the recent agreement hailed with such great hopes by the whole world.

The purpose of this whole battery of lies and falsehoods is to raise a smokescreen before our eyes. Whom does the Palestine Liberation Organization represent? The 470,000 Arabs in Israel? The approximately 1 million Palestinian Arabs from the territories occupied after the Six-Day

²³⁷ Made in Spanish in the debate on the question of Palestine; excerpted from the English translation, UN doc. A/PV.2396, pp. 42–45, 47–52.

War? The 650,000 Palestinian Arabs who live, work and govern in the Kingdom of Jordan and represent the majority of its population? Who has given it representative powers? A congress of Arab leaders, many of whom do not represent democratic Powers. Has there been a plebiscite? Those who have spoken so loudly about the self-determination of peoples, in whose name are they speaking and disrupting the whole world? I ask specifically, if they do represent the Palestinian Arabs, why were they expelled by their Palestinian brothers from Jordan in September 1970—or do they claim that King Hussein and the Palestinians living in peace in Jordan are Zionists too? Why did convulsive conflict break out among the true Lebanese people, who were living in peace, working and achieving progress in one of the few democracies of the Arab world the moment the Palestinian terrorists arrived? Are the Zionists going to be blamed for that too?

Let us say once and for all, quite frankly, that the Palestine Liberation Organization does not represent the Palestinian Arabs. Believe me, I try to understand the people in the Palestine Liberation Organization; my mission is to understand men. Of course I understand their impatience and concern and I hope that their impatience and concern will find the right channels of expression, in the spirit of peace and justice that they themselves proclaim before this Assembly. They were nurtured by the Arab Governments on the vinegar of hatred. But, even so, how is it possible that there should be so much hatred, so much injustice, so many crimes committed against innocent victims? How is it possible to distort history to that extent? The tragic paradox with which we are faced is that we have before us two groups of people, each of which speaks of peace, and one wonders how it is possible that both the Arabs and the Israelis speak of peace? If they really want peace, why are there so many wars? The fact is that each is thinking of a different kind of peace. I am inclined to believe that the Israelis want a peace that would enable them to build a progressive democratic State that might be a beacon for their people and, in so far as they can set an example, to others who in reality want to live with them as brothers; but the Arab extremists—and I draw a clear distinction—also speak of peace for the region, but what they want for Israel is the peace of the graveyard, and they have come up against a generation

of Jews who have returned to the land of their forefathers not to dig their own graves but to build roads of peace, to plant trees of life and construct cities of progress. That is the difference between the peace that each group seeks in the Middle East.

The call for the extermination of the State of Israel, which in its formulation constitutes one of the greatest and most serious crimes in history, would appear not to be enough for the Arab leaders and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Euphorically, and supported by an overwhelming majority the Third Committee adopted the most aberrant decision that could be imagined, a blasphemy against truth and common sense and an insult to human decency; they have adopted the principle that Zionism is racism and racial discrimination. What a tragic paradox, that the Jewish people, with its ideal of Zion, the greatest victim of racism and racial persecution throughout history, is now, by virtue of a resolution of the “petromajority”, a racist people and movement. The truth is that, rather than reality, it seems like a Dantean nightmare. That same majority could have voted for a resolution stating that “we, the majority of the United Nations, decide that as from today, there is no God”.

We must have a coalition of peoples and men of goodwill to eliminate hatred from the hearts and minds of some leaders as we root out weeds.

Hatred is the bastard of stupidity and mistrust, and feeds on lies. Man can become a monster who devours everything in his path, even those who created him. I am convinced that there are some Arabs who understand that with these anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist festivals we deviate from the cause of peace and all the efforts made to achieve it. May God let us live enough to hear the voice of reason and peace.

This United Nations institution was created 30 years ago to become a temple of justice and truth, friendship and brotherhood among peoples, a temple of civilization, but it could easily become an uncivilized jungle in which the law of the strong and the powerful reigns leading to a boycott which would paralyse all its activities and bring death to the world.

I, the representative of a small democratic country, ready to support peoples in the great process of liberation, ask those representing their Governments and peoples here whether they will allow this to come about. Let us be tran-

quail and rise above hatred and evil. The fate, not only of the United Nations, but possibly of something much greater, is in our hands—something perhaps that we do not understand.

Let us support the legitimate aspirations of peoples, without in any way harming the aspirations of other peoples. It depends on you, on the decision you adopt, whether future generations, when they recall our names and those of our Governments and countries, curse us or bless us. May God enlighten us.

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Note from the USSR to the USA calling for a reconvening of the Geneva conference²³⁸

Moscow, November 9, 1975

The Government of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to inform the United States of America of the following:

The lack of progress towards a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East continues to worry the Soviet Union. The main causes of the conflict remain the same. Israel continues to hold the Arab territories occupied by her. The legitimate rights of the Arab Palestinian people are still ignored. In consequence the situation in the region is dangerously tense.

Experience has shown that the course of partial steps, which has been implemented in isolation, does not lead to a solution of the Middle East question. It cannot lead to a solution so long as the main important questions of the problem of a political solution are pushed aside. Among these questions are the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in 1967 and the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Arab Palestinian people, including its right to establish its state. Only by solving these problems is it possible to achieve a genuine, sound peace in the Middle East and to provide stable conditions so that all states in the area, including Israel, may live securely and develop.

The Soviet Union has always considered and still considers that the only sound way to achieve

a full settlement is that of direct joint efforts on the part of all the involved parties. It is well-known that the international instrument for this very purpose has already been established; namely, the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, which is chaired by the Soviet Union and the United States of America. However, this instrument has for a long time been idle.

The Soviet Union has always been and remains in favour of the establishment of a just and firm peace and the achievement of genuine progress in the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The resumption of the full Geneva peace conference accords with this aim. Therefore the Soviet Union proposes that it and the United States, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, make a joint initiative to that effect. The Geneva Conference must naturally from the resumption of its activities take place with the participation on an equal footing of all the directly involved parties: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, representatives of the Arab Palestinian people in the form of the PLO, and Israel, together with the Soviet Union and the United States of America as alternating co-chairmen of the Conference.

It is quite clear that the purpose of the resumed Conference, as defined from the beginning, must be to achieve a full and fundamental political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations Organization, especially Security Council Resolution 338 and General Assembly Resolution 3236, and that the organization of the work of the Conference must be with the agreement of all the participants.

²³⁸ *Pravda* (Moscow), November 11, 1975, p. 1; translated from the Arabic text supplied, on request, by Novosti, Beirut. For the US response see doc. 196 below.

Statement by the UK shadow Foreign Secretary Maudling stressing that a Middle East settlement should be based on security for Israel and the creation of a Palestine state²³⁹

London, November 10, 1975

I come now to the Middle East. I have seen a good deal of the problems there. I have visited the Arab countries many times on business. In the summer I was for some time the guest of the Israeli Government and learned of its point of view as well.

The trouble in the Middle East is one of conflicting antipathies. There is Arab versus Israeli, Left wing versus Right wing, and the United States versus Russia. These three differing conflicts tend to interact and to make more confused a situation that in itself is extremely difficult.

Anyone visiting the Middle East comes back totally convinced of the need for agreement on this problem and the benefits that could flow from it. In sheer economic terms, the burden of defence on Israel, and, I think, Egypt as well, is colossal. I believe that it is over 30 per cent. of the gross national product. It is probably a larger percentage than this country spent at the height of the last world war.

On the other hand, when one considers the technology of Israel in agriculture and the resources of the oil-producing States, one realises how a combination of those resources could make that part of the world fertile and flowering for the benefit and happiness of those who live there. Nothing could give greater benefit to the Middle East than an agreement between the Israelis and the Arabs. Yet, given genuine good will and the elimination of fear, which more than anything, I believe, underlies the Middle East problem, a solution is possible.

The agreement between Egypt and Israel²⁴⁰ was a great advance, and all credit should go to the Israeli leaders, to President Sadat and to Dr.

Kissinger for the work they did in achieving it. But, as the Foreign Secretary rightly said, we must maintain momentum. Unless the momentum is maintained, the situation might collapse again, and for no one is this more important than President Sadat himself, whose very courageous position in the face of much criticism from other Arab countries can be fully maintained only if the progress towards general agreement can also be maintained. Clearly, there must be another meeting at Geneva at some time, but, before then, there must be more bilateral progress, and there must be some solution—in view, at any rate—of the problem of Palestinian representation.

These are still the two outstanding problems. The answer, I believe, is still to be found on the lines of Resolution 242, which both sides of the House have always adhered to and which remains the basic text for any lasting settlement in the Middle East.

Certainly the Arabs are entitled to a return of the territories taken from them in war. The Israelis are equally entitled, without any shadow of doubt, to real safety and security. But when one considers the geographical factors in Israel and the narrowness of the territory, and when one realises that in military terms the Arabs are far nearer to the heart of Israel than any Israeli is near to the heart of an Arab country, one recognises that there must be a genuine, effective and lasting guarantee of security before the Israelis can be expected to enter the sort of agreement that we must seek. Finally, I think that everyone will now agree that the other condition of agreement must be that the Palestinians should have a country of their own.

No good is served by those who advocate extreme causes. There is still a real fear in the Middle East—on the one hand, that the Arabs wish to eliminate the State of Israel and, on the other, that the Israelis plan a grand expansion across vast areas of the Middle East. These fears still exist in the minds of men there. They are utterly wrong. But, until those fears are exorcised, real peace will be very difficult to achieve. I was in Baghdad a short while ago talking to members of the Iraqi Government and I know that some Arab countries still will not recognise the continued existence of a State of Israel. Many Arab countries will, but some will not. This remains an obstacle to a settlement.

Then there is the United Nations resolution,

²³⁹ Made in a foreign policy debate in the House of Commons; excerpted from the text supplied on request, by Mr. Maudling who in a covering letter stated, "I was speaking officially on behalf of the Conservative Party."

²⁴⁰ Doc. 148 above.

which I deplore, describing Zionism as racism. This can only do harm and make a settlement far more difficult. I do not understand it. If one can have an Islamic republic—a very good thing, too—why not have a Jewish State as well? What is racist about one and not the other? So long as individuals within those countries are guaranteed proper human rights, surely both can live side by side, one with the other.

On the other hand, the Israelis must recognise that some of their activities in the occupied territories, particularly in the Golan Heights, seem to be designed not merely for strategic defence but for permanent occupation of the territory. Such activities do not help towards a solution of the problem and the more on either side who can be persuaded not to pursue those activities, the better the prospect for peace.

The two urgent problems, as I have said, are the Golan Heights and who represents the Palestinians. I was standing, only a few weeks ago, on the Golan Heights. When one looks out over Lake Kinneret—as Lake Galilee is now called—from the position previously occupied by the Syrians, one can understand perfectly well why the Israelis would be loth to see that position reoccupied by a potentially hostile Power. Therefore, the answer must come down in the long run to a United Nations presence, to demilitarisation, or to some way in which the territorial aspirations of the one country can be matched with the proper defence considerations of the others. But until one looks at it on the spot, it is hard fully to understand the practical facts involved.

As for representation of the Palestinians, the time has come when it must be recognised that the PLO is, broadly speaking, the voice of Palestinians. Many people, of course, would like to see King Hussein speaking for them. But since the Rabat conference²⁴¹ and the recent activities of the PLO, it has become a fact of international life that no one can ignore.

Its association with terrorism is to be deplored, and no hon. Member would for one moment countenance any support of terrorism. But the history of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean shows many examples where righteous causes have been pursued by honest men while, at the same time, wicked men have been pursuing the same

purpose.

One must not refuse to talk to those who are of good will because of the existence of those who are of bad will. Without doubt, in the long run there must be a settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians that will guarantee some appropriate Palestinian country of their own. The sooner it comes about, the better. I appreciate the difficulties as well as anyone, but I am absolutely convinced that the longer this is delayed and the longer effective consultation, talk and negotiation are postponed, the greater will be the dangers for all concerned in that part of the world.

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Resolution of the Israel Knesset rejecting the resolutions on Palestine adopted by the UN General Assembly (excerpt)²⁴²

Jerusalem, November 11, 1975

The Knesset resolves that Israel will not recognize the committee which has been decided upon²⁴³ and will neither cooperate with it nor participate in the processes arising from these resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Knesset resolves that the organization called the Palestine Liberation Organization is a framework for organizations of murderers whose declared aim is to destroy the state of Israel. Israel will never negotiate with the terrorist organizations in any forum and will not participate in the Geneva conference if a delegation representing these organizations is invited to it.

The Knesset calls on the Jewish people in the diaspora to step up immigration to Israel, to redouble Jewish-Zionist activity and to support the state of Israel in achieving the aims of Zionism.

The Knesset expresses its appreciation of those states that opposed the infamous resolutions of the General Assembly.

²⁴² Translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), November 12, 1975. For the resolutions concerned see docs. 13–15 above.

²⁴³ See operative paragraph 3 of UN General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX), doc. 14 above.

Statements by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Saunders made before a House subcommittee outlining US policy on the Palestinians and subsequent questions and answers²⁴⁴

Washington, November 12, 1975

Mr. Chairman, a just and durable peace in the Middle East is a central objective of the United States. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have stated firmly on numerous occasions that the United States is determined to make every feasible effort to maintain the momentum of practical progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.

The total number of Palestinian Arabs is estimated at a little more than three million. Of these, about 450,000 live in the area of Israel's pre-1967 borders; about one million are in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza; something less than a million, about 900,000, are in Jordan; half a million are in Syria and Lebanon; and somewhat more than 200,000 or so are elsewhere, primarily in the Gulf states. Those in Israel are Israeli nationals. The great majority of those in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Jordan are Jordanian nationals. Palestinian refugees, who live outside of pre-1967 Israel and number 1.6 million, are eligible for food and/or services from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); more than 650,000 of these live in camps.

The problem of the Palestinians was initially dealt with essentially as one involving displaced persons. The United States and other nations responded to the immediate humanitarian task of caring for a large number of refugees and trying to provide them with some hope in life. In later years there has been considerable attention given to the programs of UNRWA that help not only to sustain those people's lives but to lift the young people out of the refugee camps and to train them and give them an opportunity to lead productive lives. Many have taken advantage of this opportunity, and an unusually large number of them have completed secondary and university education. One finds Palestinians occupying leading positions throughout the Arab world as professionals and skilled workers in all fields. The U.S. has provided some \$620 million in assistance—about sixty-two percent of the total international support (\$1 billion) for the Palestinian refugees over the past quarter of a century.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

The statement is often made in the Arab world that there will not be peace until the "rights of the Palestinians" are fulfilled, but there is no agreed definition of what is meant and a variety of viewpoints have been expressed on what the legitimate objectives of the Palestinians are:

Some Palestinian elements hold to the objective of a binational secular state in the area of the former mandate of Palestine. Realization of this objective would mean the end of the present state of Israel, a member of the United Nations, and its submergence in some larger entity. Some would be willing to accept merely as a first step toward this goal the establishment of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza.

Other elements of Palestinian opinion appear

²⁴⁴ Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations; excerpted from US Congress, House Committee on International Relations, *The Palestinian Issue in Middle East Peace Efforts*, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, pp. 178–193.

willing to accept an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, based on acceptance of Israel's right to exist as an independent state within roughly its pre-1967 borders.

Some Palestinians and other Arabs envisage as a possible solution a unification of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. A variation of this which has been suggested would be the reconstitution of the country as a federated state, with the West Bank becoming an autonomous Palestinian province.

Still others, including many Israelis, feel that with the West Bank returned to Jordan, and with the resulting existence of two communities—Palestinian and Jordanian—within Jordan, opportunities would be created thereby for the Palestinians to find self-expression.

In the case of a solution which would rejoin the West Bank to Jordan or a solution involving a West Bank/Gaza state, there would still arise the property claims of those Palestinians who before 1948 resided in areas that became the State of Israel. These claims have been acknowledged as a serious problem by the international community ever since the adoption by the United Nations of Resolution 194 on this subject in 1948, a resolution which the United Nations has repeatedly reaffirmed and which the United States has supported. A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab states of the many Jews from those states who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.

In addition to property claims, some believe they should have the option of returning to their original homes under any settlement.

Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel.

No one, therefore, seems in a position today to say exactly what Palestinian objectives are. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is recognized by the Arab League and the United Nations General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people, has been ambivalent. Officially and publicly, its objective is described as a binational secular state, but there

are some indications that coexistence between separate Palestinian and Israeli states might be considered.

When there is greater precision about those objectives, there can be clearer understanding about how to relate them to negotiations. There is the aspect of the future of the West Bank and Gaza—how those areas are to be defined and how they are to be governed. There is the aspect of the relationship between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to those Palestinians who are not living in those areas, in the context of a settlement.

What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests—a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

Another requirement is the development of a framework for negotiations—a statement of the objectives and the terms of reference. The framework for the negotiations that have taken place thus far and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt, has been provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In accepting that framework, all of the parties to the negotiation have accepted that the objective of the negotiations is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and the resolution of the specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The major problem that must be resolved in establishing a framework for bringing issues of concern to the Palestinians into negotiation, therefore, is to find a common basis for the negotiation that Palestinians and Israelis can both accept. This could be achieved by common acceptance of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, although they do not deal with the political aspect of the Palestinian problem.

A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians. It has been our belief that Jordan would be a logical negotiator for the Palestinian-related issues. The Rabat Summit, however, recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian

people.”²⁴⁵

The PLO was formed in 1964, when 400 delegates from Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world met in Jerusalem to create an organization to represent and speak for the Palestinian people. Its leadership was originally middle class and relatively conservative, but by 1969 control had passed into the hands of the Palestinian fedayeen, or commando, movement, that had existed since the mid 1950's but had come into prominence only after the 1967 war. The organization became an umbrella organization for six separate fedayeen groups: Fatah; the Syrian-backed Saiqa; the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the General Command—a subgroup of the PFLP; and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front. Affiliated with the PLO are a number of “popular organizations”—labor and professional unions, student groups, women's groups and so on. Fatah, the largest fedayeen group, also has a welfare apparatus to care for widows and orphans of deceased Fatah members.

However, the PLO does not accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions, does not recognize the existence of Israel, and has not stated its readiness to negotiate peace with Israel; Israel does not recognize the PLO or the idea of a separate Palestinian entity. Thus we do not at this point have the framework for a negotiation involving the PLO. We cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other—rather than the objective of negotiating peace with it.

There is one other aspect to this problem. Elements of the PLO have used terrorism to gain attention for their cause. Some Americans as well as many Israelis and others have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. The international community cannot condone such practices, and it seems to us that there must be some assurance if Palestinians are drawn into the negotiating process that these practices will be curbed.

This is the problem which we now face. If the progress toward peace which has now begun is to continue, a solution to this question must be found. We have not devised an American solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the

responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East—an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature. It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible.

Our consultations on how to move the peace negotiations forward will recognize the need to deal with this subject. As Secretary Kissinger has said, “We are prepared to work with all the parties towards a solution of all the issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.” We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians. We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally openminded.

Hamilton: Thank you very much, Mr. Saunders. Let me make an observation or two about your statement—after we vote. I think we will rest at this point for a vote. Excuse us.

The subcommittee will stand in recess.

[A recess was taken.]

Hamilton: The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Saunders, I want to say that I appreciate very much your statement. I know it was prepared very carefully and I find it a very significant statement. I think it is probably the most important policy statement on the Palestinian issue that has occurred.

Some of my questions this afternoon may seem a little critical but the intent of those questions will be to draw out your own thinking on an issue that I know you have spent a lot of time on.

I must say that on the basis of your statement as well as the statement made by Ambassador Moynihan at the U.N. this last week, that it appears to me the process of rethinking of the Palestinian

²⁴⁵ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

issue is underway and that you and your colleagues in the Department are now seeking ways and means of opening up what had been a part of the Middle East problem that had not been discussed to any very great degree.

I find your statement conciliatory in tone toward the PLO and the Palestinians. It is a statement that does not reflect any hostility and it is a statement I hope will open doors. It is a statement which shows a good bit of concern for the Palestinians and attaches great importance to the Palestinian problem.

It seems to me that you extend something of an olive branch to Syria as well as to the PLO and on each of the four major issues you discuss related to the PLO and the Palestinian representation issue. You have reflected an openminded attitude seeking more information and clarifications.

You call, on page 6²⁴⁶ of your statement, for a definition of the objectives of the PLO.

You seek, on page 7, a development of a framework for negotiations.

On page 8, you raised the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians?

On page 10, you speak about the problem of terrorism and emphasize that there must be some assurances, if Palestinians are to be drawn into the negotiations, that those practices be curbed.

I very much hope that the Syrians and the Palestinians, including the PLO, read your statement and that they try to find grounds within it to approach constructively the problems.

Finally, I want to observe your statement on page 10, which is, and I quote: "It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspect of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible."

I take that statement to mean that you hope thinking on this issue will evolve within the PLO, within Israel, within the United States, and within the Arab world.

Now before I start any specific questions, maybe you would like to respond to my comments.

Saunders: I think we might just go straight to your questions. I think that it is an issue which is more easily dealt with in its specific aspects than in generalities. I think I have covered the

general points I would like to make in the overall statement.

Hamilton: Our policy today, as I understand it, is that we will not deal with the PLO until the PLO recognizes Israel and accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. And in addition to that, I think there has been mention of the fact that another reason we do not deal with the Palestinians is because they indulge in terrorist activity from time to time.

I, of course, personally, as I am sure most of my colleagues in the Congress, do not agree with many of the actions of the PLO, its tactics and some of its policies, but I am concerned about your stand on this issue. And let me suggest an analogy or two to show what I mean.

We have talked and we have dealt with North Vietnam and with the People's Republic of China at a time when they refused to recognize the existence of our friends, South Vietnam and Taiwan, and each of those countries were dedicated to the destruction of states that were friendly to us.

If we talk with those countries, why is the PLO different?

A. I think I would like to answer that in the following way, talking about the basic problem that exists here.

I do not think communication is the problem. We talk to Arab leaders who are in constant contact with the Palestinians and who describe their views and we assume that those Arab leaders also describe to the Palestinians the views that we express on this subject.

Beyond that, many private Americans as well as many Members of the Congress have talked with Palestinians.

I do not think the problem is one of communicating. The problems that we are grappling with are two, and I state these as facts, not as judgments on anyone.

The first problem is that neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have made a basic decision that they are ready to negotiate the issues involved. And the second problem is that neither side has developed positions which could provide the basis for a negotiation.

So where we are in relation to this problem is in the prenegotiating period in which the problem is to establish the view that a negotiation is necessary.

If you think back to where we began the negotiations that have led to the three agreements

²⁴⁶ This refers to the statement as originally presented; the source used has not retained this pagination.

involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt over the last 2 years,²⁴⁷ you will recall that the starting point was the acceptance by the parties to the conflict of U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, which essentially calls for a negotiation, and it was the decision of the parties that they were ready to negotiate these issues that permitted the United States to come in and play a helpful role. But it was that decision that was essential and that is, I think, what we need.

If we have that framework then the question of communication becomes a mechanical one.

Hamilton: Why do we not state our policy that way then? We state our policy in terms of saying that the PLO refuses to recognize the existence of the State of Israel. We state our policy in terms of saying the Palestinians indulge in terrorist tactics.

Why do we not state our policy in terms of your answer, which was, as I understand it, that the parties will not negotiate and, therefore, our position could be that if the parties are willing to negotiate we will recognize the PLO?

A. Well, I think we have stated our policy in a variety of ways, among them the one that I just stated, but also we have said that it is essential for the Palestinians to accept the U.N. Security Council resolutions and that is certainly a shorthand for saying, among other things, that there must be a statement of readiness to negotiate peace with Israel.

Hamilton: Why do we state this requirement that the PLO must recognize the existence of Israel? That did not bother us when we talked to North Vietnam. It did not bother us when we talked to the People's Republic of China. Why should it bother us on this issue?

A. I think we are not just talking about the technical matter of diplomatic recognition. What we are really talking about is a statement of readiness to accept the existence of Israel, a readiness to negotiate peace with Israel, rather than the objective of eliminating the State of Israel.

If you are going to have a negotiation between two parties you have to have an agreed objective for that negotiation. The objective of reasonable negotiation cannot be elimination of one side by the other; it can be the objective of establishing a basis for coexistence between two sides.

Hamilton: It seems to me our statement of policy is part of the problem. If the policy were stated as you have suggested, we would not have some obstacles that seem to me now to be in the way of discussions with the Palestinians.

Why do we raise the question of terrorism in this case when it has not bothered us with our dealings with many governments in the world which practice terrorism today?

A. I think there is another factor here that we have to cope with. This is where the analogy between the cases that you cited and this situation does not follow.

This is a negotiation in which the United States is not a party. This is a negotiation between parties in the Middle East. The United States hopes to play a helpful role, but we are not party to these negotiations. Therefore, part of the problem which we must deal with are the positions of the negotiating parties. One of the negotiating parties in this case, namely Israel, holds that it will not sit down with the PLO, partly because it follows a policy of terrorism. That is a fact with which we must cope; therefore, we cannot ignore it and it does not make much difference what the United States did in some other instance. This is a different kind of situation in that respect.

Hamilton: Well, I can understand why the United States would not urge Israel to negotiate with the PLO, and I can understand why Israel would not want at this moment in time to negotiate with the PLO. But so far as the United States, I can understand why Secretary Kissinger might not want to sit down with the PLO, or President Ford. But it does seem to me that we could take steps to approach the Palestinians, at least, in the top levels of government, to begin to try to soften this Palestinian issue.

Are we not in the posture we are now in actually increasing the strength of the rejectionist group of the Palestinians and making it more difficult for the moderates among the Palestinians?

A. Well, I know that is frequently said. I am not quite sure that we are doing this. I think one of the assumptions that we have to question in this situation is that the United States is somehow creating, even partly creating, this situation or able to break the back of it. As I say, we are outsiders trying to be helpful, we are not the generators of the problems, we are not even central actors in the problem.

²⁴⁷ Docs. 50 and 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and doc. 148 above.

So I am not sure that the posture of the United States is strengthening one faction or another within the Palestinian ranks. I think it is the situation in the Middle East that may be affecting that primarily.

Hamilton: Well, I am not sure that I can agree with that, Mr. Saunders, since we refuse to have any discussions with the Palestinian Liberation Organization at all.

A. Let us examine, if we may—

Hamilton: It seems to me that by that step you are really playing into the hands of the radical element and making their case stronger.

A. I think that goes back to the basic question of what you communicate about. As I say, once there is a framework for communication, I do not think it is the act of communicating that is the problem. The problem is the basic decisions which have to be made which creates a situation within which U.S. communication can produce something. I think that has to come first.

I see a very real distinction between the readiness of the parties to communicate on this subject and the United States simply offering communication. You can talk to lots of people and it does not achieve anything. Our goal is to achieve something here. The problem is how to move this situation forward, and I am not sure the act of communicating is by itself sufficient.

Hamilton: I must say I find very hard to understand your comment that communication is not the problem. In my observations with Arab leaders and Palestinians, I think communication is the problem. At least, they perceive it to be the problem. They see the United States as stonewalling this issue, as unwilling even to talk about it. That is one of the criticisms I think President Sadat made of us in his statements to the Congress.²⁴⁸

So I have difficulty with your observation that communication is not the problem.

May I go on to another point in your statement?

We often use words of this kind when we talk about the Palestinians. We say that no peace settlement is possible that does not meet the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the region, including interests of the Palestinians.

Why do we use the word interests and not rights? Does that suggest that the Palestinians have no rights?

A. It suggests that the objectives, interests, concerns, whatever you choose to call them, of the Palestinians, have not been defined by Arab spokesmen or by Palestinian spokesmen, and I think that we would prefer not to get into that subject until we see what it is that we are talking about.

I do not think, again, that the question of one word or another is central to what needs to be done.

In response to your earlier comment, I know that Arabs come to us and say that if the United States would just recognize the PLO or if the United States would communicate or talk with the PLO this would help solve the problem, but we have been in situations before where people have come to us and said if the United States would just do such and such that would solve the problem, and I am afraid we cannot agree the United States has the capacity to solve problems like this until certain basic decisions are made by the people whose problems these are.

When Palestinian objectives and interests are defined then I think they can be dealt with in a negotiating situation, but it is not up to the United States to define these things, and we are going to steer clear of that because we do not presume, as an outsider, to put ourselves in the position of defining what these people should want or expect out of life. That is not our job. We are here to help achieve peace, and it is possible that if we went too far too soon in responding to the issue that you are talking about or in moving into communication with one group or another, we could actually slow down the process of moving toward a fruitful negotiation rather than speed it up, and we have to be extremely careful that we do not do that.

Hamilton: Do you think that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination some place in the Middle East area, provided they accept the right of Israel to exist within secure borders?

A. Again, you are addressing the question of what people have a right to do. The Palestinians are a group of people who are not entirely agreed amongst themselves about the roots of their national identity, about their aspirations and so on. We, as I have said in my statement, and I think we agree—we feel the need is to bring the issues, the interests which are of concern to them, into

²⁴⁸ Doc. 322 below.

the negotiating process so that they can be taken into account in a settlement, but I do not think it is up to us to define precisely what they themselves cannot define.

We cannot assume that the Palestinian movement is monolithic. There are many divisions of opinion within it. I am sure there is disagreement over what constitutes the nature of these people as a nationality, if that is indeed what they claim to be, and I do not think we want to address the question of abstract principles here. Our job is to find out what is wanted and how to get that dealt with in a negotiation, and I think we just have to avoid abstract statements of principle that are going to perhaps hinder our role in the process, and after all—

Hamilton: How can you find out what is wanted and what the Palestinian position is if you do not talk to the group that claims to represent a large segment of Palestinians?

A. Well, as I said before when you disagreed with this point, I do not think we have any problem knowing what the views are. The problem is that we get different pictures of views. There is fairly full flow of information about what Palestinian views are but those views are at odds with each other. Our problem is not that we do not know; it is the fact there is not a cohesive viewpoint there to be known. Whether we talk directly or just get our information through other methods is not the problem; the problem is that they need to make decisions and that is what I meant by communication not being a problem. I agree with you there has been some lack of understanding and I did not mean to imply that each side could not understand the other's position better, but the act of communicating is not the problem—contact, recognition, meetings and so on. That is not the problem. The problem is understanding positions, and my point is that I do not think there is a solid position there yet to bring into negotiation.

Hamilton: Do we have any contact today with the PLO?

A. No substantive contact with them. There have been, as you know, working contacts in connection with PLO visits—representatives coming to the United Nations.

Hamilton: As I understand it, the PLO has a high

level group coming to the United Nations next week. Will anyone from the Department of State try to meet with any members of that group?

A. There is no plan for that.

Hamilton: And has any meeting between President Ford and President Asad of Syria been scheduled?

A. We on a couple of occasions have told the President of Syria that the President would like to arrange a meeting with him and suggested the possibility of doing it in connection with some of his European trips because it would be more convenient, and it just literally has not been possible to schedule. The offer was made in the summer and made again in connection with the visit which is taking place in the next few days and it has not worked out. But the offer is there and the two Presidents have communicated on that subject.

Hamilton: Mr. Winn.

Winn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When Anwar Sadat recently visited the United States he spoke frequently about the Palestinian issue, as we all know, and at one point he said he would urge the Palestinian Liberation Organization to accept the Palestine State on the West Bank and Gaza.

Would you consider such an acceptance by the PLO as a positive development and a start of negotiations?

A. Again, our criterion is what can lead to a successful negotiation, and I think that it would not help for us to state a judgment on that subject. The important thing is what the negotiating parties judge to be a positive move.

Winn: Well—

A. We have to be quite careful. We have been scrupulous in all the negotiations we have been involved in, in not stating an American position on the substance of negotiations. Our role here again is somewhat different from our role in some other negotiations because we are not a party to the negotiations.

Winn: I understand that. But what I think we are trying to find out is what the attitudes of the State Department might be.

In your opening statement, the printed version, you tell us what the objective is. That is, a just and durable peace in the Middle East is the central objective of the United States. Both the President and Secretary Kissinger have stated the same thing. That is fine. I do not think anybody would quibble with that.

I am not quite as optimistic about the rest of your

statement, or at least what I heard and some of the parts I have read, as maybe the chairman was, particularly after answering several questions.

Well, let us go back again to my original statement. Would the United States support such a state if the Palestinians recognized Israel?

A. I think I must state, not to evade your question, a very important principle which has been central to the American role in the negotiations over the last 2 years, and that is that we have scrupulously avoided having an American plan. All of you will remember what has happened in the past to certain American plans. This time we have gone into these negotiations to conduct a negotiation between other parties, direct negotiations, indirect negotiations, whatever it might be, but we have scrupulously avoided putting forward an American plan on the theory that what we need here is positions stated by the two sides that can be brought together in a negotiation to agreement, and I think we will have to continue to avoid stating American plans or American positions because I do not think it serves the success of this effort.

Now, if you and I were talking privately in closed session we might talk about the advantages and disadvantages of certain solutions and perhaps we could express views about this kind of subject, but I think in any formal—

Winn: *I understand your reticence. I truthfully am sorry we did not have a quorum so that we could go into a lot of points that we want to make in an executive session so that we could sort of try to get an idea on the attitudes. I do not think we are getting any, and I understand your position on that, I understand that it is tough for you, but I think what we are trying to figure out is what comes first here—where do the negotiations start?*

We have got a great big first hurdle, neither one of them recognize each other. That is a pretty big hurdle. But I think if we are talking about philosophies and attitudes we have got to say if one of them recognizes the other, try to put some pieces to the puzzle together in our own mind.

A. We do a great deal of thinking about those subjects, as you can well imagine. Our problem here is that (a) the statement of U.S. position is not something that we want to provide publicly at this point and (b) what is really important is to know what the parties themselves are prepared to do, what their views are. That is the place where we need to start.

Winn: *Let me switch to something else here.*

The UNDOF mandate in the Golan Heights expires November 30. I wonder what the United States is doing to initiate talks between Syria and Israel concerning an agreement on the Golan Heights.

Can you tell us something about that?

A. I am not sure that what is required here is discussions between Syria and Israel. There are decisions to be made on each side whether to request extension of the mandate. The Government of Israel would support, I think, an extension of the U.N. mandate and we are waiting to hear what the position of the Government of Syria would be. It is something that one needs to negotiate.

Winn: *You do not know that close to the end of the mandate what their thinking is?*

A. We are waiting to hear what the position is. It is quite clear both sides understand the American position. We, after all, were an active party in helping to negotiate the agreement which produced the placement of the UNDOF there and we support its continuation.

Winn: *Do you think that there is any chance for agreement on the Golan Heights possibly without inclusion of PLO and the discussion of Palestinian interests?*

A. Again, we are in a position now where we recognize that there are several issues that have to be addressed if the negotiations are to be moved forward and we are committed to trying to move them forward.

There are the issues that we have been discussing here. There is the issue of further movement on Golan Heights. There is the question of a negotiating forum and whether or not the negotiation should move to resume a full-scale Geneva Conference, and there is discussion of settlement of all of these issues that are being dealt with in our consultations now.

We are just not in a position yet to say in what combination those issues can be dealt with, or how, or when.

Winn: *Well, I had a question I wanted to ask you about. I will ask you and I think you will probably reiterate what you have already said. That is about an article that appeared in an issue of Commentary magazine in January 1975, by Bernard Lewis. Dr. Lewis' views and those of Commentary tend to represent a broadly liberal Jewish thinking. But in his article he says that, "Israel certainly cannot negotiate on the basis of a desire of the*

PLO to liquidate Israel," but he says, and I quote: "Israel might find it wise to test the willingness or the ability of the PLO to negotiate on some other basis."

Are you familiar with that article?

A. I did not read that article. Of course, the admonition that you read is their admonition to the Government of Israel.

Winn: To explore other possibilities.

A. Yes, we would certainly support any exploration by the negotiating parties of the viewpoints of each other in any way that they saw fit. That would be fully consistent with our position.

Winn: When we are talking with Israel and in the negotiations when we talked about Israel and Egypt's relationships and now we are talking to Israel, I am sure, and Egypt, about the Israeli-Syrian relationships, I cannot help but believe that the subject of the PLO does come up in those general discussions, particularly with the publicity that it has received in the last year, particularly with the nationwide speeches that Sadat made when he was here last week. It must be a part. To me it is an important part.

A. I think I made that clear at the beginning of my statement that it is an important part. The complex of issues affecting the Palestinians—including the intimately related question of recognition of the existence of Israel—is almost the heart of the conflict. The point you made, of course, comes up in these discussions. What we have said publicly, what I have said in the statement here, we have certainly said in more precise terms privately. So we are quite clear that there has to be movement on these other issues if there is to be further movement in the negotiations. The problem is how. And, of course, we are dealing, as I said, with one party to these negotiations, the Government of Israel, which does not recognize and says it will not sit down with the PLO. That is a fact with which we must cope.

Winn: Yes. Well, I have never done any diplomatic negotiations. I have done labor-management negotiations, which may seem pretty remote, but at the same time if both sides do not present their objectives, their goals, even though they may be impossible, sometimes, it is pretty hard to start a negotiation.

I just wondered what is lost by Israel talking to the PLO?

A. It is a question that really the Israelis have to answer.

Winn: I know. I should have asked them yesterday when they were here. I am sure they have an answer, too.

A. A number of Israelis have suffered acts of brutal terrorism and it is quite understandable what their feelings on this subject are. Out of that experience in part comes the view that they will not sit down with that group of people.

Winn: I understand their views. I understand that. But you know we can all look back in history on somebody that has walked on us or shot us and killed some of our people, but it is not going to get any better if we do not try to talk to them rather than to head into something that may be a lot worse than the deep hate or grudges that they carry.

A. I think our conversation is rather assuming that the PLO is the only possible vehicle—

Winn: No, I do not assume that because I do not agree with your statement that they are the only one. But at least, they are the one that is certainly publicized, including their acts of terrorism, but they are beginning to get recognition as a spokesman for the Palestinian Government and I do not think we are a spokesman, not necessarily the spokesman, but they are a spokesman and we cannot ignore that and we cannot close our eyes to it and they are getting recognition in the U.N., rightly or wrongly, so we certainly have to take that into consideration.

I do not think many people in the United States can name any other group of Palestinian people or organizations other than the PLO problem. I do not think they probably could, I am sure State Department cannot.

A. There are other collections of Palestinians. If you just think in terms of the proposition that you raised earlier, namely, the West Bank and Gaza, there are Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza. There are almost a million.

Winn: They would probably be very happy staying there and probably many of them will not want any part of the PLO. That is what I gather.

A. It is very difficult to know exactly what the center of gravity is in their opinion but—

Winn: They want recognition.

A. They are not highly organized.

Winn: The ones that I know over there that we have had any communications with want recognition for their people. That is the problem. There are a lot of people over there.

I do not envy you in trying to solve this problem because

it is a toughy. But if we can get Egypt and Israel together on even an interim basis then I think that should be a challenge to try to do something about the PLO.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hamilton: Mr. Biester.

Biester: I appreciate the chairman's invitation to ask questions and I really do not want to expect to ask a question which I do not mean to sound as provocative as it is going to sound.

When did we cease being a party?

A. Pardon me?

Biester: When did we cease being a party? Was there a moment when that stopped, did we announce it?

A. I hope what I said is not misinterpreted. Our commitment to continue our role in the effort to move the peace negotiations forward to reach a conclusion of the final peace remains unchanged. There is absolutely no diminution of that commitment. What I meant was even from the beginning of these negotiations—the series of negotiations which began in late 1973—the United States is not a party to the negotiations. We have helped the parties to the negotiations come together to reach agreement, but the United States is not negotiating technically as a party to the agreements. We are not normally—

Biester: My question is when did that stop? When did we stop being a party to this?

A. I do not know that we ever were, really. We do not hold territory there; we do not have military forces; we are not engaged in a war as we were in Southeast Asia. We do not have any assets, if you will, in the negotiations. We are an interested, extremely interested nation with very important interests in the Middle East. There is no question about that. When I use the word party, perhaps I am not using it as a lawyer would.

Biester: Were you thinking in terms of a principal?

A. I guess that is the legal term. There is nothing of ours that is being negotiated in this process; it is territory which others occupy, which others claim.

Biester: I think if you use the word principal I would understand what you mean. Saying we had not been a party—

A. It is a term of art in this diplomatic context.

Biester: We have a vital interest in peace in the

region?

A. No question.

Biester: We historically have had a decisive impact on the creation of the situation and we continue to be the most directly involved of any state physically located outside of the region in the solution to this component problem, so in that sense it seems to me we are a party if not a principal.

A. We have a very, very strong interest, no question about that. It is a term of art and perhaps we overuse it. From 1967 on we have normally talked about the "parties to the conflict" so when we use "party" we use it in that sense to mean Israel and the states with whom it has been fighting. So that is a term of art, perhaps rather than being legally precise.

Biester: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hamilton: Mr. Saunders, so I can get the record clear, why do we not talk to the PLO?

A. We regard the basic problem as getting a negotiation started, not the question of whether or not we talk to one group or another. The PLO has not stated its readiness to participate in these negotiations. The Israeli Government has not stated its readiness to negotiate with the PLO. In that situation we feel that it would not advance the negotiations for us to be in contact with the PLO.

Hamilton: I find it very difficult how you reach that conclusion. How can it not advance the negotiations or a movement toward negotiations if the only country that has credibility in the Middle East with the principal parties, as the Secretary has told us many, many times, will not talk to one of the principal parties. You have got an impasse there. The PLO says they are not going to talk to Israel, Israel says we are not going to talk to the PLO. Our role chiefly has been that of a mediator so far.

How do you break that impasse if we have contacts, communication with the Israelis on the one side of the question, but we do not with the other side?

A. We have to deal with the fact, as you well know, of Israeli attitudes toward the PLO, and for us to be in contact with an organization which they reject in that way will not advance the cause of the negotiations. But at the risk of sounding repetitive, I wish we could get away from the question of whether or not we have contact with the PLO. I do not think that is the main problem

to be solved. I think that problem would solve itself at some future time in different circumstances, perhaps. But the main issue is to get positions out into the negotiating area that can be brought together in agreement.

Hamilton: Yes, do you not get those positions out into the negotiating arena through communication? . . .

A. I think there has to be some internal communication within the Palestinian movement and inside Israel on this subject before you are going to get decisions to negotiate. What I am saying is I am not sure the United States moving into that situation prematurely can precipitate those decisions. The problem is that there are not those decisions now because the problem with which we are grappling is one with which the parties themselves must grapple first—

Hamilton: If we wait for the Israelis and PLO to get together we have got a long wait.

Now, at Rabat, the Arab summit meeting, they adopted a resolution which recognizes the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and grants to the PLO all responsibilities for all Palestinians in the occupied territories both on the national and international levels.²⁴⁹

How do we in the United States view the Rabat decision?

A. That, of course, is a judgment by Arab leaders that the PLO does in effect represent the Palestinian people, and we do not deny the fact that the PLO is the principal organization of Palestinian groups.

Hamilton: Are there any others?

A. Let me come to that point in a second.

The second point that needs to be made is that the PLO itself, of course, is a collection of half a dozen or more Palestinian organizations, some of which split and leave and at some points come back, so the point is that the PLO itself is not monolithic. Let me say another thing. There are many Palestinians who are not in any way associated with any of the organized Palestinian groups. Given this situation, we just do not presume to make the judgment that the Arab leaders at Rabat made; we just do not feel that we have the capacity to do that.

Hamilton: What percentage of the Palestinians do you believe the PLO speaks for?

A. I do not think we have a judgment on that. I think it is very difficult.

Hamilton: Is it 10 percent or is it 90 percent?

A. I would not want to hazard a guess. As we just mentioned a moment ago, there are a million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, people we have some contact with fairly regularly, and I do not think those stationed there would care to hazard a guess.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger considering developments after the Sinai interim agreement²⁵⁰

Pittsburgh, November 12, 1975

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the next step in the Middle East?

A. The next step in the Middle East depends, of course, importantly on the parties concerned. We have had a proposal from the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Conference,²⁵¹ which we are now studying and about which we will consult with all of the interested parties.

The major difficulty in the Soviet proposal involves the proposal that the PLO participate. This enlarges the original membership of the Geneva Conference and proposes to introduce an organization which is in favor of abolishing one of the states that is a charter member of the Geneva Conference. So a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with its original membership, is one way of proceeding.

Another way of proceeding would be negotiations between, for example, Syria and Israel, or any other negotiations that can be started on a bilateral or multilateral basis. We are openminded on this subject.

We are engaged in diplomatic exchanges with all of the parties. We have invited Prime Minister Rabin to visit the United States, and we hope he will do so at an early opportunity for a further exchange of views. We are also in close touch with

²⁵⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1901 (December 1, 1975), pp. 774–775.

²⁵¹ Doc. 183 above.

²⁴⁹ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

the leaders of Arab countries to see what diplomatic process can be generated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on that?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you give some indication why you thought it necessary to give a pledge to Israel, in that eight-point memorandum of agreement,²⁵² that the United States would not talk to the Palestinian Liberation Organization until it recognized Israel? Doesn't that ask the PLO to give up presumably its chief bargaining tool for winning itself an independent nation on the West Bank, say, and/or the Gaza Strip before the bargaining begins?

The publication of these documents has created many misleading impressions, partly because, separated from the general context of our overall relationship, they have acquired an impression of novelty and formality which, seen in context, they would not have necessarily had.

With respect to the Palestinians, we have said nothing to Israel that we have not said innumerable times publicly. We have said publicly on many occasions—and I repeat it here—the United States cannot ask any country to negotiate with an organization that is dedicated to its destruction. If the PLO accepted Security Council Resolution 242, for example, that would still leave as much room for bargaining as there is between the Arab states that have accepted 242 and Israel.

But to ask Israel to negotiate with an organization that has a program incompatible with the existence of Israel is extremely difficult.

Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary, but that is not my question. My question is, why did you feel it necessary apparently to commit the United States not to talking, to not discuss—having any negotiations?

A. What I said is in the document to which you referred. We have said nothing to Israel that we have not already said publicly. That is our position. That has always been our position.

Q. That we will not talk with the PLO—

A. Until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel.

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Statement by President Graber of Switzerland deploring the UN resolution on Zionism (excerpt)²⁵³

Bern, November 15, 1975

In equating Zionism with racism, the majority of the UN members wanted to attack the ideological foundations of the state of Israel. They exacerbated the insult by a provocation that will only reinforce the hard-liners. By distorting the nature of the meaning and scope of the Zionist movement, the resolution puts the blame on the very existence of a state that we recognize and with which we maintain close relations. The role of the UN is to search for world peace. It is obvious that this resolution is a significant set back to its achievement in the Middle East.

The best way of righting the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinians is not to attempt to inflict new anxieties on the Jews of Israel but to found a separate and viable home for the Palestinians. Such is the aim which those who concern themselves with justice and peace should seek.

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Press interview statements by President Senghor of Senegal approving the Sinai interim agreement as an initial step towards a settlement and explaining Senegal's attitude to Zionism²⁵⁴

Cairo, mid-November, 1975

Q. On the political level, haven't certain of your Arab interlocutors reproached you for your approval of the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai accord?²⁵⁵

A. No, to the contrary, all my interlocutors,

²⁵³ Made in a speech at the Neuchatel Socialist Party congress; translated from the partial French text as published in *Le Monde* (Paris), November 18, 1975, p. 8.

²⁵⁴ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, *Le Monde* (Paris), November 20, 1975, p. 2. President Senghor visited Cairo November 15–18, 1975; see also the note to doc. 176 above.

²⁵⁵ Doc. 148 above.

²⁵² Doc. 149 above.

including the Syrians, the Iraqis and the Palestinians, have happily surprised me by their moderation. None of them desire the pure and simple disappearance of Israel, and none of them have insisted on her expulsion from the UN. As for the Sinai accord, although Senegal in effect totally approves of it, it considers it a first step only, prefatory to a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal from the Golan and the recognition of the Palestinian right to a state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Q. But a number of Palestinians are saying they want a secular state in all of Palestine.

A. Senegal, being a secular state, approves of this idea, but first this state must pass through a stage of confederacy, to then become a federation, and above all it is necessary that Israel be in agreement.

Q. How is one to interpret Senegal's vote in the UN in favor of equating Zionism with racism, when in Khartoum you have just evoked Jewish martyrdom?

A. The Jews are our brothers in suffering, but I make a distinction between Judaism, Jewishness, which is the whole of the moral values of the Jewish people and Zionism, which is an expansionist ideology. In 1971, the OAU mission failed because Mrs. Meir refused to make a declaration of non-annexation;²⁵⁶ the result was the Yom Kippur or Ramadan war. That being said, we oppose the destruction of Israel as well as its exclusion from the UN. However, we now also refuse the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. As to our diplomatic relations with Israel, we will reestablish them only after the signing of a definite peace treaty in the Middle East and not before. Non-Jewish western intellectuals have disappointed me by their reaction of 'contempt' with regard to the 'savages'—these are their own words—who condemned Zionism. By doing this, Western intellectuals are behaving like racists.

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Television interview statements by Defence Minister Peres of Israel discussing implications of the attack on Ramat Magshimim²⁵⁷

November 22, 1975

Peres: I can say that the northern command on the whole has excelled in combating terrorism. In recent weeks it has scored very impressive successes within its dual deployment: defence in general, and the more specific fighting of terrorism. Naturally, the innovation here is that the penetration did not occur on the Lebanese border, but on the Syrian border. This is an additional problem.

Q. Do you think that we are prepared for such activities from across the Syrian border?

A. I think that we can be ready for activities of this kind from that quarter.

Q. Not yet?

A. I don't think that I have to answer the question in more detail; there are sufficient forces, as many as are needed for a confrontation with this problem.

Q. You mentioned the uniqueness, the fact that the terrorists came from the Syrian border. This is the second gang that has come from Syria. Do you see in this a method, or merely a coincidence?

A. Before giving it any terms, I'd first of all analyze the facts. The first time, when we captured the gang—this was approximately at the end of last month—it emerged that the gang had been briefed by a Syrian Intelligence officer; and again, I don't want to give an answer that might be interpreted imprecisely that all of Syria, as it were, knew of this. However, that a Syrian of quite a senior rank did brief the gang, of that there is no doubt. We must also analyze this incident in more depth and detail; but again, let's say, since the first interim settlement with the Syrians, whenever the Syrians wished to prevent such penetrations, they did this. Hence, again I would say that Syria in this case did not wish to prevent this, as had been the case before.

Q. As regards the Golan disengagement agreement,²⁵⁸ this incident is regarded as a violation?

²⁵⁶ See docs. 225, 233 and 394 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

²⁵⁷ Broadcast on Israel television in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5067/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

²⁵⁸ Doc. 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

A. Definitely, this is a violation of the tranquillity or the non-prevention of terrorist penetration on the border between us and Syria, something that contradicts the spirit and the content of the interim settlement between us and Syria.

Q. Do you think that the Syrians intend to extend the mandate?

A. I cannot make predictions, I would say what I know to date is that the Syrians have not yet decided. I don't know what they'll decide. This is their decision, I am sure that whatever they decide, they will decide on Syrian grounds, not on the basis of Israeli considerations. I can envisage a great number of Syrian reasons, not Israeli ones, obliging them, let's say, to adopt a decision in the direction of extending the mandate. But since they haven't decided, I won't decide for them, nor shall I prophesy what they will decide.

Q. Do you link last night's incident to the context of the mandate extension?

A. It is very difficult for me to answer. This is quite a tense situation and I wouldn't want to add tension by my words. I'd prefer that we examine the issue more thoroughly. It is clear that a second incident aggravates the issue and does not make it less serious, but the matter calls for a more thorough examination.

Q. When the UN Secretary General arrives next Monday, what can we offer him, what is our own interest as it is seen now?

A. I don't think that Israel has to offer Syria temptations or sweets of any kind. I say again: the basic Syrian tendency is well known to us—this is no trend towards peace, nor a search for a compromise and this is no striving for a dialogue. If the Syrians are doing what they are doing, or if they give their consent to such actions, this also reflects their opinion of the power ratio between Israel and Syria. I don't see that Israel can today offer any tangible proposal: Israel must be very much prepared. Your opening question was whether I am satisfied. I don't altogether think that there is any call for being satisfied; alertness is called for and this is what we shall do,—again out of a policy leading to continued calm, not to an escalation of the situation.

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Press interview statements by former Prime Minister de Murville of France regarding his visit to Lebanon²⁵⁹

Beirut, November 25, 1975

Q. Certain information has appeared in the French press leading one to believe that you suggested to Mr. Arafat, in the course of your meeting with the head of the PLO, a "bargain," if one can use this term, of the following nature:

The withdrawal of the PLO from the political scene in Lebanon (politically and militarily) in exchange for—and this in the name of France as one of the European Community—stronger support for the PLO.

A. No, nothing of the sort has happened. Firstly, my mission and responsibility were to occupy myself with Lebanon and the Lebanese crisis only, and for this reason, like the Papal Representative, Cardinal Bertoli, before me, I met Yasir Arafat because it is obvious that the Palestinians are playing an important role in the crisis. We spoke of the situation in Lebanon, and we spoke of the Palestinian position in this affair. As for myself, to settle the situation in Lebanon I insisted above all on the necessity of an accord to apply between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians so that the latter respect the agreements that have been concluded which impose on them a statute limiting their armed movement in the country and their intervention in internal Lebanese politics.

Q. Besides the Lebanese-Palestinian aspect of the Lebanese crisis, what are, in terms of your fact finding mission, the other aspects of this crisis?

A. I believe that the essential aspect is that of the Lebanese crisis, of the disintegration of this country owing to disagreement between everyone leading each individual to seek refuge in his community because he thinks he will find protection there, which consequently has repercussions on national unity. Besides this, as always when a country is in a state of crisis there is external intervention or foreign interference. I have spoken of the Palestinians, as they are obviously an important point; there are other countries, Syria notably, Libya

²⁵⁹ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Antoine Sfeir, *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut), November 26, 1975, pp. 1, 4.

without a doubt, who intervene, without speaking of the great powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, whose game, at this moment, is difficult to fathom. All these constitute part of a whole, and to settle this whole it is necessary to begin at the beginning, that is to say with Lebanon.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)²⁶⁰

Moscow, November 28, 1975

Yassir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the members of the PLO Executive Committee who accompanied him—Faruk Kaddumi, Zuheir Mohsen, Yassir Abd Rabbo, Abdel Mohsen Abu Meizer, as well as Hasan Saleh and Ahmed al-Azhari, high-ranking officials of the PLO—were in the Soviet Union on a friendly visit from November 24 to 28.

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During the talks held in a friendly atmosphere, both Sides had a far-ranging exchange of opinions on the situation in the Middle East, in particular on the Palestinian problem. Both Sides stated their agreement on the need for an all-embracing and just settlement of the Middle East conflict, which would also give the Arab people of Palestine their lawful rights based on the resolutions and Charter of the United Nations. They expressed their firm conviction that the attempts made by certain quarters to replace a complete settlement by piecemeal and separate agreements can only create a shaky illusion of progress towards peace, putting the Middle East crisis situation with all its explosiveness in cold storage to undermine the peaceable aspirations of the peoples.

During the exchange of opinions the two Sides noted the importance of the Soviet Union's initiative of November 9 as regards the convocation of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.²⁶¹

The Soviet and Palestinian Sides reaffirmed their position on the fact that a just settlement in the Middle East and the solution of the Palestinian problem can only be achieved if Israel withdraws its troops from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of aggression and that the lawful national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to form their own national state on Palestinian territory in accordance with the UN resolutions, be satisfied.

The two Sides noted with gratification the growing international support of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They stressed the great importance of the resolutions on the Palestinian problem adopted by the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The representatives of the PLO extended their profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for consistent support of the Palestinian people's just struggle for their national ideals, against the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary intrigues. The Soviet Side reaffirmed its principled and firm line of continuing this support as an inalienable part of the Soviet Union's policy aimed at improving the international climate and safeguarding world peace.

The two Sides favoured a continued increase in cooperation and unity of action by the forces of world socialism and national-liberation movements, including the anti-imperialist Arab movement, as a vital factor in the successful opposition to machinations by imperialists and their henchmen. They firmly condemned any attempts, by anyone, to undermine this cohesion as against the vital interests of Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Hungary of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)²⁶²

Budapest, November 29, 1975

A PLO delegation headed by Mr. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, arrived in Budapest on a short visit on November 28, 1975.

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²⁶⁰ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 49 (December 6, 1975), p. 10.

²⁶¹ Doc. 183 above.

²⁶² Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 30, 1975, p. 4.

At this meeting, which took place in an atmosphere of fraternal solidarity and frankness, there was an exchange of views on the objectives, activities and duties of both the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization. They also discussed urgent issues in international politics and exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East, and agreed that the fundamental condition for peace and permanent security in the Middle East area is an overall solution of the crisis, the recovery of all occupied Arab territories and the restoration of their legitimate rights to the Palestinian Arab people.

The Hungarian side also welcomed the gains achieved by the Palestine Liberation Organization at the thirtieth session of the United Nations.

The representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party affirmed the Party's solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization in its struggle for the just objectives of the Palestinian people. The visit of the Palestinian delegation has strengthened the relations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization, relations which are based on the principles of international friendship and solidarity.

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Report of the Middle East Study Group of the Brookings Institution of the US: Toward Peace in the Middle East²⁶³

Washington, December, 1975

Foreword

Nearly three decades ago the United Nations proposed the creation of both a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine. This action came after three decades of constant tension and intermittent warfare between these two communities. It is now almost sixty years since this conflict began. It has

widened steadily but its core has remained the same: limited geographically to a small area, yet hard and seemingly intractable.

Throughout these years, the American interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the entire Middle East has increased greatly. Since the 1973 war, moreover, the American role has also increased. To assess this role and to suggest how it might be employed most usefully, the Brookings Institution last summer invited a diverse group of distinguished Americans to consider how this country might help in the achievement of a workable, fair, and enduring settlement of this most troublesome conflict.

The members of the Brookings Middle East Study Group have had a continuing interest in the Arab-Israeli question from varying points of view. Most of them, indeed, have known and studied the complex issues at first hand as public-spirited citizens, lawyers, scholars, and government officials. After meeting once monthly for one or two days since last June, they have come to share a position which they now offer for public consideration. They have in my judgment made remarkable progress in bridging differences among their points of views and achieving a wide and significant area of agreement.

Each has signed in his or her personal capacity, without involving in any way the responsibility of the organization or organizations with which he or she may be affiliated.

The conclusions and recommendations of this report represent a compromise among the diverse views of the members of the group, to which they agreed as an expression of their conviction that a settlement of the conflict must likewise result from difficult but necessary compromises among the parties. It follows that the preferred conclusions of some of the members, had they been acting alone, would have differed in some respects from those of the report. Where the report presents a range of possible solutions to certain aspects of the problem, such as the Palestinian question and Jerusalem, it was because each of the solutions was preferred by some members of the group and agreement could be reached only by stating the alternatives without expressing a group preference.

The Middle East Study Group worked continuously, patiently, and with good will under the chairmanship of Roger Heyns and with the assistance of codirectors Morroe Berger and Charles Yost. The

²⁶³ The Brookings Institution, *Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975). Members of the study group were: Morroe Berger, Robert R. Bowie, Zbigniew Brzezinski, John C. Campbell, Najeeb Halaby, Rita Hauser, Roger W. Heyns (chairman), Alan Horton, Malcolm Kerr, Fred Khouri, William Quandt, Nadav Safran, Stephen Spiegel, A. L. Udovitch and Charles W. Yost. Copyright © 1975 The Brookings Institution.

Brookings Institution was able to call this group together with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation.

The study was carried out as an activity of the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, of which Henry Owen is director. The views expressed in this report are those of the Study Group and should not be attributed to the staff members, officers, or trustees of the Brookings Institution or to the Rockefeller Foundation.

This timely report merits the attention of the American public and the United States government as a thoughtful and constructive statement of a group of Americans who know the Middle East and want this nation to help that region toward peace.

KERMIT GORDON
President
The Brookings Institution

December 1975
Washington, D.C.

Summary

The study group reached five main conclusions.

1. *U.S. interests.* The United States has a strong moral, political, and economic interest in a stable peace in the Middle East. It is concerned for the security, independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area and for the friendship of both. Renewed hostilities would have far-reaching and perilous consequences which would threaten those interests.

2. *Urgency.* Whatever the merits of the interim agreement on Sinai, it still leaves the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli dispute substantially untouched. Unless these elements are soon addressed, rising tensions in the area will generate increased risk of violence. We believe that the best way to address these issues is by the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement.

3. *Process.* We believe that the time has come to begin the process of negotiating such a settlement among the parties, either at a general conference or at more informal multilateral meetings. While no useful interim step toward settlement should be overlooked or ignored, none seems promising at the present time and most have inherent disadvantages.

4. *Settlement.* A fair and enduring settlement should contain at least these elements as an integrated package:

a) *Security.* All parties to the settlement commit themselves to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the others and to refrain from the threat or use of force against them.

b) *Stages.* Withdrawal to agreed boundaries and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented.

c) *Peaceful relations.* The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations.

d) *Boundaries.* Israel undertakes to withdraw by agreed stages to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. Boundaries will probably need to be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by UN forces.

e) *Palestine.* There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestine state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.

f) *Jerusalem.* The report suggests no specific solution for the particularly difficult problem of Jerusalem but recommends that, whatever the solution may be, it meet as a minimum the following criteria:

—there should be unimpeded access to all of the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith;

—there should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it; and

—each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

g) *Guarantees.* It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreements provide. In addition, there may well be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures.

5. *U.S. role.* The governments directly concerned bear the responsibility of negotiation and agreement, but they are unlikely to be able to reach agreement alone. Initiative, impetus, and inducement may well have to come from outside. The United States, because it enjoys a measure of confidence of parties on both sides and has the means to assist them economically and militarily, remains the great power best fitted to work actively with them in bringing about a settlement. Over and above helping to provide a framework for negotiation and submitting concrete proposals from time to time, the United States must be prepared to take other constructive steps, such as offering aid and providing guarantees where desired and needed. In all of this, the United States should work with the USSR to the degree that Soviet willingness to play a constructive role will permit.

The Report

Events of the past two years—the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the Arab oil embargo and its impact on the West, the interim Sinai agreement of 1975—have increasingly brought home to the American government and people the far-reaching U.S. stake in peace in the Middle East. How can a comprehensive and durable settlement between Arabs and Israeli be achieved?

This report addresses that question in the hope of contributing to a constructive answer by its analysis and recommendations.

The following sections discuss (1) the U.S. interest in a peaceful Middle East; (2) what is required for a settlement; (3) the main components of a settlement; (4) the process of negotiation; and (5) the U.S. role in the settlement.

I. THE U.S. INTEREST

The United States has a vital interest in the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East for the following reasons, among others.

1. Rising tensions in the Middle East, which experience suggests are ultimately almost certain in the absence of a settlement, might well lead to another Arab-Israeli war and even provoke a major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, substantially elevating East-West tension and threatening the recent many-sided effort toward greater international stability. As a signatory of the UN Charter and permanent member of the Security Council, the United States

has a major responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The United States has a strong interest in the security, independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area and in the friendship of both. Their security and future development will remain in jeopardy until a durable settlement is concluded. Both would be bound to suffer gravely from another war fought with the advanced weapons now available to both sides.

3. The United States has a strong interest in the unimpeded flow of Middle Eastern oil to itself and to its European and Japanese allies, which are even more dependent on this supply. In the event of another Arab-Israeli war, or even a serious crisis short of war, Arab oil shipments to those markets might be disrupted.

4. The United States has a considerable and growing interest in trade with, investment in, and communications through the entire area.

5. Efforts by the United States to establish greater global stability and to help manage the growing economic interdependence among nations more effectively are likely to be frustrated as long as conflict and confrontation seem probable in this area where so many national interests converge. U.S. interests in this respect are congruent with those of the states in the area.

II. WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR A SETTLEMENT?

If it is essential to U.S. interests and to those of the parties to the conflict that a settlement acceptable to those parties and binding upon them be promptly found, what are the requirements that must be met?

1. The momentum toward settlement, which was strong immediately after the 1967 war but gradually subsided, was revived after the 1973 war and has continued through the Sinai agreement of September 1975.²⁶⁴ It is important that this momentum be maintained. A prolonged stalemate, a failure to move forward in a significant way over a period of months, would increase tension and could lead to renewed hostilities. It would be imprudent and unsafe to attempt to leave the situation "frozen" for any prolonged period. That is probably not a genuine option. Even though further results may not be obtained quickly, the process and momentum of negotiation must be

²⁶⁴ Doc. 148 above.

maintained. In the absence of progress, the obstacles to settlement could harden again, moderate policies and leaders be superseded by more intransigent ones, and the security of all parties be gravely imperiled by the failure of all to act while the time was ripe.

2. On the other hand, basic conditions are now more propitious for a settlement than they have been or may be again for some time. The Arab states bordering Israel have all publicly recognized its existence and indicated a willingness, under very specific conditions, to negotiate a permanent settlement. There are corresponding indications, since the 1973 war, of an Israeli disposition to negotiate either further interim steps or a comprehensive settlement, including one that would take account of the Palestinian problem.

The United States, by its intensive participation in negotiations since the 1973 war, by the substantial assurances and contributions it has already undertaken, and by its repeatedly stated belief that these are but steps on the road to a comprehensive settlement, has demonstrated that it recognizes its own vital interest in an early end to conflict and enduring peace.

3. Since the 1973 war the emphasis of peacemaking has been on interim steps, designed to reduce tension and move gradually toward a comprehensive settlement. Interim steps have advantages and disadvantages but it now seems probable that further steps of this kind will not prove feasible in the immediate future. If the momentum of negotiation is to be maintained and a prolonged stalemate avoided, peacemaking efforts should henceforth concentrate on negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, including only such interim steps as constitute essential preparations for such a negotiation.

4. The primary basis for a settlement must be a negotiated and agreed tradeoff between the Israeli requirement for peace and security and the Arab requirement for evacuation of territories occupied in 1967 and for Palestinian self-determination.

Satisfaction of the Israeli requirement would involve binding commitments by the Arab states to a stable peace—that is, commitments to recognize and respect the sovereignty of Israel, to refrain from the threat or use of force against it, to desist from other hostile actions against it, and progressively to develop with it normal international and regional political and economic relations.

Satisfaction of the Arab requirement would involve Israeli withdrawal to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications, as well as such particular arrangements for Jerusalem, as might be agreed upon. It would involve the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in one form or another, consonant with the above Israeli requirements. The Arab requirement for security would be satisfied by making reciprocal commitments outlined in the previous paragraph.

5. So that both sides may be persuaded to make the concessions which this integrated accommodation between peace and withdrawal would require, it will be necessary that, while comprehensive peace agreements stipulating the whole range of commitments be concluded, their implementation be staged over a period of years. The stages would be clearly defined in the agreements. Each stage would be undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage had been carried out. Under this procedure Israeli withdrawal and Arab movement toward normal relations would proceed in tandem. If at any stage of implementation, there should be failure by one side to carry out agreed measures, corresponding measures by the other side could be suspended. Bilateral or multilateral commissions should be established in the agreements to hear and investigate complaints about alleged failures to carry out provisions of the agreements and to iron out differences arising in their phased implementation.

6. A further requirement would no doubt be international endorsements, guarantees, arrangements, and assistance to support and supplement the peace agreements. It would be desirable that the agreements be endorsed by the UN Security Council. If they provide for demilitarized zones, the UN would be expected to provide peacekeeping forces or observers to supervise those zones.

It is likely that there will be a supplementary requirement for explicit bilateral or multilateral guarantees by one or more of the great powers. The United States should be prepared to extend such guarantees as are feasible and necessary to achieve a settlement.

A stable settlement will also need to be reinforced by measures to end the arms race in the area. Until agreed measures to this end are adopted, there will be a continuing requirement to supply weapons to the parties to enhance their sense of security.

There will also be need for substantial economic

aid to many of the parties and to repatriated and resettled refugees.

7. Finally, on the basis of the experience of the past twenty-five years, it is clear that the parties are unlikely to be able to negotiate a comprehensive and durable settlement unassisted. There are powerful political and psychological constraints within each nation or movement, which could not at present be wholly overcome even by governments and leaders desiring to do so. They need help. It is here that outside powers—particularly the United States because it enjoys a measure of confidence on both sides and has the means of assisting them economically and militarily—have a substantial, possibly a decisive, role to play. Soviet cooperation would also be most desirable to the extent the USSR is willing to play a constructive role.

These seven essential requirements for a settlement are examined in fuller detail in the following sections.

III. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF A SETTLEMENT *Mutual Acceptance and Peaceful Relations*

The peace agreements must contain binding reciprocal commitments by all parties to the settlement to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the others as defined in the agreements, and to refrain from the use or threat of force against each other.

They must equally contain commitments by all parties to the settlement to put an end to all hostile actions against the others, including armed incursions, propaganda inciting hostile acts, economic blockades and boycotts, obstacles to the normal movement of shipping, goods, and people. They should also provide for steady progress, in defined stages, toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations and cooperation. Specific reciprocal actions by the parties themselves demonstrating progress toward normal relations are an indispensable part of the process of settlement.

Palestinians

The Palestinians for the most part believe that they have a right to self-determination. For a peace settlement to be viable, indeed for it even to be negotiated and concluded, this right will have to be recognized in principle and, as a part of the settlement, given satisfaction in practice.

Whoever represents the Palestinians must recognize the equal right to self-determination of Israel and Jordan. In particular, the Palestinians must recognize the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed frontiers and must accept whatever security arrangements, mutual guarantees, demilitarized zones, or UN presence are embodied in the peace settlement.

Such a settlement also cannot be achieved unless Israel accepts the principle of Palestinian self-determination and some generally acceptable means is found of putting that principle into practice.

Possibilities for doing so might include (1) an independent Palestine state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or (2) a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising the extensive political autonomy King Hussein has offered. Either of these arrangements might be supplemented by close economic cooperation with Israel and Jordan, possibly evolving into a wider regional common market.

Moreover, a peace settlement should include provision for the resettlement of those Palestinian refugees desiring to return to whatever new Palestinian entity is created, for reasonable compensation for property losses for Arab refugees from Israel and for Jews formerly resident in Arab states, and for sufficient economic assistance to the state or entity in which Palestinian self-determination is realized, from its neighbors and from the international community, to enable it to survive and to develop.

Accomplishment of these essential aspects of a settlement is complicated by disagreement and uncertainty as to who can negotiate authoritatively on behalf of the Palestinians.

While the Arab states at the Rabat meeting in 1974 accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization as representing the Palestinians,²⁶⁵ and many other states have also done so, its claim is not unchallenged. Many Jordanians continue to believe Jordan has a better right to this representation. It is not clear to what extent the PLO can negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians on the West Bank, in Gaza, or in Jordan, to whom it does not have ready access. The PLO has not publicly recognized Israel's right to exist. Israel has not recognized the PLO or agreed to accept the establish-

²⁶⁵ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

ment of a Palestine state.

Nevertheless, it can certainly be said that a solution to the Palestinian dimension of the conflict will require the participation of credible Palestinian representatives who are prepared to accept the existence of Israel.

Boundaries

The basic principles governing the territorial aspects of the settlement should be those laid down in UN resolution 242 of November 1967 and accepted by most of the parties: "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war"; "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (the 1967 war); and the right of all nations of the area "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries."

We believe that, in exchange for the assured establishment of peaceful relations with its neighbors and suitable security arrangements, Israel should and would agree to withdraw to the June 5, 1967, lines, with only such modifications as might be mutually accepted. Jerusalem is discussed separately below.

In the Middle East as elsewhere, the only "secure" boundaries are mutually "recognized" boundaries, that is, boundaries freely accepted by the parties concerned. As long as there are irredentas that one or more of the parties passionately believes are unjustly annexed or held, no boundary incorporating those irredentas will be secure. This is particularly true in a situation where the parties have access to more and more sophisticated weapons, including missiles capable of easily spanning the contested territories and striking the cities of the other side. In an area where centers of population of the contending parties are so closely juxtaposed, security can be assured only by the establishment of normal peaceful relations.

Jerusalem

The issue of Jerusalem is especially hard to resolve because it involves intense emotions on the part of both Israelis and Arabs. It embraces sites that are among the most holy for Muslims, Jews, and Christians. It has been the focus of Jewish messianic yearning and has had special significance in Muslim history. The city was bitterly contested in the wars of 1948 and 1967, and its division in the interwar years left a heritage of deep mutual recrimination. Finally, it is the capital of Israel and might also be sought as the

capital of a Palestine state.

For all these reasons the issue is highly symbolic for both sides. Consequently, it may prove wise to leave its resolution to a late stage of the negotiation. Whatever that resolution may be, it should meet as a minimum the following criteria:

- a) There should be unimpeded access to all the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith.

- b) There should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it.

- c) Each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

All these criteria could be met within a city (1) under Israeli sovereign jurisdiction with free access to the holy places, (2) under divided sovereign jurisdiction between Israel and an Arab state with assured free circulation, or (3) under either of these arrangements with an international authority in an agreed area, such as the old walled city, with free access to it from both Israel and the Arab state. These or any other possible solutions should incorporate all three of the criteria set forth above.

No solution will be able to satisfy fully the demands of either side. Yet the issue must be resolved if there is to be a stable peace. We are convinced that ingenuity and patience should be able to find a compromise which will be fair and ultimately acceptable, even though not ideal from the point of view of any party.

Stages of Implementation

We believe that an integral part of a comprehensive settlement must be its implementation in stages that would be clearly defined in the peace agreements.

In order that a settlement be sufficiently attractive to all the parties to induce them to make the necessary compromises, all aspects of the settlement will have to be spelled out explicitly in an agreement or agreements that will be signed more or less simultaneously as part of a "package deal." Some of the provisions of such agreement or agreements can be implemented shortly after signature. Others, however, will require considerable time, probably several years, for full implementation. The latter are those that should be implemented in clearly defined stages, particular steps of withdrawal being matched with security measures and

steps in the establishment of peaceful and normal relations.

This phased implementation would enable each side to assure itself, before proceeding with the next stage, that the other side had fully carried out the agreed and defined provisions of the previous stage. If it believed the other side had not complied, it would be entitled to suspend its own implementation of the next stage, while it resorted to whatever bilateral or multilateral machinery had been established by the agreements for supervision of compliance.

Through this device no party would feel that it was bound to one-sided implementation of any part of the agreement, if and when another party had failed to carry out its defined commitments under an earlier stage.

Safeguards, Guarantees, and Assistance

Finally, the peace agreements should be reinforced and supplemented by a wide range of safeguards, assurances, guarantees, and assistance, some of which would be embodied in the agreements themselves and others provided in separate instruments.

The agreements will contain the mutual commitments to security and peaceful relations among the parties described under the first heading of this section. They will probably also contain provision for rather extensive demilitarized zones, to be supervised by UN forces or observers or by joint commissions of the parties, and to be maintained for periods of time prescribed in the agreements. There should be explicit provision that the UN forces not be withdrawn by unilateral action.

It would be desirable that the agreements be endorsed by the UN Security Council, the United States and the USSR particularly committing themselves not only to respect but to support the agreements. The Security Council will need to take appropriate action in regard to demilitarized zones and to UN forces and observers.

Should these arrangements and safeguards not be considered by some or all of the parties sufficient to make certain there will be no violations of the agreements, they may wish to seek supplementary guarantees from one or more outside powers, which might either be multilateral guarantees of the agreements as a whole or unilateral guarantees extended to a single party. These contingencies are discussed in Section V below in relation to the U.S. role in a settlement.

No doubt the parties will expect to and will continue to receive external military assistance until stabilization and reconciliation have reached a point where such assistance is decreasingly necessary. Provision for eventual limitation of the flow of arms into the area might be included either in the peace agreements themselves or in the Security Council action supporting the agreements. In any case it should be an ultimate goal.

The agreements will further need to be supplemented by the provision, by wealthy states concerned with stability in the area, of economic assistance essential to the peaceful development of its states and people.

IV. THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

Perhaps the most difficult task facing the peacemakers is not what to seek but how to achieve it.

A series of devices have been tried since 1967: good offices of the UN secretary general and his special representative, Four Power conversations at the UN, bilateral conversations between the United States and the USSR, good offices by the United States vis-à-vis some or all of the parties in pursuit, originally, of a comprehensive settlement and, subsequently, of interim steps designed to avoid a stalemate. Since the 1973 war the concentration has been almost wholly on interim steps.

The conclusion of the Sinai agreement in September 1975, significant and useful as it no doubt was, has brought out certain difficulties in this line of approach. Both parties perceive themselves as having made very substantial concessions, which may render it politically difficult for them to make further concessions necessary to a general settlement in the near future. Among the Arabs only Egypt has received any satisfaction from this agreement. Other Arabs equally involved demand satisfaction of their claims. Consequent divisions and recriminations among the Arabs have complicated the process of settlement.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is increasingly annoyed at being left on the sidelines. Its leaders believe that its extensive interests in the area and its formal role as cochairman of the Geneva Conference justify its playing a leading part in the process of peacemaking whether of a comprehensive settlement or of interim steps. While it did not interfere with Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in March or August 1975, it was certainly resentful of its conspicuous exclusion, of the absence

of consultation throughout the process, and of the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai without its agreement. The USSR, because of its relations with Syria and the PLO, certainly has a considerable capacity for complicating or even for blocking either further interim steps or progress toward an overall settlement.

At the same time the United States, in order to obtain this limited agreement, has made a considerable number of commitments which used up some of the incentives it will need to promote a broader settlement. It has also become the target of attack from other Arabs who demand progress toward their goals. The U.S. Congress is beginning to express uneasiness at growing U.S. involvement and commitments, made not to guarantee an agreed comprehensive settlement but merely to facilitate another very limited step in the process.

In any case there may not be another interim step which is feasible at the present time.

The one most frequently proposed is an Israeli-Syrian agreement, but leaders of both Israel and Syria have expressed great skepticism about the feasibility of an agreement on the Golan Heights except in the framework of an overall settlement. In the absence of such a settlement Israel is unlikely to be willing to abandon the fortified hills and kibbutzim close to the present cease-fire line, while Syria seems in no mood to be satisfied with a token or cosmetic withdrawal. Soundings should no doubt continue with both sides, but they do not appear promising.

Since Jordan's capacity to represent West Bank interests is widely contested, and since Israel and the PLO do not recognize each other, the possibility of negotiating any sort of partial withdrawal on the West Bank seems even more remote.

Mutual recognition and the cessation of all acts of violence between Israelis and the PLO or another representative Palestine body would greatly facilitate the whole process of negotiation and would in itself constitute an important interim step.

Unilateral measures of concession and goodwill by one or several of the parties could make a contribution to improving the atmosphere and should be stimulated. On the other hand, unilateral actions that aggravate fears and passions delay or even jeopardize settlement.

What would be most prejudicial under present circumstances would be to do nothing. Regardless

of how much those involved in negotiating the Sinai agreement might wish a pause of some duration, the situation is not likely to permit it. Unless Syria, the Palestinians, and Jordan are engaged in the peacemaking process, they will exert themselves even more strongly to undermine the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and to provoke tension and disorder by inviting international attention to their claims.

On the whole, therefore, we see no promising alternative for the near future to the commencement and vigorous pursuit of negotiations directed towards a comprehensive settlement involving all the parties to the conflict.

A Process of Comprehensive Settlement

While the desirability of negotiating a comprehensive settlement is clear, the means are not. Yet if stalemate is too dangerous to be tolerated for long and no significant interim step seems feasible in the near future, there is no alternative to facing and overcoming these difficulties.

A general conference at Geneva or elsewhere has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are substantial.

First, it would assemble all or most of the parties at interest and enable each government to assure its people that, even if the process was long, there was no stalemate, their problems were being dealt with, and progress was being made.

Second, a general conference would give Israel what it has so long been seeking, an opportunity to sit down with its neighbors and negotiate face to face. At the same time it would enable the Arabs to negotiate in parallel fashion, through not necessarily in tandem, and thus to avoid the public divisions provoked by separate interim steps.

Finally, a general conference, of which it was a cochairman, would reintroduce the Soviet Union into the negotiating process and oblige it publicly either to accept or to reject a share of the responsibility for actively promoting a settlement. Certainly its role would be both more legitimate and more effective if it would first move toward impartiality by reestablishing relations with Israel.

The intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union in the Middle East are the subject of considerable controversy. The region is geographically adjacent to the USSR, which has had extensive interests and involvement there at least since 1955. The extent of its influence has varied from place

to place and from time to time, and will continue to do so in the future. The Soviet Union can be prevented from achieving predominance in the area, but it cannot be excluded from it.

It seems probable that the Soviet Union would not want another war in the Middle East, which might involve it in agonizing dilemmas as to how far to go in supporting its friends, and possibly in a serious confrontation with the United States. Whether on the whole it would prefer a comprehensive settlement to the present precarious instability, and if so how far it would exert its influence in this sense, is unknown and could only be determined by testing. Certainly the Soviet Union is unlikely to press for solutions strongly opposed by its Arab friends. On the other hand, it might be willing to contribute to a settlement which protected both Arab interests and its own and in the negotiation of which it played a respectable part.

Since there is no question but that the USSR has a considerable capacity for obstructing a general settlement, and any settlement which it opposed would be likely to prove unstable, its involvement in the negotiating process and in the arrangements and guarantees following a successful negotiation would seem on balance to be an advantage rather than a disadvantage of a general conference.

There are also serious possible obstacles to a general conference.

First, the question of Palestinian representation has not been resolved. Some insist that the PLO could not attend as long as the PLO and Israel do not recognize each other. On the other hand, others insist the conference could not be held unless it does attend. It has been asserted by some that, if the PLO were to attend a Geneva conference, which would be acting pursuant to Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and were there to negotiate with Israel, it would be recognizing Israel and its right to exist in peace and security.

In any case what does have to be decided, either before a conference or not long after it convenes, is how the Palestinians are to be represented. A solution that would solve many problems would be mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO and an agreement between them to suspend acts of violence at least for the duration of the conference. Other possible solutions might be the creation of a Palestinian negotiating authority including both

the PLO and elements from the West Bank and Gaza or, at least temporarily, the inclusion of Palestinians in another Arab delegation.

A second obstacle to a general conference is the fear that it might simply reproduce a polemical, UN type of general debate. It might quickly deadlock, the Soviet Union uniformly supporting the Arabs and the United States, at least on fundamentals, Israel. If it failed, it has been claimed, the situation might be worse than if it had never been convened.

These are genuine obstacles but they must be overcome if there is no viable alternative to the negotiation, in one way or another, of a comprehensive settlement.

It was doubtless with this imperative in mind that Secretary Kissinger in his speech to the UN General Assembly September 22 said that the United States would support, not only an Israeli-Syrian interim negotiation or a reconvened Geneva conference, but also "a more informal multilateral meeting to assess conditions and to discuss the future."²⁶⁶

Such an informal meeting could prepare for a more formal conference and might have the advantage of eluding or postponing for the time being the question of PLO representation. On the other hand, if the informal meeting were to be more than preparatory and were to enter into substantive negotiations, the question of Palestinian representation would soon arise and would have to be met.

The organization of such an informal meeting also raises questions. Who would take the initiative in arranging for and sponsoring the meeting? The alternatives would presumably include the United States and the USSR acting together, the United States alone, or the UN secretary general. Whoever took the initiative would no doubt wish to consult with the others mentioned and would of course have to obtain the consent and cooperation of the principal parties in the area.

Certainly a conference to negotiate a comprehensive settlement needs to be properly prepared. On the other hand, the preparations should not be so comprehensive as to cause a deadlock and unduly delay the conference. Basic issues can hardly be settled in a preparatory process.

The conference, when it convenes, might well

²⁶⁶ Doc. 163 above.

commence with a reaffirmation of UN resolutions 242 and 338, which provide the basis for settlement. Another possibility is that, before undertaking to negotiate the details of a settlement, an attempt would be made to agree on its general framework and essential principles. In any case, there should be a minimum of plenary sessions, the real work being done by a number of committees charged with negotiating each of the main issues.

The parties should be encouraged to present concrete proposals for resolving the main issues, but if the parties are politically constrained from submitting proposals that have any chance of acceptance, one or both of the cochairmen may find it necessary to do so. As the process proceeds, new and unexpected interim steps may become feasible; these would lower tension and buy time until the final settlement is achieved.

Timing is in some sense the central problem. With issues so complex, differences still so great, and domestic political constraints on all the parties so severe, the process of hammering out a durable settlement, even if it ultimately succeeds, is bound to take a considerable time. On the other hand, continuing progress is needed if all the risks of stalemate, deterioration, and explosion are to be avoided.

V. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT

To judge by the experience of the past eight years, it seems evident that the Arab and Israeli governments cannot reach a settlement in the foreseeable future without strong encouragement from the great powers. The governments directly concerned must bear the responsibility for negotiation and agreement, but initiative, impetus, and inducement may well have to come from outside.

The United Nations has played a significant role in the area since 1947, laid down some of the basic principles of a settlement, accepted by all concerned, in Security Council resolutions 242 in 1967 and 338 in 1973, and still maintains indispensable peace-keeping forces along the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. Nevertheless, since 1967 the UN has neither displayed the capacity nor commanded the trust of all the parties sufficient to bring about a general settlement. It now seems even less likely to do so, although it could have a very consequential role in the implementation of a settlement through the use of UN forces and in the political, economic, and social

programs that emerge from a settlement.

The interests and influence of the Soviet Union in the area and its role as cochairman of a general conference are described above. It is not yet clear how far it is prepared to work for a general settlement, but since its cooperation would certainly be helpful and may prove essential, its participation in preparing and conducting negotiations should be actively sought and its intentions thus thoroughly tested.

The United States, because it enjoys a measure of confidence of parties on both sides and has the means of assisting them economically and militarily, remains the great power best fitted actively to work with them in bringing about a settlement. The fact is that whatever the United States does or does not do is bound to affect the policies of the parties and the prospects for a settlement. By either its action or its inaction it will, whether it wishes to or not, strengthen or weaken the elements on both sides which are, against all the obstacles we have described, striving for a durable peace.

On the other hand, the United States, either alone or with the Soviet Union, cannot impose a settlement. Nor would it be wise for it to attempt to lay down a detailed blueprint of what it believes a settlement should be. As much as possible should be negotiated and agreed upon by the parties on their own initiative.

These reservations about a too large U.S. role do not at all mean that the United States, alone or with others, should not feel free at any time to make proposals to the parties to overcome difficulties, large or small, which are certain to arise. It is entirely appropriate for a state extending good offices in an international dispute to do exactly that. Unless it does, in view of the domestic constraints upon the parties, the whole process is very likely to break down. The effective management of a general conference or an "informal meeting," for example, would require an active role by the cochairmen from time to time, just as did the negotiation of the interim agreements.

Besides helping provide a framework for negotiation and submitting concrete suggestions from time to time, the United States can take other constructive steps. Under appropriate circumstances and in varying degrees it can offer military and economic aid. If held within reasonable limits so as not to exacerbate fears, such aid can help give the parties sufficient assurance of security and stability

to enable them to make concessions they might otherwise refuse to make.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the U.S. role is whether or not it should offer commitments or guarantees in support of a settlement, supplementary to the mutual commitments undertaken by the parties and whatever guarantees and safeguards the United Nations may offer.

The recent debate on the Sinai agreement demonstrated that Congress would be extremely reluctant to offer guarantees or to undertake commitments going beyond traditional assurances of aid and consultation if those guarantees or commitments applied to the present unsettled situation. The Congress might well, however, consider favorably some form of guarantee of a comprehensive peace.

It is of course not clear whether the parties would wish a supplementary unilateral U.S. guarantee. In the past Israel has expressed lack of interest in such a guarantee, perhaps fearing that it would be deemed a substitute for security demands Israel favored, but that situation may have changed. If at any time it should appear that a supplementary unilateral guarantee to Israel alone or to other parties as well were essential to the conclusion of a settlement, we believe such a guarantee would be in the U.S. interest. It seems probable that a guarantee to all of the parties should best be multilateral, extended by the Soviet Union and perhaps Britain and France as well as the United States.

How extensive a U.S. guarantee should be and whether and when it should contemplate the involvement of U.S. forces would need to be the subject of extensive examination and discussion, and would have to be fully understood and approved by the U.S. Congress and the public before being undertaken. Because of the obvious difficulties, a U.S. guarantee, if undertaken, should not obligate the United States to intervene to deal with violations of the peace agreements that could be dealt with by other means, and it should be restricted to major violations of the agreements threatening world peace or the existence of states.

The main criteria for external guarantees perhaps should be:

- (1) that they are essential to obtaining and maintaining a settlement;
- (2) that they are no more extensive than is necessary for that purpose; and

(3) that they should not be directed *against* anyone but simply underwrite commitments undertaken in the peace agreements.

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Communiqué issued by Israel's government rejecting Security Council Resolution 381²⁶⁷

December 1, 1975

The Government of Israel rejects the Security Council's move in its Resolution no. 381,²⁶⁸ which surrendered to the Syrian extortion and bound renewal of the UNDOF mandate with extraneous elements having no bearing on the separation-of-forces agreement. This resolution is likely to hamper progress towards peace by means of negotiations between the parties, without prior conditions, and to sabotage the peace efforts in the region. The Government of Israel views Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—as accepted by Israel—as the sole basis for peace negotiations in the region.

On November 11, 1975, the Knesset resolved:

The Knesset rejects the resolutions adopted on November 10, 1975 in the UN Assembly in denunciation of Zionism and the State of Israel. The Knesset determines that the Assembly's resolutions encourage Israel's enemies in plotting against peace. The Knesset determines that Israel will not acknowledge the committee whose establishment was decided upon and will not cooperate with it, nor with any of the moves ramifying from the said resolutions of the UN Assembly.

The Knesset determines that the organization known as the PLO is a framework for murderers' organizations, whose declared aim is destruction of the State of Israel. Israel will not conduct negotiations with the terrorist organizations in any forum, and will not participate in the Geneva Conference should a delegation of these organizations be invited to the conference.

Pursuant upon the above resolution, the Government resolves not to cooperate in any way with the Security Council's resolution regarding the proposed debate on the Middle East and the Palestinian question, nor with the statement of the President of the Security Council regarding the invitation of representatives of the PLO to the said debate.

²⁶⁷ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, December 2, 1975, p. 5.

²⁶⁸ Doc. 25 above.

The presence of the UNDOF is an integral part of the disengagement agreement. Israel will continue to observe—on a basis of strict reciprocity—the disengagement agreement, in all its components and implications, including prevention of terrorist acts. The Government of Israel will deem Syria responsible for any murderous activity perpetrated by terrorists coming from Syrian territory.

Israel will take all necessary measures to increase security on the northern border and to strengthen the settlement disposition along it.

The ministerial settlement committee has been empowered to discuss and decide, on behalf of the Cabinet, on proposals for further settlement on the Golan Heights.

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Note from the US to the USSR suggesting a preparatory conference before reconvening the full Geneva conference²⁶⁹

Washington, December 1, 1975

The Government of the United States has carefully examined the message received from the Government of the Soviet Union on November 9, 1975, on the subject of reconvening the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva and wishes to convey the following reply.

The United States shares the concern for further progress toward a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The United States is also of the view that all of the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian issue, must be resolved if a lasting peace in the Middle East is to be achieved. The issue is how most effectively to move toward that goal.

The United States agrees that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference after careful preparation would serve the goal of achieving progress in the settlement of the conflict. The goal of a reconvened Conference should be the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Soviet Union has proposed that the U.S. and the USSR as Co-chairmen take a joint initia-

tive to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference. The United States is consulting with the parties to determine their views and will be prepared to consult with the Soviet Government on how best to prepare the agenda and procedures for a reconvened Conference and to deal with the question of participation in the Conference.

With respect to the Soviet position on Palestinian participation at the Geneva Conference, the U.S. has always held the view that legitimate Palestinian interests must be taken into account in an overall settlement. The United States cannot agree, however, that the Co-chairmen of the Conference can alter the definition of the participants in the Conference initially agreed to by the original participants.

The Soviet Union will recall that the identical letters presented by the Permanent Representatives of the U.S. and the USSR to the Secretary General of the United Nations on December 18, 1973 stated: "The parties have also agreed that the question of other participants from the Middle East area will be discussed during the first stage of the Conference." As no decision was reached at the Conference in December 1973 concerning possible additional participation, this remains a subject for discussion among the original participants. It also remains the view of the United States that the appropriate UN resolutions to serve as the basis for negotiations leading toward a peace settlement, and the ones which the parties have accepted for this purpose, are Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It would therefore not be appropriate to introduce other resolutions not accepted by all parties for this purpose.

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Speech by UN Representative Vinci of Italy outlining the attitude of the EEC to the Middle East question²⁷⁰

New York, December 2, 1975

I have the honour to be speaking in my capacity as representative of a country which at present occupies the presidency of the European Community, and on behalf of its nine member States.

²⁶⁹ Made in reply to a note from the USSR of November 9, 1975 (doc. 183 above); *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1906 (January 5, 1976), pp. 12–13.

²⁷⁰ Made in French in the debate on the situation in the Middle East in the UN General Assembly; English translation, UN doc. A/PV.2423, pp. 41–46.

This debate is being resumed in this Assembly after three years, at a time when despite the progress recently achieved in the area, the situation still gives rise to concern. It follows the recent debates on the question of Palestine and therefore completes the consideration of the fundamental problems of the Middle East in which our Assembly is engaged this year. Thus it affords us the opportunity of considering all the aspects of this complex problem and all the elements on which the search for an over-all solution depends.

The conclusion of the Disengagement Agreements in January and May 1974, between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel respectively,²⁷¹ as well as the Agreement signed on 4 September 1975 in Geneva between Egypt and Israel,²⁷² appear, at least in the short run, to have helped to reduce tension and prevent the risk of the resumption of hostilities. They represent a significant step in the right direction.

Nonetheless, the situation in the region is still a matter for concern. The Nine appeal to all the parties concerned to give proof of the greatest moderation, in order that the search for peace may lead to further progress.

It would be tragic if the considerable gains obtained after such an arduous struggle should now be compromised. We should now enter a stage which would lead to progress in the negotiations on problems which are at the very core of the situation prevailing in the Middle East, in order to arrive at an over-all settlement.

In addition, the Nine, aware of the dangers inherent in the situation prevailing in the Lebanon, appeal to the interested parties to solve their differences. They reaffirm their profound attachment to the maintenance of the independence, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Lebanon. They express the hope that all will bear in mind the need to prevent the extension of the present crisis until it affects the whole of that region.

Because of their continued interest in the Middle East, that important region so close to Europe, the Nine believe that it is up to them to promote every possible effort likely to lead to a settlement.

On numerous occasions they have considered this question and have made known the principles, which in their view, should underlie that search.

They have done so in particular in their joint declaration of 6 November 1973,²⁷³ as well as on other occasions, and at all times they have emphasized their attachment to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council which, in their view, continue to provide the fundamental bases for a settlement.

For the Nine, those principles are the following: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; secondly, the necessity of Israel's putting an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict; thirdly, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all States in the region, including Israel, and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and fourthly, recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to the expression of their national identity, as stated by the Nine on 5 November last during the debate on the question of Palestine.²⁷⁴

For the Nine, those principles cannot be dissociated. Without excluding the possibility of achieving new partial measures likely to lead to the creation of a more favourable climate, the Nine consider that an over-all negotiating formula is necessary in order to arrive at a settlement that covers all the aspects of the problem, a settlement that alone will lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. This formula could be found in the resumption of the Geneva Conference, or in any other kind of negotiation that would meet with the support of the parties concerned.

The Nine are prepared to offer their contribution in concrete terms to such negotiations. Thus, in order to ensure the security of all the parties concerned, the peace settlement should be accompanied by sound international guarantees. Such a system of guarantees would therefore appear to be an essential element in any peace settlement. It should fall within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. The Nine, aware of the role that they might play in this context, are ready to envisage the possibility of contributing to that system of guarantees.

In the immediate future, the Nine note that the United Nations continues to carry out an important and irreplaceable task for the preservation of stability in the region that will make possible the

²⁷¹ Docs. 50 and 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

²⁷² Doc. 148 above.

²⁷³ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²⁷⁴ Doc. 177 above.

creation of a climate propitious for the pursuit of efforts for peace and a direct contribution towards such efforts.

We wish to pay a tribute to the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General, as well as to the countries providing contingents to the Force. The presence of those Forces is still essential, and we fully support them.

In conclusion, the Nine note that factors of tension in the region are still disquieting. Aware of the dangers of stagnation, they feel that peace efforts should be continued without delay. The present debate should encourage all the parties concerned to persevere along the path of negotiation, and this presupposes that account will be taken of the concerns and legitimate interests of each of the parties involved.

The objective is quite clear to the international community. It is therefore a matter of will. We hope that the General Assembly will make a balanced and constructive contribution, thus facilitating our search for a settlement. Its responsibility in this situation, so fraught with dangers, is great, and its primary duty is to avoid anything that might exacerbate passions, harden positions, increase difficulties and compromise the very complex and delicate negotiations which we all so strongly desire.

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Speech by UN Representative Herzog of Israel made in the UN General Assembly's debate on the situation in the Middle East (excerpt)²⁷⁵

New York, December 2, 1975

I cannot rise to speak in this debate without a feeling of *déjà vu*. Here is this world body again concentrating on one problem while assiduously avoiding the remainder of the unpleasant problems which affect the world today. Here again we have the prospect of racists decrying racism, of dictators disparaging dictatorship, of police States deprecating police methods, of terrorists abhorring terrorism.

Here once again we see this unbelievable

reflection of the cynical nature of the deliberations of this Assembly, which has devoted approximately 30 per cent of its time at least to an endless procession of charges and accusations against the State of Israel. It is sobering indeed to reflect how this Organization has been converted from one dealing, as it should, with improving the lot of men and women in the world, with solving the outstanding problems affecting mankind, into an Organization which spends so much time and, worst of all, wastes so much money on an issue which can only be solved by negotiation, by compromise, by agreement. The issue cannot be solved, by any stretch of imagination, by a senseless continuous outpouring of hate, vilification and vituperation which, instead of solving problems, can only exacerbate them and sharpen the divisions between the parties.

The manner in which the General Assembly is dealing with the Middle East problem is a tragedy of major international proportions. Its implications are terrifying and sinister. This body should be acting as one whose purpose is to encourage negotiations, to strive for consensus and compromise; and that is the only manner in which the Middle East problem will be resolved. Instead, this body, by allowing itself to be dominated by a group of intransigent extremists whose declared purpose is to fight against any move towards peace, is encouraging dissent instead of accord, intransigence instead of compromise, fanaticism instead of accommodation and conflict instead of peace. By taking a subject which can only be settled by compromise and bringing it to the type of discussion which we are obliged to listen to in this Assembly, the United Nations is being manoeuvred into the forefront of those elements which would sabotage every effort in the Middle East towards peace. By allowing the current process in the Middle East to develop we may achieve peace. By allowing small groups of irresponsible extremists to dictate to this Assembly, misery, hatred and destruction will be perpetuated.

Of greater consequence, perhaps, is the fact that, in addition to turning this body into a world centre of anti-Semitic prejudice, the Assembly has, by means of various resolutions which have been passed by the automatic majority, converted this body into a mechanism, to be used by those who oppose accommodation in the Middle East, whereby they can effectively sabotage any move which shows promise of a move towards peace in our

²⁷⁵ Excerpted from the English text, UN doc. A/PV.2423, pp. 46-47, 52-53, 56-57.

war-torn area. When this Organization has disappeared in infamy into the limbo of history, historians will recall that the process of disintegration and deterioration began as soon as it allowed itself to depart from the original lofty purposes for which it was created and to become the instrument for those who would block the road to peace in the Middle East. Representatives can move from Committee to Committee today and they will discover that this obsession with Israel which has been imposed upon them has become a mania which has by now perverted this Organization into the sorry picture which it presents to the world and has turned it into a body which is rapidly losing any vestige of credibility in the eyes of decent people.

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The Security Council has created a mechanism which is already beginning to show results in moving our strife-torn area towards peace and accommodation. Extreme elements in the Middle East, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), have come forward with the avowed purpose of sabotaging the existing mechanism which has been created and with the further avowed purpose of destroying the agreements which have already been reached in the Middle East. The issue before the United Nations now is whether or not it is going to allow the elements of violence, hate and intransigence to set the tone in the Middle East, or whether it will maintain the momentum which has been achieved on the basis of resolutions reached in the Security Council towards negotiation, accommodation and peace in the Middle East.

In the course of the protracted struggle in the Middle East, nothing has been achieved without negotiation. On the other hand, no negotiation has taken place without something positive being achieved. Why not, therefore, encourage the process of negotiation, which has achieved results?

Let me reiterate, so that there is no misunderstanding whatsoever: If the purpose of this and other debates is to develop a process of negotiation and maintain the momentum of negotiation without preconditions, the Government of Israel declares that it will co-operate in every way as befits a self-respecting sovereign nation. If, however, the purpose of all these exercises is merely to pass purposeless, one-sided resolutions and create

a situation whereby the Security Council or the General Assembly will attempt to impose a solution, will attempt to dictate to one or other of the parties, then,—in order to avoid misunderstandings which might arise out of the use of diplomatic parlance—let me sum up Israel's attitude to this proposition of an imposed arrangement in two very simple words: forget it. We will not be a party to any attempt to dictate to us, an attempt which has become so evident in the ridiculous propositions put forward to this Assembly and to the Security Council.

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I listened to the representatives reaffirming their Governments' oft-repeated policy supporting the rights of all States in the area to exist, including, of course, that of Israel. I should be most intrigued to know how the representatives of all the countries that support this view reconcile their statements, made doubtless in good faith, with their support for the PLO, in the light of the statements of the representative of the PLO.

I have posed this question time and again and, in the cynical traditions of this body, have received no reply. I ask it again and am only too aware of the fact that I shall receive no adequate reply. Nevertheless I repeat my question: How do they reconcile PLO policy with theirs? How do they expect us to negotiate with people whose open avowed policy is to destroy our existence?

This being the case, would it not be far wiser and far more logical to ask the representatives of the PLO whether or not they accept as a basis the resolutions laid down by the Security Council and whether they are formally prepared to renounce their declared policy calling for the destruction of a Member State of the United Nations? No country can reconcile in any way its affirmation with regard to Israel's sovereign rights with recognition of or discussion with an organization which denies the existence of those sovereign rights.

The issue is not a question of territory, it is not a question of the Palestinians, although these are both important. It is a question of change of heart in respect of Israel on the part of the Arab countries. Until that change of heart is achieved, no meaningful advance can really be attained.

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Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel reviewing his talks in London²⁷⁶

London, December 3, 1975

Q. Our friends' recent decision [as heard] at the Security Council was a difficult one. Did you discuss this issue and how was the British position explained?

A. We discussed this issue among others. The British position had been co-ordinated with the American one and we cannot protest to the British without also protesting to the Americans about the way in which the Security Council vote was carried out.

Q. Do we have a complaint in this respect against the Americans?

A. Yes, there is one, that is, to be accurate I should say that the Americans and British in general tried for a simple procedural resolution regarding the extension of the UNDOF mandate on the Golan, without any addition whatsoever. At a second stage they tried to limit additions as much as possible. However, to our detriment, they finally voted in favour of a resolution which contained one addition which was worse than all the other additions—I mean the reference to the relevant UN resolutions. The Americans and British did indeed compensate us by announcing from the Security Council rostrum that as far as they were concerned, the only relevant resolutions to this issue are Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. They had their reservations about other resolutions, particularly those made by the General Assembly. However, there is a difference between a Security Council resolution and a Security Council announcement. I thought that both the Americans and the British should not have (?given) their hand—even going as far as threatening or announcing a veto if these words were included, which are liable to be misinterpreted and encumber the peace process in the Middle East with grave difficulties.

Q. Jim Callaghan has just returned from a nine-day tour of several Arab states. He came out there with several

²⁷⁶ Interview conducted by Haggay Pinsker and broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5077/A/2-3; reprinted by permission. Allon was in London December 2-3, 1975.

very, very enthusiastic declarations about Britain's chances of doing good business with the Arab countries. Will this influence Britain's relation or relations with Israel?

A. I hope with all my heart that Britain will be able to do good business with the Arab countries, as long as this business is limited to economic, scientific, educational, social developments and not be carried out through the supply of arms.

Q. But the point in question, in fact, is a supply of arms in large quantities, mainly Jaguar aircraft, for reasons which are mainly economic.

A. Well, as of this minute no arms have been ordered, no planes have been ordered and no commitment has been given for their supply on Britain's part.

Q. But there are serious considerations.

A. I do not know what will happen when the Arab countries—if and when they should want such arms. The British are not sure about this and neither am I. However, if such a possibility indeed arises, a danger exists that a serious debate will flare up between us and our West European friends—be it France or Britain. At this very minute there are no discussions of arms deals of the kind mentioned.

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Declaration adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Countries at the UN condemning Israel's attack on Lebanon²⁷⁷

New York, December 4, 1975

The Co-ordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Countries in the United Nations (New York) condemns most strongly the vicious and terrorist Israeli air raids against defenceless villages and Palestinian refugee camps, killing many innocent civilians, women, children and elderly persons, which constitutes a new brazen act of aggression against Lebanon, a peaceful and non-aligned country, and a further act of violent persecution of the Palestinian population.

In undertaking this violent and provocative action—particularly at a time when there is a significant forward movement, reflected in the

²⁷⁷ Text transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by the Permanent UN Representative of Algeria in UN doc. S/11897.

adoption of Security Council resolution 381 (1975) (which was proposed by the non-aligned members of the Council), in according the PLO its rightful place in all efforts for peace in the Middle East—Israel has once again demonstrated its stubborn and persistent refusal to join the international community in seeking a lasting and just settlement of the crisis.

Its acts of aggression are dangerously increasing tension in the region, directly threatening international peace and security—and have rightly met with general outrage and condemnation in the world.

The Co-ordinating Committee urges that the international community, the United Nations, and all peace-keeping countries, undertake necessary measures to effectively make Israel desist from repetition of its aggressive acts and to comply forthwith with the United Nations resolution.

It asks the Security Council to condemn this act of aggression and to take steps to restrain Israel from pursuing its policy of launching attacks on its neighbours and terrorizing the Palestinian refugees.

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Final declaration of the Conference of Jewish Solidarity²⁷⁸

Jerusalem, December 5, 1975

We have come to Jerusalem to give expression to the devotion of the Jewish people to Zion and its solidarity with the State of Israel.

We reject categorically the resolution adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the initiative of the enemies of Israel and their supporters, which impugn the right of our people to national independence in the Land of Israel.

The historic right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is inalienable.

We declare that the resolution of the UN Assembly condemning Zionism, the national revival and liberation movement of the Jewish people, constitutes a violation of elementary rights and justice, and is null and void.

In Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, we pledge ourselves to stand by the State of Israel with all our heart and soul, and to help it to fulfil its

historic mission in the return to Zion, in immigration and absorption, in the settlement of the Land, and in the fostering of Jewish and universal values.

In the face of the campaign of baseless slander and calumny, we shall intensify our efforts to deepen the unbreakable bond of the Jewish people with its spiritual heritage and its historic homeland.

We shall work to strengthen Israel's power to defend its independence and we shall support its efforts to establish a lasting peace with its neighbours.

We, representatives of Jewish communities and organizations from all parts of the Diaspora and spokesmen of the State of Israel, set our hands in witness to this declaration at the closing session of the Conference of Jewish Solidarity in Jerusalem, on this day, Sabbath eve, the 1st of Tevet, 5735, the 5th of December 1975.

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Press communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministry of Sweden explaining Sweden's support for PLO participation in the Security Council debate on Israel's raids on Lebanon²⁷⁹

Stockholm, December 5, 1975

The Security Council yesterday started a debate regarding the complaints from Lebanon, Egypt and Syria concerning Israeli air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon. The Council decided by vote that the PLO should be invited to participate in the debate. The result of the vote was 9 votes for (Sweden, non-aligned countries, East European states), 3 votes against (USA, United Kingdom and Costa Rica) and three abstentions (France, Italy and Japan).

Sweden's vote for the participation of the PLO in the debate does not imply a change of Sweden's Middle East policy. We have in the past supported proposals to invite the PLO to participate in debates in the United Nations concerning the Middle East problem. Our attitude to this matter was made clear i.a. in the discussions of the United Nations and in the Swedish Riksdag in the autumn of 1974.

In Sweden's opinion the PLO is the most authoritative representative of the Palestinian

²⁷⁸ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, December 7, 1975, p. 2.

²⁷⁹ English text supplied, on request, by the Swedish embassy in Beirut.

Arabs. This people must be represented in the debates of the United Nations concerning the future of the Middle East. This view is based upon the conviction that all parties directly affected by the conflict must be heard if a peaceful solution shall be reached.

Sweden's attitude in this matter does not imply a Swedish position on the political programme of the PLO. Sweden disagrees with many points in that programme. This, however, does not prevent us from voicing the opinion that the Palestinian Arabs must be heard.

A few days ago the Security Council decided to prolong the mandate for the UN forces on the Golan heights. In this connection the President of the Council said that the majority of the members of the Council supported the idea of a debate concerning the Middle East in January to which the PLO should be invited to participate. Sweden then made it clear that we supported the idea that such a debate should be held and that the PLO should be invited to participate in this debate. The decision of the Council was accepted unanimously with the exception of China and Irak who did not take part in the vote. The United States declared that the statement of the President concerning an invitation to the PLO did not have American support. Our vote yesterday in the UN concerning the participation of the PLO in the present debate of the Council is an expression of the same line as we took a few days ago.

The rules of procedure of the Security Council give an opportunity to invite states as well as individuals. On Swedish request the rule of procedure referring to invitation of a state was not used, since Sweden does not regard the PLO as a state.

The present debate in the UN is mainly about the question of Israeli air raids against Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In this debate Sweden will criticize the Israeli acts but will also protest against violence practised by other parties in the Middle East conflict, among them the PLO.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Fischer of East Germany (excerpts)²⁸⁰

Damascus, December 8, 1975

Oskar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, visited the Syrian Arab Republic from 5 to 8 December 1975 at the invitation of Abdul Halim Khaddam, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of the SAR.

Both foreign ministers attached particular importance to their exchange of views on questions involved in solving the Middle East conflict. They agreed that as a result of the policy of the aggressive circles in Israel and their imperialist allies, no basic question of the conflict has thus far been settled. Oskar Fischer and Abdul Halim Khaddam stressed that partial steps on a separate basis do not serve the settlement of the problem. They only favour the attempts by imperialism and the ruling circles of Israel to delay a solution of the conflict.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR highly appreciated the consistent policy of the Syrian Arab Republic aimed at a general solution of the conflict. He assured the government and the people of Syria of the support and solidarity of the GDR in the anti-imperialist struggle for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Both foreign ministers agreed that a stable peace in the Middle East can only be achieved by the withdrawal of the aggressor Israel from all Arab areas occupied since 1967 and by a guarantee of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to the creation of its own state. Abdul Halim Khaddam, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SAR, stressed the great importance of close cooperation with the USSR and the other countries in the socialist community in implementing these basic demands.

²⁸⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XVI, 1 (January 13, 1976), p. 4.

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel criticizing the Security Council decision to invite the PLO's participation in its debates and rejecting an imposed settlement²⁸¹

Jerusalem, December 8, 1975

Q. Did Washington put unreasonable pressure on Israel to swallow the U.N. Security Council deal allowing the PLO to take part in next month's Middle East debate?²⁸²

A. There was no pressure. But I think the U.S. fails to realize that the Syrians and the Soviets have embarked on a collision course with the basic policies of the United States and Israel—and, I believe, of Egypt, too. That basic policy was to bring about negotiations between the parties based on U.N. Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973 and in the context of the Geneva conference. The Syrian-Soviet strategy is to prevent these negotiations with new resolutions in the Security Council. Why? Because the interim agreement with Egypt was in conflict with the Syrian extremist position against Israel and because the Soviets thought it would further reduce their influence in the Arab world . . . Unless you understand what lies behind the strategy you will not see the forest for the trees.

Q. Has the U.S. breached or violated an understanding with Israel to coordinate diplomatic tactics and strategy?

A. There was no actual breach. But the latest resolution runs contrary to the common strategy agreed to by the U.S. and Israel. For the last eight years the U.S. had blocked what it has now allowed to happen. We had always agreed that there would be no imposed settlement. The so-called PLO's participation in next month's council debate—as if the Palestinian issue was the key, which it is not—only serves the strategy of sabotaging the whole process of negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. To the best of my knowledge, there is no change in the U.S. position, but I hope Washington realizes that the Syrian-Soviet-PLO maneuver in the council next month will be to come up with a resolution that will be tantamount to an imposed solution.

²⁸¹ Partial text of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Jay Axelbank, *Newsweek* (New York-International edition), December 15, 1975, pp. 22–23.

²⁸² Doc. 12 above.

Q. Do you perceive a change in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians?

A. I have no reason to doubt that the U.S. will continue to refuse diplomatic contacts and negotiations with the PLO as long as it doesn't recognize the right of Israel to exist and accept [Resolutions] 242 and 338.

Q. If the PLO does come around to recognizing Israel's legitimacy and permanency, would Israel then permit the creation of a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state?

A. I don't believe the PLO can really change its position apart from lip-service to our existence. They are not going to abandon their objective of a secular state in a greater Palestine because they would then lose their *raison d'être*. Basic to their philosophy is that Jews have no right to a state of their own, and that their own state should be erected on the ruins of the Israeli state. In any event, I don't believe we should change our policy on the Palestinian issue, [which is that the Palestinian question] is not the key to a Mideast solution. Only when the Arab states decide to reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel, and to sign peace treaties with us, will peace be achieved. And it is in the context of these peace treaties that we must solve the Palestinian issue. This can only be done in negotiations with Jordan. We will flatly refuse any attempt to detach the Palestinian problem from Jordan. There will never be room for a third state between Israel and Jordan. Therefore, I don't see any room for political negotiations with Palestinians.

Q. Israel is now trying to promote some limited form of Palestinian home rule on the West Bank, but local leaders say the proposed autonomy is fictitious; they won't have the right to veto new Israeli settlements and the right to raise their own taxes. How much autonomy are you willing to give them?

A. There is no government decision about home rule. But we did decide to allow free, democratic elections for all the municipalities in the West Bank. We want to give them more freedom to run their municipal affairs under our military government.

Q. In view of Syria's diplomatic success and Egypt's diplomatic isolation, do you think Egypt will now be tempted to adopt a more militant stance?

A. If the U.S. gives in to the Soviet-Syrian strategy, then you can be sure there will be stag-

nation that might lead to war in the Mideast sooner than many people seem to realize.

Q. The Syrians tried to regain diplomatic momentum by linking the United Nations peacekeeping mandate on the Golan Heights to a solution to the Palestinian problem. Why is that "blackmail," as you called it?

A. Because bringing it to the Security Council deviates from the basic principle that everything has to be discussed on a bilateral basis. A Security Council debate on the entire conflict mixes up all the issues, and by trying to come up with one, comprehensive, over-all, imposed solution, you will wreck any chance of a settlement. It's the best way to increase tension and provoke another war.

Q. Assad has told Newsweek that Golan is not the problem and that even if Israel returns the entire Syrian area now occupied, it will not advance the solution to the core of the problem—the Palestinians.²⁸³

A. It's a good pretext to refuse the road to peace. That's the real motivation. I would go further. If they could ever get a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state—which we will never accept—they know it would be much, much easier for the next phase: the destruction of Israel.

Q. Resolution 242 treats the Palestinians as a mere refugee problem. Why do you object to an amendment—or a new resolution—that would recognize that they also have political rights?

A. I am not saying that the Palestinians don't have any rights. What I'm saying is that those rights can only be asserted in a negotiated settlement with Jordan. As for the Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, there should be a solution—but only as refugees.

Q. In other words, keep it a refugee problem?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you think new and expanded Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are an appropriate answer to the U.N. Security Council vote?

A. It's part of our answer.

Q. But why is it appropriate?

A. First, to make it clear to the Syrians that even in the context of a real peace we will not go down from the Golan Heights, though that doesn't

mean we have to stick to the present lines. Second, to strengthen our presence there in view of the threats that might now come up between Syria and Israel. Third, to signal the Syrians that our resolve is not weakening.

Q. Assad told Newsweek in September, after the Sinai accords, that Palestinian commandos were free to launch guerrilla raids into Israel from Syrian territory.²⁸⁴ Does your statement that Syria will be held responsible mean that it will become a target for Israeli air raids as Lebanon now is?

A. Under our disengagement agreement with Syria, with all its attachments, we consider that Syria took upon itself the responsibility to prevent terrorist groups from penetrating the present cease-fire lines. This agreement can be maintained only as long as this undertaking is respected. And if terrorist penetration continues, we will cope with it in an appropriate manner.

Q. Some of your colleagues favor a change in Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians. They want negotiations with any group that recognizes Israel and abandons terrorism. Why isn't that reasonable?

A. Israel is a free country and everyone can say whatever he thinks. I don't agree with them because when you agree to political negotiations with a Palestinian element, it means you begin to accept a third state between Israel and Jordan. Such a state would be a cancer in the heart of the Mideast. It would be a weak state, run by extremists whose dream would remain the annihilation of Israel, and the first foreigners to come there would be the Soviets.

Such a state would also be 10 miles from Tel Aviv. Even their short-range rockets could reach all our populated centers. And if the Soviets put SAM missiles there, they could interdict all our civilian and military flights. Terrorism would spread all over Israel. This is something no Israeli could tolerate. And no doubt the whole Arab world would be dragged into a struggle for the fulfillment of Mr. Arafat's dream. Therefore, Israel cannot accept as a matter of principle—unless Israel decides to commit suicide—the creation of an independent Palestinian state between us and Jordan.

Q. So even if the PLO stated its willingness to

²⁸³ See *Newsweek* (New York-international edition), March 3, 1975, p. 10.

²⁸⁴ Doc. 301 below.

negotiate on the basis of recognition of—and peaceful coexistence with—Israel, it wouldn't change your viewpoint?

A. We will never negotiate with the so-called PLO. Admittedly, we are quite isolated. But . . . we must stick to what we believe, regardless of what others might think. The purpose of our enemies is our destruction and we have to conduct a policy knowing that we are still at war after 27 years and that this war might last another 27 years.

Q. Where do we go from here—if anywhere?

A. The impatience of many political leaders outside the area—and of the media—betrays illusions about shortcuts. There aren't any. As long as the leaders of the three-Arab confrontation states don't sit down to negotiate peace treaties with Israel, the state of war will continue, as it has for the last generation.

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Speech by UN Ambassador Moynihan of the US proposing amendments to a UN Security Council draft resolution on the Palestine question²⁸⁵

New York, December 8, 1975

At the outset of this present debate in the Security Council concerning the complaints of Lebanon and Egypt about Israeli raids into Lebanon, the United States spoke briefly but, we hope, consistently—consistent with a position we have maintained throughout the long and often heartbreaking duration of this conflict, which is nearly coeval with the existence of the United Nations itself; and we stated that we considered that all loss of innocent human life was reprehensible and that we were prepared

to deplore, in strong terms, such loss of life, whether it occurred from the acts of Governments or from the acts of organized groups. We made no distinction—as, indeed, no distinction could be made with respect to value or worth—between the loss of the life of a Lebanese child and the loss of the life of an Israeli, or Syrian, or Egyptian child. We asked on that occasion if it were not possible for the Council to join in this perception which all of us share. None of us around this Council table think otherwise; none of the nations or organizations represented at this table would share a different view. We said that:

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolution which registers the strongest disapproval by this Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of innocent civilians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotiations. (1860th meeting, p. 6)

Now, we said that in our capacity as a member of the Council, but I think it will be granted that ours is a special concern in this regard, owing simply to the fact that we are the member of the Council which is seeking, in the role of mediator, to bring about peace. We are trying to mediate this seemingly unending conflict, and we cannot see the role of mediator as in any way advanced by a one-sided resolution, a resolution which would persuade one or another party that an imbalance had occurred, that an injustice was being done. It is the even-handedness of the United Nations, just as it is the even-handedness of the mediator, that bears any promise of success.

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Deploring Israel's defiance of these resolutions,

Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security Council resolutions,

Convinced that Israeli massive air attacks against Lebanon were premeditative in nature,

1. *Strongly condemns* the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and of Security Council resolutions;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks against Lebanon;

3. *Issues once again* a solemn warning to Israel that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would have to consider taking appropriate steps and measures to give effect to its decisions.

The draft was vetoed by the US at the same meeting, with Costa Rica abstaining and all other members in favour (UN doc. S/PV 1862, p. 63).

²⁸⁵ Made before the Security Council; English text, UN Doc. S/PV 1862, pp. 27–32. The amendments, which did not receive the approval of the Council, were made to the following draft resolution, presented by Cameroon, Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania and Tanzania (UN doc. S/11898):

The Security Council,

Having considered the question inscribed in its agenda at the 1859th meeting,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Egypt (S/11893);

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization,

In the past, this Council has seen and understood and acted upon this fundamental requirement of responsible behaviour, to wit, the requirement of even-handedness and balance. The most recent occasion on which a Security Council draft resolution of this kind had been before us was in April of 1974, when we adopted resolution 347 (1974), in a context not dissimilar from the present context: violence and counter-violence; violence, counter-violence and then violence counter to that. It is not new to human history, certainly not to that of the Middle East.

On that occasion the Security Council acted in a manner which was resolute but fair, concrete but balanced. Resolution 347 (1974) was adopted by 13 votes to none in opposition—such that the whole of the Council may be said to have approved that course of action; and nothing, a year and a half later, should suggest to us that there was anything imprudent about what we did.

On the contrary, it stands as an example of responsible behaviour seeking effective results. We all know this. There is no Government at this table that does not know this, and it is not required of me to do anything more than to say what we also all know, which is that the draft resolution before us is not balanced; it will not be perceived as fair; it will not advance the cause of peace. To that extent it cannot be seen as responsible.

We speak not just as a Government, but as a Government seeking to bring peace in the role of mediator. That is our role in the Middle East. It is never an easy one. We find ourselves called upon to make pleas to you for perspective and balance in a matter and at a time in which we fully understand that there are Governments at this table that do not feel balanced at the moment. And we can understand why they would not. Yet we, as mediators, say: "Even so, it is not the moment that matters, it is the progress we are making towards a just and lasting peace; and the question is, will the action we take today add to that progress, encourage it, facilitate it, or will it do otherwise?"

Therefore, the United States, the mediator country, would like to suggest two simple amendments to the draft resolution before us. We have asked the Secretariat to circulate the amendments without delay. I am sure it is doing its very best, as it always does—and here indeed they are.

Now, these are not unfamiliar amendments.

On the contrary, the language will be familiar to you, Mr. President, and to a number—to most, in fact—of the members of the Council, for the very simple reason that most of the members of this Council have already voted for them. These amendments have won the approval of every permanent member of this Council; they won the approval of all the members elected to the Council who were here last year, and they won the approval of all other elected members who were there at that time, with the exception of one permanent and one elected member that chose not to participate in the vote. But with respect to all the participating nations, the vote was unanimous.

The amendments read simply. The United States would add to our present draft resolution, which has three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a fifth. The fourth paragraph would read:

4. *Condemns* all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;

The fifth paragraph would read:

5. *Calls upon* all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

I repeat, these are operative paragraphs which the Security Council has already voted upon; it did so in a similar situation—or a not dissimilar situation—a year and a half ago. There is no one present at this table who opposed those paragraphs.

The purpose of the fourth paragraph, very simply, would be to provide balance as to those acts which we condemn, reflecting nothing more than our true feelings and our stated position, that we condemn all acts of violence. I cannot imagine that any Government would not be willing to condemn and deplore violence which leads to the loss of innocent lives; and I simply point out that there is not a Government at this table which did otherwise when faced with the possibility—more than the possibility, the necessity—of doing so a year and a half ago.

Finally, the fifth operative paragraph would call upon all parties to refrain from any action that would endanger the negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I remind you, those negotiations have not failed in the year and a half since the relevant resolution was adopted; on the contrary, extraordinarily difficult, dense, but in the end successful,

negotiation has brought conditions of peace, the absence of violence, and stability to the Sinai, and similar efforts are soon to be undertaken, we cannot doubt, with respect to the Syrian-Israeli border, and the relations of those two States.

In those circumstances, in the name of sanity, in the name of peace, the United States proposes these amendments and asks, Mr. President, for a vote thereon.

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Resolution of the Assembly of the World Council of Churches regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict²⁸⁶

Nairobi, early December, 1975

1. The World Council of Churches has expressed concern regarding the situation in the Middle East on previous occasions. Events which have occurred in the area during the meeting of the Fifth Assembly in Nairobi have demonstrated anew that tensions persist there unabated.

2. We are concerned at the continued escalation of military power in the area which can only aggravate the threat to world peace from the unresolved conflict and stress the necessity for the great world powers to cease furnishing arms that maintain and aggravate tension.

3. We recognize that an international consensus has emerged as the basis for peaceful settlement on the following:

a) Withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967.

b) The right of all states including Israel and the Arab states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

c) The implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

We are encouraged that the parties to the conflict seem to be progressively willing to accept these principles.

4. We recognize the Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement²⁸⁷ as a means of reducing tension between Egypt and Israel. However, since it is not addressed to the fears and distrust among

Israel, other neighbouring states, and the Palestinian people, this Agreement must be followed soon by resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference for reaching a total settlement on the basis of the principles mentioned above. The Geneva Conference should necessarily involve all parties concerned, including the Palestinians.

5. We note that some Arab states have recently declared their readiness, with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to seek agreement with Israel based upon these principles.

6. Although the parties have not trusted one another sufficiently until now to engage in dialogue, full mutual recognition by the parties must be seen not as a precondition to, but rather as a product of the negotiation. We call upon all parties to take those steps essential to negotiations with hope for success. Among these steps, we emphasize the cessation of all military activity, both regular and irregular, including terrorism.

7. Peace in the Middle East must be based upon justice and security for all concerned. The well-being of each party depends upon the well-being of all other parties. We urge the churches to help their constituencies to have more accurate information on and more sensitive awareness of the various dimensions of the Middle East conflict. The churches could thus help to promote mutual trust among the parties and to develop a responsible involvement in peaceful solution on the part of their members and the governments of their countries. This opportunity is open to churches within the area and the churches outside the area as well.

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Resolution of the Assembly of the World Council of Churches regarding the status of Jerusalem²⁸⁸

Nairobi, early December, 1975

1. For many millions of Christians throughout the world, as well as for the adherents of the two great sister monotheistic religions, namely Judaism and Islam, Jerusalem continues to be a focus of

²⁸⁶ English text as published in *Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism* (London), no. 46 (February, 1976), p. 8. The Assembly met November 23–December 10.

²⁸⁷ Doc. 148 above.

²⁸⁸ English text as published in *Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism* (London), no. 46 (February 1976), pp. 8–9. The Assembly met November 23–December 10.

deepest religious inspiration and attachment. It is therefore their responsibility to cooperate in the creation of conditions that will ensure that Jerusalem is a city open to the adherents of all three religions, where they can meet and live together. The tendency to minimize Jerusalem's importance for any of these three religions should be avoided.

2. The special legislation regulating the relationship of the Christian communities and the authorities, guaranteed by international treaties (Paris 1856 and Berlin 1878) and the League of Nations and known as the Status Quo of the Holy Places, must be fully safeguarded and confirmed in any agreement concerning Jerusalem. Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem and neighbouring areas belong to the greatest extent to member churches of the WCC. On the basis of the Status Quo none of the church authorities of a given denomination could represent unilaterally and on behalf of all Christians the Christian point of view, each church authority of a given denomination representing only its own point of view.

3. Many member churches of the WCC are deeply concerned about the Christian Holy Places. However, the question of Jerusalem is not only a matter of protection of the Holy Places, it is organically linked with living faiths and communities of people in the Holy City. Therefore the General Assembly deems it essential that the Holy Shrines should not become mere monuments of visitation, but should serve as living places of worship integrated and responsive to Christian communities who continue to maintain their life and roots within the Holy City and for those who out of religious attachments want to visit them.

4. While recognizing the complexity and emotional implications of the issues surrounding the future status of Jerusalem, the General Assembly believes that such status has to be determined within the general context of the settlement of the Middle East conflict in its totality.

5. However, the Assembly thinks that apart from any politics, the whole settlement of the inter-religious problem of the Holy Places should take place under an international aegis and guarantee which ought to be respected by the parties concerned as well as the ruling authorities.

6. The General Assembly recommends that the above should be worked out with the most directly concerned member churches, as well as with the Roman Catholic Church. These issues

should also become subjects for dialogue with Jewish and Muslim counterparts.

7. The Assembly expresses its profound hope and fervent prayers for the peace and welfare of the Holy City and all its inhabitants.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (excerpts)²⁸⁹

Brussels, December 12, 1975

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 11 and 12 December, 1975.

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7. Ministers reviewed developments in the Mediterranean area since their last meeting. They expressed concern at the possible dangers of new tensions that could affect the balance of forces in this region. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to the continuation of efforts designed to achieve an overall settlement resulting in a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. They requested the Council to keep this question under review and to report back to them again at the next meeting.

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Television interview statements by Defence Minister Peres of Israel defending Israel's policy in the occupied territories and towards the PLO²⁹⁰

December 14, 1975

Herman: Mr. Peres, Prime Minister Rabin says that Israel will never sit down in the United Nations with the Palestine Liberation Organization; Secretary Kissinger

²⁸⁹ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1907 (January 12, 1976), pp. 57, 58.

²⁹⁰ Interview conducted by Richard C. Hottelet, Rowland Evans and George Herman for CBS's "Face the Nation"; transcript supplied, on request, by CBS. Copyright © CBS Inc. 1975.

says it ought to sit down as part of the debate; how is it going to come out? What will happen?

Peres: Probably, I believe, in the coming Security Council meeting, which is January 12, Israel won't participate, because unfortunately it was added to the renewal of the armed forces in Syria, by the Syrian pressing upon Israel, and I don't see any reason or any good that may come out of us being there.

Herman: *You think you may suffer from your absence? The PLO being there?*

Peres: I don't think so. I think Israel has nothing to gain, and may I say furthermore that the United Nations became, from our point of view, a real problem, because it takes such strong and extreme positions, which doesn't enable the Arabs to be more moderate or lenient.

Herman: *Mr. Minister, do your remarks about what is happening in the United Nations presage any kind of a change in Israel's attitude toward the UN?*

Peres: No, not basically. I mean we are going to remain members of the United Nations, but we can see with great regret and sorrow the new role that the majority of the United Nations is playing, I believe contrary to its own aims and hopes.

Evans: *Mr. Minister, Prime Minister Rabin said last week in an interview with Newsweek Magazine, and I quote, there will never be room for a third state between Israel and Jordan, unquote.²⁹¹ By what right does Israel lay down such preconditions and such political barriers to possible solutions in the Middle East?*

Peres: Well, Israel is deciding on our own methods, and for us a third state may mean the difference between security and insecurity, I wouldn't like to say death and life, because if we shall have a third state between Jordan and Israel, it will be a real problem for both of us, for the Jordanians and the Israelis. Such a state will be oriented upon Soviet Russia, we'll have Russian arms, their missiles, their guns will menace our parliament, our populated areas, and in addition to that, they may transfer the Fatah bases from Lebanon to the West Bank, making life almost impossible for all of us. So we're not just passing a judgment in the blue air; we are dealing with a problem very close to our homes and lives.

Hottelet: *But, Mr. Peres, this is a premise that you yourself set up. Need it inevitably be so, or with the whole world really intent on setting up some kind of stable peace in the Middle East, is it not possible and is it not preferable to look around for some way in which a balanced structure, a political structure of peace, can be created, in which you and the people with whom hopefully you will live for the next thousand years can find some reconciliation of what are now very sharp differences?*

Peres: I completely agree with you, about the need for peace, about a necessity to enable the Palestinians to live their own life, and furthermore I am convinced that such a structure can be established, if we shall look good enough at the facts. I for one feel that when you have two people living on the very same land, you can either divide the land and have partition, or divide the government and have federation. There are federal states all over the world, including the United States of America, if you wish. So in the long run, I believe the federation is the right solution for the Palestinians and ourselves.

Hottelet: *But at the moment what you are doing is standing pat. You are standing pat on strong armaments, you're not coming to the Security Council even to discuss the possibility of peace with the PLO, you say you will never negotiate with the PLO. Most of the world, most of the countries of the world, accept the PLO as the legitimate representative spokesman of the Palestinian people. Why don't you, who for many years called for unconditional negotiations with the Arabs, now sit down to unconditional discussions at least with the PLO to see if a structure of peace may not be achievable?*

Peres: You know, sir, there is an optical error. We do meet with the Palestinians on a daily basis. There are a million and a half Palestinians living together with us on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We meet weekly, almost daily, with the mayors who are elected, who represent the people; we talk, we discuss, and there are many changes taking place in the area itself. I mean the PLO, after all, if you look at it really seriously and deeply, it is a coalition of six different armed parties. They were never elected; this is the only liberation movement that lives outside the place they want to liberate; they don't have discipline. If you will conclude an agreement with Arafat, Jordan won't follow suit, he will continue to shoot and fight. You know, from time to time, the world becomes a prisoner of a mood or a slogan or a generality.

²⁹¹ Doc. 204 above.

Unfortunately we must look with open eyes to the reality as it is.

Evans: Mr. Minister, let me try this from another standpoint then. You say you do believe in self-determination on the West Bank, but self-determination would not result in a PLO government; that's what you're saying, correct?

Peres: In a way, yes.

Evans: Now let's take the Golan Heights. You said to the world that you had to have security for your northern Galilee because of the Syrian bombardment from the Heights, so you scaled the Heights and you took the Heights and the city of Kuneitra. Now you are putting new settlements, sir, on the Heights to protect your presence on the Heights, and this seems to be a process of absorption that could be endless. How do you answer that, sir?

Peres: You know, in the last two years, Israel made three agreements, two with the Egyptians, one with the Syrians. We gave back land for something which wasn't really tangible, not clear. We hoped very much to continue to negotiate with the Syrians in a meaningful way. Instead the Syrians stopped it, and they say, gentlemen, it is not the Israeli-Syrian issue at stake, but the Palestinian one. And what we really wanted to tell the Syrians is either or—or go towards peace, or we shall establish facts.

Evans: But, sir, you are also establishing facts on the West Bank, are you not, with the creation of new settlements there? You say you will not negotiate with the PLO on the West Bank, and you have never been willing to negotiate with King Hussein on the West Bank. Again, sir, I see a contradiction of purpose.

Peres: Well, nothing like it. If I want to answer in a polemic way, I would say why can't there be Jewish settlements on the West Bank even if the West Bank won't be a part of the Jewish state? You can have a Jewish settlement, but I want to answer more seriously than that. There are dynamics, not just on our part, but on their part as well. It is not just that we are building settlements on the West Bank, but that the Arab people are building a great deal of houses and settlements within Israel.

Evans: Within Israel?

Peres: Within the old Israel, so to speak, in the vicinity of Jerusalem. You know, only around Jerusalem the Arab people built last year close to 6,000 homes.

Evans: But they are Israeli citizens?

Peres: No, some of them are West Bank—

Evans: In old Israel?

Peres: Pardon?

Evans: In old Israel, pre-'67 Israel?

Peres: Well, in the vicinity of Jerusalem.

Evans: But not pre-'67 Israel?

Peres: Yes. Well, part of it, which is today Israel, and part of it in Israel itself, Israeli citizens—I mean, what I want to say is there is an uninterrupted movement and building, and nobody can stop history and say let's wait for a wise world, or for a single solution. Then may I again say that we were willing to negotiate with King Hussein, a person that we respect very much, and probably is a trustworthy man. The king really wanted us to withdraw from a part of the West Bank, but unfortunately he couldn't give us anything in return, politically. Now there is no sense that just Israel will move geographically and the Arabs will maintain their hostile policies. Again, we shall narrow our land and we shall be at war under worse conditions.

Hottelet: Mr. Peres, Israel's policy now, a policy of defense and strength, imposes what seems to be a crushing burden on a small country, a country with a population less than half that of the City of New York with a defense budget for the coming year of some five billion dollars, buying F-15's at the cost of \$24 million a plane, every able-bodied man in Israel serving 90 days in the army. How long can you go on with the deficits, with the declining standard of living that all this entails? Is the price not too high? Shouldn't there be some other way?

Peres: That's the problem. Do we have an alternative? You know, the history of the Jewish people is a trial in two ways, living outside our own country, and then one tragedy chased another tragedy. Then living in our own country, and making a supreme effort to protect ourself and defend ourself. It is difficult, I admit. It is costly, unfortunately, but deep in my heart, I believe two things—a) that we can face it, and b) in spite of all the pessimism we shall have peace sooner or later with the Arabs.

Hottelet: Many countries, including even Syria and the Soviet Union, Egypt, Arab countries, European countries, have suggested another way. They have said that if Israel says it will live within the borders of 1967,

that is to say, before the June war of '67, that then they will join in creating a system of peace in which Israel will get the protection I mean, nothing is one hundred per cent safe in human life—but it will get the protection of international acceptance.

Peres: You know, the story is sophisticated, the experience is growing. Let's not forget that up to '67, Israel was within her '67 frontiers and yet we never had peace, because even if we shall return to the '67 frontiers, I'm sure that the PLO, all of them or part of them, will continue to demand that the whole of Israel will become the so-called secular and democratic state, namely Moslem state, and we won't have peace again. May I say, I know that this fact is not well known, but immediately after the Six Day War, the government of Israel officially suggested to the United States government and to the Arab countries that we are ready to return to the international frontiers of '67 on the Syrian and Egyptian front against a complete and full-fledged peace. This was rejected.

Hottelet: *But things have changed and the Arabs now, who rejected it then, indeed seem now to be prepared to accept it. Why not pick them up?*

Peres: Things have changed but not in the only direction that you are mentioning. Today there are 21 Arab states. I wouldn't say, for example, that Libya is an outstandingly peace-loving nation. I can't say that Syria is such a nation. I mean, when it comes to hostility, there is an Arab bloc. When it comes to peace, you have 21 different opinions of 21 Arab states.

Herman: *How is it, then, that you are able to say, as you did a moment ago, that you are confident that sooner or later we shall have peace? Who is going to bring it? Who is going to negotiate it? Who is going to lead the way? Is it you?*

Peres: Well, we shall take part in it. I would like to remain, as I should, modest, because we are a tiny little country, but I shall tell you who—the people themselves. You know, when I'm looking to the Egyptian situation, the growth of population, the emigration from rural to urban areas, the rise of expectations, more and more Egyptians will begin to ask why continue and waste money and human life on war? And as a matter of fact, this is probably one of the reasons why we had already two agreements with the Egyptians, and I do hope we shall have a third one.

Herman: *You think the tensions and the hatreds which have led to the war will simply wither under changes in the culture and society of the countries around you?*

Peres: Yes, I think that when an army is running a nation, you are in trouble—

Herman: *But is it necessary for Israel—for your country—to take any action to make sure this happens, or do you just sit there and wait for it to come to you?*

Peres: Oh, yes sir. We have to take plenty of action, but we must measure the atmosphere so we won't waste our opportunity to negotiate meaningfully for peace.

Evans: *Mr. Minister—*

Peres: I'm sorry—

Evans: *Excuse me, sir.*

Peres: I want just to add one point. I mean, we are ready to give most of the territories back. You know there is no country that was attacked four times in a quarter of a century and three times already made withdrawals from the complete Sinai desert. We are ready to do it again—not from the complete but from most of it—if we shall be able to get in turn a meaningful peace, or alternatively we have also, however, suggested the end of the state of belligerency. This, unfortunately again was refused.

Evans: *Mr. Minister, just for the record, in 1956, it was my recollection that Israel made a deal with the French and the British to invade Egypt. I don't remember the Egyptians attacking Israel.*

Peres: Well, you have some problems with your memory, and I shall try to straighten you out on that—

Evans: *We have a disagreement on that. Let me ask you—*

Peres: No, no. I must return to it. Up to 1956, the headquarters of the Fatah were the Gaza strip, penetrating our country, killing our children and women, taking our homes—I don't know what you call war.

Evans: *Senator McGovern said last week, I do not think the Israelis can sustain their position of not dealing with the PLO. Now he has a reputation of being a fairly good friend of Israel, as many of his Democratic friends do, and most politicians in this country. But in view of that statement, and many other politicians feel the same way, do you see any possibility that if the PLO*

said we will recognize the existence and sovereignty of Israel, under which you could sit down and negotiate with the PLO?

Peres: You know, it's a little bit strange to listen to such a question. Suppose I should ask you if Mao Tse-tung will become a Republican. Will you vote for him?

Evans: Well, sir—

Peres: There is something deep in the structure, in the nature of things. We, I repeat, we are ready to talk with any and all Palestinians about every possible subject, day and night. We don't want to be shot or killed by the PLO. If the PLO would come back to Israel, stay there as a million and a half Arab people are doing, stop shooting, and trying to look for peace, then they won't be PLO, and you won't have a question and I won't have to answer it.

Evans: Well, then your answer would be yes, we would sit down and speak with the body that now calls it itself PLO?

Peres: Then there wouldn't be a body like that. What is the body? It's a coalition of six armed parties, undisciplined, getting money from Libya, Iraq, and Syria, getting arms from the Russians. We are talking about something which exists, and Israel.

Hottelet: Mr. Minister, you said that the people will really be the key to peace, provide the momentum to peace. There is considerable political ferment in Israel today over the question of negotiation with the PLO, or the Palestinians, over the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, over this unfortunate raid into Lebanon, which from here looks like a political disaster. There is concern about the erosion of American political support for the Israeli position. The government hangs by a hair in the— a majority of one, is it, in the Knesset. Do you think the time has come in Israel for new elections, to take a new reading of the political desires and political strength of the various currents of opinion in Israel?

Peres: No, sir. Israel is still a democratic country. As a matter of fact, in spite of all the emergencies that we are having, if you will look at the number of parties we are having, we are a very rich and large country. Now like every democracy, we elect a government, so we shall have something to oppose, to be against, to criticize. That's the nature of things. I think the government is being elected for four years, it has another

year and a half to run, I wouldn't change it. And I'm not surprised there are many opinions. I would like to remark to Mr. Evans that there was a period when all of our friends, for example, objected to the mere declaration of the State of Israel. They thought this may be a mistake. There were some Israelis who felt like it. But it's a free country, and we have plenty of problems. We have a coordinated policy up to a point with the United States of America, which is very dear to our hearts, and which we appreciate. We know in a free world you can't have a hundred per cent agreement, a hundred per cent of the time, to wake up every morning and say you and us are thinking alike.

Herman: Are we thinking less alike today than we were six months ago?

Peres: Naturally, things from Washington, when it comes to Jerusalem, look differently than things from Jerusalem, looking back at our own homes and problems.

Herman: I don't know whether that means yes or no. Do you think—

Peres: There is, I would say, a 60 or 70 per cent agreement, and a 30 or 40 per cent probably a difference of opinion.

Evans: Mr. Minister, you say that we do have a coordinated policy. You know that the United States is pressing hard on your country to take a less, if I may use the word, intransigent position on the PLO. Now, you're asking us for two and a half billion dollars, not just for one year but for each of the next four years. Don't you think that the Israelis should, the Israeli government should give the American administration and the American people a little more thoughtfulness on some of these political issues, in payment, political payment, for what the American people are doing for Israel?

Peres: Undoubtedly that we must consider very carefully any request made by the American people and the American administration, but I'm not aware at all that the American administration is asking anything about the PLO.

Evans: Mr. Saunders—

Peres: This is one of the points where we are in full agreement.

Hottelet: Mr. Peres, as minister of defense, do you think that the policy of raids, such as the raid of the 4th of December into Lebanon, should be continued? Do you

think that the policy of setting up settlements in the occupied territories should be continued?

Peres: I wouldn't like to answer in a general way, because we don't have principles on that matter. Each case must be studied separately and carefully. The raid on Lebanon was done after a great deal of study, after we got very solid information that there is—are stores of missiles, concentrations of infiltrators, endangering the life of our people, I wouldn't generalize on it. I can tell you that we shall go a long way not to endanger the lives of innocent people. This is a very important consideration. Unfortunately, in time of war things like that may happen to our great regret and sorrow.

Hottelet: *What about the settlements?*

Peres: On the settlements, if you look carefully at the map, you will discover a logic in settling the country as well, but again I mean we are dealing a little bit with headlines and not with very precise lines on the map, and this includes the Golan Heights as well.

Herman: *Do you think things in the Far East are now moving towards better chances for peace or are they still decreasing?*

Peres: You mean the Middle East.

Herman: *Middle East, excuse me, yes.*

Peres: Well, I think as I have said the United Nations is playing a very difficult role by giving a majority to every extreme view. I believe that with Egypt we had a nice start, and I am very hopeful that we shall be able to continue very much. I believe that our relations with the Palestinians are improving and also gives room for hope.

Herman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, for being with us today on Face the Nation.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of President Giscard d'Estaing of France (excerpts)²⁹²

Cairo, December 15, 1975

At the invitation of President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and his wife, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic, and his wife paid an official visit to Egypt from December 10–15, 1975.

Special attention was accorded to the Middle East conflict. The two Presidents agreed that no time must be lost in reaching a comprehensive, just and permanent settlement of the conflict, based on Israel's evacuation of all the territories occupied in 1967, on the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed frontiers and on the right of the Palestinian people to have an independent homeland. The settlement should also comprise appropriate international guarantees in which France is prepared to participate.

The two parties stressed the importance of the Suez Canal being reopened to international navigation and President Sadat expressed his gratitude to France for the part she has played in clearing the Canal and expressed his satisfaction at her participation in development and construction projects in the area.

The two Presidents expressed their concern at the developments in the Lebanese crisis which affect a friendly country and expressed their interest in the maintenance of the unity and cohesion of the Lebanese entity and in stability in the area. In this connection President Sadat expressed his appreciation of the initiative taken by the French government in sending Couve de Murville on a mission to that country.²⁹³

The two sides expressed their satisfaction at the progress achieved in the Arab-European dialogue and their wish for the rapid and effective development of this dialogue in all fields which in fact they see as a framework for strengthening the links of

²⁹² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 16, 1975.

²⁹³ See doc. 191 above.

cooperation between Western Europe and the Arab world and as being a factor for political stability and economic progress.

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Communiqué issued by a meeting of foreign ministers of East Europe (excerpts)²⁹⁴

Moscow, December 16, 1975

On 15 and 16 December 1975 a meeting was held in Moscow of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was attended by Foreign Minister Petyr Mladenov on behalf of Bulgaria, by Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer on behalf of the GDR, by Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski on behalf of Poland, by Foreign Minister George Macovescu on behalf of Romania, by Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek on behalf of Czechoslovakia, by Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja on behalf of Hungary and by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on behalf of the Soviet Union.

1. The participants in the meeting conducted an exchange of views on some current aspects of developments in the international situation, including the situation in Europe.

2. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs expressed their satisfaction that, regardless of all the complications and contradictions in the present situation in the world, development on a basis of equality of peaceful and friendly relations between the nations, an extension of mutually advantageous cooperation between the nations and a stabilisation of the process of détente have become the predominant characteristics. This is very largely due to the dynamic and consistent policy pursued by the socialist countries, which meets with an increasingly favourable response and support among all progressive and peace-loving forces in the world.

4. With regard to recent events, the still dangerous situation in the Middle East was discussed. The participants in the meeting expressed themselves in favour of a continuation of active efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in this region, a comprehensive and fundamental political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Such a settlement must have in view the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, guarantees of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to set up their own state, and guarantees of the sovereignty and independence of all the countries of the Middle East.

Great importance was attached to the re-opening of the Geneva Middle East peace conference with the participation on a basis of equality of all immediately interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). It was pointed out that the UN—the Security Council and the other UN organs—should play a more active part in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of the conflict.

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Message from the government of the USSR to the US government insisting on PLO participation in a reconvened Geneva conference²⁹⁵

Moscow, December 18, 1975

The Soviet Side has attentively studied the reply of the US Government received on December 1,²⁹⁶ to the proposal made by the Soviet Government on November 9 this year,²⁹⁷ that the USSR and the USA, as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, come out with a joint initiative that its work be resumed.

The Soviet Side notes the agreement expressed by the United States that all questions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine question,

²⁹⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XVI, 1 (January 13, 1976), pp. 2–3.

²⁹⁵ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 52 (December 27, 1975), p. 8.

²⁹⁶ Doc. 196 above.

²⁹⁷ Doc. 183 above.

should be solved to ensure lasting peace in the Middle East and that achievement of precisely such a general political settlement of the Middle East conflict should be the purpose of the resumed Geneva Conference.

But clearly contradicting these statements, the American Side actually makes it impossible to convene the Geneva Conference, objecting to participation in the Conference—from its very resumption and on an equal footing with other participants—of the Palestinian people represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. The reference made by the United States to justify this position that during the first stage of the Conference in December 1973 no decision was adopted on the matter of the Palestinians' participation naturally cannot be a reason against solution of this question now.

The idea set forth by the American Side to hold some sort of a preparatory conference, but again without the participation of the PLO representatives, cannot be taken otherwise than as an intention to avoid convening the Geneva Conference.

The Soviet Union continues to firmly hold that the most effective way to cardinally solve the Middle East problem on the basis of appropriate decisions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly is to use an international mechanism created expressly for the purpose, the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, in which all the Sides immediately concerned should take part, including the Palestinian Arab people represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization which has received broad international recognition, as well as the USSR and the USA as co-Chairmen of the Conference.

As to the US proposal to hold bilateral consultations with the USSR on matters connected with the resumption of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Side consents to the holding of such consultations.

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Address by Pope Paul VI to the College of Cardinals (excerpt)²⁹⁸

Vatican City, December 22, 1975

What is to be said, then, about the ever serious and unsolved problems of the Middle East? Should we repeat, perhaps, how much, and for what very strong and particular reasons, it is close to our heart and causes concern for us? Or should we again recall the fundamental lines which, in the opinion of the Holy See, should preside over and make possible its fair and stable solution?

In the light of the imminent Christmas celebrations, we would like at least to invite the whole Christian world to raise its thought to the Land of Jesus: to the places that saw his birth, his hidden life as a worker and his laborious and luminous life as the Master, his death and his victory over it: to the City that continues to be a spiritual centre of love and devotion for the disciples of Christ, as for the sons of the Jewish people and for the followers of Islam; and to call everyone to repeat the ancient praying acclamation: *Fiat pax in virtute tua!*

This peace, which we sometimes seem to be laboriously, slowly approaching, and which is continually pushed back into the distance, this peace must be the object not only of the wishes but also of the active and tireless efforts of all the parties concerned. Avoiding sterile and dangerous extreme standpoints, and silencing, in particular, the voice of terrorism and of indiscriminate reprisals against one another, they must seek to bring the dialogue further on, in suitable ways and through appropriate channels.

Although we, too, are convinced of the necessity of a just and wisely balanced overall solution, in fact just because of this conviction, we take the liberty of exhorting the leaders of the various parties not to neglect the concrete possibilities, modest though they may be, which occur to start negotiation and establish a favourable atmosphere and the indispensable premises to progress towards the longed-for conclusion.

And though aware of the tragedies, not long

²⁹⁸ Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the Vatican Secretariat of State.

ago, which urged the Jewish people to seek a safe and protected stronghold in a sovereign and independent State of its own, in fact just because we are aware of this, we would like to ask the sons of this people to recognize the rights and legitimate aspirations of another people, which has also suffered for a long time, the Palestinian people.

In speaking of the Middle East we could certainly not fail to recall, with an emotion full of concern but which would not like to remain closed to hope, what has rightly been defined the tragedy of the Lebanon. Our particular concern was clearly shown, to the Lebanese people and to the world, in the mission that we entrusted to our special envoy, Cardinal Paolo Bertoli, to whom we wish to express again, on this occasion, our gratitude for the zeal, competence, and spirit of sacrifice with which he carried out his delicate task.

Unfortunately the situation, though amid renewed attempts at a truce, continues to be dangerously uncertain and threatening.

Those who have been able to know and admire from close up the example of peaceful coexistence set for such a long time by the population of the Lebanon, Christian and Moslem, are led almost naturally to think that the explosions of violent hostility of which it has become the theatre, cannot have an adequate explanation without forces extraneous to the Lebanon itself and to its true interests.

Our wish, our warning which goes to everyone, cannot, therefore, be but this: do not desire, do not permit the destruction, for obscure reasons, of a tradition of tolerant coexistence and good collaboration, which should, on the contrary, remain an example also for other and more extensive forms of civil and religious coexistence in the Middle East, if it is desired—as it must be—that a real, secure and stable peace will reign there and restore to those lands a tranquillity that is in the interests also of the neighbouring peoples.

And in this painful hour, let us call Christians, in particular, to pray for the Lebanon, that God may grant all its populations to find again the spirit of brotherhood, the way of concord and national reconciliation.

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Press conference statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger expressing reservations about the creation of new Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights²⁹⁹

Washington, December 23, 1975

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we switch to the Middle East for a minute and ask you if the United States has asked the Rabin government not to allow further settlements in the Golan Heights or, indeed, if the United States has suggested anything in this regard to the Rabin government?

Kissinger: I do not want to comment about Presidential messages. It has been our general policy to point out that the creation of new settlements on the Golan Heights and elsewhere complicates the diplomatic process. And we have from time to time brought this to the attention of the Israeli Government.

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Press statement by Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark criticizing Israel for its policy toward the occupied territories³⁰⁰

Copenhagen, December 30, 1975

A small country like Israel must have its existence secured. That is quite clear. But on the other hand, Israel should not think that it in the long run can find the world accepting the view that one not only can acquire territory but also hang on to occupied territory won through war.

This is a view which we have followed in principle throughout the conflict in the Middle East. If it is possible today to say that a change of attitude has taken place, it is in relation to the Arab countries. It is only during the last five to six years that the majority of the Arab countries in the region have been "discovered" by the Danish Foreign Ministry. That is naturally our mistake, but today the Arab world is a reality for us and that can never harm the balancing act which the

²⁹⁹ Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1908 (January 19, 1976), pp. 73-74.

³⁰⁰ Translated from the Danish text, *Kristeligt Dagblad* (Copenhagen), December 31, 1975.

conduct of foreign policy is. Naturally, it also has some influence, though I still claim that the basic elements in our policy are the same.

The Danish attitude has always been that the rights of the Palestinians should be taken into account in a final Middle East settlement. If one is to criticize Israel one of the strongest points must be that Israel has never allowed or encouraged the formation of political parties among the Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan. Consequently we are today completely without a picture of the political make-up of the Palestinians.

On this background I certainly think that the PLO is one of the more moderate spokesman of the Palestinian cause. An eventual acceptance of the PLO must, however, depend on the PLO recognizing the existence of Israel and on Israel receiving guarantees of its existence behind secure borders.

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Section of the Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross relating to the Middle East conflict in 1975³⁰¹

Geneva, 1976

MIDDLE EAST

CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

For the eighth consecutive year, the ICRC continued the mission which it started in 1967 to help the victims of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

As the last of the prisoners of war taken in October 1973 had been repatriated during 1974, the ICRC could concentrate its efforts in 1975 on protecting and helping the civilians, especially those in the Israeli-occupied territories. The delegates tried to get to grips with the humanitarian problems besetting both individuals and whole communities, in order to try to solve them insofar as the means and possibilities available to the ICRC allowed.

The ICRC delegates held frequent discussions with the Israeli authorities on the subject of these various problems which included the destruction

of houses, expulsions and the medical situation in the occupied territories.

ICRC activity, as in the past, was based essentially on the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Israel did not always recognize the applicability of this Convention to the occupied territories although it did allow the delegates to perform the tasks resulting therefrom on a pragmatic case-to-case basis.

On this basis, large-scale action was continued to help civilian detainees and internees (visits, distribution of relief supplies in prisons, transport for detainees' families) and to assist people in crossing the demarcation lines (especially students from the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the West Bank of the Jordan).

Relief food supplies made available to the ICRC by the European Economic Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Arab Republic of Egypt were distributed to the needy as in previous years, under the supervision of the delegates.

Help to inhabitants of the occupied territories was made possible by the collaboration of the ICRC delegations in Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Cairo, which, in particular, participated in the operations enabling families to visit one another across the demarcation lines. They also forwarded a mass of family messages and ensured that the needy received relief food and other supplies either direct or through charitable organisations.

Activities to help civilian detainees and internees

In 1975, ICRC delegates visited seven prisons in Israel and seven in the occupied territories. Just over 3,000 Arab civilians from the occupied territories and the Arab countries parties to the conflict were being held in those fourteen prisons.

As the prison population was more stable in Israel than in the occupied territories, the ICRC visited detainees in Israel every two months and those in the occupied territories monthly. The usual reports were drawn up and submitted to the governments concerned (the detainees' own governments and the Detaining Power). Various approaches were made to the Detaining Power on the subject of the conditions in the prisons, especially overcrowding.

Some 6,500 standard parcels, containing cigarettes, biscuits, etc., and 31,300 parcels of fruit

³⁰¹ Excerpted from International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1975* (Geneva, 1976), pp. 20–23.

were distributed by the delegates who also bought 1,525 books for the shelves of the prison libraries and transmitted 6,263 Red Cross messages to the detainees. The ICRC also financed the purchase of glasses, dentures, orthopaedic footwear and artificial limbs for 264 Arab prisoners.

The ICRC continued to provide transport for most of the detainees' families in the occupied territories, from their homes to the prisons. In all, 722 coachloads and 139 taxi trips conveyed 32,788 persons. The financial contribution of the ICRC to these operations was nearly 150,000 Swiss francs.

Reuniting families and student travel

When a person wishes to be reunited with his family in the occupied territories, his relatives may submit a request to that effect to the authorities of the Occupying Power. Once this first step has been taken, the ICRC intervenes only to help those cases which are refused and where the humanitarian problems created by the separation are apparent.

In 1975, thirty cases were submitted by the ICRC. Of these, five were accepted, sixteen refused and nine undecided. The above-mentioned procedure, which has been in force in the occupied West Bank of the Jordan for many years, was introduced in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai only in the second half of 1975 (during the first six months 28 persons were reunited with their families in Gaza and Sinai).

Operations to enable civilians to travel between the occupied territories and the adjacent Arab countries continued during 1975: families were reunited on one side or the other of the demarcation lines, students from the occupied territories returned home for their holidays and then went back to their studies together with new students who had just completed their secondary education in the occupied territories.

Most of these operations took place in the United Nations buffer zone in Sinai, which 17,797 persons crossed, compared to only 8 at Lod, 33 by the Allenby Bridge and 94 at the western entrance to Kuneitra.

Exchange of mortal remains

In April and December 1975, the remains of 93 Egyptian soldiers were returned to the Egyptian authorities and those of 39 Israeli soldiers who

fell on the Egyptian front in 1973, to Israel.

Egypt also returned to Israel the bodies of two civilians.

These exchange operations were carried out in the presence of ICRC delegates.

Repatriation of an Israeli soldier

An Israeli soldier who had been captured by the Lebanese forces on the night of 1–2 January 1975, was repatriated on 17 February. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, he had been visited by ICRC delegates on three occasions during his captivity. On the same day, Israel freed eleven Lebanese civilians who were repatriated under ICRC auspices.

Relief supplies

The relief food supplies provided by the European Economic Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Arab Republic of Egypt (78 tons for people in southern Sinai) were distributed to the needy by various organisations with the participation of the ICRC delegates.

The delegates set up a specific relief operation between February and April. Torrential rains had flooded the El Arish region, causing serious damage and leaving many people without shelter. On 22 February, the ICRC organised the first convoy, transporting 2,000 blankets and several dozen tents, while the Israeli authorities provided emergency food and medical supplies. During the following days, the ICRC also distributed 35 tons of flour from the relief food supplies provided by the EEC and the Swiss Confederation.

As soon as the catastrophe was announced, Egypt proposed sending relief supplies to the victims. The ICRC delegates negotiated with the Israeli authorities and obtained permission for 72 tons of emergency food supplies and 10,000 metres of cloth, a gift from the Egyptian Red Crescent, to the flood victims, to be handed over to a Red Crescent representative at El Arish on 30 April. These supplies were distributed by the local town council and Red Crescent with the help of the ICRC delegates.

Help for invalids

At the end of 1974, the Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany made a further financial contribution to the *Magen David Adom* to enable it to continue providing help for the disabled in

the occupied territories in 1975. Working with the ICRC delegates, the Magen David Adom was able to fit 37 invalids with artificial limbs.

Hospital and medical situation in the occupied territories

In 1975, as in 1971, 1972 and 1974, an ICRC medical delegate made a detailed study of the hospital and medical situation in the occupied territories in the Gaza Strip, Sinai and on the Golan Heights. For the first time for many years, this survey was extended to the West Bank of the Jordan.

During this mission, which ran from the beginning of April to August, the ICRC medical delegate visited some 240 infirmaries, clinics, medical centres and hospitals.

Reports drawn up for the authorities of Israel and of the Arab countries concerned contained the comments and suggestions of the medical delegate, who had been afforded every facility in performing his task. Several discussions were held with the competent authorities on the subject of the problems reported.

Population shifts

There was only one Arab population shift in 1975. The Bedouin tribes of the Ein Sadr region in the Sinai were moved to El Rissan and El Malha. The authorities of the Occupying Power informed the ICRC delegation that this move was necessary for military reasons. The operation affected some 1,800 persons who were helped by the Israeli authorities to resettle. The delegates satisfied themselves that this transfer was carried out under the best possible conditions and they regularly visited the tribes in their new places of residence. The ICRC provided them with some relief food supplies, drawing in particular on its flour stocks. It also asked the Israeli authorities to allow this community to return to its home territory as soon as the reasons given for this move ceased to exist.

Incidentally, the withdrawal agreement between Egypt and Israel made it possible for several Bedouin tribes to return to their original locations from which they had been routed in 1967 either by the war or by the establishment of military zones.

Unsolved problems covered by the Fourth Convention

The ICRC is concerned to see that the Fourth

Convention is respected in the occupied territories and it approaches the Occupying Power whenever it notes that that Power is not respecting some obligation, or civilian right, specified in the Convention.

Despite earlier approaches, renewed in 1975, some problems have still not been solved.

—Applicability of the Fourth Convention: the ICRC is of the opinion that it is applicable *in toto* in the three occupied territories and it cannot accept that a duly ratified international treaty may be suspended at the wish of one of the parties.

—Destruction of houses: Despite all the efforts made by the ICRC on the basis of Arts. 33, 49 and 53 of the Fourth Convention, the destruction of houses continued. In 1975, the ICRC was informed of 57 homes destroyed and eleven bricked up. These measures affected more than 300 persons. The ICRC provided those victims who did not immediately find a new home with basic necessities (tents, blankets, food). The ICRC has constantly reminded the Israeli authorities that it is opposed to such destruction.

—Expulsions: Referring to Art. 49 of the Fourth Convention, the ICRC delegation protested against the expulsion to Lebanon, on 18 April, of five civilian Arab detainees who had until then been under administrative arrest. The ICRC also transmitted to the Israeli authorities requests by persons expelled before 1975 to return to their homes in the occupied territories. The ICRC, which had already tried to prevent these expulsions, supported these requests.

—Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

LEBANON

The situation in Lebanon grew steadily worse from April through December as fighting intensified between the opposing groups. It was only at the end of October however that the hospitals and dispensaries, overwhelmed by the victims, suddenly encountered critical shortages of medicines, bandages, blood, plasma and other blood substitutes. The ICRC acted quickly to help deal with the situation.

The ICRC had maintained an office in Beirut since 1967, serving as a regional logistics base. Its most recent major activity had resulted from

the outbreak of the conflict in Cyprus in 1974. As the Lebanese situation worsened, the office had only one delegate and some local personnel to deal with demands made upon the ICRC for a large-scale operation.

This operation started on 2 May with the dispatch to Beirut of a head of delegation, a doctor, a relief specialist and a radio operator.

The ICRC team was immediately given the support of the major institutions concerned, which set up an ad hoc committee to deal with the situation. The committee included representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Lebanese Red Cross, associations of private hospitals and pharmacists, the Lebanese Medical Order, the Western Beirut Medical Association and the "Palestinian Red Crescent".

The ICRC medical delegate drew up a list of the most urgent requirements. Thanks to the joint efforts of the ICRC, the Swiss Army and the Swiss Civil Defence, it was possible to assemble within 24 hours the first shipment of 16 tons of relief supplies—mainly medical—worth 487,000 Swiss francs. The shipment left for Paris on 6 November, where it was transferred to a plane for Beirut.

By the end of 1975, relief shipments by the ICRC, the Swiss Government, 22 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a private organization, reached a value of 1.77 million Swiss francs.³⁰² These supplies were distributed as they were received, on the basis of a plan drawn up by the ad hoc committee in consultation with all of the recipient groups.

Due in large part to these shipments, the deficiencies which prompted the ICRC intervention were soon overcome, with bilateral aid also playing a large part. Despite the continued fighting, the medical and health situation in Lebanon was under control at the end of the year, making it

possible to reduce again to some extent the ICRC delegation, leaving in Beirut the head of the delegation, a relief delegate and some local personnel, including a radio operator.

It should be noted that relief did not constitute the sole activity of the ICRC during this phase of the emergency. Major work was also carried on by the Agency, which performed outstanding service.

Disrespect for the protective emblem

The armed confrontations in Beirut created a virtually continuous condition of extreme danger, which considerably restricted the freedom of movement of the ICRC delegates, just as it did for the population as a whole.

It is sad to report the protective emblems, the red cross and the red crescent, were not respected. In some instances, they even became the targets of gunfire.

The worst of these incidents occurred on 23 May when a convoy of medical vehicles of the ICRC, the Lebanese Red Cross and the "Palestinian Red Crescent" came under heavy fire. One of the drivers was seriously wounded.

After this incident, the ICRC, the Lebanese Red Cross and the "Palestinian Red Crescent" issued a joint statement, to remind all the people of the nature of the protective emblems and the obligation to respect them.

This appeal produced no change in the situation however, a fact which the ICRC delegates had to reckon with. This resulted in a degree of paralysis in their activities, except during periods of truce.

Under these conditions, none of the measures usually undertaken in such situations to assist the victims—in particular the evacuation of the wounded under ICRC protection—could be carried out.

³⁰² To this amount should be added the sum of 545,800 Swiss francs, the value of the food provided by the EEC and the Swiss Confederation [original note].

Arab World

Joint statement issued after a meeting of Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan, Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria, Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt, PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi, and General Secretary Riyadh of the Arab League¹

Cairo, January 4, 1975

To follow-up the implementation of the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit conference in Rabat² and proceeding from the Arab commitment to support the PLO on the pan-Arab and international levels, delegations led by the Jordanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the head of the PLO political department and the Arab League Secretary General met at the Arab League headquarters on 3rd and 4th January.

In an atmosphere of brotherhood, solidarity and full appreciation of the national responsibility in confronting the Israeli aggression, those meeting discussed the drawing up of a formula for organizing relations between the confrontation forces in the light of the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit conference, and for implementing these resolutions.

In an assertion to adherence to the five points mentioned in the seventh Arab summit conference's Resolution No 3, it has been agreed to take the necessary measures to implement these points through the holding of bilateral meetings between the PLO and the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian governments. It has also been decided to organize periodic meetings between the confrontation forces; these meetings will be called by the Arab League Secretary General and be held in Cairo, Damascus and Amman in order to tackle joint issues.

It has been decided to take positive steps and to refrain from taking measures or making statements that do not help the development of relations between the PLO and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

Those meeting took notice of the Jordanian

Government's measures to give the resolution adopted by the seventh Arab summit conference in Rabat its full meaning and content while at the same time observing the rights gained by the Palestinians in addition to the commitments made to the occupied Palestinian areas.

It was agreed that the confrontation states should work to strengthen the PLO in order to enable it to carry out its national (qawmiyah) and international responsibilities. They also agreed that the next conference of the confrontation powers should be held in Damascus in February.

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Declaration of the Palestinian Rejection Front attacking the meeting of foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the PLO (excerpts)³

January 4, 1975

The meeting with the lackey regime of Amman is a clear departure from the objectives of the Palestine revolution which, in its charters and its legal decisions, has stressed the necessity for continued struggle and conflict against that regime until such time as it is overthrown and a progressive nationalist regime is established on its ruins.

Secondly, by deciding to meet with it the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization is exonerating that regime of all the crimes and massacres it has perpetrated against our people and our revolution in Jordan, and is playing a direct part in putting an end to its isolation at the Arab level.

Thirdly, the decision to meet with the Jordanian regime is a cruel blow to the nationalist and progressive relations that have always linked the Palestine revolution to the Jordanian movement of struggle and its progressive and nationalist forces.

Fourthly, the move towards reconciliation with

¹ Broadcast on Cairo radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4796/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

² Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), January 11, 1975, pp. 6-7. The Rejection Front consists of the PFLP, PFLP-GC, ALF and the Popular Struggle Front. The joint communiqué of the meeting of foreign ministers is doc. 217 above.

this regime under cover of the slogan of alleged unity of Arab ranks is an unpatriotic infringement on the part of the Palestine Liberation Organization of the relations that have linked the Palestine revolution with certain revolutionary movements in the Arab area to which the lackey regime in Jordan has been hostile. Its attitude to the revolution of our masses in Oman is the clearest possible indication of the role it is playing in the area. It is not merely a matter of what the regime is doing in the Jordanian-Palestinian arena: the role it is playing extends much further than that to include its active participation, as a reactionary force in the area, in operations directed against Arab nationalist struggle movements throughout the length and breadth of the Arab area.

In condemning all meeting, reconciliation and coordination with this lackey and reactionary regime in Jordan, the Rejection Front assures our masses of its intention to continue its struggle against this traitorous regime, stressing that its only relations with it stem from its determination to fight it to the death: there can be no meeting or coordination with it of any kind.

Struggling Palestinian masses:

The truth about the capitulationist wing of the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization was disclosed when it agreed to reconciliation and coordination with the lackey regime in Amman. This move has revealed once and for all how utterly spurious is the stand of those loud-mouthed opportunists who, both before and since the Rabat conference, have so vociferously exploited the formula of "No reconciliation, no meeting and no coordination" with the subservient regime in Jordan. For their three Noes have now become three Yeses. Yes to reconciliation, yes to meeting and yes to coordination with that regime.

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Press interview statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO reviewing the current situation and discussing the policy options of the Palestine resistance⁴

Early January, 1975

Q. Your speech⁵ has, however, been very much criticized by certain sectors of world opinion, notably in Israel.

A. The Zionist propagandists, infuriated by the striking success which we have just achieved, have deliberately falsified my remarks by presenting them in a tendentious manner. I have, however, pleaded in favour of fraternal and egalitarian peaceful co-existence between Arabs and Jews, all Jews without exception, in the territory of Palestine; I have in addition made a solemn appeal to the Jews to renounce once and for all the path of war and the suicidal complex of Massada. To my knowledge, nobody has up to now replied by offering an alternative to my proposal. Worse still, the Zionist propagandists have emphasized a sentence in my speech taken out of context, in order to give credence once again to the ignoble thesis, according to which we are really seeking to drive the Jews into the sea.

Certainly, I have declared that I dream—I have clearly said dream—of a unified and democratic Palestine. But is it a crime to dream? It is forbidden to imagine the evolution which could take place during the coming years?

Can I erase from my memory the house where I was born in Jerusalem, a few feet away from the Wailing Wall, a house which Mrs Golda Meir ordered to be destroyed under the occupation regime? Do I have less rights than the Russian-born naturalized American lady who came to settle in the land of my ancestors?

Q. You therefore lay claim in the immediate future to the whole of Palestine?

A. There, too, our enemies have passed over in silence the appeal which I made in that same address to the international community, in my

⁴ Interview conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 7, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *Survival* (London), XVII, 2 (March-April, 1975), pp. 85–88.

⁵ Referring to Arafat's speech to the UN General Assembly, doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

position as the leader of the Palestinian revolution, inviting this community to help us to set up a national government ruling over the whole of Palestine, which would be liberated from the Zionist occupation.

You no doubt notice that I am using the term Zionist and not the term Israeli. Why should it be otherwise, since up to now they have refused to recognize the existence of a Palestinian people?

Q. Since you would accept, in other words, a compromise which would lead to the creation of an Arab state in a part of the territory of Palestine, why do you not announce in an explicit manner that you are prepared to attend at the Geneva Peace Conference?

A. I shall reply to this question on the day we receive a formal invitation to participate in that conference.

Q. But do you not consider yourself entitled to be present where the future of Palestine is being discussed?

A. The leadership of the resistance is not inclined to lay down its cards on the table prematurely, to unveil in advance its strategy and tactics. As usual we shall take the military, political and diplomatic decisions which may be needed, at the required moment.

Q. Will you constitute for that purpose a provisional government in exile?

A. Commissions have been set up to study that question from every aspect. But I can assure you here and now that we intend to create a provisional revolutionary government, but not in exile. It will establish its seat where we think it will be best able to serve our national cause. It will be representative of all the Palestinians, regardless of their political adherence, whether or not they are members of a fedayin organization. But it will become an integral part of the PLO. We shall not commit the error made in the past in Algeria by the National Liberation Front who set up executive power which was not completely under its control. Our government's first task will be to thwart the intrigues of certain Arab states, of the Zionists and of the Americans which seek to exclude the Palestinian people from an eventual settlement.

Q. Your opponents are making precisely this accusation against you, that you are seeking to become part of international negotiations, which can only lead, in their

eyes, to a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. They maintain in this respect that your presence at the Geneva conference would imply de facto and reciprocal recognition of Israel and the PLO and that a territorial compromise, which would be concluded there, would inevitably lead to the signing of a peace treaty. What do you think of this logic?

A. Firstly, it is the right of the leaders of the PLO to take decisions of a political or diplomatic nature in all fields, and this within the framework of directives given by the National Council (the Parliament of the resistance). Secondly, we think that the presence of representatives of the PLO in every international assembly constitutes in itself a victory for the Palestinian people, ostracized by imperialist and Zionist forces which have not ceased to deny us the right to a national autonomous existence. For our part, we shall continue working to create new conditions which would permit us to confront the enemy in a still more effective way.

Numerous people opposed the admission of the PLO to the United Nations by putting forth analogous arguments. Nobody denies today that we carried off a great victory in agreeing to go to the UN General Assembly. Everyone has been able to see that this precedent has not only served the Palestinian cause, but also all other national liberation movements. Through our attitude we have shown that we were at one and the same time both pioneers and revolutionaries.

Q. If this were so, would you be prepared to establish direct contacts, either secret or not, with those whom you consider to be your enemies, as for instance Mr Kissinger?

A. All decisions in this respect will be taken with a view to the permanent and long-term interests of the Palestinian people. Personally, I have no objection against meeting anyone who would allow me to clarify or advance the cause of our people, as defined by the ten-point action programme adopted last June by the Palestinian National Council.⁶ It was with this purpose in view that I recently had talks with both M. Sauvagnargues and Herr Schroeder.

Q. Again according to your adversaries, you would be wrong to build an independent State on the West bank of the Jordan and the Gaza strip in the event of Israel

⁶ Doc. 246 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

agreeing to give those territories back to you. In their view, this State would not be able to survive economically.

A. Would Peru perhaps suit them better? Since when does a fatherland constitute a commercial operation? No matter whether it be poor or rich, the land of our ancestors is dear to us, and we shall fight to get it back. That goes without saying for every genuine patriot. Cabral built an independent state in Guinea-Bissau, one of the smallest and poorest countries of this planet. The same goes for the South Yemenites, who have established their Republic in spite of the miserable economic conditions of their country.

Q. If your ideas are to such an extent in contradiction with those of your adversaries of the Rejection Front, do you intend to liquidate them?

A. Yes, but only through a permanent dialogue. We have, however, the material means to get rid of them in a radical manner: 98 per cent at least of all the fedayin support our positions. But we have never had recourse to force in order to silence the dissident voices. That constitutes one of the permanent characteristics of our movement since its very birth. Is that not likewise the case with the Zionist movement from which we have much to learn when it comes to dialogue and democracy? We are tolerant because we are strong.

Q. Would you be the same with King Hussein whom you have sentenced to death?

A. It is an old story. The Palestinian resistance passed this sentence during the massacre to the fedayin in Jordan, in September 1970. Since then, the government of Amman and the PLO have been called upon to act in concert to apply the resolutions of the Arab 'summit' of Rabat,⁷ which deprived King Hussein of all authority to decide about the destiny of the Palestinian people. However, on the essential point we have not modified our position in regard to the Hashemite regime. According to the terms of the decision taken by our National Council, the struggle of the Jordano-Palestinian National Front will go on for the establishment of a democratic regime in Jordan where, remember, more than a million Palestinians are living.

Q. Have you obtained any tangible results from the quadripartite conference which took place in Cairo on

*3-4 January?*⁸

A. No fundamental problem whatsoever has been solved. We have only laid the basis for bilateral and collective consultations which, we hope, will make it possible to translate into practice the resolutions taken at Rabat. We have nevertheless the distressing impression that King Hussein has not, in spite of outward appearances, renounced his ambition to speak in the name of the Palestinians at Geneva, according to the clearly expressed wish of the Americans and the Zionists. In this regard, you can be sure that we shall never accept the possibility of the government of Amman substituting itself, not even partially, nor provisionally, for the PLO, which has been solemnly recognized as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, not only by all the Arab Islamic states, but also by the Third World, the socialist camp, and more recently by the UN.

The Zionist-American intrigues in which certain Arab countries take part are continuing. Their objective is to torpedo the Geneva conference, to conduct negotiations 'step by step' outside of any international control, and to eliminate from the diplomatic scene our faithful friend, the Soviet Union, as well as the Security Council represented by Kurt Waldheim.

To that effect Washington and Tel Aviv have made concrete proposals to Cairo and Amman concerning the restitution of a part of Sinai to Egypt and of a part of the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom. These proposals are presently being studied in the two Arab capitals. Yet the Americans and Zionists have not hidden their intention thus to isolate Syria—to which no offer of a new Israeli withdrawal on the Golan heights has been made; to make Syria alone assume the whole weight of the political and military struggle; to create a gulf between Syria and the PLO on the one hand, and between Egypt and Jordan on the other; and finally, to break the pan-Arab solidarity which had found a concrete expression at the 'summit' of Rabat.

These intrigues are however bound to fail because they are sterile. They will not achieve their goal because today it is no longer possible to leave the Palestinian factor out of account. On the other hand, if Egypt should conclude a separate agreement comprising not only military but also political

⁷ Doc. 308 in *ibid.*

⁸ Doc. 217 above.

concessions the situation in the Middle East would notably deteriorate. We shall then take whatever measures would be judged necessary. Under those conditions one has to expect that the vital interests of the United States and of the West in general will be hard hit.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Lebanon of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)⁹

Chtaura, January 7, 1975

In response to the invitation of his brother, His Excellency President Sulayman Franjeh of the Republic of Lebanon, President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic paid an official visit to Lebanon on Tuesday, January 7, 1975.

During this visit the two presidents held official talks which were marked by a spirit of brotherhood, confidence, affection and friendship. In the course of these talks they reviewed Arab issues in general and the Palestinian issue in particular, concentrating on the advances made in connection with the latter at the Arab and international levels, especially since the last summit conference in Rabat and the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. They were in complete agreement on all these matters.

The two presidents stressed the importance of reinforcing Arab solidarity and of mobilizing Arab resources for the battle of liberation, and spoke in glowing terms of what was achieved through this solidarity during the October war of liberation.

The two presidents expressed their satisfaction at the close fraternal relations that exist between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic, affirmed their determination that everything possible should be done to promote them, and gave the instructions necessary to ensure that they are made deeper and stronger in all fields.

The two presidents also reviewed the repeated Israeli aggressions against Lebanese territory, and

President Hafiz Asad praised the steadfastness of Lebanon and the heroism of her people and her armed forces. He declared that Syria supported Lebanon with all her military, political and economic resources and was prepared to provide her with everything she requires to enable her to hold out, to resist aggression and to maintain her sovereignty and territorial integrity, in view of the two countries' single destiny in their confrontation of the common enemy,

His Excellency President Sulayman Franjeh also expressed, on his own behalf and on behalf of the people of Lebanon, the highest appreciation for the heroism displayed by the Syrian Arab army during the October war and the Golan war of liberation for the recovery of the occupied Arab territories and to safeguard the national rights of the people of Palestine in full. His Excellency also expressed his admiration for the great achievements in all fields that have been realized in the Syrian Arab Republic under the leadership of President Hafiz Asad.

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Radio interview statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO welcoming the opening of a PLO office in India and considering the results of the four powers meeting in Cairo¹⁰

Mid-January, 1975

Q. You have just signed letters with our Ambassador to open a PLO office in Delhi. The people of India have watched with great admiration the struggle of the Palestinian people. On this occasion, would you like to say something for the Indian people?

A. I feel that this step which we have taken today will build up more and more the strong relations between our people and our friends, the people of India. And it means treading the steps of the great leader, Gandhi, and the great leader Nehru and, now, Her Excellency, Indira Gandhi, who is supporting our struggle against imperialism, colonialism and Zionists—our just struggle

⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 8, 1975, pp. 1, 10.

¹⁰ Interview conducted by K.K. Sud and broadcast on All-India Radio on January 19, 1975; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by All-India Radio.

to regain our homeland—Palestine—from where we have been kicked out by Zionists and imperialists. What has been done now means that our friends, the people of India, are supporting our case, our problem and it will help us a lot and this will give a push to our struggle more and more, so that we gain victory and return to our homeland.

Once, I remember, at the last interview between me and her excellency, Mrs. Gandhi, in Algiers, during the non-aligned countries' conference, I remember what she had promised me, and now we can say that what she had promised, has been fulfilled. Thanks to the people of India; thanks to her excellency; thanks to his Excellency the President of India. And I am sure that our relations will be more and more stronger in the future. We are struggling together, we are struggling in one trench; we are struggling in the channel of the non-aligned countries, the Afro-Asian countries till we achieve our aims, through the fair steps, for the future, the future of our new generations. This is the true and real peace, and just peace.

Q. I wanted to ask you a question regarding this Cairo meeting.¹¹ You know conflicting reports have been appearing in the Press—yes—regarding the meeting of the representatives of Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the PLO. And I think you have also said in some interview that some American Zionists proposals have been submitted under which Jordan is being asked to negotiate the disengagement from the West Bank. What is the PLO's stand on this matter now?

A. You see, this conference which had been held between the four parties—Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the PLO—it has been according to the summit conference, the Arab summit conference which had been held in Rabat and we were trying to execute the resolution of this summit conference. I can say frankly that we have not made a big step in this conference which had been held in Cairo. But we hope that in the future, in the next conferences—and specially since we have agreed to have more and more meetings and the next meeting, for example, will be held in Damascus next month, i.e. in February—we hope then we will have to take more steps. But according to our estimation and our information too, and from some news which

we have heard from different sources, there is an American offer to Egypt and to Jordan. We do not know exactly what is in this offer. But we have discussed this matter in the last committee and have decided that we will make quick and strong contacts, with all the parties, the Arab parties and other parties which we consider friendly parties.

We know that this year of 1975 is a very serious and dangerous year in this area. "Peace or War"? According to our information, our analysis, our very important news, which is coming from inside our occupied territories, Israelis are preparing for the fifth war. And, as you remember, their President has threatened the Arabs with the nuclear bomb-weapons.¹² And we are watching very seriously what preparations are being made on the side of our enemies, who have been supported by the Americans.

The help, the support which has been given by the Americans last year, 1974, is around five thousand million dollars of arms, economic help and in other fields. This will give you an idea about the relations between this tussle, which one calls the tussle of Israel, the imperialistic tussle, in this area. They are acting in the same role which had been played in the past in India by the East India Company. The same, they are trying to play the same role. But you see, and I am sure, that these projects will not succeed in achieving any of their dreams to build their Empire in this area. Because I am sure there will be one will in this area. The will of our nation, the Arab nations. We are not alone. We have many friends. We have friends in India. We have friends in non-aligned countries, we have friends in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America. We have friends in socialist countries. So we are not alone. And I have to say something to these Americans, who are threatening to occupy some parts of Arabic countries and especially the source of petrol for they have to remember that they are not the only power. We have other powers which are very friendly to our cause, to our people and to our nation.

Q. Thank you very much, Sir.

¹² Israel's President Katzir was reported to have told visiting Western scientists on December 2, 1974, that Israel had the ability to produce nuclear arms. *Le Monde* (Paris), December 4, 1974, p. 8.

¹¹ See doc. 217 above.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)¹³

Damascus, January 17, 1975

In response to the official invitation of his brother Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, His Majesty King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, paid an official visit to the Syrian Arab Republic from Muharram 2-5, 1395 AH (January 14-17, 1975 AD).

The two sides reviewed the Arab and international situations and the problems that concern their two countries.

In the Arab field the two sides conducted a profound study of the situation in the Arab world in general and, in particular, of the Palestine cause and the advances it has made at the Arab and international levels, in particular at the Rabat Arab summit conference and at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The two Arab leaders affirmed that peace based on justice is the desire of their peoples and of all peoples of the world, and that such peace cannot be achieved without total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the safeguarding of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. But the Israeli enemy has obstinately persisted in his occupation of the Arab territories; he has continued to escalate his acts of terrorism against Arab citizens, to issue statements and threats of war and to deny the rights of the Palestinian Arab people in defiance of the international community and its resolutions as adopted by the United Nations. All this constitutes a grave threat to peace in the area and in the world as a whole.

In the view of the two leaders the disengagement of forces that has been achieved on the Sinai and Golan fronts is a first step towards the establishment of a just peace in the area. However, the Arabs should not place too much confidence in this as long as total withdrawal has not taken place and the rights of the Palestinian people have not been safeguarded. For, confronted as they are

with a malicious and malevolent enemy, they must always be in a state of full readiness to confront his underhand expansionist and aggressive schemes until such time as, God willing, final victory is won.

The two sides agreed to continue to support and consolidate the Arab solidarity manifested during the Ramadan war of liberation in Sinai and the Golan which formed the basis of the resolutions of the seventh Arab conference at Rabat.¹⁴ They agreed on the necessity of following up the implementation of the resolutions of the conference in both letter and spirit, and to place all the energies and resources of the Arab nation in the political, military, economic and other fields at the disposal of the battle of liberation against the common enemy, in the light of the dangers threatening the destiny of the Arab nation.

They agreed to maintain their support for the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people at the national and international levels, so as to enable it to liberate the land and to recover the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The two leaders expressed their extreme concern at the repeated brutal Israeli aggressions against Lebanese territory and agreed that Lebanon should be supported in her confrontation of the relentless enemy and that all the Arab countries should be called on to stand by and support her.

With a view to developing solidarity between their countries the two leaders agreed that there should be an exchange of visits between officials at all levels; in implementation of this a high level Saudi delegation will visit Syria to lay the foundations of such cooperation.

King Faisal also decided to provide Syria with financial aid totalling one hundred and fifty million dollars to meet some of the country's more urgent requirements and also to provide a loan of two hundred million dollars for the implementation of certain Syrian development projects.

¹³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), January 19, 1975, p. 7.

¹⁴ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

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Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan considering the place of Jordan and of the PLO in any negotiations with Israel¹⁵

Amman, mid-January, 1975

Q. Do you think the Rabat summit was justified in denying you the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians?¹⁶

A. Let history be the judge. Members of my dynasty have always worked faithfully for the Palestinian people and their legitimate national rights. But it serves no purpose to hang on to a past that's no more. My personal feelings apart, my sole aim is and will be to help our brothers recover their lost homeland. I hope the PLO will live up to its new responsibilities.

Q. In view of the fact that Israel, with United States' concurrence, wants to negotiate only with you, would you be prepared to consider a proposal for a military pullback on the West Bank?

A. I have received no proposal on this point, and in the present state of things I shall take no initiative to start up a dialogue which I am not competent to conduct. Israel no longer has any choice but to talk directly to the PLO.

[At this point, the Jordanian Premier, Zeid Rifai, took up the conversation, adding: "Even if Israel submits to us a proposal for a military pullback, we'll refer immediately to Mr Yasser Arafat. Since the Rabat summit, Jordan is no longer directly concerned with the dispute. In any case, the Jewish state is expected to give back all the territories it conquered in 1967 and has no right to choose whom it will speak to and who will benefit from a pullback. In the view of the majority of the UN members, the PLO alone is entitled to take possession of the West Bank, partly or wholly liberated."]

Q. What would happen if the other Arab states prodded the government of Jordan to act in place of the fedayeen organisation?

A. Israel passed up several chances of bringing about a settlement after 1967, because it preferred

keeping the territories to obtaining a just and lasting peace. All our proposals were rejected. After the October war, we suggested that the Israeli army draw back behind the ceasefire lines to a depth of 12 kilometres. This would have returned only the city of Jericho to the Arabs. Mr Kissinger said our offer was very reasonable, but Israel didn't think it useful even to give an official answer.

Since then we have learnt that the Jewish state hopes, on top of everything, not only to keep the settlements it has established along the Jordan since 1967, but to set up new military bases as well. This beleaguered outlook is tragic, because it inevitably leads to new and bloody confrontations. Given the Israelis' psychological make-up and the way they obsessively cling to one idea of security, I was prepared before the October war to envisage a gradual dismantling of their paramilitary settlements. But the situation was radically altered by the October war, and my proposal is null and void today.

Despite all that, I haven't changed my mind. If the Jewish state agrees to giving us back the territories it conquered in 1967, it is still possible to have a genuine settlement followed by peaceful coexistence and sincere cooperation between Arabs and Israelis. Besides, Jerusalem could remain a unified city and once more become the meeting place of the three great monotheistic religions, provided of course the Eastern part of the Holy City is restored to Arab sovereignty.

Q. Would you be willing to see President Sadat go to the point of concluding a separate peace?

A. My attitude is guided by the principle that the sovereignty and the independent wishes of brother Arab countries must be respected. Each Arab head of state is entitled to act as he pleases, to choose the instruments which will enable him to recover every inch of land occupied by Israel. I shall never oppose any step which would bring us closer to a just and lasting peace.

The conditions in this part of the world no longer allow a repetition of the so-called no-war, no-peace situation which existed before the October clash. If constant progress is not made towards a settlement, an explosion is bound to take place and it will be disastrous for everybody. Israel, for its part, would have to realise that it will no longer be possible for it to maintain its military superiority.

¹⁵ Interview conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 21, 1975, p. 6; excerpted from the English translation, *Guardian Weekly* (London), February 1, 1975, p. 12.

¹⁶ See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

Q. How, in these circumstances, do you see your future relations with the PLO, whose ideas on war and peace are so far removed from yours?

A. The talks we had with the PLO's representatives, especially at the recent four-party meeting in Cairo,¹⁷ were friendly, even rewarding, because we managed to understand one another better. It is not out of the question that I may agree to to talk to Mr Yasser Arafat directly.

Q. Yet your representatives at Cairo rejected all the PLO demands regarding its military and political presence in your country. In particular, you refused to allow the fedayeen to use your kingdom for infiltrating into Israeli-occupied territories.

A. The PLO already has an office at Amman, and some Palestinian Liberation Army units have always been stationed on Jordanian soil. For the moment, that's as far as we can go in tolerating the PLO's military and political presence in the kingdom. We don't want a repetition of September 1970's sad business.

Q. Do you believe the fedayeen have abandoned their intention to assassinate you or bring your regime down?

A. Since the Rabat summit, we have decided to ignore all such threats. We are in effect determined to maintain a climate of good will and co-operation with the PLO.

Q. Yet Mr Arafat recently said¹⁸ that he has not given up his aim to set up a democratic regime in Amman.

A. With all due respect, I think that question does not fall within his jurisdiction. A man's house is his castle.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing a possible interim agreement with Israel and relations with the US and the USSR¹⁹

Cairo, mid-January, 1975

Q. Is it true, Mr President, that you are demanding the simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai,

the Golan Heights and the West Bank within the next three months?

A. Yes, but I will be ready to accept successive withdrawals if necessary. What is essential for us is to maintain the dynamics of peace. The situation in the Middle East is explosive. We must turn to our tasks quickly, otherwise the result will be irreparable.

Q. What do you ask of Israel at this moment?

A. The return of the Mitla and Gidi passes in Sinai as well as the Abu-Rudais oilfields. That is the minimum for us. I am hoping to receive an answer on this subject from Washington at any moment.

Q. What price are you prepared to pay for such a withdrawal?

A. I have nothing to offer for the return of a territory which belongs to us by right. We shall only make concessions in the event of a package deal. In any case, concessions need harm neither our territorial integrity nor our national sovereignty.

Q. We believe that the matter is one of whether you would allow goods bound for Israel to pass through the Suez Canal.

A. We have not made any decisions on this subject. It all depends on the attitude of Mr Rabin's government towards us. I wish soon to return the Suez Canal to international navigation. The revenues, which will amount to more than \$300 million a year, will help to improve the lot of the Egyptian people. In this respect I remain resolutely optimistic.

Q. Do you expect that Israel will also accept a new retreat on the Golan Heights, which are considered indispensable to the security of the Jewish state?

A. I suspect that the Israeli leaders will give way to the increased demands of internal political considerations. I do not think that they can believe, with their internal problems, in the possibility of annexing a territory which has always belonged to Syria. However, if they are obstinate about keeping Golan, we will be moving ineluctably towards a new war.

Q. Do you not believe that it is even more difficult to obtain withdrawal from a part of the West Bank for the benefit of the PLO, which Israel rejects as being a terrorist organization?

¹⁷ See doc. 217 above.

¹⁸ Doc. 219 above.

¹⁹ Interview conducted by Eric Rouleau and Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 22, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *Survival* (London), XVII, 2 (March-April, 1975), pp. 81-84.

A. It is time that the Israelis faced the situation realistically and understood finally that no peace is possible in the Middle East as long as the Palestinian problem is unresolved. It is ridiculous to put forward the argument of terrorism for refusing any negotiation with the PLO. Mr Menahem Begin is an ex-terrorist who is proud of being one. But he sits today in the Knesset in his capacity as leader of the opposition. The PLO leaders have denounced aeroplane hi-jacking and have just condemned the Orly attack. Has not the moment arrived to give them a chance, to allow them fully to assume their responsibilities?

Q. Let us suppose, Mr President, that Israel declares herself ready to return part of the West Bank, not to the PLO but to King Hussein. Would you reject such a proposition?

A. Such an offer would constitute in our eyes a manoeuvre to divide the Arab world, which, you know, has designated the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In spite of everything, an eventual Israeli proposition will be submitted to examination by the Arab heads of state and to the Palestinian leaders. These will then decide whether or not they should authorize King Hussein to regain possession of the part of the West Bank which will be evacuated by Israel.

This having been said, I can assure you that Washington will not be long in recognizing the representation of the PLO. It would be up to the United States and the Soviet Union, guarantors of the cease-fire in the Middle East, to invite the PLO to take its place round the negotiating table at Geneva.

Q. What would you do in the event of Israel's refusing to effect further withdrawals on the three fronts even after the three-month deadline?

A. I would demand the immediate convening of the Geneva conference. We will not allow the present impasse to continue. If Israel refuses to negotiate a settlement the only path left open to us will be that of war. However, I again repeat that we prefer a peaceful solution. We are conscious, indeed, of the fact that neither of the two antagonistic camps is in a position to impose a solution by violence. If the Israelis reach the same conclusion, it would be better to come to an amicable understanding.

Q. Meanwhile, do you support the PLO when it insists on the right to be present, in a political and military capacity, in Jordan and on the right to use the Hashemite territory as a base for its military operations against Israel?

A. Personally, I believe that it is essential that that the PLO have a political presence in Jordan. As for the rest, I do not want to interfere. It is up to King Hussein and Mr Arafat to agree on the new stages of their co-operation. Meanwhile, everything must be undertaken to favour a durable settlement. To this effect, I do not cease to encourage the Palestinian leaders to form a government, whatever its composition in order that they may fully exercise their responsibilities.

Q. Some people reproach you for having excessive confidence in Mr Kissinger.

A. Of all the American Secretaries of State with whom we have had dealings in the past twenty years—notably Dulles, Rusk and Rogers—Mr Kissinger has revealed himself to be the most far-sighted, the most perceptive in his judgments, and also the most loyal. He only promises what he can give. He has honoured all his obligations in our respect. Certainly, the Watergate affair, the internal crisis in the United States, has slowed his efforts in favour of peace. But I am certain that he will not disappoint us. However, supposing Henry is not the man I have just described, do you believe that we would have another alternative to American mediation? I am not saying that the Soviet Union has no role to play, but it must be admitted that the United States resolves most of the setbacks, since Israel is entirely dependent on her.

Q. Do you believe then that the United States is in a position to exercise pressure on the Jewish state?

A. I most certainly do. But we are not asking the Americans to put an end to the privileged relationship they have with the Israelis. We only want them to intervene to prevent an explosion which would risk leading them into a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Understand me well. I have absolutely no intention of entering into a conflict with the United States or any other super-power. I know my limits. On the contrary, I seek good relations both with Moscow and Washington—and only in the interests of Egypt.

It is true that at the Vladivostok 'summit' Mr Ford and Mr Brezhnev were unable to come to an

understanding over the way to reach a solution in the Middle East.

The former favours a settlement by stages, the latter insists that the whole problem be submitted to the Geneva conference. I do not think, for my part, that the two methods are contradictory. We will continue our negotiations with a view to regaining part of our lost territories and we will go to Geneva on the day when it is possible to sign a definite peace agreement.

Q. Nevertheless, your relations with Moscow continue to get worse. What exactly are the differences which separate you from your Soviet allies?

A. First of all, they were and they remain hostile to any military action, even limited, against Israel. They are refusing to deliver the military supplies which we need. It is the same as in 1971—the year I had announced as being decisive—in a very simple way they prevented me from launching the hostilities: they abstained from honouring arms contracts already concluded.

Today our differences extend to various fields, military, economic and political. They accuse me notably of waging an anti-Soviet campaign in the Middle East in order to undermine their position in the region. Nevertheless, it is my duty to make public our grievances, to inform the Egyptians and other Arabs of the difficulties we run into. Why should they take umbrage at criticisms, though natural, in relationships between allies. Moreover they reproach me for obstructing the convening of the Geneva conference, which is not true.

In the economic field, they are not giving us the means to overcome the effects of the war, of the destruction inflicted on us by the enemy, of world inflation. Last year we should have given them £E80 million (about \$209 million) in partial settlement of the debts we had contracted in buying arms and equipment. This year we asked them for a ten-year moratorium, similar to the one they had allowed Syria, due to the fact that our investments in internal projects did not permit us to honour our debts. But they turned a deaf ear. However, our financial problems are one thousand times worse than those experienced by our Syrian brothers.

In the military field, they refuse to replace the supplies we lost during the October war or to deliver us the latest sophisticated arms which they provide for Syria without difficulty. Israel, for

her part, has received all she needs from the United States, to the point that those responsible in Washington complain that the Jewish state has drained the American arsenals. And I only cite examples illustrating the inimical attitude the Soviets have towards us.

Q. How do you explain the fact that they allow the Syrians what they refuse you?

A. I am unable to understand their attitude.

Q. Could they have taken umbrage at your decision to refuse permission for the experts and military advisers to return to Egypt?

A. I know nothing about it. In any case, they have not mentioned this matter since I expelled their technicians in July 1972.²⁰ That affair, as far as I am concerned, is over and done with.

Q. Before the October war you also claimed that Moscow had not adequately equipped your army. Nevertheless, you did not seem to lack for anything when you launched your offensive against the Bar Lev line. Many people since then believe that you are still bluffing today.

A. I give you my word that what I am telling you today is the absolute truth. Certainly, I am receiving Soviet arms, thanks to the purchases made by my friend President Boumedienne, as well as supplies from Western Europe paid for by King Feisal.

Q. If Moscow persists in not delivering the arms you ask for, would you go as far as renouncing the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty?

A. I cannot exclude such an eventuality, but it is very difficult to take a decision which would go against the interests of Egypt and the Arab world in general. I would have to think a lot before taking such a decisive step. We cannot renounce Soviet arms because no other power is in a position to substitute for the Soviet Union in this field. However, my patience has its limits, and my duty is to ensure, by all means possible, the defence of my country.

Q. Could it be concluded from this that you are not fit to participate in a new war?

A. Absolutely not. The arms we possess are sufficient to inflict on our enemy heavy, very heavy, losses, more than those they experienced in the last conflict.

²⁰ See docs. 111 and 219 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

Q. Do you think Israel intends to launch a preventive war?

A. Yes, I am persuaded of this, because the leaders of the Jewish state hope in this way to resolve their formidable internal problems while at the same time satisfying the army, which seeks to assure itself of a decisive victory in an effort to regain the prestige it lost in the last armed conflict. The Israeli military have not drawn one lesson from the trial they experienced. However, they should beware: we are as capable as they are of having recourse to a preventive war if we judge it to be indispensable for our defence.

Q. Do you believe Israel needs the green light from the United States to launch hostilities?

A. I am certain of it. However, it is to be feared that the Massada and Samson complexes from which they suffer may lead them to take the initiative without the prior agreement of Washington. Profiting from a favourable conjuncture due to the next American presidential election in the United States, they could be capable of dragging the United States and the whole world into a new war.

Q. If it is true that the United States furnished Israel with the means to fight for 21 days without having recourse to foreign aid, do you not think that Syria and Egypt find themselves in an inferior position in this respect?

A. Syria has no reason to envy Israel. She is endowed with supplies equivalent in quantity and quality. As for Egypt, I would prefer to say nothing on the subject. . . .

Q. Do you anticipate the opening of a third front by Jordan in the case of a new war?

A. I wish for it with all my heart, but I do not think that Jordan has the means to play an active part in eventual hostilities. However, I assure you that my strategy is peaceful and not belligerent in nature.

Q. Do you expect to be believed by world public opinion?

A. World public opinion would be wrong not to take me at my word. Before the October war I aroused general scepticism when I proclaimed my willingness to regain the occupied territories by force. I am equally sincere today when I declare that I ardently wish for peace. Having said this, I will not hide from you that I am in the process of taking every measure necessary for the defence of Egypt.

Q. You recently stated that you would go to war if Syria was the victim of an attack. Would you do the same if Israel should occupy southern Lebanon as many in the Middle East think she intends?

A. The case of Lebanon differs from that of Syria. We have made definite promises to Damascus, but not to Beirut. The Arab world in its entirety is collectively responsible for the defence of Lebanon.

Q. Do you believe the Arab states would resort to the oil weapon in the guise of reprisals, and, in such an eventuality, would Europe be spared?

A. I reply in the affirmative to your two questions. It would be absurd to sanction countries like France which observes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict an attitude of marked objectivity. In any case, we would be reasonable, as we have been since the October war. We have absolutely no intention of strangling the Western economy, contrary to the claims of the American leaders.

Q. Do you take seriously the threats of Mr Gerald Ford, and Mr Henry Kissinger concerning the possibility of an American military intervention in the Middle East?²¹

A. Henry was wrong to use such language. The gunboat diplomacy practised in the nineteenth century is inconceivable in the present world situation. Do you remember the deplorable failure of the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956? Do you think we would remain with our arms folded in the face of an American military intervention? The United States has been warned: the Arabs will set fire to the oil wells if they are the victims of an armed aggression.

Q. Israel maintains that she would make substantial concessions if the Arabs agree to offer her a total peace, and particularly if they agree to accept the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. Would you be prepared to consider such a settlement?

A. I am ready to conclude a peace agreement with Israel and to accept the obligations entailed in such an accord. Nevertheless, I think it is still too early to speak of diplomatic relations and open borders. It would be necessary to stamp out the bitterness and hatred accumulated in the course of 26 years of bloody conflict. I leave to the next generation the task of deciding whether it is possible not only to coexist with the Jewish state but also to

²¹ See doc. 199 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and doc. 38 above.

co-operate with it. It all depends, moreover, on Israel's attitude after peace is established.

Q. In these circumstances, would you be ready to grant Israel guarantees for her security, while giving her, for example, control of Sharm-es-Sheikh?

A. Sharm-es-Sheikh has no strategic value, as was demonstrated in the October war. So long as the Arabs are in a position to close the Bab-al-Mandeb straits at the southern tip of the Red Sea, what use would it be to occupy Sharm-es-Sheikh?

Q. Would you agree to demilitarize Sinai?

A. Yes, if Israel consents to a similar measure, and in equal proportion, on her own territory. But, believe me, international guarantees assuring the security of Israel and her Arab neighbours at the same time are worth nothing. The United States and the Soviet Union are willing to furnish us jointly with such guarantees, which would be sanctioned by the other members of the Security Council, and, if they wish it, by the whole United Nations.

Q. You are expected in Paris on 27 January. What do you actually expect from this visit, the first by an Egyptian head of state to France?

A. First of all, I am very happy that I have been given the opportunity to meet your President, for whom I have great respect. Our meeting will, doubtless, allow us to put into action the friendship which binds the Arab world not only with France but with the whole of Europe. We would most highly appreciate your government's position in the field of energy. Naturally, we would contribute towards assuring France's oil supplies under any circumstances.

France could provide us with the technology we need for our economic development. Moreover, King Feisal has already bought from France a significant quantity of military supplies for our use. We hope to acquire more.

I also intend to examine with President Giscard d'Estaing the possibility of constructing in Egypt nuclear plants which are indispensable to a country like ours; where 95 per cent of the land is desert. We will also consider other fields in which we could establish fruitful co-operation.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)²²

Aswan, January 20, 1975

At the invitation of his brother Arab, President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.M. King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia paid a visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

H.M. King Faisal affirmed his view that aid must still be extended to the Arab Republic of Egypt to enable it to withstand any unscrupulous attack to which it may be subjected. As a result, King Faisal has decided to do his utmost to realize these objectives.

The two leaders examined the situation in the Arab homeland in depth. H.M. King Faisal praised the heroism of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces on the Sinai and Golan fronts, as well as the Arab armies and the Palestine resistance which fought in the Ramadan war under the leadership of Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hafiz Asad, who are determined to proceed with the struggle irrespective of cost or sacrifice. The King also praised the splendid position adopted by the Arab countries in closing their ranks and mobilizing their energies in order to gain the glory of contributing to the liberation of the land and its sanctuaries.

President Anwar Sadat applauded the position of H.M. King Faisal as well as his role in the battle and the aid and cooperation which he has extended to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The two leaders affirmed their concern to consolidate and coordinate Arab solidarity and their determination to continue to implement the resolutions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, especially those that relate to enabling the PLO—as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—to discharge its responsibilities on the national and international levels. They further affirmed the necessity of mobilizing all the energies of the Arab states for the sake of liberating the occupied Arab

²² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 21, 1975.

lands as well as Islamic sanctuaries from the common enemy threatening the destiny of the Arab nation.

The two leaders also expressed grave concern for continued Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory and agreed to support Lebanon to allow it to face the vicious Israeli attacks. They urged all sister Arab states to stand by Lebanon and lend it support.

The two leaders expressed their conviction that peace cannot be established unless Israel withdraws completely from all occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem and respects the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to its homeland and to freedom of self-determination.

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Statement by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon questioning the Palestinian presence in Lebanon²³

Beirut, January 24, 1975

"State" in its simplest form implies an authority that is one and supreme, above all individuals and groups and centers of influence no matter what they may be. When this single, unified authority is absent, the state is absent. This exigency is not motivated by a desire to subjugate the people, to humiliate individuals and to dominate arbitrarily. No, the motive is to prevent dispersion of the power to decide, lest sharing this power among many forces give rise to "powers" which are contradictory, contrary, and conflicting.

The political society which wishes to guard its cohesion and soundness and desires authority for the service of man and the group, does not accept that this basic axiom be neglected under any circumstances. In Lebanon we have accepted what no other political society would accept. We have been forced to do that. We have been compelled to detach several regions of the country from the sovereignty of the state and its laws.

Another sovereignty and other laws rule over these regions.

Is this true or not?

If anyone denies this, would he be kind enough to tell me what the state or Lebanese authority can do for him if our brothers in the Resistance suspect him of wrong and one day lead him off to their centers and courts. Whether he be innocent or guilty. It is enough to mention those killed by mistake at "inspection posts", or questioned about their identity, their political behavior or tendency, their destination, their reason for travel, etc.

The south is another story. A whole region, the very borders of the country with Israel, has slipped away from the authority of the state to fall under another authority, or rather several other authorities, some known, some unknown. One of these decides to quiet the front, others decide to stir it up, to bring it to the burning point. As for the Lebanese authority it is the last to know, the last to object and protest.

There, then, is the south, that lost piece of land which has tried in vain to discover who is responsible for it, its security and its destiny. There, too, is all of Lebanon, alone amidst the rest of the Arab world, pushed into war without knowing who made the decision or why or how.

If all this and more does not mean that we are no longer in our own country, then what does it mean?

If all this and more does not mean that the state has become a number of petty states, the law a number of laws, and authority several authorities, then what does it mean?

We would not be mistaken if in this situation we demanded that complete sovereignty be abdicated, not just half. Relinquishing part is worse than surrendering all. We went through this experience in the period of colonialism and the mandate. Despite the feelings of debasement, bitterness and injustice we were at least facing one authority which we could resist or try to live with, moreover the safety of the individual and his person was assured.

But when authority and sovereignty are dispersed, part here and part there, then the situation becomes unbearable.

May our Palestinian brothers excuse me for talking with such candor. It is our conviction that this candor will help them to understand us better. Perhaps if we remind them of their absolute

²³ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 25, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAN Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 15-19.

rejection of any Arab meddling in their affairs and their refusal of any tutelage, any critical gesture no matter how trifling, small, or simple, then they will realize the extent of this sacrifice which they are demanding from us and are holding us to with insistence.

I am not broaching this question from the aspect of national dignity and vigor, but from that of effectiveness, the effectiveness of the state, the effectiveness of its powers and decisions which are the guarantee of our joint security.

I would prefer a thousand times that the Palestinian Resistance rule over us and take the full responsibility for our conditions and their own, rather than this partition of responsibility and sovereignty and the authority of the law. At least in the former case we would know who is responsible and how to settle accounts or seek protection. The rule of the Palestinian Resistance would not be worse in any case, than the rule of colonialism and the mandate. Believe me, I prefer this one sole rule to the present dispersion of powers.

What has led us to this state of affairs? It is a national division. Lebanese, in addition to their old traditional differences, are divided between a group that calls for indulgence towards our brothers whom life, Israel and the world conscience have treated unjustly, and another group who say what I have just said. To put it more candidly: a group indulgent only to the extent that the existence of the state is not destroyed and responsibility is not dispersed, and a group indulgent to the furthest limits and even beyond. The fault, the entire fault, is this unlimited indulgence.

Were I in the place of our Palestinian brothers I would have tried, perhaps, to profit from the occasion to the very limits of possibility exactly as they have done without hesitation.

But I would not have gone to such lengths if someone were to give me palpable proof that such indulgence is an enormous harm to him and to me at the same time.

Shall we recall how renunciation, indulgence, and abdication began?

It began when our brothers the fedayeen took upon themselves to infiltrate to our southern borders and to establish their centers there without asking or consulting anyone. When the military authorities notified the political authorities about the consequences of this and the impossibility of assuring protection for the south and for the

Resistance itself in such conditions, no matter what their strength and capacity, the ruling establishment was divided within itself—the indulgent and those who rejected indulgence, those who demanded a recognition of fedayeen activity and those who rejected it.

In vain we tried, the government and ourselves, the army and ourselves, to lead the other group to understand that official recognition of fedayeen activity was an unusual innovation which threatened disaster.

In vain we tried to show the dangers of ceding the responsibility of sovereignty over the Arqub and our borders, and the dangers of presenting Israel with the pretext it had been seeking since it came into being.

At that time the atmosphere was heavy and oppressive; it stifled voices and deafened ears. Then the inevitable happened.

There were things which we never for a moment accepted and the necessity of which was unconvincing. If it is said that the Cairo accord²⁴ forms a bond of clear consent, the truth is that it was less an accord than a plank which a drowning man grabs for as he sinks. We did not agree to it and the government was not in a condition allowing it to accept or refuse. The government was forced to choose between two evils: that of a destructive civil war or that of the "accord" which it accepted under constraint.

I do not bring up this subject for the sake of stirring things up; that is not my aim. My purpose is only to arrive at the following question after the ordeal which has been imposed on us: how much benefit did the Palestine cause derive from our ceding the south and from the actions and operations undertaken from there? To what extent was Israel harmed? What were the injuries to Israel which profited the Resistance and its cause? Were they one quarter of the injuries inflicted on Lebanon then we would be the gainers and would be willing to continue the gamble on condition that these who pretend to weep cease their crying and accept this obligatory price for the cause and its future.

But if the balance of gain and loss tilts toward the side of Israeli interests in a conspicuous, serious way, then we are fools and dolts, still worse by

²⁴ An alleged text of the Cairo accord is doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

continuing in this way we would deceive ourselves into encouraging suicide for its own sake. We ask nothing more than such a comparison be made and that the account be given. But, to whom will you read your Psalms, David?

There is a strange insistence on refusing all investigation, all dialogue, all negotiation and all discussion no matter what its type. This is a thing which increases our fear and it is for this reason that I came to the President of the country to look into the matter with him and to tell him frankly that the conditions have become such as to demand a minimal refusal of what the passage of time and the mildness of our reaction has fostered. We must demand it be reined in or at least kept where it is, and we must not allow it to become further aggravated or compounded.

Let it be understood, we are not seeking to create any problem with our Palestinian brothers. We ask only that they put order in their ranks and suppress anarchy. We ask, for example, that they exact justice from those responsible for the affair in Tyre and the other similar affairs continually occurring. I am sure that if a severe punishment were inflicted on those who kidnapped the soldiers and were implicated in the famous events of May, this act of kidnapping would not have been repeated yesterday in Tyre in similar circumstances.

How can one be content with condemnations and disavowals, and expressions of pain and grief and the like? They are means which do little to put fright into the anarchist or fear into the madman, nor do they restrain the frustrated disbeliever who wishes to spread his despair and disbelief to all.

Either the Resistance is capable of deterring these manifestations and will give proof of that in word and act, or the Lebanese authorities must be allowed to regain their complete authority and responsibility. This is in our interest and in the interest of Palestine and its people also.

Decisions about war must be restricted to us alone, or at least let them be Arab decisions taken on the highest level, otherwise there will be no war or any thing resembling it. And all this talk about defense matters and arms and arming will remain talk until the matter of the country's defense returns to our hands.

If it seems to others that some of us, or more precisely, myself have hesitations or questions in this area, it is certainly not because I have any

fear of dying for the country and its honor and sovereignty. Rather the hesitation comes from the certainty that military defense is impossible when there is more than one military plan, more than one army and more than one leadership. It is vain to talk about military defense in such a situation. I can not imagine that Egypt or Syria would have been able to do any thing in the recent war if they allowed our brothers the Fedayeen to conduct themselves on the front and on the borders the way they are acting on our front and our borders.

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Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt made at the conclusion of his visit to France²⁵

Paris, January 29, 1975

Q. What about the Mirage?

A. This problem has a long history. We took a decision more than six months ago at the Supreme Council of the armed forces to diversify our sources of arms. Accordingly, I was very concerned to discuss the subject of the Mirage aircraft, for the following reasons: First, I have not received any replacements for arms lost more than fourteen months ago. Secondly, I want our armed forces to get the Mirage which is a multi-purpose aircraft. For these reasons, I asked President d'Estaing in my talks with him if we could buy some of these aircraft and he agreed, and I am grateful to him.

Q. What role can France play? What role can Europe play in solving the problem?

A. I discussed this subject at length with President d'Estaing. The mature and perceptive role of leadership which France is playing in Western Europe is of great importance. Our region represents a security flank for Europe. This is why Western Europe must contribute to the solution of the problem. I talked about this with the French president, discussing not merely France's role of leadership but calling upon France and Western Europe to perform such a role.

²⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 30, 1975, p. 3.

Q. How many Mirage aircraft will you get and what will be the manner of payment?

A. You have no doubt heard that I asked to buy 120 aircraft which is equivalent to the total lost in the October war. But this is not true. What I have agreed to buy is much less. As for payment, we have no problem there because we have the necessary funds to buy these aircraft.

Q. President d'Estaing spoke of the possibility of achieving a settlement for the Middle East problem. He appeared optimistic. Is this due to the effect of what you said to him? Has the visit achieved its objectives?

A. Let me begin at the end. The visit did in fact achieve all the objectives I had envisaged for it. As for optimism, I found President d'Estaing optimistic even before I told him I was optimistic too.

Q. You stated in a press interview that, speaking for both Egypt and Syria, you would not attack Israel. Did you contact Syria about this matter? If the situation is dangerous, does this mean that the danger lies in an Israeli attack against you?

A. I want to repeat again that we in Egypt, and I can speak for Syria also, will not begin an attack on Israel. You have to believe me because you did not believe me when I said once that I will launch war. But if Israel attacks Syria, the problem does not require an agreement with Syria because Egypt will fight if Israel attacks Syria and there is no need for any agreement.

Q. I mean, is there an agreement that Syria will not attack Israel?

A. When I state this, I am talking on the basis that we belong to one command.

Q. In case of a settlement, would you agree to the presence of international, including French, forces? Do you have other proposals for international guarantees?

A. When the time comes for guarantees we will discuss them although it has not come yet. I have talked at length about this with President d'Estaing. If such guarantees include the presence of international troops, I would have no objection whatever to French troops. On the contrary, I would welcome this, provided troops are stationed on both sides of the border.

Q. What is your view of Kissinger's efforts and of the role played by France?

A. I welcome the French role and have talked at length about it with President d'Estaing. We went even further and talked in terms of a total conception of the problem in the next stage.

Q. Will France join the Geneva Conference?

A. Not at first, but at a later stage.

Q. When do you expect this conference to be held?

A. I have stated that we must now avoid an explosive state of affairs. Israel must withdraw from all three fronts before we go to Geneva.

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Statement by General Secretary Habash of the PFLP outlining means of confronting plans against the Palestine revolution²⁶

Baghdad, early February, 1975

Brothers:

For many a long year our masses have been hungry, afflicted, persecuted, poverty-stricken and deprived of education. The enemy is in occupation of areas of our land; our resources are being plundered. By draining off our wealth and exploiting our efforts imperialism is becoming ever more bloated, while our civilization and our very existence at the material level are being undermined. The gravest of responsibilities falls to the nationalist forces: it is to mark out the course for the confrontation of this plan.

1. The Palestine revolution must continue and be escalated; the settlement must be sabotaged and national unity must be established on the basis of rejecting all settlements, continuing to fight and insisting on the establishment of a national authority over every inch of Palestinian territory that is liberated in the above way.

2. It is the duty of the vanguard of our masses in Jordan and of their national forces to crystallize the will for liberation of the Jordanian masses and to

²⁶ Made in a speech at the Conference of Craftsmen's Organizations held February 1-3, 1975; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), February 8, 1975, pp. 16, 17.

establish a Jordanian-Palestinian front. This will make the Jordanian arena a supporting base for continuing the battle of liberation in the territory of Palestine.

3. In view of the inability of the Lebanese regime to protect territory and people, it is the duty of the vanguards of our masses in Lebanon and of the Lebanese nationalist forces to organize and arm themselves and to establish a Lebanese-Palestinian front. This will counter aggressions, protect the revolution and realize the will of the masses in the territory of Lebanon.

4. It is the duty of our masses in Syria and Egypt to struggle for the liberation of the occupied territory by fighting to check the rightist recidivism and to redirect their countries on to the course of the Arab national and social revolution.

5. Iraq, with its progressive régime, bears a special responsibility at this fateful historical stage, and it must face up to this responsibility. Iraq, under the command of the Baath Party and the National Front, should release the energies of the masses, reinforce national unity and induce a profound awareness of the solidarity and unity of destiny that link the Arab and Kurdish peoples. It should consolidate the progressive gains that have been achieved, and start on the implementation of new projects through comprehensive and unified development plans. In this way, through its energies, resources and nationalist and progressive line, Iraq can constitute a force bearing a special responsibility for supporting the struggles of the Arab nation in all its regions. It can also play a major part in the advance of the Arab revolution towards its goals.

6. The nationalist and progressive Arab regimes of Iraq, Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Libya and Somalia should, through cooperation and co-ordination, play their part in aiding the Palestinian revolutionary line and supporting the Arab guns that are at the ready in Oman and Eritrea. They should consolidate their social and progressive achievements and transform the slogan of Arab solidarity, now under the command of Arab reaction, into Arab solidarity against imperialism and its schemes.

11. The immense oil resources at the disposal of Arab territory must serve two purposes. They must be transformed into a powerful weapon in

the hands of the masses to be used for the recovery of our rights; they must also be used for the building of a modern Arab society and the elimination of backwardness.

The nationalization and liberation of this wealth and the employment of all our revenues on behalf of the Arab masses must take place within the framework of a programme covering all sections of the Arab liberation movement.

13. In our unrelenting struggle against imperialism we must rely on all the forces of the revolutionary camp, which comprises the socialist countries, the national liberation movements and all progressive and democratic forces in the world.

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Statement by Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan outlining Jordan's reaction to the resolution of the Rabat Arab summit²⁷

Aqaba, February 6, 1975

Both at the meetings of the kings and presidents at the Rabat conference itself and at the preparatory conference of foreign ministers that preceded it, the Jordanian delegation, headed by His Majesty the King, raised all aspects and dimensions of the situation and possible developments in it, indicating Jordan's responsibilities, duties and potentials. There were collective and bilateral discussions and talks characterized by a high level of appreciation of the responsibilities imposed by the stage through which the Arab nation is now passing in its confrontation of the crisis of aggression. At all the meetings a fraternal, friendly, frank and objective atmosphere prevailed. After exhaustive consultations, and in the light of the talks and discussions that took place, the Jordanian delegation took a decision which it believed was to the advantage of Jordan, of the situation, of the cause as a whole and of all Arab

²⁷ Made in a speech to the Conference on Educational Guidance; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 7, 1975, p. 7. For the resolution see doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

parties. So that national and local responsibilities may be allotted and with a view to facilitating common action in an atmosphere of general mutual understanding, Jordan decided, in conformity with the Arab consensus, to approve the Arab resolution adopted by the Arab summit conference regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and affirming the right of the Palestinian Arab people to establish a national authority, under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated. This resolution also affirmed support for the organization in the exercise of its responsibilities at the national and international levels, within the framework of Arab commitment, and calls on Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization to devise a formula for relations between them in the light of these resolutions and with a view to ensuring their implementation.

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Naturally, however, Jordan will never renounce her national responsibilities vis-à-vis the problem as being one of flagrant armed aggression against Arab territory and against Arab rights. For the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan confronts the aggressive force of Israel on a long line of confrontation in a central theatre of war. Moreover, whatever happens to Jordan is inseparable from what happens to Palestine.

As I have said, this change in the situation has involved changes in many important fields. But the Jordanian government, determined as it is to meet its obligations vis-à-vis the Arab resolution and to perform its national duty, has, in its domestic and foreign policy, followed a middle course in which no place has been allowed for the improvised or the extempore. It is my duty to recall, with the greatest respect and esteem, that this sound course was planned by King Hussein himself in his wisdom and discernment.

In the field of foreign affairs Jordan is committed to supporting the principle that the Palestine Liberation Organization shall represent the Palestinian people in any talks that may be held on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and any occupied Palestinian territory that is liberated. Jordan rejects Israeli claims which attempt to restrict the right to discuss these matters to Jordan

alone, if for no other reason than that she is committed to the principle that Palestinian territory shall be returned to the Palestinian people under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Jordan will never go back on this decision and never abandon this commitment.

In the field of internal affairs Jordan is well aware of the situation that has arisen from the merger of the East and West Banks, for twenty-five years, in as close a union as has ever existed, a union so close that it is now difficult to distinguish between what is Palestinian and what is Jordanian, let alone set a date for such distinction. And there is no need to mention how intimately the life of individuals and groups has become fused or that they now all owe allegiance to a single entity and to the same institutions.

Jordan is also well aware that it is by no means easy to abandon the administrative and economic system that has arisen in the West Bank and has become linked to the government headquarters in the East Bank. She also realizes that it may be impossible for the liberation organizations, in the circumstances that have so far existed, to shoulder the administrative responsibilities at present entrusted to the Jordanian government as regards the West Bank, its people, the affairs of its citizens and their day to day requirements and transactions. Therefore, as proof of its good intentions, the Jordanian government has decided to continue in the performance of its duties vis-à-vis the West Bank until such time as circumstances permit the liberation organization's taking over these responsibilities. His Majesty the King announced this at the Rabat conference, and his announcement was greatly appreciated.

However, for the Rabat resolution to be truly meaningful, not only political moves are required. In addition the requisite steps must be taken to make the Palestinian identity a tangible fact. This is something that affects the Jordanian arena and has repercussions on the Jordanian entity, in as much as it will make that entity definite and distinct. Therefore such modifications, changes and adjustments as have been made in the Jordanian internal situation since the Rabat resolution and such measures of this kind as may be taken in the future, are intended exclusively to give the Rabat resolution its true significance in the Palestinian and Jordanian arenas. In the near future elections to the new Chamber of Deputies

will be held, and women will take part in the elections for the first time in the history of Jordan. They will be free, model elections which will return the best of this country's men to seats in parliament and entrust them with the task of representing this Arab people of ours. In everything that has happened and that will happen in the future two elements have been taken fully into account. The first is that there should be no excessive haste in taking decisions: they must be based on due appraisal of developments in the situation. The second is that the fundamental rights of all citizens will be maintained; care will be taken to ensure that nothing is done to infringe or do violence to them and that no measures are taken that could infringe their civil rights as regards nationality, identity, work and so on. Also every care will be taken to ensure that nothing is done to disturb or upset our social, political and economic situation.

We therefore believe that it is imperative that the joint efforts of the two superpowers the US and the USSR to reach fruitful results as regards solving the crisis should continue. Here we are most anxious that détente between these two superpowers should continue, and we regard it as gravely detrimental; indeed quite intolerable, that the solution of the crisis of aggression in the Middle East should be governed by the state of the relations between the two superpowers. We believe, and we are right to do so, that the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories daily augments the fruits of aggression, not to mention the complications arising from the continuation of that aggression and the surprises it may give rise to.

Speech by Emir Sabah of Kuwait made at the opening of the new session of the Kuwait National Assembly (excerpts)²⁸

Kuwait, February 11, 1975

Honourable Members,

As we meet today our Arab area is passing through a critical period in its history. In spite of the progress achieved by the Arab nation as regards its just causes, our enemies are waiting for disaster to befall us, in the hope that it may prevent us from making further gains and impair our prestige in the world. It is therefore absolutely essential for the sake of both our present and our future that we consolidate our gains, develop our solidarity and step up our cooperation. This is an article of faith to Kuwait, and she strives unrelentingly to realize it. Moreover, in pursuance of our unambiguous policy in the Arab field, from which we never deviate, Kuwait, along with her sister Arab countries, has expended unceasing efforts to consolidate the gains achieved by the Arab nation during and since the Ramadan war, and to confront the international conspiracies aimed at misrepresenting the Arab situation in general and the attitude of the Arab oil producing countries in particular. Kuwait's efforts have been based on her profound belief in the common destiny and her realization that reinforcing Arab solidarity, strengthening unified Arab action and meeting Arab commitments within the framework of a comprehensive Arab plan are the best way of achieving the highest goals of the Arab nation.

On the basis of this clear view of joint Arab action, Kuwait has participated in the summit conferences and in the implementation of their resolutions, as also in the meetings of the two emergency sessions of the Arab Defence Council. Kuwait has also continued to give full support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the honourable struggle in which the Palestinian people are engaged.

Honourable Members,

Our intrepid army, which is performing the

²⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), February 12, 1975, p. 14.

tasks of protecting the security of the homeland and defending its safety, and which stands at the ready to respond to the call of our brothers in the Arab homeland to defend our just causes, is continuing to develop both its manpower and its equipment, and the government is taking pains to supply it with every resource in conformity with the most modern patterns and in all fields for its present and anticipated future activities.

Kuwait is also cooperating with the Arab countries in the unified Arab project for the production of the arms required by the Arab forces, believing that the establishment of this industry in Arab territory will achieve the independence in this field which the Arab countries have so long striven to achieve.

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Foreign policy report of Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt (excerpts)²⁹

Cairo, February 18, 1975

I would like to lay before you some of the basic facts in the sphere of Soviet-Egyptian relations:

1. There are no differences between us and the Soviet Union concerning international issues. There are considerations of principle which are common in both our viewpoints. Both of us proceed from our commitment to work to liberate all peoples from oppression and domination and to fight imperialism. If we examine the current state of the liberation movement in the world, we find that Egypt adopts a position of genuine support for all liberation movements as expressed in specific practical actions. Perhaps our common view of international problems may best be seen in similar voting records at the UN and at various international conferences.

2. Bilateral relations are progressing normally along the lines established for them by the effectiveness of Egyptian political activity. In fact, we have always been concerned to maintain close and developing relations with the Soviet Union in all

fields and there were only two outstanding problems that affected development in relations. The first was the question of making good the military equipment lost by Egypt when waging its greatest war in modern times in defence of Arab right and honour, indeed in defence of the very existence of the Arab nation. The second was the problem of rescheduling the debts owed to the Soviet Union due to our difficult circumstances because we were forced to spend our income on preparations for a continuing war and rebuilding what had been destroyed by Israeli aggression, in addition to earlier problems that had accumulated.

3. When Comrade Brezhnev decided, while I was in Moscow, that he would visit Egypt to see President Sadat, despite the fact that he has never visited the region since he came to power about ten years ago, this too may be considered one of the fruits of Egyptian policy. I have no doubt that he will visit us soon and this was confirmed by Comrade Gromyko when he was in Egypt recently. I would like to tell you that this visit was never at any point suspended but was postponed for reasons that we fully appreciated. We also appreciated the way the Soviet Union chose to inform us of these reasons since it showed Soviet concern and respect for Egypt's international weight and position. It is perhaps appropriate to add that when Brezhnev received me on my recent trip to Moscow, he took care to emphasize the cordial relations existing between him and President Sadat.

4. Whoever imagines that Egypt is interested in the Soviet Union only as an arms supplier would be making a grave error. We view the arms supplies with which we repel and deter the aggression against us as only one of several aspects of solidarity and cooperation in various spheres. These are not confined to politics but include the economy, trade and scientific, cultural and technical exchange. We are, in addition, anxious for the Soviet Union to play an effective role in settling the Middle East problem, not just because of its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the implementation of UN resolutions, but also as a friend of whom we are fond and proud.

If we move next to examine quickly our policy in the Arab world, we find that Egypt's Arab policy has proved to be sound and well-founded at all levels. Joint Arab action has now been made

²⁹ Presented to a joint meeting of the Foreign and Arab Affairs Committees of the National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 19, 1975, p. 7.

possible by creating conditions which enable us to use the maximum degree of Arab solidarity and unity of ranks and to isolate factors that make for dissension and conflict. Thus the net result of Arab action is a reflection of power factors only. You will have noticed that the contacts of the president with Arab leaders in Arab capitals or in Egypt were always a decisive factor in shaping events in this region of the world and in determining their timing so that our Arab nation has constantly been taking the initiative and was always capable of movement.

When the seventh summit conference met in Rabat on October 26-29, 1974, most political observers in the world doubted the possibility of achieving Arab consensus regarding the right of the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. But the healthy climate in the Arab world in the few months preceding the conference and the great efforts made by the Egyptian leadership in support of the PLO made it natural for everyone to agree, at the highest levels, upon the right of the PLO to represent the people of Palestine. Thereby, the cloud that had darkened Arab horizons, impeded its efforts and wasted much of Arab energy in inter-Arab squabbles was now lifted. In the end, such squabbles benefited only the enemy.

You also know that the Rabat conference paid particular attention to bolstering Afro-Arab co-operation. In fact, this cooperation is founded upon common principles and interests. For us, it is a strategic and not a tactical issue. In this regard, I would like to point out that sister African states and their wise leaderships have demonstrated their perspicacity and a profound wisdom in declaring that by supporting Arab rights against Zionist falsehood they did so out of faith in the justice of the Arab cause and in the unity of Afro-Arab struggle, not out of greed for material gains, as some had claimed.

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This leads me to talk about the visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the region in the last few days as part of his efforts to get things moving and thus reduce tension in the region. Before discussing what was achieved during this visit, I would like to set forth the following points which would help us to follow the situation:

1. No one can deny the wisdom of a policy that

seeks to continue to pressure for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and to keep events moving along so that the situation will not stagnate.

2. Egypt does not view any future disengagement agreement on the Egyptian or Syrian fronts as an alternative to the Geneva conference. It would necessarily be a prelude and a natural preparation for it. For even if disengagement takes place on both these fronts, portions of Arab land dear to our heart would still be under Israeli occupation. Furthermore, the focal point of the entire conflict, which is the problem of the Palestinian people, cannot be tackled except at the Geneva conference under UN supervision and with the USA and the Soviet Union assuming special responsibilities. President Sadat, in addressing the ministers of information, made it a point to emphasize the connection between any new territorial agreement and political action within the framework of the Geneva conference.

3. In responding to the efforts made by the USA in this regard, we are not falling victim to American designs or pursuing the path of partial solutions as some arrogant and pretentious people have claimed. Rather, we are sincerely responding to these efforts in full awareness of the true dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its effects on the Arab nation's present and future. We are determined that there shall be no partial or unilateral political settlements.

4. The activity that Egypt finds acceptable at this stage must be of a purely military nature so that it constitutes a spatial extension of the disengagement that has actually taken place on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.

5. There is no talk at all, nor even any idea, of ending the state of war at the present stage. Egypt is committed to the view often expressed by the president, namely that such an ending can be discussed only within the framework of a total political settlement at the Geneva conference. Whoever imagines that the state of war can be ended partially or in stages is mistaken. A state of war is a specific legal state which cannot be fragmented. Once parties enter into it, they find themselves circumscribed by a series of laws and regulations that must be applied. Until the state of war is ended by a comprehensive peace agreement, a state of war cannot be lifted or removed piecemeal.

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8. Egypt will remain, as always, the party that is most enthusiastic about the Geneva conference. It is forgotten by some people that the idea of the conference was in origin an Egyptian idea proposed by the president to the international community on October 16, 1973, from this very platform and at a time when our brave soldiers were fighting their most splendid battles. Out of our concern for the conference, we are anxious that it be convened in circumstances which can ensure success and progress for it. Therefore, we cannot go to the conference before we make certain that the parties concerned, especially the USA and the Soviet Union, should agree that the first decision to be taken when it resumes its activities would be to invite the PLO to join it at the appropriate time. Egypt, in adopting this position, does not wish to impede the proceedings of the conference as is claimed by deceitful and mercenary voices. Egypt is a party that has nothing to lose if the conference were to convene tomorrow. But it refuses to abandon its nationalist responsibility or to disavow the trust placed in it. Therefore, I contacted our Syrian and Palestinian brothers in order to reach agreement on the strategy to be followed whereby we can be assured that an invitation will be extended to the PLO. We have also contacted the Soviet Union and the USA in this regard, the results of which will soon be apparent.

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Press interview statements by Deputy Chairman Hussein of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council discussing Iraq's attitude to means of achieving Arab strategic goals³⁰

Baghdad, mid-February, 1975

The power and stature of Arab oil today derives from the Arab freedom fighter. Thus, this fighter has a legitimate right to this oil in order to bolster his resistance and develop his life as a human being in every Arab country. Hence, we think that it is necessary to use the oil weapon in the

battles for liberation and development throughout the length and breadth of the Arab world. We stand opposed to the domination of international monopolies over our oil and we want our oil to be truly Arab and to serve the cause of humanity by maintaining reasonable prices for it, so as not to lose the positive European attitude that has developed in our favour and not to exhaust the third world by driving it towards the imperialist sphere of influence. For instance, we cannot simply stand and watch the terrible pressures to which two progressive regimes like India and Sri Lanka are being subjected because of energy.

The Palestine problem is the principal Arab cause. It is a cause that has international as well as national repercussions affecting, as it does, every Arab country. In facing this problem of destiny, we know that we cannot tackle it independently of its repercussions nor of the peculiar nature of the Palestine revolution. To be fair, the Palestine revolution is carrying out its mission in the midst of the most difficult circumstances ever encountered by a liberation or resistance movement in the world. This is why we do not ask of the Palestine revolution except what we ask of ourselves. We have only this to say to the Palestine revolution and to our Arab brethren: we must carefully analyse and accurately understand the current international scene and the trends of international politics. We must use the facts and information at our disposal in this regard in a manner that ensures progress and not regression. We must be armed with patience and self-confidence as we pursue our military struggle but without adventurism, just as we must pursue our political struggle without any bargaining. Power relations are on our side as is history and the passage of time.

The October war, it is true, had positive results and created new facts. To exploit such results and facts properly, we must be in favour of anything that we can obtain provided this does not take the place of our strategic objectives. We are exactly the opposite of what they try to picture us as being. We do not reject any political or military move, provided we do not blind ourselves to the realities and the liberation movements of the Arab world.

Now let me tell you frankly that the position adopted by the rejectionist movements is not in any sense an extension of the Iraqi position. They have their own particular interpretations, some of

³⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo) February 22, 1975.

which agree and some do not with our own policies. We are opposed to negative rejection. We are opposed to stagnation as well as to bargaining. We are always in favour of positive and conscious moves. We clearly committed ourselves in the Rabat summit conference to the fact that the PLO is the sole and legitimate Palestinian representative on the road to liberation. At the Rabat summit, which incidentally was the first Arab or international conference I ever attended, I told our Arab brothers, "You accuse us of employing extremist and unrealistic slogans which may lose us the support of international public opinion won by our flexible policy. We say that it was the October war, not the flexibility, which gained us the support of world public opinion, as well as the powerful stand adopted by our friends." Policy is always related to material facts which, when lost, change that policy and all that it stands for. Let us not argue about war and flexibility when we are all agreed that we do not want to lose our cause and want also to move forward and not stand still. Fine. What is it that we first want, in the framework of international legality? We want unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands. Let us go to the UN General Assembly and get a resolution to implement this. Let us then choose the Soviet Union, the USA, China and France to supervise its implementation. Israel will refuse to comply with this. But what does it want? It wants Palestine with, at least, the borders of 1975. There can be no alternative but to impose liberation by force after having properly prepared the national and international scenes. This is where political and diplomatic activity must be concentrated.

Yes, I agree that the revolutionary has the right to advance and retreat within his strategic framework. Where revolutionaries are found, all means are merely formal and can be employed without fear. At the same time, why are we afraid of what is called extremism and consider it to be negative? Why not transform it into a positive quality and use it both nationally and internationally?

No, we have not and we shall not abandon the PLO. We are always concerned that our relations should be based upon the common struggle and our fraternity and be governed by clarity and objectivity irrespective of certain differences in viewpoint. In this context, we are in favour of maintaining the maximum degrees possible of dialogue

and cooperation in the struggle in order that the Palestinians may fulfill their aspirations and attain their unity. I will let you in on a secret. We recently arrested an intelligence officer working for one of the countries of the region. During his interrogation, we discovered a devilish and well-thought out plan to disrupt relations between Iraq and the PLO by distorting various positions and fabricating reports. We shall acquaint brother Abu Ammar with the full details. In short we favour revolutionary clarity in our relations but do not ask for complete identity of standpoints and analysis. Our Iraq throws its doors wide open to the PLO and to all our brothers in struggle without the slightest discrimination.

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In the light of past experience, of present realities and future expectations, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries appear to be our allies and friends, irrespective of occasional differences in views regarding certain issues. Our duty is to strengthen this friendship and this alliance and to remember that the Soviets are not Arabs. We should not ask of them what we ask of ourselves. At the same time, we must appreciate their own commitment to the movement for human progress and should constantly strive, in a comradely and scientific fashion, to make them understand our own views of our problems. Also in the light of experience of present realities and future expectations America, specifically, appears to be now and will be for a long time to come, our principal enemy, by the very nature of its imperialist system. This is not an emotional but an objective analysis. In spite of this, we are not against relations with America because we are enemies, not of America itself, but of America's hostile policy towards our economic and political liberation, our national unity and the rights of our people in Palestine. If America wants to establish new relations based on non-interference in our affairs and on common interests, we are open to this. As I said to Rockefeller when he visited us, the borders of Iraq are like a razor's edge slashing all who try to attack us.

We are in need of advanced technology and have adopted a regulation stipulating that any foreign tender for a scheme announced on the international market must be accepted provided it is the cheapest, the best technically and the

quickest of all, with no regard whatever to nationality. Thus, for example, an American company is undertaking the construction of a deep-water harbour in Fao, in the South. Our civilian airlines have been supplied with US made Boeing aircraft. In my discussions with Mr. Rockefeller, I made the point clearly that if any US company transgresses the purely economic bounds of its operations by engaging in politics, relations with that company would be severed forthwith. There are of course certain vital projects which we can allow only our friends and allies to help us with. In point of fact, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have performed and are still performing an important role in developing our strategic economy and our defence capabilities. But these friends cannot shoulder all of the burden.

The Arab countries have become rich and this wealth cannot all be absorbed. Consequently, we must find other forces whose interests may be linked with those of the Arab world and whom we can then propel towards independence from American hegemony. These forces are the countries of Western Europe. With them we must construct rational ties and interests that are lasting, common, strong and wide-ranging. These countries, in spite of their relative inferiority in technology and in military and economic power when compared with the US and the Soviet Union, can nevertheless be of technological benefit to us. One might add that our own Arab contribution to their liberation from US hegemony weakens America's capacity to harm us and we would thus be in a better position. In point of fact, France with its culture, its weight and its enlightened and independent leadership from de Gaulle to Pompidou to d'Estaing, is the key to new and healthy Euro-Arab relations. During the recent visit of my friend, M. Chirac, the French prime minister, to Iraq, we reached deep understanding concerning the basis of the strategic relationship which can be established in all spheres between European unity and Arab unity in the long term, and between France and Iraq in the short term.

When all is said and done, we remain a part of Asia, and Israel is occupying part of our Arab Asian homeland. Hence the security of the Mediterranean is strategically linked with that of the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This fact occupies a prominent place in our thinking and policy as regards foreign affairs.

We are against retreat into a shell. We are against aggression. We are against the fragmentation of Arab causes. At the same time, we are for international peace and prosperity without exception. Hence we feel an enormous responsibility towards the problems and issues of the third world. We are most closely concerned with contributing to their solution for we are, in essence, part of that world.

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Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya discussing his attitude to the Geneva conference and the PLO and outlining the practical limitations to Libya's involvement in an eventual war³¹

Tripoli, late February, 1975

Q. Nevertheless, there is certainly talk in PLO leadership circles of accepting, by way of a compromise, a Palestinian state which would be established in the West Bank and Gaza.

A. I am firmly opposed to such a puppet state. The Geneva conference should serve the Palestinians as a platform, not as a place to capitulate.

Q. Do you support the policy of the PLO or the "Rejection Front"?

A. I have no opinion on the various organizations which make up the PLO. I support the Palestinian people, whoever its representatives may be. The PLO is only a political garb, however, which is constantly changing. For me, any man who carries arms is worthy of representing the Palestinian people.

Q. Is it true that you are giving guerrilla training to Palestinians?

A. I refuse to give information to the enemy by means of an interview. I can tell you, however, that we disapprove of aeroplane hijackings as well as of aggressions committed against civilians. Nevertheless those who indulge in such acts are,

³¹ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* (Paris), February 22, 1975, pp. 1-2.

in our eyes, excusable. They profit by mitigating circumstances.

Q. Is that why you refuse to hand over to the PLO the hijackers of a British VC10?

A. We have returned to the PLO all the fedayin that we were detaining. Abu Ayyad personally led the enquiry and took upon himself the responsibility for the fighters' fate.

The Arab states should be ashamed to participate in the Geneva conference. Their cause bears no discussion. The UN has acknowledged the right to retrieve the territories conquered by Israel in 1967. The choice for Israel is therefore between unconditional withdrawal from these territories and war.

Q. Don't you think that Mr. Kissinger is in a position to reach this objective by diplomatic means?

A. I am not interested in Mr. Kissinger or his activities. Who is he, after all? A foreign minister, a high functionary who will sink into oblivion like his predecessors. These partial disengagement agreements that he is trying to bring about do not deserve my attention. The problem for me has quite different dimensions.

Q. However, what would you do if a new war were to break out between Israel and its neighbours?

A. It goes without saying that, in this case, all the Arabs would find themselves in the same camp facing a common enemy.

Q. But if Lebanon were to be the only country attacked?

A. Contrary to the other members of the Arab Defence Council, which have also made precise commitments in this respect, I have provided Lebanon with military material of appreciable quantity and quality. However, if south Lebanon were to be occupied by the Zionist state, our geographical distance would prevent us from immediately coming to its aid.

Q. Do you think it would be necessary to decree an oil embargo in the case of a new Arab-Israeli conflict?

A. There is no rule on the matter. We could have recourse to the oil weapon in time of peace as in time of war. We could equally dispense with this form of reprisal. The means of pressure at our

disposal are numerous and diverse: the closing of the Suez canal, economic boycott, the breaking of diplomatic relations—all constitute equally valid choices. The nature of our reply will depend on the international circumstances.

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Statement by President Asad of Syria insisting that peace must be based on justice and referring the definition of Palestinian rights to the PLO³²

Damascus, February 26, 1975

By our victory in the October war, and its extension, the Golan war, we have imposed a new situation which our enemies are unable to ignore, although they are trying to bypass it and to create complications that will enable them to avoid facing facts that impose themselves so strongly that they cannot be ignored, and to avoid submitting to the demands of justice and peace.

Israel talks of peace at all times and in all places, but it is a strange kind of peace she talks of.

She differs from the whole world in her understanding of peace. She understands peace as meaning the continued occupation of parts of the territory she occupied in 1967. She understands peace as meaning disregard for the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people. At best Israel is prepared to bestow a few crumbs of rights, regarding even this as a concession and a sacrifice.

We for our part understand peace as it really is. We understand it as all peoples of the world understand it. We understand it in the light of the concepts of freedom and justice for which man has struggled throughout the long centuries of history and for which innumerable sacrifices have been made in the course of those centuries.

The peace operation which we and the whole

³² Made in a speech at the opening of the sixth general conference of the Syrian National Union of Students; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 27, 1975, pp. 3, 7.

world are looking for cannot be detached from its basis. The basis of this operation, as I have said, is not the Golan, nor is it Sinai: it is the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

Perhaps we shall be asked: What are these rights? Our answer is: Let the Palestine Liberation Organization be asked this question, and it will answer. And we shall support its answer whatever it is. This is not in accordance with any regional principle, or because the Palestinians are a nation by themselves. No, the Palestinian people are part of this Arab nation, and all of us in every part of the Arab homeland are concerned with the cause of Palestine. We are all equal in this field: we are all required to struggle to the same extent and to sacrifice to the same extent, as Arab citizens, whether we live in Syria, in Palestine, in the Arab East or the Arab West. It is not in accordance with any regional principle that we say: ask the Palestine Liberation Organization about the rights of the Palestinian people. It is because we want to give due prominence to the people of Palestine and their cause, and to oblige the enemy and the world to acknowledge the existence of this people and their cause, to impose the cause of this people on the enemy who, as we all know, refuses—not only now, he has refused since 1948—to recognize the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. These rights cannot die with the lapse of time, for as I have said on more than one occasion during my meetings with the masses of the people, the rights of peoples cannot die with the lapse of time.

Therefore, if we are to know what the rights of the Palestinian Arab people are, let us first ask the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will give the answer, and all of us will support it in its answer, in response to the dictates of the all-Arab cause and also to humanitarian dictates, which are essential to the peace process.

Secondly, if we want to know what these rights are, let us refer to the successive resolutions of the United Nations. These provide indications of the nature of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

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Memorandum from the PFLP to the Chairman of the Palestine National Council suggesting outlines for a future line of action (excerpt)³³

Beirut, early March, 1975

After this preamble, we believe that the political minimum for national unity at the present stage in which our cause is confronted with the conspiracy of imperialism, Zionism—Israel—and reactionism, must clearly and unambiguously include the following points:

1. At the Palestinian level

Determination to reject and combat the Geneva conference or any other conference leading to direct or indirect negotiations with the enemy or to recognition of him or peace with him; consequently to reject and combat all forms of settlement, based on balances of forces favourable to the forces hostile to the movement of the masses and the revolution.

Determination to reject and combat Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, or any resolutions appended to them or based on them; to reject and combat all resolutions recognizing the legality of Zionist presence in our occupied territory.

Adherence to the principles of the Palestine National Charter and respect for the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council of the Liberation Organization at its successive sessions, which stipulate continued armed struggle and all kinds of struggle linked to it, especially in the occupied territory, for the total liberation of Palestinian national territory.

2. At the Jordanian level

Alliance with the Jordanian national movement for the overthrow of the lackey regime in Jordan and the establishment of a democratic national regime to constitute a supporting base for the battle of liberation.

Determination to condemn and combat any invitation to meet or to coordinate with the lackey regime in Jordan.

Struggle by all available means to obtain freedom

³³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), March 8, 1975, pp. 4–5.

of Palestinian military and mass action in Jordan.

3. *At the Lebanese level*

Struggle to protect Palestinian guns, the overt presence of the resistance and its freedom of action.

Struggle to maintain all the gains achieved by the Palestinian masses.

Alliance with the Lebanese national movement and the formation of a Lebanese-Palestinian resistance in South Lebanon.

4. *At the Arab level*

Struggle to establish an Arab popular national fighting front to oppose imperialism and settlement.

Strengthening relations with the nationalist and progressive Arab regimes which reject the United Nations resolutions recognizing the legality of the Zionist presence in our homeland, and which oppose imperialism and settlement.

Struggle to establish the revolution's freedom to carry on armed struggle from all Arab territories against the enemy, the Zionist entity and the Jordanian regime.

Condemnation of any Arab regime that advocates settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 or any resolutions appended to it or based on it.

Condemnation of any attitude in connection with the cause of Palestine and the future of its people that has any negative effect on the right of the Palestinian people to continue the struggle to recover their full rights to liberation and return.

5. *At the world level*

Continued efforts to strengthen our alliances with the forces of world revolution: the socialist countries, national liberation movements and democratic national forces opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction. Continued dialogue with our allies throughout the world with a view to correcting the erroneous attitudes of those that have recognized the legality of the Zionist presence in our occupied territory.

6. *At the organizational level*

Efforts to revolutionize the Liberation Organization, its institutions and offices, and to turn the Liberation Army into a combatant people's liberation army and to liberate it from official Arab tutelage; the drawing up of schedules and a timetable for the achievement of this.

Adoption of the formula of a front in which all organizations have equal status, collective command at all levels in the building of national unity, and avoidance of all kinds of domination, monopolization of power and exclusiveness.

Mr. Chairman,

These are the most important of the basic points that we believe must be incorporated in any programme for a political minimum, on the basis of which national unity between the different sectors of the Palestine resistance movement can be established within the framework of the Liberation Organization and its legislative and executive institutions.

We hope that the Executive Committee has taken advantage of the experience it has gained in the last few months, reconsidered its political course and learned enough to make it enthusiastic for a political programme in which such points constitute the minimum.

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Statement by President Asad of Syria suggesting a unified political command between Syria and the Palestine resistance³⁴

Damascus, March 8, 1975

I declare that in this region we are prepared to undertake any action which will strengthen the Palestinian struggle.

We are prepared to establish a unified Syrian-Palestinian political command. This clearly means that we are prepared to establish a Syrian-Palestinian political command that will guide Syrian-Palestinian policy and a unified military command that will lead the Syrian-Palestinian armed forces.

We are prepared to do all this, if our Palestinian brothers find that this agrees with the requirements of the Palestinian struggle and enforces and strengthens Palestinian national unity. Of course, strengthening the Palestinian struggle means the strengthening of Arab solidarity.

I am here not implying particular forms of action, but only expressing the extent to which we are prepared to go for the benefit of the Palestinian struggle. I am not suggesting any particular form of action which will be imposed on others, but am expressing some thoughts aiming at the

³⁴ Made in a speech marking the 12th anniversary of the March revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 9, 1975.

strengthening of the Palestinian and Arab struggle, which can be shared by our brothers.

However, it must be clearly understood that any form of action we might decide upon now or in the future should end in the liberation of Palestine and in the establishment of the Palestinian state, for our thoughts and suggestions are now aimed at bringing into existence a unified struggle for liberation.

This should not mean that we refuse unity after liberation. On the contrary, we are consistently pro-unity and unity itself is to us a sacred aim which comes before any other aim. But unity for liberation is one thing and unity established in time of peace is another thing. We are now discussing unity for liberation.

Brothers,

I do not wish to talk on this subject any longer and what I have already said was intended to be thoughts and suggestions for possible future discussions. But of course in what I have just said, I am sure I am expressing what is going on in the conscience of every citizen in this country; I am expressing some of the feelings of struggle for unity that are deeply planted in the hearts of our people. Unity to us is an absolute faith which is completely independent of any circumstances, whether good or bad, and of any temporary opportunity or benefit.

We here are part of the Arab nation; the Arabs everywhere are our brothers, we always want to meet them, struggle with them for all our sakes, in order to bring right, justice, dignity to us and all nations of the world.

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Television interview statements by President Asad of Syria explaining his proposal for a unified Syrian-Palestinian political and military command³⁵

Damascus, March 8, 1975

Q. Mr. President, half an hour ago, during the celebrations of the twelfth anniversary of the March revolution, you made an important revolutionary proposal on the

establishment of a unified Syrian-Palestinian political and military command to continue until the Palestine entity is established.³⁶ What led you to take this important decision so suddenly?

A. Our struggle in Syria is linked to the Palestine cause and the struggle of our people in this country is linked to the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people. We always bear in mind what is likely to be of use to our Palestinian brothers in their struggle. In my speech today I wanted to show how far we could go if doing so would help the Palestinians in their struggle to recover their usurped rights. There is nothing surprising about it. We are always living with the Palestine problem: it is something basic in this area, and if we want to advance towards peace our only road lies through the just solution of this problem. After that a just peace in the area can be achieved—the peace for which we are struggling and striving with all our might.

Q. Did you take this revolutionary decision after consultation with Yasir Arafat or the Palestine Liberation Organization which was recognized at the Rabat conference as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people?

A. We have not studied this matter with Mr. Yasir Arafat or with the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

As I said, we always have the cause of Palestine in mind, for it is our cause, and the Palestinian people are a displaced part of our people. Because we think in this way we are always seeking formulas, means and possibilities that can help in our struggle. That is why I made proposals which, as I said, were just ideas that I put forward; it is for our brothers on the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization to decide on them. We are ready to implement them if they think they are in the interests of their struggle.

We want to give them confidence as they carry on their struggle, to encourage them and to embody a reality that we have been aware of throughout the course of history—that we are a single people working for a single cause. I therefore did not consider it necessary to study this subject with Yasir Arafat; they are just ideas I have put forward. We are ready to implement them when the Executive Committee of the Palestine Libera-

³⁵ Interview broadcast on French television on March 20, 1975; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 21, 1975, p. 2.

³⁶ See doc. 236 above.

tion Organization decides that we should. In any case, we are working for Arab cooperation, for Arab cohesion, and we believe that the more firm and solid we are able to make this unified Arab rank, this Arab cohesion, the better we shall be able to achieve justice in our cause, the better we shall be able to advance towards a just peace. The Syrian-Palestinian meeting, if what I have proposed can be so called, lies within the framework of Arab meeting as a whole. Of course we believe in and are working for Arab unity, and even when we talk of unity between Syria and Palestine it is within the framework of action and struggle for Arab unity.

Q. When you talk of the establishment of the Palestine entity, do you mean the whole of liberated Palestine, or a Palestine entity to be established, for example, in the West Bank and Gaza?

A. We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestine. A short time ago I made a proposal for unity between us and our Palestinian brothers. This means that they are an entity or that we regard them as being an independent entity. In Rabat the Arabs unanimously decided that it was the Palestine Liberation Organization that represents the Palestinian Arab people, and a matter like this, connected with the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, must be discussed with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By virtue of the unanimous Arab decision at Rabat,³⁷ I have no right, nor have our other brothers, to talk of the rights of the people of Palestine on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which alone can talk of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. When the unity of political command I proposed is established we can discuss the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and decide what these rights are. Then, I presume, any member of that unified command will be able to say what the rights of the Palestinian Arab people are.

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Resolution of the Kuwait National Assembly opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem³⁸

Kuwait, March 15, 1975

The Kuwaiti National Assembly;

Following with deep anxiety and sorrow the calls for internationalizing the Arab city of Jerusalem;

Stressing the unbreakable ties of the Arab city of Jerusalem with Palestine and the Arab and Islamic world;

Recalling that throughout the centuries when this city was subjected to foreign occupation the sanctities of the religions were violated and many were killed and exterminated;

Noting that Islamic sovereignty in this city has throughout the centuries [words indistinct] freedom of prayer for everybody and preserved lives and possessions during peace and war; warning that the fall of this city to the claws of Zionism in 1967 was followed by a blatant aggression against Moslems and Christians—represented: firstly by the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, by desecrating the holy places, by robbing churches and then confiscating the possessions of the Arab inhabitants, destroying the Arab quarters, deporting the inhabitants and adopting legislative [word indistinct] measures to annex this holy city to Israel;

Taking into consideration that the international organizations, the United Nations and its agencies in particular, have stressed the Arabism of this city when they called on Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and not to bring about any changes in the position of Jerusalem and to annul all the legislative and administrative measures adopted by Israel to change the city without one resolution calling for its [word indistinct]:

1. *Strongly denounces* any attempt aimed at internationalizing this Arab city or at removing complete Arab sovereignty over it.

2. *Believes* that internationalization of this city is only a new form of occupation and an open violation of its Arabism.

3. *Stresses* the absolute ties of this city with the

³⁸ Broadcast by Kuwait radio March 16; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4857/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

³⁷ See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

Palestinian soil and with the Arab and Islamic worlds.

4. *Stresses* the [word indistinct] clear and specific rights of the Arabs in this city in accordance with the UN Charter and the World Declaration on Human Rights.

5. *Believes* that maintaining the Arabism of the city is the sole guarantee of the freedom of prayer for all and for the city's preservation of its spiritual position, and thus the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area.

6. *Appeals* to the Arab, Moslem and friendly peoples and parliaments and governments to exert every possible effort to foil the attempts to internationalize Jerusalem and to restore Arab sovereignty over it.

7. *Appeals* to the UN and the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the concerned international organizations and all the world governments, parliaments and peoples to work for the immediate implementation of the UN and other international organizations' resolutions and recommendations, particularly those resolutions stating that there should be no change in the status of this city and demanding that its Arabism be restored.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the PLO Executive Committee welcoming the proposal of President Asad of Syria for a unified Syrian-Palestinian political and military command³⁹

Damascus, March 15, 1975

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Damascus on March 15, 1975, and discussed the call of President Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, for the formation of a unified Syrian-Palestinian political and military command.⁴⁰

After studying all aspects of the subject the Executive Committee decided to welcome this initiative, and expressed its great appreciation to President Hafiz Asad for this national initiative of his which is an embodiment of national commitment and of the unity in struggle between Syria and

the Palestine revolution on the path to liberation, return and the reinforcement of the Arab solidarity which was given concrete form by the glorious October war.

In the view of the Executive Committee the establishment of this unity will reinforce the fundamental principles established by the sixth Arab summit conference at Algiers and reaffirmed by the seventh Arab summit conference at Rabat. In itself it constitutes a solid nucleus for comprehensive Arab solidarity on the path to the liberation of the Arab territories occupied and usurped by the Zionist enemy.

In the view of the Executive Committee establishing this unity and consolidating it on the basis of the goals of Palestinian and Arab struggle will create a basic and effective force that will form a strong bulwark against the Zionist and imperialist challenges that confront our Arab nation in its struggle to achieve its objectives and against attempts to strike at our revolution, to liquidate our cause and to shatter Arab solidarity.

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Political Report of the Central Front of the Political Organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (excerpt)⁴¹

Aden, March 20, 1975

Greater development of solidarity and cooperation between the Arab countries is demanded by the nature of the struggle in which the Arab nation is engaged against the state of Israel. The maintenance and development of solidarity and cooperation between the Arab countries in reinforcing the Arab nation's capability to confront all the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism and the economic and social challenges that confront it is an urgent necessity if Arab national liberation struggle is to be victorious. Our country has played a modest role in the achievement and

⁴¹ Submitted to the sixth conference of the Political Organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen held March 20–23, 1975; excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), March 29, 1975, p. 28.

³⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 16, 1975, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁰ Doc. 236 above.

reinforcement of Arab solidarity through the visits we have paid to other Arab countries, our participation in Arab conferences and meetings and the modest part we have played in achieving the positive results of the resolutions of the sixth and seventh Arab summit conferences held in Algiers and Rabat.⁴² These resolutions are an auxiliary factor in the solidarity and cooperation between the Arab countries in the service of the Arab struggle for liberation against imperialism and Zionism, and they deprive the forces of imperialism of the hope of individual moves being made towards partial settlements.

As a matter of principle we support the Arab national liberation movement, and this attitude of the revolution of the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen derives from its policy vis-à-vis Arab issues, first and foremost of which is the just cause of the Palestinian Arab people. This firm attitude of ours takes the form of material, military and moral support for the Palestine resistance movement and determination to foil all attempts to contain the Palestinian revolution. We have played an honourable though modest role in consolidating the unity of the Palestine resistance movement and we have stressed the need for it to solve its minor disputes within the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This same attitude also applies as regards recent developments at the United Nations, where we have affirmed that Democratic Yemen will support the Palestinian people and the Palestine revolution and support any step taken by the latter as being the sole legitimate party entitled and able to determine the requirements of Palestinian national struggle and the tasks of Palestine revolution.

Democratic Yemen will also strive to strengthen its relations with all democratic and progressive forces in the liberated Arab countries and regimes, on behalf of the struggle against old and new colonialism, Zionist settler colonialism, aggressive bases and world monopolies.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt regarding the failure of talks with US Secretary of State Kissinger to arrive at an interim agreement with Israel (excerpts)⁴³

Cairo, March 24, 1975

There is no need for me to list the national objectives that have been and still are the basis of Egyptian policy and the cornerstone in any Egyptian move. Nor will I pause to discuss the attempts being made to distort the heroic Egyptian struggle for the sake of Arab sovereignty and dignity. You know best how fraudulent and untrue such claims are. I was merely concerned that you share with me my own conceptions, regarding the priority of objectives at this critical stage of our national history. I say therefore that we have proceeded and shall continue to proceed along the following lines:

1. To secure the Arab nation against possible aggression in the present or future, and to strengthen the Arab stand in such a manner as to make it impossible for foreign aggression or internal fragmentation to shake or topple the structure.

2. To liberate the Arab will and free it from all restrictions and to insist that all our moves and decisions spring from higher national interests, not from foreign influences nor from narrow regional prejudice or selfish and impotent opinions.

3. To protect Arab soil and safeguard every inch of Arab territory and not to ignore any move that may in future prejudice in any fashion Arab territorial integrity from the Atlantic to the Gulf.

4. To support with all our strength the brotherly people of Palestine in their struggle to restore their full rights, primarily their indisputable right to create their independent political entity on their own soil and to preserve the Arab character of Jerusalem.

5. To support the Arab cause in all its phases by soliciting the support of world public opinion and of all peace-loving forces, primarily the high-minded peoples of Africa, whose struggle to protect their heritage, resist temptations and frustrate pressures has become proverbial; the support

⁴² Docs. 331–333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*

⁴³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 25, 1975, p. 3.

also of non-aligned, Islamic and third world nations as well as the nations of the socialist camp and the friendly movements of Europe and Latin America and to deny the enemy the chance to defraud and beguile us. All this requires that we preserve at all times the humanistic image of our legitimate struggle as well as its rational content which shuns all forms of prejudice or bigotry. So long as our cause is just and strong, we must not deprive it by word or deed of any factor that lends it strength. Rather our duty is to make it stronger, more persuasive and more vigorous. And while some had accused us, before the tenth of Ramadan, October 6, 1973 of being weak advocates of a strong cause, it is necessary now and in the future for us to be strong advocates of a just cause.

6. To refuse to be sidetracked from the main issue by secondary conflicts or diversionary issues which erupt or are induced inside the Arab family of nations. This is because if we do so through an emotional outburst or for reasons of political posturing, we would have wasted an essential ingredient of power in the Arab position and accomplished an objective which our enemy has long pursued.

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This being our stand which is inspired by right, justice and peace, the Israeli enemy made its own intentions plain when it insisted on adopting stands that it knew beforehand Egypt could not accept. It requested that Egypt should agree to ending the state of war, which is a request that flies in the face of the most elementary logic. Israel knows full well that Egypt has often announced through President Sadat that it will not accept an ending to the state of war except as part of a comprehensive settlement that insures the complete return of Arab lands and the restoration of Palestinian rights. Had Egypt agreed to bargain over this national objective, the whole situation in the region would have been other than it is today. We could not have needed to continue our heavy sacrifices in blood, spirit and sustenance. When Egypt held firm to its basic position which is noncompliance with this illogical request to end the state of war while our lands remain occupied and our brethren in Gaza and the West Bank still suffer from the worst sort of occupation, Israel, as is its habit, resorted to manoeuvre and fraud. It made several proposals all of which revolved around the idea

of ending the state of war explicitly or implicitly. Each proposal brought forth the firm answer from us that you know. They even requested that Egypt should refrain from entering into any military operations directed against Israel by another state, despite the fact that Israel's leaders were certain that merely to raise this issue is to invite a clear refusal and to sabotage any agreement.

Israel knows better than anyone that Egyptian strategy is unchanging and rests upon the following principles:

1. Ending Israel's occupation of all Arab lands is a national objective which does not admit of any bargaining or whittling down.

2. Our comradeship in arms with Syria cannot be frittered away by political moves under any circumstances. It is an indissoluble fellowship cemented by the blood that was shed on the sands of Sinai and above the heights of the Golan and nurtured by a long and common history of struggle.

3. Egypt's commitment to the people of Palestine does not stop merely at the point of not prejudicing the rights of that brotherly people which has suffered the brunt of the Zionist onslaught and put up a proverbial resistance to aggression. Rather, Egypt's commitment goes beyond this to the point of working positively and employing all means in order to enable that people to regain their right.

Out of faith in our national commitment, in the battle and in the unity of the cause, I place before you the broad outlines of the proposal submitted by Egypt at these negotiations on the grounds that they constitute the basis for a military move that may prepare the way for a comprehensive solution in which all sides may take part. The first of these broad outlines is that the agreement can only be a limited military step which involves total Israeli withdrawal to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields. Egypt also asked that Israel should undertake not to engage in any military or quasi-military operations against Syria. In case Israel reneges on this undertaking, Egypt is on record as maintaining that it would carry out its full obligations towards Syria. Egypt also requested that the American president should give written assurances that his government would work actively in order to arrive at another disengagement on the Syrian front before the middle of the current year. Needless to mention, the wisdom behind this last clause is that if the disengagement agreement

on the Egyptian front had been concluded, its implementation, by the nature of things, would have needed some months. In this manner, our policy was aimed at achieving disengagement on both fronts at once.

In addition, Egypt took care to make sure that the proposal would explicitly state that no disengagement agreement was a final peace agreement nor can any such agreement impede the convening of the Geneva conference. For this latter must take place as soon as possible and all the parties concerned must take part with the object of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

Egypt further insisted that Israel must admit that no just or lasting peace is possible in the Middle East without Palestinian participation. Egypt also stressed the fact that the undertaking to refrain from military or quasi-military operations should run concurrently with the duration of the agreement and be conditional upon the continuation of efforts made to arrive at a just and lasting peace, in accordance with both the spirit and letter of resolution 338 and of other UN resolutions that have to do with the conflict. It is of course well known that the latest UN resolutions in this context affirm the right of the people of Palestine to determine their future. I would single out in this regard resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly at its last session.

The important thing in all this is that Israeli obstinacy and insistence upon aggression, despite all the efforts being made by various nations and peoples, have become, once again, obvious to the whole world. Israel's isolation is bound to increase to the point where it will be surrounded by a wall of rejection—the international community's rejection of Israeli policy with its insistence on aggression and on the law of the jungle, with all the dangers that such a policy represents to world peace and to the prosperity of nations. Faced with Israel's obstinacy, there can be no alternative but to escalate Israel's isolation from the international community, the UN and international organizations, sharing thereby the fate of South Africa and Rhodesia. The means to achieve this are at hand. We have no alternative but to pursue this path in conjunction with all nations and forces which

believe in justice, honour and respect for international agreements. One cannot conceive of a situation where the whole world continues to suffer and to sacrifice and where entire nations are grievously harmed in their security, power, energy and lines of communications all because of the obstinacy of one state, Israel, which has chosen an evil policy that harms the whole of mankind.

The potentialities of the Arab nation, their great material and economic power, the strategic location of our countries and Egypt's unique geographical position linking the world's continents through the Suez Canal—all this constitutes a vast force which must be taken into account. And this will only come about if we mobilize all Arab potentialities and use them in a scientific and rational manner based upon proper planning. In conjunction with this, specific decisions must be taken in this regard so that Israel may come to feel its guilt and reconsider its policy. Hence, I must declare that we shall all adopt certain measures which shall be a punishment to Israel for its international policy. Egypt's determination to move towards peace represents a wider Arab determination that is an expression of the conscience of the Arab nation and its aspirations. The preservation of national Arab interests is Egypt's primary cause and constant preoccupation.

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Foreign policy statement by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia (excerpt)⁴⁴

Riyad, March 31, 1975

The second pillar of the foreign policy drawn up by the late King is support for the unity of Arab ranks and the institution of real and effective Arab cooperation between the different Arab peoples in all fields—political, economic, social and others. This is what His Late Majesty was declaring when he said that the Arabs, in particular, should combine and understand each other, they should work in harmony with each other and act in unity,

⁴⁴ Delivered on radio and television by Crown Prince Fahd; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), April 1, 1975, p. 1.

rather than in disunity, so that they may avert the dangers, religious and political and ideological, that threaten them and their future.

Experience has shown that disunity brings dangers and that unity of ranks averts them. Our government will strive with deep faith to apply the words of the late King to the effect that "the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regards itself as supporting every Arab and in the service of every Arab with the aim of achieving cooperation, solidarity and brotherhood."

These two pillars—Islamic solidarity and unity of Arab ranks—are the basis of Saudi Arabia's efforts to recover the usurped rights of the Palestinian people, to regain the occupied Arab territories and to mobilize all its resources, financial and human, for the recovery of usurped rights. In this it relies, after God, on the justice of its cause and the Saudi people's faith in it—as the late King Faisal told them, "When I act, make statements or speak it is on you, after God, that I rely, and as regards the deliverance of Palestine you will be in the van, not in the rear."

The essential point in the solution of the Palestine problem is the deliverance of Muslim Arab Jerusalem from the clutches of Zionism and the restoration of the status it enjoyed when the banner of the faith floated over it. If our King left us before he was able to pray in the first spot to which the Muslims turned in prayer, all the members of our people will pray there on his behalf, and all believers will offer up their prayers for the repose of his soul.

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Statement issued by a meeting of Arab Communist and Labour Parties regarding the current political situation (excerpts)⁴⁵

Beirut, early April, 1975

8. As regards the problem of repelling Israeli-imperialist aggression and the liberation of oc-

cupied Arab territory, two major trends are at present to be observed. The first involves the pursuit of a policy of bargaining with imperialism instead of adopting the resolute attitudes demanded by the interests of our Arab peoples and the solving of our just national problems. The aim is to splinter and weaken the alliance of our national liberation movement with the world revolutionary movement, and especially with the USSR and the other socialist countries. This trend seeks to achieve partial and individual solutions which, it is hoped, will lead to the perpetuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and prevent both the Geneva conference being held and the USSR playing a part in the direct solution of the Middle East crisis. It is also designed to impede the struggle of the Palestinian people on behalf of their right to self-determination in their own land and to establish an independent national state.

The other trend is progressive and nationalist; it demands a comprehensive solution based on the total liberation of the Arab territories occupied in the June aggression and underlines the support for the struggle of the Palestinian people on behalf of their right to self-determination and to establish their national authority. It also believes that closer friendship and cooperation in all fields with the USSR is essential for the success of this nationalist line.

9. The Palestine national liberation movement occupies an important position in the activities of the Arab liberation movements, and performs an active and effective role in the confrontation, which is now so acute, of the forces of imperialism and Zionism in the area, with the object of foiling their aggressive projects and solutions.

This movement has recently achieved important successes at the Arab and international levels, by affirming the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and to establish their national state, and by gaining recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as their sole legitimate representative.

There can be no doubt that the realistic manner in which the basic facts of the Palestine problem

⁴⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Akhbar* (Beirut), April 5, 1975, pp. 20–21. The following parties took part in the meeting: the Jordanian Communist Party, the Tunisian Communist Party, the Algerian Socialist Vanguard

Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Syrian Communist Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Moroccan Party for Progress and Socialism.

have been put forward has done much to secure the international sympathy and support now enjoyed by the just national cause of the Palestinian people, this support being shown by the way the world has accepted their goal of establishing an independent Palestinian national authority in the territory that is liberated from Israeli occupation.

The achievement of this important goal, which requires hard and arduous struggle, is a decisive step towards the recovery of the other legitimate rights of that people.

The just solution of the problem of the Palestinian Arab people is a fundamental element in the establishment of a just peace in the area and in eliminating and liquidating a focus of chronic tension.

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11. In October 1973 a war of national liberation broke out because of Israel's aggressive policy and her refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. The aim of the war was to achieve the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and it made clear a number of important facts:

That the end of Israel's absolute military supremacy in the area had begun.

That an acute economic, political and ideological crisis had broken out in Israeli society.

That the crisis of Zionism as being a reactionary, and ideologically racist movement, had become more acute.

That wide-scale revolutionary impetus had been given to the Arab masses both inside and outside the occupied territories, and that they had recovered their self confidence.

That the absolute importance of the alliance with the USSR and the superiority of its armaments in the battle had been established.

That the importance of Arab solidarity, as a weapon in the struggle against imperialism and Israeli aggression, had been established.

In spite of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary activity that followed the war, and although the Arab right has followed a policy of bargaining and withdrawal, the achievements of that war and its general significance will continue to have a positive effect on the Arab liberation movement.

12. Imperialism, and in particular American imperialism, which has made unremitting efforts

to recover and strengthen its oil, political and strategic positions in the area, will benefit from the negative developments that have resulted from the activities of reaction and the right in the Arab world, and will strive to arrange things in the area in a manner that suits its own interests and those of its local allies, and prevents the Arab countries advancing along the road of economic independence and progressive social change, rather remaining the prisoners of their relations with capitalism and their subjection to imperialism.

As an important factor in the achievement of this plan American imperialism has established and is establishing military bases in the area with the aim of making certain reactionary countries, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, a major military force for the encirclement and destruction of the national liberation movement—a policy which endangers peace and security in the area.

The imperialist plan also concentrates on neo-colonialist methods, especially as regards:

a) Fragmenting the unity of the nationalist and progressive regimes and forces at the Arab level and within each country, in preparation for destroying them;

b) Weakening and destroying the alliance with the socialist camp and especially the alliance with the USSR.

c) Spreading ideas hostile to communism and the USSR and mounting campaigns of intimidation against the communist parties and the progressive forces.

d) Economic penetration of the Arab countries, combatting the advance towards winning independence from the imperialist economy and escaping from the orbit of its control; achieving imperialist domination of the principal bases of the economy, in particular oil wealth, and resisting all activities aimed at liberating this wealth and recovering the Arab peoples' rights to it.

e) Cultural penetration of information media, education, universities, research and cultural centres so as to propagate bourgeois reactionary thinking and to weaken the vigilance of the Arab peoples, to mislead the masses and to poison their ideas, with a view to weakening their fighting spirit in the struggle for their just rights and against their enemies, the forces of imperialism, reaction and Zionism.

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Press interview statements by Deputy Chairman Hussein of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council outlining the circumstances possibly conducive towards a Middle East settlement and discussing a joint Arab military command⁴⁶

Baghdad, early April, 1975

Q, I should like to know Iraq's view of the Middle East problem.

A. We believe that in politics all available strength, energy and pressure should be exerted with a clear view of things and genuine attachment to Iraqi and Arab interests.

If we confront the enemy firmly and strongly we shall make him respect us and oblige him to appraise his position in the light of the extent to which we can endanger and injure him.

If Israel feels that she can harm the Arabs to an extent and in a manner decided by her, she will not seek peace.

But if Israel realizes that her existence depends on the Arabs' consent, because of their strength and cohesion, she will accept a peaceful solution.

Getting one's rights through peace is a new idea in international relations, which has not yet taken root.

But I am convinced that there can only be peaceful coexistence on the basis of the knowledge that each side can harm the other in the event of confrontation or clash.

No country has ever been able to get peace other than through force. A country does not have to use force; what is important is that it should have material and moral strength to use as a weapon in the field of political confrontation.

Today we live in a world in which facts cannot be concealed: everything is known, even undeclared intentions.

It would therefore be disastrous for us to suggest that we intend war when it is impossible for us to strike; if we did the enemy would exploit the situation, as happened in the aggression of June 5, 1967.

You should only suggest that you intend to

make war when all the conditions for making war have been met, and this is what we must concentrate on as our first strategic goal.

Q, What can we expect from Geneva, or rather, what do you think of the Geneva conference?

A. The Geneva conference is the last possible stage in the peaceful solution; there is no later stage.

We still maintain our attitude towards this method, but we do not want to make difficulties.

As I said, if Israel realizes that her existence depends on the Arabs' consent, she will be more flexible and accept a peaceful solution in Geneva.

Therefore it is in the interests of both Iraq and the Arab nation—regardless of what we think of the Geneva conference—to go to it as heavily armed as possible.

Here we may ask to what extent America is convinced of the Geneva conference within the limits of her major strategic relationship with the USSR and the pressures they exert on each other, and of the Soviets' support for Arab rights, which could push things in the direction of another war which could be injurious to American policy in the area.

If America is prepared to exert pressure on Israel within the limits of the strategic relationship, we may anticipate something more than Kissinger's mission, but if America pretends to make efforts and then to fail, there is not much to be hoped for.

Q, What do you think Iraq's duty is as regards the problem of the liberation of Palestine?

A. The October war confirmed that Iraq provides Syria and Jordan with strategic depth, while Libya and Sudan constitute Egypt's strategic depth.

We now have an army that is stronger than it was in the October war as regards equipment, training and experience.

Some of the other Arab countries have their armies and some of them are eager to pour all their resources into the battle and to use them in the fighting, but no Arab country, with the exception of Egypt and Syria, has an army equal to that of Iraq.

Q, What does Iraq think of the establishment of a unified Arab military command? Not a merely token command, but a real command capable of making plans

⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo), April 14, 1975.

and supervising their implementation?

A. If we do not consider our national situation and the importance of there being a single command for the combatant armies, let us at least take advantage of the experiences of the world.

The strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO lies in the fact that they have a single command and uniform armaments. Even if our national situation does not prompt us to establish a single command, at least the technical requirements of the military art should prompt us to do so.

However, I do not want to oversimplify matters and to conceal aspects of the problem that could give rise to difficulties. For there to be a single command there must be a single political trend as regards our view of the battle and, consequently, the strategy drawn up in the light of the tasks required by the battle. If the command is not unified from this point of view every army will refer to its own political authority to see what decision it will take in the light of its own individual strategy.

It is therefore very important that there should be an integral view and that this view should be discussed, so that we may ensure unity of command at least as regards effective action, if not as regards political conformity in all matters.

We cannot hope for as much as that, but we are taking action within the framework of realities, and we can say that the military and political strategic goal of the coming battle must be clear.

Within the framework of these calculations a unified military command can be really effective.

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Communiqué issued by the Regional Command of the Baath Party of Syria on the decisions adopted at the Party's Sixth Regional Conference (excerpts)⁴⁷

Damascus, April 20, 1975

C. In Arab and international policy:

The Conference conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Arab and international situation

and affirmed the correctness of the policy pursued by our Party and our region under the command of Comrade Hafiz Asad, the General Secretary of the Party—the policy which led, among other things, to the victories of October. In the course of this analysis it was established that the principle contradiction that still dominates the present stage of the struggle of the Arab nation is with the Zionist enemy and the imperialist forces that support him. It was decided that the interim objective of Arab struggle, for the achievement of which all efforts and resources must be mobilized, is that of the liberation of all the Arab territories occupied during the aggression of June 1967 and the safeguarding of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. In the light of this the following basic principles were adopted:

1. To continue reinforcing the intrinsic military strength of the region and raising its combat capacity;

2. To continue building the home front in such a way as to ensure that the resources of our people are mobilized for the battle;

3. To increase and expand the region's economic resources so as to ensure that the requirements of defence and social and economic progress are met;

4. To regard the battle with the Zionist enemy as an all-Arab battle; this requires that it be seen in its true perspective;

5. To resist the imperialist conspiracies in the area, to frustrate them and to resist their schemes directed against the Arab nation;

6. To endeavour by all available means to frustrate the attempts to liquidate the Palestine cause and the cause of the total liberation of Arab territories through partial solutions or settlements or through partial steps taken in isolation;

7. To mobilize all forces against the Zionist enemy and to concentrate on the principal battle and not to allow ourselves to become involved in marginal battles;

8. To ensure that all our policies are framed in the light of the interests of Syria and of the Arab nation and that they are of service to the interim objective of Arab struggle.

In the light of its definition of the interim objective and the fundamental principles of our struggle at this stage, the Conference took important decisions in the field of Arab and international policy, among the most important of which were the following:

⁴⁷ Excerpted from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 21, 1975, p. 3. The conference took place April 5–15, 1975.

1. To make the measures taken towards the achievement of unity more effective and to take all possible steps on the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

2. To strengthen and consolidate Arab solidarity and to endeavour to channel the military, economic and political resources of the Arab nation into the battle.

3. To endeavour to achieve such effective military coordination as will lead to a unified military command, to ensure the best possible utilization of the armed forces on the various fronts and to expand the Arab military forces and to increase their capability and effectiveness.

4. To endeavour to achieve Arab economic integration and to promote the efforts made within this framework, and to take such measures and undertake such activities and contacts as will lead to the employment of surplus Arab wealth in the field of the overall development of the Arab homeland.

5. In the field of the Palestine cause, the Conference affirmed that it has always been the principal cause in the Arab liberation struggle against Zionism and the imperialist forces that support it. The Conference viewed with satisfaction the positive developments that have been achieved to the advantage of the Arab liberation cause in general and the Palestine cause in particular, and took a number of decisions in connection with the Palestine cause, the most important of which are:

a) Commitment to support for the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland and to self-determination in their own territory, and continued struggle for the total liberation of Palestinian soil;

b) To make every effort to give due prominence to the Palestinian identity and to promote nationalist feelings among the Palestinians within the framework of their affiliation to the Arab nation;

c) To support the right of the Palestinian Arab people to establish an independent national authority in such Palestinian territory as is liberated, by:

1) Supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people, in the exercise of its responsibilities at the political and military levels.

2) Making every effort to strengthen national unity between the various sections of the resistance movement in such a way as to assist the Palestinian

movement in the achievement of its progressive national objectives.

The Conference took note of the responsible and courageous attitude to the Palestine cause adopted by Comrade Hafiz Asad, the leader of the march of our Party and our people, in calling for the establishment of a unified Syrian-Palestinian military and political command,⁴⁸ and of his resolute stand against all imperialist and Zionist schemes aimed at impairing the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and disuniting the Arab front. In the light of the attitude adopted by the Party and its revolution in this region to the Palestine cause and the cause of liberation, and in the light of its concern for the unity of the Arab cause as being a cause of destiny, the Conference condemned all suspect activities and moves and all the various conspiracies to which the Arab nation and its liberation movement are being subjected—moves aimed, among other things, at shattering Arab solidarity and the unified Arab stand, and at extorting concessions.

International policy

1. In the field of international organizations, conferences and institutions:

a) To continue to make efforts and engage in effective action within the framework of the United Nations and its institutions and organizations, with a view to encircling and isolating the Zionist enemy, and to make every effort to secure the adoption of resolutions on the Palestine cause and the question of aggression, so that the enemy may be shown to the world in his true light and that his aggressive and expansionist character may be disclosed and that Arab rights may be made known.

b) To support and promote the non-aligned movement and to make every effort to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, and to make use of this movement to secure greater isolation of the Zionist enemy.

c) To strengthen cooperation between Arab organizations and regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity.

2. In the field of relations with the socialist countries:

To make every effort to reinforce cooperation in all fields with the socialist countries and in particular the USSR

⁴⁸ Doc. 236 above.

3. In the field of relations with the non-aligned countries:

To strengthen and promote cooperation in all fields with the non-aligned countries and to support them in their struggle, and to take bilateral action with them in the service of our common goals in the struggle to achieve social and economic progress and to combat Zionism and imperialism.

4. In the field of relations with the African countries:

To support and promote relations with the African countries and to consolidate the front of cooperation and alliance with these countries with a view to strengthening the world front against Zionism, colonialism and all kinds of racial discrimination; also to approach the Arab countries capable of providing economic aid to the African countries, and to aid and support the African national liberation movements and to provide them with aid. The Conference also stressed the importance of contacts and meetings with these countries at all levels.

5. In the field of relations with the Latin American countries:

To make every effort to develop our relations with them and to recruit the services of Arab émigrés living in those countries to develop relations with them with a view to reinforcing our struggle against Zionism and world imperialism.

6. In the field of relations with the European Community:

To make every effort to develop our relations with the European countries with a view to developing their attitudes to our principal problems, especially in the light of the developments that have taken place in the European arena; also to establish an Arab-European dialogue with a view to inducing the European countries to adopt more serious and equitable attitudes in the Arab-Israeli conflict; to ensure that political attitudes are linked to economic interests; also to contact European public opinion circles with a view to explaining our problems and inducing them to adopt more sympathetic attitudes.

7. In the field of national liberation movements:

To continue to provide material and moral support to national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to stress the importance of solidarity with all forces of liberation, progress and socialism throughout the world.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of Presidents Asad of Syria and Sadat of Egypt⁴⁹

Riyad, April 23, 1975

At the invitation of H.M. Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, President Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, paid a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the period Rabi II 10-12, 1395 AH (April 21-24, 1975). During this visit, bilateral talks were held between Presidents Asad and Sadat, ending in a trilateral meeting in which King Khalid took part. These meetings were characterized by their friendliness and a spirit of concern for common Arab interests.

The three leaders reviewed the latest developments in the Arab region, especially as concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the talks between Presidents Asad and Sadat a full and frank discussion took place of the past, with all its positive as well as negative aspects. Agreement was reached concerning the necessity of benefiting from the morals and lessons of the past and of the avoidance of all that may impede common efforts which are bound to lead to the realization of national objectives. The two Presidents agreed that political activity in future demands that the closest cooperation be established between Syria and Egypt since their unity of efforts would have positive repercussions for pan-Arab interests and would constitute the basis for common Arab action in the face of the common enemy. With this in mind and proceeding from a common cause, the two Presidents have agreed to coordinate their common moves in all basic issues related to the struggle against the Israeli enemy.

The three leaders meeting in Riyad announce their sincere desire to do their utmost to arrive at a just and permanent peace in the Middle East using various means towards that end. They affirm their determination not to allow the situation to relapse back to a state of no war-no peace which had characterized the period before the Ramadan war. They announce to the Arab people their adherence to these principles and their joint

⁴⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 24, 1975, pp. 1, 4.

efforts to achieve them as well as their sincere cooperation with all Arab countries for the sake of entrenching Arab solidarity.

Finally, the three leaders declare that the immediate future may herald a period where peace based on justice might be established provided Israel implements UN resolutions stipulating the illegality of acquiring territory by force and the necessity of an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on its own homeland. Otherwise, Israel might pursue a policy of arrogance and aggression, ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people and thus creating an atmosphere of instability and danger. It would thus have deprived the Middle East and the world of the chance of creating a just peace to which millions of men aspire and thus, by its acts, would expose the peace of the region as well as of the world to jeopardy.

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Statement issued by the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution calling for an Arab boycott of the Phalangist Party of Lebanon (excerpt)⁵⁰

Beirut, April 25, 1975

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While agitating against the Palestine resistance after every Zionist attack on Lebanon, while calling for the use of the most extreme kinds of violence and repression against the Lebanese nationalist movement and the Palestine resistance, and while advocating the establishment of a military dictatorship to rid Lebanon of the "terrorists", the Phalangist command has moved in the opposite direction as regards the defence of Lebanon's territory and sovereignty. It has opposed the adoption of a defence plan in cooperation with the Arab countries on the grounds that "Lebanon's strength lies in her weakness" and the colonialist "foreign guarantees" and "Lebanon's international friendships" with the countries of the colonialist West provide sufficient protection for her territory and her people.

The failure of Kissinger's mission, the real aim of which was to split the ranks of the Arab confrontation forces, was the signal for the lackey forces in Lebanon to engage in further conspiracies against the Palestine resistance, especially after the announcement of the establishment of a joint Syrian-Palestinian command⁵¹ as a first step towards the unification of all the Arab confrontation forces.

Brothers,

As a result of the latest massacre they have perpetrated, the Phalangists have become even more isolated and there has been wide-scale resentment of them in all Lebanese circles, including those which the Phalangists claim the "right" to represent.

Faced with this crippling isolation the Phalangists have tried to concentrate their fire on the Lebanese nationalist movement and to make out that it was this movement that "embroiled" them with the Palestine resistance, but these Phalangist stratagems are doomed to failure. Just as they failed in their previous attempts to split the ranks of the resistance by claiming that there was "honourable commando action" and "dishonourable commando action," so their present attempts to destroy the cohesion between the Lebanese nationalist movement and the Palestine resistance are doomed to failure. In view of the odious crimes the Phalangist gangs have committed, it was natural that this time the resistance should unequivocally refuse to let them play the game they have always played in the past when they pretended to be eager for conciliation after every conspiracy they carried out against the Palestinian national presence.

It was in this context that the Lebanese nationalist movement defined its position when it declared the imposition of a political and national boycott on the Phalange's gangs because of the role they were playing in the service of the schemes of colonialism and Zionism, because they were being used as a tool to stir up civil strife and to destroy the cohesion between the Lebanese and Palestinian people and because they were a confessionalist group hostile to the unity of the Lebanese people in particular.

These Phalangist provocations are dangerous not so much because of their political or military

⁵⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), April 26, 1975, p. 3.

⁵¹ See doc. 236 above.

weight, in spite of the large quantities of arms that they receive from hostile quarters, but because of the role they are playing in the implementation of the plans of hostile forces, in full cooperation with them and with closely coordinated timing.

Therefore the problem that faces you today is not only that of showing up this group and disclosing its links with suspect quarters. The fundamental issue is that of making available all means of effective political support for the cause of the Palestinian people and the Lebanese nationalist movement in such a way as to ensure that the Lebanese nationalist arena can hold out against the conspiracies of colonialism, Zionism and the internal forces that make common cause with them.

It is essential that the political boycott of the Phalangists resolved on by the Lebanese nationalist movement be expanded to comprise the whole of the Arab arena, so that all Arab nationalist and progressive forces may impose a total embargo on all dealings with this group at both the popular and official levels, in all the Arab countries. But it is equally essential that the meeting of the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution should decide on a political line and on a unified course of action to escalate the struggle of all Arab nationalist and progressive forces against the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy with a view to achieving the goals of the Arab struggle to liberate the occupied territories and to safeguard the full national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

What is going on is a miniature version of what the forces of colonialism and Zionism are planning to achieve against all sections of the Arab national liberation movement. Hence the need to be sure of all the consequences liable to accrue in the present stage, and we hope that this will form the basis of the discussions of this emergency session of the General Secretariat.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt outlining the establishment of the ceasefire after the October war and examining the effects of the failure to negotiate an interim agreement with Israel (excerpts)⁵²

Asyut, May 1, 1975

Let us review together the period after the October war until the present to see what happened. I would like to pause and examine the ceasefire, because there are some in the Arab world who believe that Egypt pulled out of the war and requested a ceasefire prematurely. This is not so and I would like to correct that impression. In August of 1973, a month or so before the war, I passed by Saudi Arabia and met the late King Faisal and had a lengthy talk with him. At first, he was rather anxious about us, not out of fear but out of concern for the consequences of the war. When I reassured him that our position was sound and that we had no other alternative but to storm that obstacle, he said to me: I have a simple request of you, and that is that you do not request a ceasefire after an hour or a day or two to enable us to formulate a common Arab stand. The battle must last a long time and must be planned as a long-range operation to enable us to evolve a common Arab policy. I said I fully agreed with him and I promised that we had planned for a long battle. Then I travelled to Qatar and on to Syria where we took the final decision for October 6.

The battle then began. As you have already heard me say, six hours after it began, the Soviet ambassador called upon me asking me for a ceasefire. This, as I once mentioned, was upon the request of Syria. I sent a message to President Asad asking for clarification and he replied that nothing of the sort had taken place. The following day, he called again with the same request. I had by then received President Asad's reply and thus told him that there was no question of a ceasefire and that we were proceeding with the war. On the morning of the 13th, I was woken up by the British Ambassador at dawn. There was a letter

⁵² Made at a workers' meeting on the occasion of Labour Day; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 2, 1975. pp. 3-4.

from Kissinger and another from Prime Minister Heath. I was asked whether I had in fact accepted a ceasefire because America was informed that I had accepted it.⁵³ Then the Soviet Premier came over and stayed in Egypt for four days. His purpose was basically to ask for a ceasefire.

At all these points, beginning six hours after the battle began, on to the second day, the third day when I was woken up by the British Ambassador and until the arrival of the Soviet Premier, we had been rejecting a ceasefire. I rejected a ceasefire because I wanted to allow time for a common Arab stand to develop and to prove our capabilities to the whole world. The war in any case had to accomplish its planned objectives. Thereafter, on the 19th, I was asked by the late Marshal Ismail to go to the operations room because a basic and decisive decision had already created a breach in our lines. However it was not at all as dangerous as some sources were saying, including, unfortunately, some of our Arab brethren. On the 19th, I was struck by the fact that for the past ten days we were not fighting Israel but the USA. In my planning for the battle, I had calculated that the Soviet Union would act as a balance to the USA. The two big powers would balance each other and leave us alone on the battlefield with Israel. On the 19th, and having fully reviewed events, I found myself face to face with the USA. We cannot of course take on the USA. As I stated in a cable I sent to President Asad on the 19th, I was not prepared to face the historic responsibility of destroying my people and my armed forces, and that I was prepared to face the consequences before my people and the entire Arab nation. All this was written on the 19th.

I consented to a ceasefire because, as I said, I was not prepared to destroy Egypt and its armed forces, as the USA was quite capable of doing so. In the ten days prior to the 19th, it was not Israel fighting but the USA. In the Arab world, it was said that Egypt had asked for a ceasefire prematurely. We state our viewpoint clearly and report the facts as they occurred. We have no desire to engage in any political outbidding nor are we professional politicians. We are Arab nationalist revolutionaries who believe in our country and in the objectives of our Arab nation. The ceasefire, like other things that took place during and after

the war, is enmeshed in many facts and details and the time has not yet come to declare them all. But I would like to assure you and to assure the Arab nation that Egypt, in all its policies, is fully cognizant of its responsibilities towards Egypt and Arab nationalism, the Arab cause and particularly towards the people of Palestine. The ceasefire came into effect but was violated two hours later by the Jews who imagined that they could change the course of the war by capturing Ismailia and Suez, encircling our armies and thus defeating us completely. As you know, Suez fought heroically and they could not enter it or stay in it at all. To this day, their dead are buried in Suez. As for Ismailia, they could not even reach its outskirts.

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After the 1974 disengagement agreement, President Nixon, as you recall, came here along with Dr. Kissinger. It was then thought that a further disengagement agreement had to come. Why? In order to prepare calmly for Geneva, the forces were still too close to each other. Israel had to express a desire for peace. How could it demonstrate this? A further withdrawal was necessary so that we could prepare for the Geneva conference and then attend it. At no time at all was any thought given to holding a plebiscite on the Geneva conference. The question was: Could the USA achieve anything before the Conference or not? If it could not, then we all were to go to Geneva. President Nixon left to visit Israel and the second step was supposed to take place in September or October. But events developed in the USA, the President resigned and the new one had to be given time to study the problem. This time was wasted at the expense of the schedule of steps we had worked out already but we had no alternative but to accept. Throughout this period, I kept in touch with Dr. Kissinger and President Ford.

Also, in July 1974 and even before that date, we were in touch with the Soviet Union, for I have already indicated that it is not at all to our interest to have cloudy relations with the Soviet Union or to have any misunderstandings. It was agreed that our foreign minister would visit the Soviet Union in July, to be exact, July 15, 1974. Two days before the visit was due to take place, the Soviet Union postponed it to a day in October to be agreed upon. October came and we had the

⁵³ See doc. 182 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Arab Summit in Rabat. This was in truth the Palestine conference because all Arabs then agreed to hand full responsibility over to the Palestinians.⁵⁴ When we returned, the foreign minister paid a visit to Moscow. He returned with the promise that Brezhnev would visit us in January of 1975. But throughout November and December, we maintained contact with the USA and with the Soviet Union. Letters were exchanged. We were set upon going to Geneva, irrespective of whether the step-by-step diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger succeeded or not. We were going to Geneva in any case. In December, the foreign minister and the war minister visited Moscow⁵⁵ and were told that Brezhnev would meet them. For some reason, he postponed his own visit to Egypt.

I am concerned here to assert that from the moment that the war ended, that is from the ceasefire on October 22, 1973 and until January, 1975, that is for a period of 14 months, we received nothing from the Soviet Union except for the tank deal previously agreed upon and bought partially by President Boumedienne during the battle. In the December visit, the Soviet Union released some weapons which had been contracted for before and should have been delivered in 1973 and 1974. These now began to arrive in January 1975. But the Soviet Union had stated, quite accurately, that it was not prepared to discuss making up our losses. Incidentally, we were not asking for free arms. We were ready to pay in order to recoup what we had lost. But the Soviet Union refused even this and merely carried out deals that had fallen due in 1973 and 1974.

Concurrently, America was following its step-by-step diplomacy. As you know, President Ford informed me that Dr. Kissinger was going to visit us twice, once in February and once in March. I tried to convince him to make them one trip, but we finally agreed on two trips. In February he came on a fact-finding mission and then he came back in March. He spent about 17 days shuttling back and forth between us and the Israelis. One week before the end, I told Kissinger that it was hopeless and no agreement was forthcoming. He remained optimistic and did his honourable best. But it was perfectly clear to me that Israel, for various reasons which I made clear

in my recent speech to the National Assembly, was not ready for, and not capable of peace because it had a very weak government. They were still in a state of fragmentation, precisely as we had been in 1973, and which was transferred to them that year.

Quite frankly, the USA holds most of the strings where this issue is concerned because it is the USA which supplies Israel with the means to live, with butter and with cannon. But you all know how Israel applies its pressure there. However, the USA must reassess its policy. From Asyut and from this Egyptian workers' platform, I am addressing myself now to the United States and I am telling them that the time has come when the USA must formulate a specific position regarding Israel in the problem that concerns us now. We are going to Geneva. But we would like the American position to become clear: either black or white. Does the USA plan to protect Israel within its present borders? Does the USA plan to defend Israel in territories belonging to others which it has acquired by force? All this must become very clear in any US reassessment of policy. From our side, we would like to maintain the most cordial relations possible with the USA and likewise with the Soviet Union.

As for the Suez Canal, I had two options. Either the Canal would remain closed or else I would reopen it. After careful analysis, where does the interest of Egypt lie? We have all seen that when I resolved upon opening the Canal, there was an immediate response from the USA. France and the French President responded as did the whole of Western Europe. The Soviet Union responded as did all Asian and African countries. The whole world welcomed our decision and viewed it as a wise decision adopted in a spirit of international responsibility. Therefore, we gained and did not lose by opening the Canal. Over and above all this, we shall be receiving the dues from the Canal, God willing.

⁵⁴ See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

⁵⁵ See doc. 200 in *ibid*.

Radio statements by Executive Committee member Qaddumi of the PLO reviewing the visit to the USSR of a PLO delegation⁵⁶

Mid-May, 1975

To exclude the USSR from peace efforts, apart from the fact that it is a friend and ally of the Arabs and gives effective support to the confrontation forces, would be to weaken the Arab cause.

Arab diplomacy can achieve no success if it excludes the USSR from its calculations and as for us, the Liberation Organization and the people of Palestine, we cannot—it is quite impossible that we should exclude the Soviets from any consultations or measures taken for the establishment of a just and permanent peace that does not impair the right of the people of Palestine to their homeland.

We were received by Comrade Brezhnev. There were three of us: Abu Ammar, Nashashibi and myself. Our reception was very warm: Brezhnev and Arafat embraced.

A meeting was held at 12.30 on May 1; it was attended by Comrade Brezhnev, all the members of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party and us three.

In the course of the summit meeting Brezhnev affirmed the USSR's support for the national rights of the Palestinian people and for the interim programme adopted by the last National Council on the establishment of an independent national authority.⁵⁷

The talks we had with the Party and the Soviet government were extremely important, especially as they included the discussion of many details and possible future developments, whether they bring peace or war.

During the talks the Soviet comrades affirmed that the Palestine problem is the essence of the Middle East conflict, and the source of all the crises in the area. Hence the Soviets' recognition that the Palestine Liberation Organization is a principal party to the Middle East conflict and that there can be no peace efforts without participation on an equal footing by representatives of the

Palestinian people.

This is not a new attitude on the part of the USSR: at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviets approved resolution 3236, one clause of which stipulates that the Palestinian people are a fundamental party in the finding of a just and permanent solution in the area.

The Soviets' support for the Organization has not been restricted to mere resolutions: they have provided extensive moral and material support in other fields.

Among the issues discussed in detail during the recent visit to Moscow was that of Geneva.

The Geneva conference is veiled in obscurity, and during the talks we made several statements relative to the conference, including the fact that we cannot submit the subject of the Geneva conference for discussion by the Palestine National Council unless our invitation to attend it is couched in the terms we want—this invitation must be based on United Nations resolution 3236.

First and foremost we must know what benefits will accrue and what will result from our attending the conference, and there must be a clearly marked course set out in a programme of action.

The Soviets said that they understood and supported our attitude, because both the Soviets and the Organization are convinced that if the Americans and the Israelis attend the conference it will not be with the intention of serving world peace.

The USSR will support us in our attempts to obtain the kind of invitation we want, and we found no difficulty in convincing them that the right formula is that based on resolution 3236—the Palestinians' right to Palestine. However, the problem is, as we know, that the Geneva conference has two chairmen—Comrade Gromyko and Henry Kissinger.

What is being said in Washington is all nonsense and untruths, because American policy is aggressive and imperialist, and the only way to change it is to smash it, as happened in South East Asia.

America is now trying to create conditions favourable for the enemy to wage another war against the Arab nation whenever he chooses. Therefore the sound course is to prepare for military action.

There have to be very good reasons for American policy to change. It is wrong to say that the

⁵⁶ Broadcast on "Voice of Palestine" (Cairo); translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), May 13, 1975, second bulletin, pp. 2–4.

⁵⁷ Doc. 246 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

victories of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will make America more humble in the Middle East, because the situation requires that she should become even more intransigent and aggressive to compensate for her losses and defeats and to consolidate her presence in this area.

That is why we discussed with the Soviet comrades possible future developments, whether at the level of peace or of war.

The recent visit to the USSR by the PLO delegation was the culmination of previous visits, in as much as in the course of it all details and possibilities were discussed and a formula for sound and rapid cooperation was put into execution for the achievement of our national objectives. This visit also brought to a close a stage in which the American step-by-step policy was dropped and in which the Middle East crisis, the essence of which is the Palestine problem, will have to be raised to higher levels of political and diplomatic activity.

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Speech by Prime Minister Salim of Egypt presenting his government's policy to the National Assembly (excerpts)⁵⁸

Cairo, May 13, 1975

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It is the right of this honourable assembly to request the government to lay before it the broad outlines of our political and diplomatic moves, and to reaffirm the basic commitments governing such moves, which have often been specified by the president in many of his addresses to the nation and to your honourable assembly, and have been most recently clarified in his important speech on Labour Day, May 1, 1975 in the city of Asyut.⁵⁹ The president has always emphasized three points:

1. A clear perception of our objectives and of the changes taking place around us,
2. The independence of our will and the preservation of our freedom, and
3. Our insistence upon our rights and our determination to achieve them.

We believe in peace founded upon justice and insist upon the total liberation of Arab lands and the realization of the rights of the Palestinian people. It is from this basis that our military, political and diplomatic moves have proceeded. Ever since the victories of the glorious October war, Egypt has seized the initiative and has not ceased, positively and vigorously, to move events towards a solution, recover Arab rights in their totality and secure the Arab nation against any dangers that threaten its existence or interests. We shall go to Geneva, taking into account the following facts:

1. We are going to the Geneva conference in order to arrive at a comprehensive settlement not at temporary arrangements.

2. As we draw near to the conference, we grow in strength. We have proved to the whole world our military prowess and our national strength in the glorious Ramadan battles. By deciding to reopen the Suez Canal, we have shown that it is we who seek peace and that it is Israel which is the arrogant party for it has not grasped the changes that have taken place, it obstructs attempts at settlement and is threatening the interests of the international community.

3. We insist upon the participation of representatives of the Palestinian people at the conference and upon complete synchronization of policies with Syria, the PLO, all the confrontation states and all the Arab peoples who have unified their strategies at the Arab summit conferences. Egypt's Arab nationalist commitment is unchanging. Egypt is part of a single Arab nation whose prosperity and security are indivisible.

In the coming stage, the government will be concerned to concentrate Arab activity and thus mobilize all Arab power, freely and of its own accord, for the purpose of achieving pan-Arab progress and security. Egypt is proud of its African identity and the government shall endeavour to strengthen its political, economic and cultural ties with sister governments of the great African continent. It will also seek to consolidate co-operation with the Asian countries to whom we are linked by strong and fraternal bonds, with the non-aligned states which work for international peace and human progress and prosperity and with brotherly Islamic peoples with whom we share doctrine and faith. The government believes in the necessity of pursuing a flexible international

⁵⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 14, 1975, p. 4.

⁵⁹ See doc. 248 above.

policy based upon free and confident cooperation with all international powers, without suffering from any complexes or residues of past experiences. This flexibility is called for by the fact that the world has moved from the cold war era to détente. It is also a natural result of our having followed an open policy with the whole world for the sake of obtaining expertise and technology wherever they may be found.

As a result of the policy set down by the president regarding the continent of Europe, European governments and peoples have shown an increased understanding of the Arab cause and of the interests we share with them by virtue of strategic location, proximity and cultural as well as historical links. The government will continue to work to bolster the bases of cooperation between Egypt and Western Europe in the various fields: political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural, and shall strive to develop the close relations linking us to the countries of Eastern Europe, which have been cemented over many years.

Relations with the Soviet Union are proceeding positively and the results will become apparent in the next few months. Egyptian-Soviet friendship has grown over many years of cooperation, interaction and common experience. On many issues, our views were in agreement. While appreciating Soviet support for the Arab position, we expect the Soviet Union to play a vigorous and prominent role in the efforts being made to arrive at a just and lasting settlement of the conflict. We hope for increased cooperation in all fields and expect a rescheduling of Egypt's Soviet debts, whose burden can no longer accord with the needs of the Egyptian economy at the present time.

As for our relations with USA, they are proceeding according to Egypt's foreign policy planning which is to take care to establish cordial relations with all who respect our independence and our free will and deal with us on a basis of equality and mutual interests. We are closely watching the reassessment of US policy in the region after the failure of Dr. Kissinger's mission as a result of Israeli obstinacy and irresponsibility. We hope that President Sadat's meeting with President Ford will result in a US policy which rejects aggression and the forcible occupation of the territories of others while supporting a peaceful, just and lasting solution that guarantees the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. We

hope for increased bilateral cooperation in the economic, technical and cultural spheres.

Our ability to perform our basic duties on the home front is most closely linked with the extent of our success in obliterating the traces of Israel's aggression, in establishing healthy international relations within a framework of respect for international law, in faith in the United Nations and in international cooperation for the sake of prosperity. All of this is intimately connected with the solidarity of our home front, our ability to develop our own power, the support of the Arabs and our influence on the course of events. The government undertakes to operate in all these spheres positively and with all due speed. It views the future with confidence and with the hope that our national objectives will be accomplished for the benefit of our masses and the Arab nation.

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Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt calling for a positive attitude in confronting Israel⁶⁰

Kuwait, May 14, 1975

Q. Your Excellency, a question from the Kuwaiti magazine al-Yaqza. You said just now that what we want to hear in Salzburg is whether America is protecting Israel within her frontiers or within the territory she has usurped? Although in fact, as the frontiers of Israel are also usurped Palestine, it does not make any difference which part of the question President Ford answers.

A. You are touching on an essential point; I'll talk about it frankly. In 1971 and 1972 I visited the USSR four times—in March 1971, October 1971, and February and April 1972, and every time at every session the USSR said frankly that there could be no infringement of the frontiers of Israel: Israel is an established fact and there could be no infringement of her frontiers. You're not unaware of America's attitude, all of you know it—Israel is in the United Nations, so it is silly to talk about throwing Israel into the sea; this is

⁶⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), May 15, 1975, p. 13.

outbidding and I will have nothing to do with it. Israel within the 1967 frontiers is an established fact. Any one who wants to change it can try to; I can't change it. It was proved in the October war, when I sent my cable to President Asad on October 19, in which I said to him, because I was exhausted, that I would agree to a ceasefire because America had been fighting me for ten days and I was exhausted. The cable said that I was going to agree. I had refused a ceasefire five times, three times from the USSR, once from the British ambassador when he woke me up at dawn on the 13th, and the fifth time when the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin came to Egypt and stayed for four days to persuade me to accept a ceasefire. But I refused all these offers. But on the nineteenth, when I had been confronting America for ten whole days, I wasn't prepared, as I said in my message to President Asad, I wasn't prepared to accept the responsibility before history of having my people and my armed forces destroyed again. So I agreed to a ceasefire.

All I ask for, all I say, is that America should define her attitude, because this will result in an entirely new situation. And then, policy is not drafted and strategy is not drawn up in front of the microphone, it isn't talked about.

Q. Mr. President, another question from Kuwait Television. Observers are explaining your continuous journey from today until the date of the opening of the Suez Canal as having a great influence on the unified Arab plan at the coming Geneva conference. Has Your Excellency anything to say about this? Thank you.

A. In accordance with what we agreed on there must be coordination between the confrontation countries before Geneva and at my last meeting with President Hafiz Asad in Riyadh⁶¹ we agreed to form a two-power committee with deputies of the two presidents. This is in addition to coordination between the confrontation countries, which must be achieved. During my journey I shall go to Syria and I shall go to Jordan and our Palestinian brothers will be in constant touch with us, and I shall certainly meet them in Damascus, and there must be preparation for Geneva, as much as there was for October 6, or rather more.

Q. The report that the European Common Market has signed an agreement with Israel has produced a harsh

reaction in Arab circles.⁶² Has the President any views on what steps should be taken with regard to the Common Market following this agreement, and have your talks during this trip dealt with, or are they going to deal with Arab-European developments in the light of this move?

A. Yes, I have got something to say on this—you heard me say it to the National Assembly, I prefer action to emotion. If we wanted to be emotional we might say: Let us boycott Europe, let us abuse Europe, and, and—very well, but where would that lead, what would it do? What would it mean? No, nothing of the kind. We discussed the matter yesterday at the joint session, with Emir Sabah and our brothers; I said what I thought and they agreed with me—that we must storm the arena that Israel is entering and enter the Market and confront Israel there. We must not disappear from any forum and boycott it as we did in the past when we said—No, no, no—with the result that the first half of Palestine was lost and then the rest of Palestine and then they annexed Sinai and the Golan as a result of our no, no, no. Why don't we go and combat and confront Israel in international circles, everywhere. I am for confrontation, I think we should go in and not just sit and abuse the Common Market and boycott the Common Market, etc. We must enter and correct all that. We must stand up and fight our battle properly.

Q. If an agreement is reached in Geneva including the establishment of a Palestinian national entity, will it be in return for Arab recognition of Israel?

A. All the parties will be present at the Geneva conference and as I've said and declared many times before—but some people took it into their heads to use imported catch words which we should never have imported—they didn't believe me when I said that there could be no peace except at Geneva and with all parties present.

As for establishing a Palestinian entity, that's for the Palestinians to decide first and foremost; it's their affair and they will speak for themselves, no one else is in charge of them. Very well, what are we going to give Israel in return? We Arabs must agree on this. Because as you remember, when Kissinger was with me last March and the question of ending the state of war was raised, I said to him: It is not in my power, it is not in my power to end

⁶¹ See doc. 246 above.

⁶² See docs. 93 and 104 above.

the state of war, because that is a subject to be discussed at Geneva with all the parties present; ending the state of war rests with all the parties, not with me. That is why I say that some people have taken it into their heads to use alien catch-words about an individual solution and a partial settlement—these are alien, not Arab expressions; believe me, they're not Arab. I've often pointed this out, but nobody listened, until you know what happened, and you know that this isn't true. What are we going to do? And in return for what? What shall we Arabs get from guarantees? Before Israel says what she wants, we want our guarantees, we Arabs. That's why I say it would be a very good thing to expand the circle of Geneva so that the two super-powers may not be alone; as many West Europeans as possible should come in, or the five permanent members of the Security Council, including China, and the non-aligned countries—or any number—so that we too may get guarantees. We want guarantees just as much as Israel.

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Resignation statement of Prime Minister Solh of Lebanon (excerpt)⁶³

Beirut, May 15, 1975

Before the honorable parliament undertook to discuss the statement of the government with its exposition of the government's operations and undertakings on every level, and, the limitation of its conduct in the unfortunate events and bloodshed which occurred at Sidon and which brought about the deaths of a number of citizens, the foremost of whom was the militant nationalist, Maaruf Saad⁶⁴—before it was possible to pause for any length of time to consider the significant results of those incidents and their complications—the country witnessed once again bloodshed of more serious

and wider consequences. We are still experiencing the consequences which have arisen out of the massacre of Ayn al-Rummana which took place this past April 13.

Today, if I come back to adopting what is contained in the previous statement of the government, my sole desire is to put before you a statement focused on clarifying my position in regard to the current events and to do that with the conviction on my part of the necessity of putting into effect the full role which the constitutional institutions are to play in dealing with the current problems the country faces. The principal institution in this regard is this honorable Chamber of Deputies.

In the afternoon of the 13th of April a despicable crime took place at Ayn al-Rummana against a bus carrying a number of Lebanese and Palestinian citizens returning to Tall al-Zaatar.

It is clear that the Kata'ib Party bears full responsibility for the massacre, for the consequent complications, and for the deaths, the damages, both physical and moral, which have afflicted the country as a result. That was clear from the first moment this ugly crime was committed and in view of that Party's continued failure to express disapproval of the crime and its refusal for three full days to surrender those responsible for it. Moreover, its responsibility for the crime is again clear and publicly acknowledged in the decision to surrender two of its perpetrators and the promise to surrender the others.

The clear proof of the responsibility of the Kata'ib Party for this incident is made evident when we link it with its precedents and with the attempts that followed to expand the conflict that sprang from the incident, attempts to expand the fighting so as to include fighting between Lebanese and Palestinians and between the Lebanese themselves.

For a long time now, the Kata'ib Party, in every position it has taken, has persisted in preparing, politically, ideologically, materially, and through action, for operations of this kind.

The memoranda which have continuously come out both in and out of season, have brought up the question of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and called frankly for opposition to it and agitation against it. These statements have expressed a continuous call to attack the officially approved policy apropos of Lebanese-Palestinian relation-

⁶³ Made before the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies; Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 16, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975)*; *Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 24–27.

⁶⁴ A former member of the Chamber of Deputies who died during the troubles in Sidon in late February 1975.

ships on the one hand, and Lebanese-Arab relationships on the other. This is the spurious call which is raised against the firm role Lebanon plays as a helper in the Palestinian struggle, a role which is embodied in the commitment to decisions made in Arab summit meetings and in the voyage of the President of the Republic to the United Nations for the purpose of expounding the Palestinian problem in the name of all the Arabs.

All of this concentrated political activity served as an incitement to confessional agitation. Hand in hand with it was a feverish military preparation represented in the creation of a militia equipped with arms, the easy acquisition and large quantity of which comes from a known source, as was confirmed by the Mufti of the Republic in a communication that was never challenged. The pretext for this was the arms in the hands of the Palestinian combatants whereas everyone knows that these are directed towards the battle with the Israeli enemy. But those other arms serve no other function than to prepare to strike at the Palestinian Resistance and to concoct acts of internal strife pushing the country towards civil war, all for the purpose of preserving confessional distinctions and a policy of isolationism which most Lebanese insist on rejecting.

If the carrying of arms by those who wish to fight the enemy is permissible and understandable, how can all this provocative bearing of arms be justified on the part of a group which continually repeats, in the face of Israeli aggression, that Lebanon's strength lies in its weakness, while this same group refuses to join the ranks of the army and the security forces. This only makes the country a house without a roof and a land without a protective fence.

All of these facts paved the way to the butchery of Ayn al-Rummana then following the despicable butchery, there was clear confirmation that the Kata'ib Party aimed to enlarge the clash and make it all-inclusive by demanding the involvement of the army and by pressing the government to active confrontation with our Palestinian brothers and with the overwhelming majority of those Lebanese who do not see eye to eye with the Kata'ib.

Distinguished members:

Our awareness of these aims has, from the first moment, impelled us to state that our principal duty is to prevent the transformation of the massacre of Ayn al-Rummana into a general conflict which

we clearly saw could have no other aim than to destroy our national unity and strike at the Lebanese-Palestinian brotherhood. From this aspect we have defined the nature of the measures which must be taken to confront the complications arising from these events. Some may have criticisms concerning our application of these measures, criticisms to which we shall reply later, nevertheless, it would be wrong to use these criticisms to cover up or remove the real responsibility which is borne by that side which paved the way, politically and militarily, for the crime, carried it out, assumed responsibility for it, and then tried to develop it to a point where it would become a full-scale civil war.

Herein lies the principal responsibility. It is not in the substance of the Lebanese-Palestinian relationships nor in what is called the "absence of the state" that is, its failure to fulfill its role. That is to say, the measures we adopted to confront the events represented the full extent to which we were able to go in the light of the general situation under which the country is living and the situation of the state institutions and apparatus—and it must be said frankly that the current confessional organization in these institutions and apparatus largely paralyse their effectiveness, especially when it concerns one party taking upon itself the prerogative of defending certain confessional privileges.

I can not but be frank in regard to the position taken in the matter of calling in the army.

Indeed, my idea was not to call in the army, because I saw that the army would become enmeshed in the strife and that would inevitably result in greater destruction and more serious harm.

However, the confessional demonstrations⁶⁵ which were organized under cover of support for the army following the painful events in Sidon brought the greatest harm to this national institution and depicted it as belonging to one partisan group of Lebanese at the expense of others.

Besides, more than one previous prime minister has brought up for discussion the matter of the army's leadership. More than one political group has put forward the question of that equality which has disappeared from within this institu-

⁶⁵ Demonstrations and rallies in support of the Lebanese army had been organized by the Christian parties on March 5, 1975.

tion. This problem of the army, in fact, constituted an essential element of the crises in the previous governments. Employing the army, therefore, in internal security affairs became a matter to which more than half the country was strongly opposed.

The law of the organization of the army must be revised in the direction of subjecting it, as is true of other institutions, to the control of the political authorities. Balance must be restored to it to enable it to fulfill its national role in the most perfect fashion. However, the crises concocted gave us no time to carry through with this matter, and consequently it was not within our power to use the army during the recent incidents. In fact, we prevented its involvement in these incidents, and our conscience is at rest in the satisfaction of knowing that we solved the problem without incurring greater danger, a deeper and more widespread division, more violent and bloody confrontation, which might have led to civil war itself with the consequent danger to Lebanon's unity and independence.

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Statements by Prime Minister Jallud of Libya pointing to US-Zionist links and calling for the establishment of a Palestinian revolutionary government⁶⁶

Tripoli, May 15, 1975

Brothers,

Mr. Jarrah asked the question: Do we have to fight America? I want to alter the question and ask another question: Do we accept the loss of Palestine? Do we accept the *fait accompli*? Do we accept the Zionist presence in our beloved Palestine? In theory all Arabs answer no, but I want a practical answer. All of us who say we reject the Zionist presence and surrender to the *fait accompli* must turn to the gun which is the way we can liberate Palestine.

The conflict between us and Zionism is a conflict between two nationalisms, between Arab nationalism with its cultural implications and racist Zionist nationalism which wants to destroy Arab nationalism. It is a conflict for existence, and this conflict can never be solved by a conference or by a third party or by the United Nations.

There is something important about Nixon's visit to the occupied territories and Egypt and the communiqué he issued with Golda Meir which I believe Arab thinkers have not noticed. I mean his statement that there is a cultural link between the American people and Zionism. This is the first time in the history of Zionist-American joint communiqués that one has made this point. It is no small matter, and we must analyse it so that we may understand its extremely grave significance, and so that the extent of the relationship between Zionism and America may be made clear. In our struggle to liberate Palestine we must define our strategy and our ideology and rely on the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries, the third world countries and the developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The course is clear and the course of action is clear, and we must stop being carried away by words and by legal rights and legitimate rights and statements and turn to the gun and to action.

I asked the heads of all the states I visited what they meant by the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and none of them could answer my question. Because the Arab nation has no clear objective we have been unable to influence our enemies, though we have in our possession weapons that enable us to influence them, while we have been able to persuade some of the friends we met on our journey to state definitely that they support us.

Brothers,

We have said that the Arab nation should stop following a mirage, and we now call on the Palestine revolution to stop following a mirage. We believe that the Palestine revolution has won sufficient military and political victories to enable it to proceed to a very advanced stage—that of announcing the revolutionary government that will reinforce the fighting and the political struggle

⁶⁶ Made in a speech at the opening of a National Seminar in Support of the Palestine Revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), May 17, 1975, p. 2.

and believe in the liberation of Palestine and hold fast to the gun till the very last moment. We must distinguish between the establishment of a state and the establishment of a revolutionary government: a state is established by an international decision, but establishing a revolutionary government is a Palestinian matter and the decision is Palestinian.

On behalf of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Libyan Arab people, we address a revolutionary call to the Palestine revolution to take a courageous stand and face up to its responsibilities by declaring a revolutionary government that will mark out a clear course of struggle for the liberation of Palestine by the gun.

We also call on the Arab nation, once the Palestinian revolutionary government is declared, to face up to its responsibilities in a manner fitting to that stage. The revolutionary government will rely on the Arab countries and the Arab masses in meeting the responsibilities of fighting and liberation. It will have a trained regular army that will be responsible for liberation and an official agency responsible for information, political and popular struggle. We have a model in the Algerian revolution which had a provisional revolutionary government, and in South Vietnam there was a provisional revolutionary government.

The other Arab countries may be negligent, but in the event of the declaration of the revolutionary government, the Libyan Arab Republic—the revolution of the beginning of September—and the Arab people will meet their responsibilities to the full and join the destiny of Libya to that of the revolutionary government, of the Palestinian people and of the Arab masses that rely on it, and the land of the Libyan Arab Republic with all its resources will be the land of the Palestinian government.

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Recommendations of the Popular Conference of Lebanon regarding the current incidents (excerpts)⁶⁷

Beirut, May 16, 1975

The popular conference which met in the evening of May 16, 1975, in the Alumni Club of the Islamic Maqasid Society, and was attended by a large gathering of representatives of progressive parties, nationalist forces and personalities, and trades union, professional, student and social organizations and representatives of the different quarters of Beirut, to discuss the present political situation and to decide what attitude should be adopted to it:

Congratulates Prime Minister Rashid Solh on the honourable nationalist attitude he adopted in the historic statement he made at the session of the Chamber of Deputies held on May 15, 1975,⁶⁸ in which he took a decisive stand vis-à-vis the continuing Phalangist conspiracy against the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese nationalist movement, revealing just how dangerous that conspiracy was before, during and after the Ayn al-Rummana massacre;

Highly appreciating the manner in which, in its diagnosis of the current political crisis, Prime Minister Solh's statement is in agreement with the attitude of the Lebanese nationalist movement, its demands and the radical solutions it calls for, resolves:

1. *To condemn* the continuing Phalangist conspiracy against the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese nationalist movement and to reaffirm the decisions taken by the popular conference held on April 15 within the framework of the wide-scale national campaign to boycott the Phalangist party and to thwart its suspect fascist plan.

2. *In confronting* the current political crisis which, with the resignation of the prime minister has entered a new stage, to insist on the principal demands contained in Prime Minister Solh's statement, which constitute the only sound basis for dealing with the situation in a radical manner. These demands are:

a) *The achievement of democratic political reform*

⁶⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), May 17, 1975, p. 10.

⁶⁸ Doc. 252 above.

to ensure the proper distribution of powers among all centres of authority and to make it possible to establish a form of political representation that really reflects the popular will, through the democratic amendment of the electoral law.

b) *Commitment to meeting the requirements of the common Arab battle against the Zionist enemy and, above all, commitment to supporting the Palestine cause and the struggle of the Palestinian people in all ways and with all available resources, however great the sacrifices involved, and to establishing the closest and firmest relations with the Palestine resistance on the basis of full coordination with a view to safeguarding common interests.*

c) *To amend the law on the organization of the army, so that it may be subjected to the political authorities, so that balance may be established in its ranks and that it may be supplied with all available material and manpower resources to enable it to perform its basic national role and to avoid its being involved in internal security issues, the numbers and equipment of the internal security forces being increased to meet the requirements of this situation.*

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4. *To call on the popular masses to be vigilant and prepared to confront the reactionary Phalangist conspiracy against the nationalist movement and the Palestine resistance by engaging in all forms of struggle.*

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Resolution adopted by the National Assembly of Egypt deploring the letter of US Senators to US President Ford regarding continued aid to Israel⁶⁹

Cairo, May 25, 1975

The Assembly took note of the letter addressed by 76 US senators to President Ford on May 22, 1975,⁷⁰ asking that US arms and military and economic aid continue to be poured into Israel without this aid being contingent upon Israeli policy regarding efforts being made to achieve a

peaceful, just and permanent settlement in the Middle East. The Assembly also heard the statements of its deputy speaker and of the deputy prime minister and foreign minister as well as the debates among Assembly members regarding this letter. The Assembly considers the letter to be most unfortunate, whether in regard to its timing or its contents, its political implications and its repercussions upon the prestige and position of the USA as a great power assuming special responsibilities in the international sphere.

As regards its timing, the letter was sent after it became manifestly clear, even to Israel's most avid supporters, that Israel was unwilling, or at best unable to follow the path that might lead to peace in the region and after Israel had caused a grievous set-back to US efforts that sought to prepare the ground for a comprehensive peace settlement that would put an end to war, violence and instability. It is odd that the letter was written after Egypt and sister Arab states had adopted a reasonable attitude towards the question of peace, having gone a long way along this road despite vigorous challenges and many setbacks.

As to content, the letter is an aggregate of the largest possible number of contradictions and falsehoods which we thought no one could possibly dare to express openly once Israel's policies and intentions had become so glaringly obvious and following the radical changes that had taken place as a result of the glorious October war. For this war put an end, among other things, to theories of military superiority and to the assumption that turning Israel into an arsenal for modern US weapons is Israel's best guarantee of security and represents the shortest road to peace. To encourage Israeli expansionism and to imply that it is legitimate to play around with existing international frontiers for the sake of arriving at secure and recognized borders that can be defended is a short-sighted policy which violates the most basic of legal codes and of international laws.

As for the repercussions of this irresponsible stand and its adverse effects on the ability of the USA to shoulder its international responsibilities, it may be stated, to begin with, that Israel has been able in this manner to carry out the threat it had made when signs first began to appear that the American people had begun to refuse to allow their country to become a tool used to perpetuate the forcible occupation of Arab lands and a

⁶⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 26, 1975, p. 8.

⁷⁰ Doc. 100 above.

protector of Israeli expansionism and regression.

While the Assembly expresses its disapproval of this irresponsible stand, it applauds the stand of other Senators who honestly acted in accordance with their consciences and refused to be led astray by such manoeuvres which are subject to Israeli pressure. The Assembly calls upon parliamentary bodies in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America as well as all peace-loving forces in the world, to condemn the behaviour of a group that does violence to the principles of parliamentary representation and destroys the very fabric of parliamentary life.

On this occasion, the Assembly reaffirms its confidence in the wise policy followed by Egypt. It reasserts that its call for the establishment of a just and permanent peace is based on principle and founded upon our deep faith in the rightness of our policy, the solidarity of our Egyptian and Arab fronts, the maturity of our struggling masses and their ability, inspired by the spirit of October, to oppose any aggressive schemes. The Assembly also expresses its faith that the president of our republic who has guided the ship of state with such wisdom under diverse conditions and to the greater glory and honour of Egypt and the Arab nation, will react to this irresponsible action taken by a group within the US Congress with the decisive stand that it merits in order that truth and justice be heard.

Based upon the preceding, the Assembly empowers President Anwar Sadat to adopt any measure he thinks necessary regarding the effects of this letter, which the Assembly has debated, upon general state policy.

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Interview statement by President Sadat of Egypt considering the possibility of allowing passage of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal⁷¹

Suez, June 5, 1975

Q. Will the Egyptian authorities allow Israeli cargoes to pass through the Canal?

⁷¹ Made to journalists at the opening of the Canal; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 6, 1975, p. 12.

A. I have already said on more than one occasion that it is one thing for ships to pass through the Canal, and another thing for cargoes to pass through. The 1888 treaty does not allow the ships of such states as may be at war with Egypt to pass through the Canal. We have been at war with Israel for twenty seven years, during which time not a single Israeli ship has passed through, and we shall not allow a single Israeli ship to do so as long as we are at war. As for cargoes, that depends on how Israel behaves; it is not a problem of Israeli cargoes, but of how Israel behaves. As for achieving peace and continuing the operations that lead to it, the situation is practically frozen, and Kissinger's mission has collapsed because of Israel's intransigence. The step she took recently may indicate the start of an operation towards peace, but the whole world has understood it and welcomed it and is going along with us. The operation that Israel has initiated is insignificant in extent,⁷² but it is important in what it symbolizes, and we are waiting to see what her next steps will be.

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Statement issued by the National and Progressive Front of Iraq expressing anxiety over the situation in Lebanon⁷³

Baghdad, June 8, 1975

The masses throughout the whole Arab homeland are watching with the greatest concern the terrible and bloody events that are taking place in the Lebanese arena.

Since April 13 the rightist Phalangist Party has been launching a campaign of terror against the sections of the Palestine resistance and the nationalist and progressive forces in Lebanon, using increasingly lethal weapons openly supplied by American imperialism and Zionism.

The Phalangist Party is not alone in this major conspiracy; it is supported by the forces of the right and reaction that are playing their part in the implementation of a dangerous imperialist-Zionist plan directed not only against the Lebanese and

⁷² See doc. 111 above.

⁷³ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), June 9, 1975, pp. 1, 7.

Palestinian masses but against the Arab national liberation movement as a whole.

The criminal plan that is at present being implemented by the Phalangist and the rightist and reactionary forces consists of every kind of attempt to prevent the formation of an alternative to the military government that has resigned and to escalate internal clashes with the object of smashing the strength of the Lebanese nationalist movement and bringing the Palestine resistance movement to heel as a prelude to imposing humiliating imperialist-Zionist solutions.

Appreciating as we do the policy of cohesion pursued by the different parties and sections of the Lebanese nationalist movement and their call for the formation of a unified national command to confront the malevolent conspiracy, we call on the Lebanese nationalist movement to lose no time in combining in a national front to defend the interests of Lebanon and its struggling masses and the unity of Lebanese-Palestinian struggle, and to protect the positions of the Palestine resistance which has demonstrated such revolutionary mastery in escalating the struggle in the occupied territory against the strategic establishments of the Zionist enemy.

If the criminal conspiracy in Lebanon is not to be turned into a confessional conflict the unity of the Lebanese-Palestinian masses must be reinforced and firmly established on a national and democratic basis.

If the future and the destiny of Lebanon are to be safeguarded there must be the highest degree of vigilance as regards the criminal imperialist-Zionist scheme. Also the internal campaign of attrition must be checked and all national forces and resources must be mobilized in the struggle for democracy and to resist all spurious agreements that may be adduced to justify the imposition of military government on Lebanon.

The National and Progressive Front of Iraq strongly supports the Lebanese masses and their democratic nationalist movement in their confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy.

We call on the Lebanese and Palestinian masses to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and unity that link them and so thwart the efforts of the terrorist agents of Zionism and imperialism to impose partition and liquidation.

It is essential that the Palestine resistance should hold fast in its positions and continue to resist the

dangerous conspiracy; this is indispensable for the defeat of the criminal scheme of the rightist and reactionary forces and their imperialist and Zionist masters. While saluting the efforts that our brother Arabs have made and are still making to support the Lebanese-Palestinian masses in their ordeal and to isolate the Phalanges and the forces of the rightist conspiracy, we call on them to redouble their efforts to check the course of the terrible crime which is strangling the life out of Lebanon.

May the national and democratic will be victorious in Lebanon, and let efforts be united to thwart the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy and to inflict an ignominious defeat on the Phalangists and on the suspect and subservient rightist and reactionary groups. Victory to the Palestine resistance movement and to the unity of Lebanese-Palestinian struggle.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)⁷⁴

Amman, June 12, 1975

President Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid an official visit to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in the period June 10-12, 1975, at the invitation of his brother, H.M. King Hussein.

In the light of the two Arab leaders' belief that unity is the sacred goal for which generations have made sacrifices and struggled to achieve; in the performance of their mission to serve the aspirations to unity of both their peoples, and in the service of the brotherhood of their two countries and the unity of interests and goals of their Arab people; from their appreciation of the circumstances through which the Palestine cause is passing and of the greater cohesion, preparation and mobilization this necessitates; from their belief in the leading role performed by the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic in the defence of Arab territory and rights and in support of the

⁷⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 13, 1975, p. 7.

common Arab march, the two leaders agreed to form a joint higher committee of a number of senior political and military officials from each country, each side being headed by its country's prime minister, to perform the following tasks:

1. To draw up the necessary plans of action for the development of programmes of cooperation, coordination and integration between the two countries in all areas and fields, political, military, economic, educational, information, cultural, etc.

2. To follow up the implementation of these plans.

3. To supervise the work of the existing sub-committees and such committees as may be set up by the Joint Higher Committee.

It was decided that the Committee should hold periodical meetings in Damascus and Amman once every two months or whenever necessary, and that its first meeting should be in the middle of July.

His Excellency President Hafiz Asad commended the attitude of his brother, His Majesty King Hussein, and the progress achieved by the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan under his wise and intrepid leadership. His Excellency also expressed his esteem for the Jordanian armed forces and his pride in the intrepid role they played in the Ramadan and Golan wars and his admiration for their high standards and all they have achieved in the way of building up their strength and developing their capabilities under the leadership of their Supreme Commander, His Majesty the King.

His Majesty the King likewise commended the attitude of his brother, His Excellency President Hafiz Asad, and the great steps Syria has taken along the road to total resurgence under his courageous leadership.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Libya of a joint delegation of the PFLP and the PFLP-General Command⁷⁵

Tripoli, June 14, 1975

At the invitation of the political leadership and the Arab Socialist Union of the Libyan Arab Republic two delegations, one representing the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by its General Secretary, Dr. George Habash, the other representing the Popular Front-General Command, headed by its General Secretary, Ahmad Jibril, visited the Libyan Arab Republic from Jumada I, 24-Jumada II, 1, 1395 AH.

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In the light of the political situation and their common view of the gravity of the present stage and the dangers it involves to the future and the destiny of the Arab revolutionary movement in general and the Palestine revolution in particular, the two sides agreed on the following:

1. To reject and combat all settlement projects put forward by American or other imperialism, whether at the Geneva conference, Salzburg or other contemptible conferences leading to either direct or indirect negotiation with the enemy, to recognition of him or to the signing of a truce with him, and also to reject United Nations resolutions which recognize the legality of the Zionist usurpation of any part of our homeland or deny the national rights of the Arab people to full sovereignty over their territory in Palestine.

2. Resolute struggle to ensure that the Palestine resistance can continue to perform its duty and to escalate its armed struggle and all forms of struggle required by the situation for the liberation of all Palestinian Arab territory, the elimination of the Zionist entity and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian society as part of a comprehensive unified Arab society, in as much as the Arab-Zionist conflict is a struggle for existence, not for frontiers.

3. To condemn the Egyptian regime and to regard its maintenance of its present attitude as a manifestation of treachery to the aspirations of

⁷⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), June 20, 1975, pp. 6-7.

the Arab nation, which threatens its very existence, of hostility to the struggle of its popular masses and of contempt for the blood of its martyrs.

4. To call on the Arab masses and their national revolutionary movements, and all labour and trades union federations in all parts of the Arab homeland to resist this treacherous conspiracy and to give expression to their indignation and condemnation by all possible ways and means. For the cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs, not only the Palestinians, and the fact that the battle and commando action are the concern of all Arabs requires that the masses be in a state of alert in all Arab countries, so that they may resist, show up and thwart the conspiracy.

5. To call on the Arab peoples, the peoples of the Islamic world and the peoples of the third world, to declare their support for Palestinian armed struggle aimed at liberating occupied Arab territory and restoring it to its people and returning its people to it, and to regard the cause of Palestine as a sacred national cause that concerns all peoples struggling for freedom, right, justice and peace.

6. To stress the importance of strengthening friendship with the socialist countries, headed by the USSR, and with liberation movements and forces of progress throughout the world, and of consolidating relations with them to ensure that they stand by us in our struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

7. To call on the official leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to adhere to the principles of the Palestine National Charter and to respect the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions, which clearly stipulate rejection of and resistance to all kinds of settlement; continuation of armed struggle for the liberation of all the Palestinian territory; to declare, clearly and unambiguously, their rejection of all kinds of settlement, to have nothing more to do with such settlements and to refuse to go to the Geneva conference, so that it may be possible to discuss the potentiality of establishing Palestinian national unity based on firm revolutionary foundations.

8. The two parties affirm that what is being done in Lebanon by the traitorous Phalangist party is part of the great conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine cause. The two sides praise the honourable and resolute stand of the Lebanese

nationalist forces in their support and protection of the Palestine resistance and call on them to maintain this inflexible attitude until the imperialist conspiracy fails and the Palestinian Arab people and the intrepid Lebanese people are victorious.

9. So that this may be achieved, the Arab Socialist Union of the Libyan Arab Republic expressed its readiness to stand by the Palestine resistance and to provide it with every kind of support, in the light of its profound belief in the unity of Arab struggle and the common destiny of the Arab nation, while regarding the cause of the liberation of Palestine to be an Arab national responsibility and Libyan Arab territory as providing the battle with strategic depth and facing up to all the responsibilities arising from this.

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Statement by Prime Minister Jallud of Libya reviewing his visit to Iraq⁷⁶

Baghdad, June 18, 1975

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We have agreed on the following:

1. The central problem of the Arabs in their confrontation of the Zionist enemy is the occupation of Palestine: the occupation of other Arab territories since then has been the direct result of the occupation of Palestine. Therefore the liberation of Palestine is the goal of our struggle against the Zionist enemy.

2. Resolutions 242 and 338 involve recognition of the Zionist entity as an existing state. Thus those who recognize these two resolutions recognize the Zionist entity, both as a state and a popular organization, at the expense of the cause of the Arab territory in Palestine.

3. Rejection, in form and substance, of any negotiation or peace with or recognition of the Zionist entity and condemnation of any regime or organization that contravenes this principle.

4. Struggle in all forms against those who recognize the Zionist entity or act on the basis of

⁷⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), June 19, 1975, pp. 1, 7.

surrenderist projects; this includes attending the Geneva conference. Any quarter, official or popular, that is silent about what is going on in this connection is in fact giving its approval to these capitulationist proposals.

5. The Palestinian people, wherever in the Arab homeland they may be living, must be absolutely free to engage in political activities and to express their views in the service of the cause of their destiny, the liberation of the territory of Palestine. Any pressure exerted on them is an act of hostility to the will of the Arab nation and its goals of liberation.

6. The fundamental role of the Palestine resistance is armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine and we who, like it, are committed to this course, believe that the Palestine Liberation Organization should clearly and frankly declare its attitude to the surrenderist projects to enable the Arab states and the Arab masses to support it as it pursues its course towards the goal of liberation. We are committed to the employment of all available means to protect the Palestine Liberation Organization and all sections of the resistance from the conspiracies that are being concocted against them, if they clearly and frankly declare that their goal is liberation.

7. Discussion and consultation with the states, popular organizations and political organizations that believe in the liberation of Palestine and reject negotiation and peace with and recognition of the Zionist enemy, with a view to forming an official and popular front for armed struggle to activate the Arab masses and prepare them to confront their responsibilities as regards liberation; and the employment of all the financial, material, military, economic and political resources of the Arab nation with a view to the total liberation of Palestine.

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Press interview statements by Palestine National Council member Jiryis discussing his views on the direction of the future struggle and a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict⁷⁷

Beirut, June, 1975

Q. I heard that you recently prepared a report for the PLO Research Center, addressing itself to the efficacy of violence and guerilla attacks in trying to change the balance of power in the Mideast, and that it was criticized within the Palestinian Council. Was there such a report?

A. No, it was not a report, but a personal article, published in the newspaper An-Nahar, in three parts.⁷⁸ In it, I discussed the major aspects of the Palestine problem. I came out strongly against the so-called armed resistance and the popular war. That was criticised very much, even by some who would not consider themselves rejection front people. I said that there are other ways to solve the Palestine problem besides armed struggle and armed resistance. That was criticized from many quarters. Others liked the article—opinion was divided, some were for, some against. But it was not a report, it was my personal article.

Q. You say you proposed other methods of pursuing the liberation struggle. Please describe them for us.

A. I analyzed the Palestine problem in three dimensions. One of them is international, one the Arab dimension, and third is the Israeli and Jewish aspect.

Internationally, in the last one and a half years we have attained a good measure of progress in international recognition—80 or 83 states in the U.N. But the western powers, I mean the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the U.S.A., still have very much influence in this region, and it seems that it will continue. We have gotten the recognition of only one of these three factors, the Eastern bloc. We got some help from some of the West European states, but from the United States we are getting nothing. I called for a change, to enable us to win support of Western Europe and America.

⁷⁷ Interview with Sabri Jiryis conducted by members of a US delegation sponsored by "Fellowship of Reconciliation," *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XVIII, 6 (September, 1975), pp. 12-17.

⁷⁸ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 13-15, 1975.

Now for the Arab dimension: I think that all the Arab states care for their narrow national interest more than any other. One of our faults is that we depend on them very much; we think that the Palestinian problem is the main concern of some or another group of the Arab states. But it has been proven to us that every Arab state has its narrow national interests, they are not united themselves, and by no means have only the Palestine problem in mind. Since the Palestinian problem has a special aspect, there is no reason for us not to take an independent line.

Thirdly, the Israeli scene: I pointed out in the article, some dissenters whom I would call moderate Zionists. They speak more and more of Palestinian rights, of a Palestinian state. It is worth dealing with these trends. I also dealt briefly with Zionist history and expressed my opinion that we have no reason to fear competition by the Zionists. It seems to me that the continuing military struggle only helps the Zionists to control the Israeli population, and to convince Jews elsewhere that the Arabs want to throw the Jews into the sea. This must be changed.

Now the main theme: Some of the Palestinian organizations say that the only way is to go on with the armed struggle. I say that first of all, the Palestinians do not have enough power to solve the problem by force. Not even Israel, Egypt, Syria or the others can solve it by force, so how can we? There must be some kind of a peaceful settlement.

Q. Could you be more specific about other approaches you advocate instead of force?

A. The basic question is: Are you for a Palestinian state or not? I am for it. I belong to that faction of the PLO which would really like a Palestinian state. To explain, let me first analyze the criticisms against such a strategy:

This state would mean an end to armed struggle. That does not bother me, I think it is good. Such a state could be a tool for solving the Palestinian problem, for those who will inhabit it and those who will live elsewhere. I do not see why the emphasis should not be shifted towards economic, social and even political activities.

Some say that the Palestinian cause is still the main one which unifies the Arab world. Perhaps, but it is a negative unifying element. The Arab world has other things to do: developing, indus-

trializing, and so on. Let these struggles unify and lead it towards a better future, and let the Palestinian problem, a negative unifying factor, be solved.

This is the heated discussion among Palestinians, going on since the October war: For or against a Palestinian state.

Q. What percentage of Palestinians lean in your direction?

A. I think we have a majority. We have a numerical majority of the Palestine National Council, and I think that the majority of the people are for this state, too. Roughly, there are 3 million Palestinians. About half live in the territories occupied since 1967 or inside Israel. The other half live outside, in Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, etc. If you let the people inside the occupied territory choose between life under occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state, I think 95% would be for the Palestinian state. It is in their interest.

Outside, we are divided, but still a good number really support it. For example, about 300,000 Palestinians in Kuwait or elsewhere, connected with the West Bank, would support such a move. The PLO, as you know, adopted the so-called Ten Point Program. It was explained everywhere, rightly, as a move towards agreement to such a state.

Within the PLO, *Fatah* is for the Palestinian state. *As-Saika* has also declared its support. So has the *Democratic Front*. Against it are the *Popular Front* and the *General Command*, which as everybody knows are small organizations. Thus, I am on the side of the majority.

Q. Is this discussion realistic at all? Will the present Israeli government ever accept such a Palestinian state?

A. Changing the Israeli position is a hard problem. Up to now, they refuse to deal with any PLO person, extremist or moderate. There are many reasons. Internally, I doubt whether the government could decide to withdraw from the occupied territories and allow a Palestinian state, without falling. Public opinion is moving to the right—even if Rabin wanted to, he could not.

Also, the moderate-extremist division within the PLO is used by the Israelis as an excuse. Israel is colonizing the occupied territories: drawing labor for industry, creating a market, and hoping to reach the rest of the Arab world through them.

There *are* Palestinian moderates and extremists, but the Israelis use it as an excuse to avoid dealing with the PLO or even any genuine Palestinian leadership. But the Israelis will be forced, by international pressure, or by another war, to give up the territories. Their arms, financial aid, political support all come from abroad. No Israeli government can do without these. Even Ben Gurion, were he alive, would have to agree.

Q. Do you view the two-state solution as permanent?

A. Our declared aim, as you know, is a single state in all of Palestine. I do believe in it, theoretically. But practically, I am against it. I would not like to see a single state now in Palestine. The reasons are very simple, connected more with us than with the Israelis. On the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the people are almost of one social class, either agricultural workers or day laborers. Even if we had a single democratic state now, the Arabs would be of a lower class, attached to the Israeli economy.

Also, we have our own Palestinian problems. A single state of Arabs and Jew could not do much for Palestinians on the outside. So I prefer two states now, Israeli and Palestinian. Perhaps after 10, 15, 20, or even 25 years, when political circumstances change and a state of development is attained enabling us to deal with social, economic and other problems, then the time may be ripe to discuss a single state. By then the war situation will have changed so that people will not discuss it the way they do now.

I am trying to be realistic and am saying it openly: Even if the Israelis agreed to a single state now, we could not bear it. What could we do? We have no university on the West Bank. We have no industry. We have nothing. Every Palestinian knows this, especially the leadership. There is a lot to do, to solve the problems of the refugees, so now and for 20 or 25 years we should keep away from the Israelis.

Q. Do the majority also prefer two states? Do they share your economic and social analysis of the problem?

A. Here I am expressing my own opinion and trying to interpret the declared statements of the PLO. Every party has its own explanation of why it supports a peaceful settlement. I am giving mine.

You know we have extremists. Some factions are opposed, would not hear of it. Also, there

exists division in the Arab world. The Palestinian "rejection front," supported and armed by Iraq and Libya, is on one side, the rest of the PLO with the other Arab states on the other side. They have some differences between them, but strategically they work along the same lines. Most of the Arab states would favor such a solution—at least they like the program which we passed at the last National Council meeting. Even Iraq might change its position after agreement with Iran and rapprochement with the U.S.

Q. Please answer for yourself and for the PLO. Immediately after the Palestinian state comes into existence, how do you see its relationship with Israel—economically, socially, etc.?

A. Here, my and the PLO's views are exactly the same. If a state is established, we would insist on complete independence, especially economically. As I explained, this state wouldn't be independent the moment the Israeli economy dominates it. The Israelis and their sympathizers would like a sort of federation between the West Bank state, Jordan and Israel. This we oppose, on economic grounds at first. Otherwise, the state would be dominated by the Israelis forever.

Q. How will the state build industry and farming?

A. The Arab states interested in this solution promised Arafat they would give the state something like 1% of their national income for such and such years. The Arab world has very much money. That is not a problem. They would like to get rid of Palestinians who make trouble inside their countries. It was not an official resolution, but was discussed in the Arab League on a very full scale. It was said that the Arab countries would commit themselves to assisting this state for something like 15 years. Once there is a peaceful settlement, this state would also get help from the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Europe. As long as we solve our problems, it will be OK.

Q. So any money is OK except Israeli money?

A. It's not the Israeli money; it's the Israeli domination. Besides, do you really think that Israel has money to offer? You know their situation. They get financial help from the U.S. and pass some of it on to Africa. We don't need that, we can get it ourselves, directly.

Q. What about contacts between you and moderate Israelis, in other countries?

A. In Israel the majority takes a hard line, but there has been some dissent. There are people, like Arie Eliav, a few other M.P.s, and a good number of intellectuals. Up to now the PLO will not have any contact with Israelis, but it is being rediscussed. Some PLO members have met Israelis, even officials, but when revealed by the Israelis, they denied it here. I hope that this attitude will be changed. With non-Israeli Jews we have many contacts, nobody is against it. The problem is with Israelis as such. As I said, we have our extremists. They won't like it, they do not want to hear of it, and they accuse people who do it with treachery, selling out, etc.

Q. What about contacts after the state is established?

A. Eventually, there will be recognition. Otherwise, how can the Palestinian state be established? How could they live with each other? But we cannot extend complete recognition to Israel now; no Palestinian can do it and be respected. Full recognition would mean giving up rights to lands and homes inside Israel and abandoning the democratic state idea.

Q. If they recognize you, would you...

A. I don't think they will. Why? Because we would then come up with a list of our claims inside Israel, like compensation for land which was taken. There are some 4 million dunams of agricultural land, there are homes, the refugees who have been away for 25 years: it is a big problem. Simply to say: "We recognize you and that's that"—The Israelis cannot do it and we cannot do it.

Q. Perhaps over time... it could start in more subtle ways.

A. It would have to take time. Look, now everybody speaks of guaranteeing Israel's 1967 borders. You see how complicated and difficult even this is. The Palestinian problem is much deeper. People may return to the West Bank, but what about those who left Galilee in 1948? I come from there. Nobody speaks about it. I have some property there—what will happen to it? Like me there are thousands.

Q. Sovereign states deal with problems like reparations. It seems that this could be resolved. When the Palestinian state is established there has to be some kind of recognition between those two neighboring states.

A. You mean after the state is established?

Q. Or in the process of negotiating.

A. In the process it's difficult. After the state is established, perhaps, but now, even with all the international pressure, they are only speaking about the 1967 occupied territory.

Q. How can this Palestinian state defend itself? It is hard to see Israel accepting a state on its borders, that...

A. The Israelis ask for guarantees, and we shall, too, though we do not like guarantees any more than the Israelis do. Personally, this problem does not bother me; I have a broad view. Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with all their wealth, can only with great difficulty fight Israel and Israel fight them, as seen in 1967. To think that a Palestinian state could continue to fight Israel after it was established is simply a joke, even if it wants to. In other ways, economic, social and political, perhaps. But our people know that even if they say the fighting will go on, it simply cannot be.

Q. If a two-state solution were finally signed, how would the rejectionists be controlled by the majority of the PLO, to prevent sabotage?

A. The people living there would be against such acts. Fatah has more influence than the others now because it says: "We want to get rid of the Israeli occupation." It will not be a political problem as it is now, but an internal problem. Even those inhabitants who now help the rejection front—their interest would be against it. Of course, there would still be extremists, some hotheads who would go on with it, but I think it would not be a problem.

Q. Would you feel it the responsibility of the new Palestinian government at that point to jail the hotheads?

A. I would do it, if I were responsible. The question is very clear and logical. If you want to go on and fight, there is no need to enter into any agreement. You can continue the so-called popular war, but it would better to leave the situation as it is now, because then you will get the support of all Arabs. The moment you say that you choose another way of solving the Palestinian problem, it means you have chosen it and have to defend it. You cannot do it both ways. The rejection people know that very well and that is the main point on which they attack us.

Q. What about guerilla activities carried on outside Israel, contrary to the policies of the PLO? In Europe for example.

A. This is a delicate problem. We are a voluntary organization, all of the PLO organizations are. Now a certain faction, not the leadership, of the Popular Front did it, and enjoyed the complete support of Iraq. We tried many times to stop them but they wouldn't. We contacted the Egyptians, the Syrians and the Saudis and asked them to apply pressure on the Iraqis to cease support. Now, after the PLO's recognition, these actions are discredited, for months there has not been one. Some dissidents may continue, with protection of the Libyans. We can press Libya, but there is a limit—we can ask the Algerians to talk to them, or the Tunisians. But acts like these are dying out.

Q. What percent of the Palestinians in exile would return to a Palestinian state?

A. I think a minority. Most Palestinians here in Lebanon come from Galilee, which would still be Israeli. Conditions at first would not be much better than they are here, so I think they would prefer to stay. The majority would stay, see what happens, and then plan carefully. Many Palestinians in Syria won't go because they are well-integrated. Syria is the only Arab government which never discriminated against the Palestinians. These are the biggest Palestinian areas in the north. In the Gulf countries, there are 300,000 or more Palestinians who have gone there freely to work. They will not rush back. The majority in Jordan would probably stay, too, provided there is contact with the West Bank.

So it seems that in the beginning a minority of Palestinians would return. I would go, whatever the conditions. Many others would, too, but the majority not. We would get some from the camps, who are fed up, especially agricultural workers. Many Palestinians are students, or work in the U.S. or Canada: For them it would be hard to return. Those inside Israel would stay there, some half a million.

Q. I am aware of Jewish paranoia, reinforced by incidents such as Hebron in 1929, riots in 1936, and common statements among the Oriental Jews in Israel, who say: "You don't know Arabs the way we do. We lived with them." I ask: Can you suggest any way to start breaking stereotypes?

A. We can put it the other way: They say you don't know Arabs, I say you don't know Zionists. If we really want to speak about such experiences, I could speak about ours. But these kind of people

are not the best ones for participating in the solution of the Palestine problem, neither on the Jewish or Arab side.

We have our own extremists—they don't put it this way, they cover it with revolutionary words—but they say the same thing. We do have them, and we have to face them. We know that. Whoever thinks that among Israelis or Palestinians, or among any other nation in the world, there are no fascists, is mistaken. That is one of the problems we have to face. I have no easy answer. I hope that most people will not be like that.

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Statement issued by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO outlining the bases of relations between Lebanon and the Palestine resistance⁷⁹

Beirut, late June, 1975

On Monday morning, June 23, 1975, there was a meeting in the Presidential Palace in Baabda between His Excellency President Sulayman Franjeh, Mr. Salah Khalaf and the ambassadors of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In the course of this meeting there was a discussion of the whole range of Lebanese Palestinian relations and the factors that have impaired them especially during the incidents that have taken place since April.

The discussion took place in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding and frankness. The command of the Palestine revolution wishes to stress that His Excellency Sulayman Franjeh expressed his concern, both as a private person and as President, for the Palestine revolution which, in turn, reaffirmed its belief in and dedication to the sovereignty, security and stability of Lebanon.

What then do the Palestinians want of Lebanon and for Lebanon?

The Palestine resistance in Lebanon is not a political clique affiliated to any specific quarter, nor does it wish to be so.

The Palestine resistance in Lebanon is not a

⁷⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin Al-Thawra* (Beirut), June 29, 1975, pp. 7, 9.

party to the internal affairs of Lebanon, nor does it wish to be so.

The Palestine resistance in Lebanon is neither a confessional group nor the auxiliary of any such group, nor does it wish to be so.

The stability of Lebanon is the stability of the Palestine revolution.

The tranquillity of Lebanon is the tranquillity of the Palestine revolution.

The invincibility of Lebanon and of any Arab country is the invincibility of the Arab homeland as a whole.

Coexistence between confessions is what the revolution is striving to achieve in the Palestine of tomorrow.

The Palestine revolution is bearing arms only for the sake of liberation and for the defence of its existence: these are inseparable twins, for there can be no liberation without revolution and no revolution without revolutionaries.

The Palestine revolution has nothing to say on whatever political, social and economic system, regime and legislation Lebanon may choose for herself, except to wish her continuing prosperity and greater success.

Let us then expand the field of harmony, confidence and affection so that there is no place for anything else, within the framework of earnest commitment to all the accords and agreements between us. On this basis the following are essential for the maintenance of the equation of Lebanese Palestinian brotherhood:

1. That the Palestine revolution should unreservedly and unambiguously respect Lebanese sovereignty.

2. That Lebanon should concede the right of the revolution to exist in her territory within the framework of adherence in letter and in spirit to the agreements concluded between them.

3. That there should be mutual confidence between all groups and confessions and that all cause for fear should be removed.

4. That there should be a firm conviction that the Lebanese and the Palestinians are fighting in the same trench against the same enemy and that they have the same destiny.

5. That there should be a clearly expressed will for coordination between the summit and the base and vice versa.

263

Letter from Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt to UN Secretary-General Waldheim refusing Egypt's consent to a renewal of the UNEF's mandate⁸⁰

Cairo, July 14, 1975

I am writing to you in connexion with the present developments in the Middle East.

You will recall that, in the aftermath of the October 1973 armed conflict, the Security Council adopted its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, calling upon the parties to the conflict to cease all firing and terminate all military activity. Furthermore, it called upon the parties to start, immediately after the cease-fire, the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 in all of its parts. In addition, the Council decided, in its resolution 338 (1973) that immediately, and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned, under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Council further decided, by its resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 to set up, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force. It subsequently decided, by resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, that the Force be established for an initial period of six months.

In implementation of resolution 338 (1973), the first phase of the Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in Geneva in December 1973 under the auspices of the United Nations. You were of the view that the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem and that the continued operation of the UNEF is essential, not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Council concurred with your opinion and decided, by its resolution 346 (1974), to extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months.

Then, the Council extended the mandate of the UNEF for an additional period of six months by

⁸⁰ English text as transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in UN doc. S/11757 on July 15, 1975.

resolution 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, but noted that "the overall situation in the Middle East will remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems are unresolved."

Consequently, efforts were deployed during the months of February and March 1975 to achieve a further disengagement agreement which was necessary as an additional measure designed to pave the way for the Geneva Conference, where substantial issues conducive to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East could be dealt with. None the less, due to Israel's policy of intransigence and procrastination, those efforts failed.

However, in order to defuse the explosive situation, and in contrast to Israel's attitude, President Sadat decided to reopen the Suez Canal for international navigation and embarked upon a major programme for the reconstruction of the cities in the Suez Canal zone. Six hundred thousand citizens of this area have returned to their homes. All these major decisions were, beyond any doubt, practical steps taken by the Government of Egypt to stimulate the process of peace.

Moreover, the Egyptian Government decided to renew the mandate of the UNEF for an additional period of 3 months in order to afford peace efforts every possible chance.

However, it was clear from the outset that the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in accepting resolution 340 (1973) and in declaring its readiness to extend her co-operation in this respect, has underlined the temporary nature of the Force and its functions as a first step in the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

And although this was the underlying concept in all the Security Council resolutions establishing and renewing the mandate of the Force, Israel has profited from the relative prevailing "quiet" to further its occupation rather than to assist the efforts aiming at achieving a lasting peace.

It must be emphasized, therefore, that, with no further steps taken toward peace, Egypt cannot adhere to the Israeli interpretation of the *raison d'être* of the UNEF.

In these circumstances, an extension of the mandate of the Force by the Security Council would defeat the very purposes the Council envisaged in establishing the Force, since the quiet is being transformed into stagnation and, con-

sequently, the perpetuation of the occupation.

It is, therefore, abundantly clear that it is impossible for Egypt to consent to any measure that could lead to the continuation of the occupation of its territory.

While Egypt does not consent to further renew the mandate of UNEF, she is not against the proper use of the Force. Egypt objects to the use of the Force and its presence by Israel as a means to maintain the state of "no-war no-peace" and the perpetuation of the occupation of Egyptian territory in defiance of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and accepted norms of international law.

Egypt, however, does not prevent the Council from acting in conformity with its prerogatives under United Nations Charter so that Israel does not misinterpret either the physical presence or the philosophy behind the UNEF, established to serve the cause of peace in this strategic and highly sensitive area.

I request that this letter be brought to the attention of the President and members of the Security Council.

(SIGNED) ISMAIL FAHMY

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

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Policy statement by Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon presenting his new government to the Chamber of Deputies (excerpt)⁸¹

Beirut, July 15, 1975

Gentlemen,

The current crisis should prompt all of us to affirm some of the facts imposed on us by our situation, our obligations and the development of events in our country and around it.

The first fact is that all groups of the Lebanese people, whatever their sympathies, have adopted the Palestine cause and have regarded it, and still regard it, as their own principal cause. They have struggled, and are still struggling on its behalf, truly, honestly and faithfully, in thought and in

⁸¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 16, 1975, p. 3.

action with all their might, abiding by all the pacts concluded and resolutions taken in this connection, believing that any solution of this problem must be based on justice and right.

Here we should like to affirm that we are confident that, as they have so often affirmed, our Palestinian brothers in their turn respect our laws and customs and the relationship between us and them that derives from our common concern for the security of Lebanon and the triumph of the Palestine cause.

The second fact is that Lebanon must remain true to the course she has followed in Arab and international policy, in as much as she is an integral part of the Arab world and shares the fate of her Arab brethren for better or for worse; she is open to the whole world and not aligned with any axis or grouping, and she expects all to return confidence for confidence and love for love so that she may continue to perform her mission for her own benefit, for theirs and for that of all humanity.

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Statement by President Bakr of Iraq expressing his misgivings over current diplomatic developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict⁸²

Baghdad, July 17, 1975

We have repeatedly warned that the aim of this imperialist-Zionist policy is to induce certain Arab regimes and the Arab masses to accept a series of successive concessions and withdrawals, so that the parties concerned with the so-called peaceful settlement may be able to represent acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 as being a victory, or a major political gain, although these resolutions involve, in both form and content, recognition of the Zionist entity and renunciation of the territory it occupied before 1967 in return for part of the territory it occupied then.

This course is dangerously misleading. It ignores

Arab right to Palestine and represents the problem as having started in 1967, ignoring the fact that this generation rejected the Zionist occupation of Palestine from the start and has struggled for many long years to liberate it, and that the 1948 occupation was the cause of what happened in 1967.

In affirming these principles and facts we are not motivated by extremism or a desire to embarrass others, or a failure to be realistic, as certain quarters try to make out. Our affirmation is based on two fundamental considerations. The first is that the Zionist entity, by virtue of its character and its organic links with imperialism and the fact that it performs the role of imperialism's agent in this sensitive area, can never be anything but aggressive and expansionist. The second is that the Arab nation is not so incapable of obtaining its legitimate rights that it has to relinquish some of them to obtain the others.

With the major human, economic and military resources at its disposal and the position it occupies in the international community, the Arab nation is neither weak nor incapable of fighting Zionist aggression, as those who work in collusion with imperialism and have no confidence in their nation and its resources would like to make out. By mobilizing these resources, or a major part of them, within the framework of a serious long-term plan of struggle, by exploiting all available circumstances and by building international relations in conformity with the strategic goal, the Arab nation can achieve its goal of full liberation. Even though the full achievement of the strategic goal may not be possible in a single stage, the Arab nation can take major steps towards achieving it without relinquishing that goal or its historical rights.

It is wrong to say that public opinion will only support us if we accept resolution 242 and 338 and relinquish our legitimate right to Palestine.

Fair-minded international public opinion rejects as a matter of principle the idea of the aggressor being rewarded for his aggression. It also rejects as a matter of principle—and this is what we must make every effort to affirm in the international arena—the idea that the aggressor should impose his terms for withdrawal from territories he has occupied forcibly. If Arab diplomatic and information activity had followed this right course throughout the last eight years we could have obtained

⁸² Made in a speech on the anniversary of the July revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), July 18, 1975, pp. 3, 6.

extensive world support for our stand on this legitimate and just basis.

Nor is the Arab nation today so politically, militarily and economically weak as to be obliged to accept what it was not obliged to accept twenty years ago, and our international relations and prestige are certainly stronger and more extensive now than they were then.

From our concern for the unity of Arab efforts and of Arab ranks, and from a sincere desire for fruitful and fraternal cooperation with our brothers in the Arab countries concerned, we stress the need for efforts to mobilize Arab military, economic and political resources within the framework of a serious long-term plan of struggle based on the principles we have mentioned. We are convinced and confident that in this way the Arab nation will achieve a better position, and we believe that the time has come for the immediate establishment of a northern military front consisting of ourselves and our sister Syria, and for Iraqi armed forces to be stationed in Syrian territory. But the Syrian government must clearly declare its rejection of resolutions 242 and 338 and the Geneva conference in accordance with the principles we have mentioned. It must adhere to the course of struggle that sees occupied Syrian territory in the Golan as part of a whole, and its liberation a step towards the liberation of Palestine and all the usurped Arab territories.

We also believe that the time has come for the Jordanian front to be activated for the confrontation of aggression and for greater Arab resources to be supplied for its military and economic support. We believe that the Egyptian front should be strengthened with very extensive Arab economic resources and with military resources from the countries of the Arab Maghreb.

The mobilization of Arab resources on this basis will ensure an atmosphere favourable for the sound and effective employment of military means, in accordance with the rules we have determined, without prejudice to the most effective method, the method of struggle, including the use of force, when both the Arab and international situations are favourable.

We also stress the need to make use of the Arabs' immense economic strength in a sound and effective manner, both in directing political activity and in meeting the requirements of the military battle and in confronting the Zionist enemy and the

foreign forces that are behind him.

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Press conference statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon outlining his complaints against the role of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon⁸³

Beirut, July 17, 1975

Christians and Muslims have lived together in Lebanon for hundreds of years without their differences ever sinking to the level of massacres. The Palestinians have been living in this country since 1948, and there were never any differences between us and them until 1969. But this time the confrontation has gone beyond the furthest limits demarcated by the principle of coexistence and of compassion among honourable men.

When the people of Palestine awakened in 1965 it was natural that the fact that the Palestinians, in their transition from the state of being refugees to the state of being fighters, should give rise to certain difficulties and disturbances which the Lebanese tried to understand, and sometimes to accept, with the greatest possible long-suffering and patience. It never happened that the few inevitable confrontations, which could not be avoided, were disfigured by inhuman conduct, nor were confessional controversies marred by savagery, before the emergence on the stage of events of a secret and alien force.

This force that came from outside infiltrated into Lebanese and Palestinian circles and forced on us a battle that is not ours and drove us into the odious course of civil war.

What is happening today is not a confessional conflict; it is the result of a conspiracy whose aim—as I have said—is to injure Lebanese and Palestinians alike. But, most regrettably, the slyness of the parties to this conspiracy has enabled them, till now, to play on certain leaders who, like us, are committed to the protection of Leba-

⁸³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut), July 18, 1975, p. 4.

non's sovereignty and the defence of her territorial integrity.

Yes, ultimately the issue is that of the independence of Lebanon and the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the Lebanese homeland.

Of course the leaders of the resistance repeat on every possible occasion that they have no ambitions in Lebanon and have no designs on her territory, always affirming that they are Lebanon's guests until they can return to their country. But what they say is not reflected in their actions.

Yes, they were refugees when they came to Lebanon and enjoyed hospitality not offered them by any other Arab country.

Then they demanded quasi-diplomatic rights for the camps they had established in the approaches to the towns and the suburbs, and succeeded in extracting these "rights" from the Lebanese authorities by a variety of means.

Then they started behaving as if they were in an occupied country, as has been happening up till now in Sidon.

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Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia outlining the desired principles of a solution to the Palestine question and the means available to Saudi Arabia to achieve it⁸⁴

Riyad, mid-July, 1975

Q. How do you see the ultimate solution of the Palestine problem? What is needed and what is possible? And what united attitude should the Arabs adopt before going to the Geneva conference?

A. In my view the solution of the Palestine problem is one that should be compatible with the basic principles and the historic facts of the problem. As for what is possible, it is what is accepted by the Palestinian people as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. It must also be a solution that the Arabs are able to agree on before going to the Geneva conference.

Q. What do you think is the role of oil in solving the crisis?

A. We of course hope that there will be peace based on right and justice—without Zionist obstinacy forcing us into a confrontation to defend our rights. If this is not achieved it is impossible to say what will happen.

Q. There are reports of increasing attention being paid to military strength in Saudi Arabia. What is the explanation? Why this attention at the present juncture?

A. It is the duty of all Arabs, and not only Saudi Arabia, to arm and continually strengthen and develop our military forces in all circumstances and at all times, because might is what protects right.

I do not think that our interest in increasing our strength requires any explanation, as long as the Arab and Islamic nations are being exposed to the Zionist threat at all levels.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)⁸⁵

Cairo, July 20, 1975

In response to an invitation extended by President Muhammad Anwar Sadat to his brother H.M. King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, and seeking to consolidate the unity of the Arab nation in its struggle to liberate its homeland, recover Arab rights and preserve the sacred places of Islam; seeking further to consolidate the ties of amity and brotherhood between the peoples of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Republic of Egypt along lines established by His late Majesty King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, H.M. King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz, concerned to single out the Arab Republic of Egypt, citadel of Arab resistance, for the first official visit he makes outside his country after assuming rule there, paid a visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt in the period Rajab 7–11, 1395 AH, corresponding to July 16–20, 1975.

⁸⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo), July 21, 1975, p. 8.

⁸⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 21, 1975.

As regards relations between the two sister states, the two leaders expressed their satisfaction with the rapid growth and development of these relations in the interests of the two countries and peoples. They agreed upon the necessity of consolidating cooperation between them in all fields. Consequently, 600 million dollars have been deposited at the Egyptian Central Bank as credit facilities in order to bolster the economy of that sister country and King Khalid has decided to contribute to the popular housing scheme in Helwan. The two leaders also reviewed the current Arab scene in the light of the efforts being made to find a peaceful and just solution to the Middle East problem and Israel's intransigent attitude which challenges the will of the international community. King Khalid expressed his support for the measure adopted by the Arab Republic of Egypt regarding the UN Emergency Force in view of Israel's procrastination and clear insistence not to conform with all the sincere Arab efforts made to bring about peace in the region. Among the most important of these efforts was President Sadat's decision to reopen the Suez Canal to international shipping as a contribution to the revival of the economy of many countries in the world especially the Afro-Asian and friendly European countries. The two sides agreed upon the necessity of persevering in mature Arab efforts directed at maintaining the initiative in the hands of the Arab nation, exposing Israel's expansionist aims before the peoples of the world and increasing its international isolation; all this, in addition to the necessity of going forward in mobilizing all Arab energies to face any aggressive act by Israel and of consolidating common Arab efforts that aim at liberating occupied Arab lands, recovering the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, specifically its right to determine its destiny and recover its soil as well as the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to express this in all quarters as the sole and legitimate representative of that people in conformity with the resolutions adopted by Arab and Islamic summit meetings. In the Islamic field, the two leaders expressed their satisfaction with the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Jidda, Rajab 3-7, 1395 AH, corresponding to July 12-16, 1975.⁸⁶ They expressed their support

for these resolutions as well as for institutions promoting solidarity among Muslims. The two sides expressed their satisfaction also with the results achieved by the Afro-Arab dialogue held in Cairo under the auspices of the League of Arab States on Jumada II 30 and Rajab 1, 1395 AH, corresponding to July 9 and 10, 1975, and with the communiqué and programme of action adopted by the participants as regards Afro-Arab cooperation. The two leaders hope that sincere and brotherly cooperation would increase between the Arab and African peoples in all fields, founded upon the common struggle they are both waging for development, liberation and progress and against the forces of racism, fragmentation and aggression. They also expressed their gratitude for the unqualified support that the Arab cause received from all the friendly African governments and peoples and for the decisive stand adopted against the racist and imperialist Israeli aggression.

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Declaration of the Catholic hierarchy of Lebanon on the Lebanese conflict⁸⁷

July 22, 1975

II. What is the Remedy?

We must examine closely this state to which we have arrived, and although we may be unable to change the course of international politics, at the very least we can tend to our own affairs and treat the causes of anxiety which led to this explosion.

II. 1. The Palestinian Problem.

In this perspective, we received with satisfaction the declaration of the Palestinian leadership, affirming their resolve not to meddle in Lebanese domestic politics, to avoid arousing sensibilities or infringing our national dignity, and to respect Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon has adopted the Palestinian cause, and has borne heavy sacrifices to aid it. Moreover, by the voice of his Excellency the President of the Republic and by all means available, on every occasion and gathering, Leba-

⁸⁶ Doc. 126 above.

⁸⁷ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 23, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), p. 36.

non has defended the cause and the right of Palestinians to return to their country. We ourselves openly proclaimed the justice of this cause in the letter which our assembly sent last year to the Catholic Bishops of the world. That letter has become an official document of the United Nations.

However, our adherence to this cause does not allow us to be remiss in our duty to our country, Lebanon. It is our right to demand that our brothers the Palestinians respect the sovereignty and security of this country, in an efficacious manner that will put an end to any exploitation of this cause by any group of people challenging the law or pursuing goals completely unrelated to the cause. There is no doubt that the general situation demands more sincerity, self-control, and wisdom to assure stability and impose respect for the law on all, in all circumstances, and over all the country.

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Statements by President Sadat of Egypt discounting the "Rejection Front" and explaining Egypt's hesitation over the renewal of the UNEF mandate⁸⁸

Cairo, July 22, 1975

We have stated our serious readiness for peace and have even suggested the ways and means leading to peace. The whole world has now realized that Israel's claim that it is seeking peace while the Arabs do not is a fraud. The world has come to know the truth which is that Israel not only does not want peace but is afraid of peace, fearing that peace would increase the power of the Arabs and would decrease its own importance and shake the very foundations of Israeli society. Today we can all see that Israel has never been as hard pressed and as isolated as it is now. But here too we had to bear up with the attacks against us by people whose mentality was superficial and who have extremely narrow regional interests: men who, having wielded the microphone as a weapon,

were no longer able to wield a rifle or a gun. They have created what they call a "Rejection Front" and have tried vainly to expand their small size. I would like to ask: what are they rejecting? Israel for the past seventy years has benefitted from this rejection and would like nothing better than for us to keep rejective.

Let us take the rejection of political struggle. Politics is a continuation of war just as war is a continuation of politics, especially when we are also preparing ourselves for any eventuality, including a new military confrontation. I would ask also: who are these people who are doing the rejection? There is the rejection of the weak, which amounts to nothing and there is the rejection of the strong. Because we really fought a war, we can negotiate and we can also reject. But our rejection has value, it has effect. Arab public opinion no longer pays any heed to this mythical blind rejection because it is in reality "armchair" rejection. It is the sort of rejection that takes no account of the sufferings of the Palestinian people, the blood they have shed, their camp life and their conditions under Israeli occupation. It is verbal rejection, rejection on paper which counts for nothing in the real world of events and is hardly worth the paper it is written on.

We have negotiated and we have fought. We shall negotiate if there is a chance and we shall fight if need be. We have negotiated with success and we have fought successfully, thank God. The achievements have not been inconsiderable especially when compared with the years of stagnation. This makes us feel that we are following the right path and we are setting an example to others. We are shouldering the responsibility of leadership in this process. This is our role and our responsibility as a nation. This is also my role and my responsibility as a leader of this nation.

Therefore, on July 14, the deputy premier and foreign minister sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General informing him that Egypt does not wish to renew the mandate of the Emergency Force, whose current term runs out on July 24, so long as Israel is using the presence of this force as a way of maintaining a state of no war and no peace and continues thereby its occupation of Egyptian territory.⁸⁹ Egypt called upon the Security Council

⁸⁸ Made in a speech at the opening session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 23, 1975, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁹ Doc. 263 above.

to deal with the issue in the light of the powers and responsibilities specified by the UN Charter.

In fact, the President of the Security Council has begun a series of intensive discussions and the Council has held several emergency meetings which resulted in the Council asking its president to send an appeal to us which the foreign minister received at dawn this morning.⁹⁰ The appeal, it is clear, voices the anxiety of the Council concerning the dangerous situation in the Middle East and its concern to follow developments there closely as well as its conviction of the necessity of achieving more progress towards a just and permanent peace and the avoidance of any stagnation in the position. Accordingly, the Council president called upon us to review our decision not to prolong the mandate of the Force. We are therefore studying all aspects of the situation taking into account the fact that the responsibility of the Council does not stop at the point of working to lessen tension but stretches to include guarantees of the full implementation of resolution 338 of 1973 as well as other related resolutions. I will keep you informed of what we will finally decide upon once I meet with our National Security Council, and will thereafter report to you what we have decided.

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Letter from Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt to the President of the Security Council agreeing to a renewal of the UNEF's mandate⁹¹

Cairo, July 23, 1975

I have the honour to refer to the appeal which you, on behalf of the Security Council and in your capacity as its current President, have addressed on 21 July 1975 to President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.⁹²

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt takes note of the concern of the Council over the situation in the Middle East, as well as its assurance to follow very closely the situation in the Middle

East. Furthermore, my Government particularly notes the Council's emphasis on the importance of achieving further progress towards a just and lasting peace and preventing a stalemate in the Middle East.

Egypt considers such a declaration on the part of the Council a proper step compatible with its responsibilities under the Charter regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The Government of Egypt will not fail to co-operate with the Council in order to prevent Israel from resorting to policies and tactics aimed at hindering the implementation of the Council's decisions and United Nations resolutions on the question of the Middle East and perpetuating the Israeli occupation of the territories occupied since June 1967.

Egypt, in pursuance of its policy designed to pave the way for achieving progress towards peace and to create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, has undertaken several initiatives in that direction, despite Israeli tactics of procrastination meant to maintain the status quo and perpetuate the occupation of the territories she occupies since June 1967. Consequently, Egypt welcomes the appreciation expressed by the Council in the appeal you addressed on its behalf for the constructive measures already taken towards peace.

Under the circumstances prevailing until the date of the letter I addressed to the Secretary-General on 14 July 1975,⁹³ an automatic extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force would have defeated the very purposes the Security Council envisaged in establishing the force, since the 'quiet' it brought about in the region for a limited time has not been used to achieve progress towards peace. It has, on the contrary, been used by Israel to freeze the situation.

However, in view of the contents of the appeal of the Security Council addressed by you to President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat, as well as in response to that appeal, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt accepts the further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for three more months, that is, until 24 October 1975.

⁹⁰ Doc. 11 above.

⁹¹ Text as published in a note by the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/11771 on July 23, 1975.

⁹² Doc. 11 above.

⁹³ Doc. 263 above.

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt reiterates its view, formally conveyed to the Secretary-General on 26 October 1973 (document S/11055) that it accepts resolution 340 (1973), by which the Council decided to set up the Force as a first step in the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Council regarding the question of the Middle East and that the presence of the Force on its territory is governed by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law which safeguard Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I seize this opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and the genuine concern he displayed for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East. Our appreciation also goes to the United Nations Emergency Force and its role in serving the cause of peace pursued by the United Nations.

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Statements by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing his talks with US President Ford and outlining the contribution of various Arab states to Egypt during the October war⁹⁴

Cairo, July 23, 1975

Q. Mr. President, there were talks held between your excellency and US President Ford. We would like to know the details of these talks and whether there were any agreements between you and President Ford?

Sadat: The question as posed by the brother member relates to the Salzburg talks between President Ford and myself. It had been agreed that if the second disengagement agreement on the Sinai front was about to be concluded, I would pay a visit to the USA. When the negotiations broke down last March in Aswan, there was no longer any point to my visit. Later, I received a letter from President Ford saying that he would be in Europe during the period from the end of May to early June and would be happy to see me in Salzburg if possible. We thus agreed to

meet in Salzburg on June 1 and 2. Of course, our talks centered on the Middle East problem. I put forth our point of view in full. Certain quarters, specifically one of our brother Arab countries, had tried to attack or throw doubts upon our position. In the Rabat summit and, before that, in the Algiers summit, a unified Arab strategy had been agreed upon by Arab kings and presidents. Not one foot of Arab ground, according to this Arab strategy, will be given and no bargains will be struck where the rights of the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, are concerned. This is the strategic framework, the main objectives I am talking about. Therefore, when I say that I represent Arab opinion on this question, there can be no room for anyone else to come in and try to outbid us. As for details, we discussed the developments at Aswan, the repercussions of the problem, the Israeli position and the Egyptian position. The American president listened to my full explanations and analysis and offered his own in reply. The agenda was an open one and there were no specific items. The Middle East problem was of course the focus. At that meeting, we agreed that the USA had set forth its own position which is to persist in its efforts to activate the question of peace, indeed to activate the whole problem. The US president made his position clear at the two lunches that were held namely, that the USA will not allow the situation to revert to one of stagnation or to a state of no war and no peace.

On our side, we put forth our arguments and our position based on the principles we had agreed upon, that is, not to squander an inch of Arab territory and not to bargain away rights that are the sole property of the Palestinian people. There were very many details. We discussed the motives of Israeli policy. We reached agreement, after all these talks, that the USA would persist in its efforts and begin new initiatives. We further agreed that the convening of the Geneva conference was essential and not open to question and that we were planning to attend the conference whatever happens. This is because if peace is to come about, all sides must be represented. Therefore, the only place for a peace agreement is Geneva. We also discussed another problem, the question of the troubled Egyptian economy. We discussed the possibility of the US aid, and the American president expressed his complete wil-

⁹⁴ Made in response to questions at a session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 24, 1975, pp. 3-4.

lingness to offer US help by itself, or in conjunction with US allies in Western Europe and throughout the world, to help us overcome the difficulties faced by our economy.

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He did not offer any specific solutions nor any maps nor did I bring any specific maps along. But I maintained, as you and every one else knows, that if a step was to be taken, it would have to include the question of the straits and of the Sinai oil fields. The US president, as I mentioned, undertook to do his utmost to activate the process leading to peace, prepare for the Geneva conference and try to accomplish another step before the conference convened. I asked that this step be taken on both the Sinai and Golan fronts. As regards Sinai, I have already said that it is a question of the straits and of oil. As a follow up to this, the US ambassador came back two days ago. I met him and he presented an account of their latest efforts and their position. I replied to their position the day before yesterday. But I have nothing yet to present to you, nothing specific. If something turns up, and when the Congress meets again, I will present you with the details. If this happens later, I will announce it to the people for we have been accustomed to lay all matters before the people.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Sudan of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)⁹⁵

Khartoum, July 27, 1975

At the invitation extended by President Jaafar Numairi to his brother, President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President Sadat paid an official visit to Khartoum in the period July 26-27, 1975.

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The two leaders, having reviewed the latest developments in the Middle East, reaffirmed their steadfast conviction that no peace is possible in

the Middle East without an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to establish an independent Palestinian entity led by the PLO, which is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Sudanese side expressed its absolute support in this regard for Egypt in its unceasing efforts to arrive at a just solution of the Arab problem. It applauds the position adopted by Egypt as regards the UNEF.⁹⁶ Concerning this matter, the two leaders call upon the UN Security Council to work to implement UN resolutions on Arab questions and to put a stop to the deliberately unresponsive Israeli policy as regards the efforts being made to establish a just and permanent peace in the region.

The two presidents express their complete satisfaction with the solidarity, unity and support manifested by the Arab states at this important historical juncture. They affirm their determination to consolidate such solidarity and cooperation for the furtherance of the economic and social development of the Arab nation and to intensify contacts and communication between them at all levels, both popular as well as official.

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Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat made before the summit conference of the OAU (excerpts)⁹⁷

Kampala, July 29, 1975

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What colonialism has done in Palestine is very similar in many ways to what it has done in Africa. In our country Zionist colonialism has employed all the pretexts and arguments utilized by European colonialism in Africa. Sometimes they want to "civilize" us, on the pretext that this is the responsibility of the white man. Sometimes they want

⁹⁶ Docs. 11, above.

⁹⁷ Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), August 3, 1975; excerpted from the partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 258-261.

⁹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 28, 1975.

our "deserts" to "blossom like the rose" and to establish an "oasis of democracy" among us. But in fact all they want is to perpetuate our enslavement and backwardness, to suck the lifeblood of our peoples and exhaust them through racial discrimination, slavery and colonization.

The massacres of your people by the butchers of South Africa and Mozambique, for example, find their parallels in our land of Palestine: Deir Yassin, Kafr Qassem and dozens of other villages are the counterparts of Chawola, Wiriya and dozens of previous African massacres. The dozens of African villages and towns burnt by the colonists are exactly paralleled by the three hundred and eight-five Palestinian villages and towns destroyed by the Zionists in 1949 and the twenty thousand Palestinian houses they have demolished since 1967. The [colonists'] attempts to destroy our independent economy and to turn the West Bank and Gaza Strip into a camp of exploited labourers are in no way different from the "Bantustans" in South Africa and the Llalid Jimentos in Mozambique. The thousands of detainees with which Vorster, Ian Smith, Salazar and other criminals have filled the gaols have their counterparts in the twenty thousand prisoners of war and detainees now in the prisons of the Zionist enemy. Just as the colonialists have assassinated the martyrs Lumumba, Mondlane and Cabral, so the Zionists have assassinated the martyrs Kamal Nasser, Kamal Adwan, Abu Yusuf and others of our heroic leaders. Similarly they give our endurance, resistance and just struggle against their crime, whether in Africa or Palestine, the name of "terrorism," but it is they who are the real terrorists and enemies of peoples.

By working its way into our countries, colonialism, under the various names it has assumed, has profoundly humiliated man, robbed him of all the mainstays of human, national and civilizational development, deprived him of the most elementary human rights and then obliterated his role in history and culture and plundered his material and spiritual resources, thereby paralysing his consciousness and creative ability.

Settler colonialism in southern Africa and Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine are not only phenomena that resemble each other from a distance; they are strategically and organically linked. In the early days of settler colonialism there was cooperation between Herzl, the principal propagandist of Zionism, and Cecil Rhodes, the

propagandist of white colonization in southern Africa, and this cooperation has continued, developed and assumed various forms. The racist governments of South Africa have always given their full support to Israel in her aggressive wars against the Arab countries, especially in the expansionist colonialist war of 1967, and Israel has consequently supported racist colonialism in Africa.

Mr. President,

Permit me to express my profoundest gratitude by the noble and courageous attitude adopted by the African countries in severing their relations with the Zionist entity which is the enemy of the aspirations, peace and freedom of peoples. In this connection too, permit me to call for the building of economic relations in harmony with the relations in struggle that exist between the countries of the Third World. In the light of common interests and the requirements of common struggle, those countries that are able to do so, and especially the Arab countries, should give greater material support to the African countries, so that they may complete the process of their economic and political liberation and overcome the effects of colonialist blackmail. This is a national duty that our Arab people must preform on behalf of their brothers in Africa with whom they share a common destiny and future. How noble was the attitude of sacrifice adopted by certain African countries in support of Arab struggle when they deprived themselves and their peoples of sustenance to assist our Arab peoples during the glorious battle fought by our Arab nation against the Zionist enemy in 1973.

World imperialism, led by the United States of America, has provided the Zionist-Israeli policy of aggression with economic, military and political support to encourage it to oppose the will of the whole world, and is still encouraging it to continue its aggression and expansion. This makes it one of the most dangerous seats of war in the world, for it is planning a fifth war against our Palestinian people and their armed revolution, and against our Arab nation, with full support from the United States of America. This means that all forces of peace in the world must join with our people in eliminating the danger of this cockpit of militarism which is threatening humanity with disaster.

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Political report issued by the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of Egypt (excerpts)⁹⁸

July, 1975

The National Issue:

The ruling authorities are gambling on the American role in the area and are obstinately attached to an American solution of the crisis.

They are recognizing the state of Israel step by step and preparing to coexist with it in the area.

They are raising no objections to the acceptance of a partial individual solution with Israel in return for a few kilometres of the Sinai desert.

Foreign Policy:

The ruling authorities are more and more abandoning the slogan of "strategic alliance" with the USSR, launching unceasing smear campaigns against the friendly USSR and trying to restrict Egypt's relations with the countries of the socialist camp.

They are making unremitting efforts to white-wash American imperialism, seeing the role it is playing in sabotaging peace and its colonialist consumption of the wealth of peoples as "efforts in the service of world peace and prosperity" and representing the United States as the sincere friend of Egypt and the Arabs.

They are strengthening their relations with the regimes that are the agents of American imperialism, such as Iran; they have even not hesitated to send an official friendship delegation to Chile, thereby helping to break the isolation of its fascist regime.

Arab Policy:

The ruling authorities are stepping up their cooperation with the reactionary Arab regimes and establishing a Cairo-Riyad axis, while their relations with Syria are becoming cooler and their relations with the Palestine resistance are deteriorating, not to mention the escalation of the clash between them and Libya.

They are increasingly withdrawing from their national commitments to the Arab nation.

They are condoning the imperialist-reactionary conspiracy against the unity of Lebanon and the Palestine resistance, adopting an attitude of neutrality as between the lackey forces of reaction on the one hand and the nationalist and democratic forces and the Palestine resistance on the other.

It would be an over-simplification to imagine that it will be easy for the ruling authorities—whatever their intentions—to reach a comprehensive settlement with the Zionist enemy and imperialism, because the attitudes of the parties to such a deal are governed by numerous contradictions, conflicts and balances of forces.

Inside America there are forces that want a settlement of the problem that will enable America to rely, for the protection of her interests in the area, on both Israel and on friendly Arab regimes. But there are also other forces that insist on absolute support for Zionism and Israel.

In Israel there are extremist Zionist forces, whose strength and influence must not be underestimated, that oppose a compromise solution with the Arabs however great the concessions by the Arabs.

In Egypt the ruling authorities cannot entirely ignore the nationalist trends in the Egyptian armed forces and the reactions any surrenderist solution could arouse in the ranks of the popular masses in Egypt and the Arab world. Also their ability to move in the direction of making concessions decreases the further the October war recedes into the past, because the credit the authorities built up as a result of that war is daily dwindling. Again, the escalation of the crisis of the world capitalist system in general and the political and economic crisis of American imperialism in particular can but limit the extent to which the ruling authorities benefit from the policy of linkage with America and of economic openness to the West, and dissipate many of the dreams of the social forces that are betting on the American horse.

As against this, to shut one's eyes to the dangerous slope down which the powers that rule the country are sliding, and to try to defend the policy of retreat and withdrawal or to justify the conduct of the authorities and to affirm the patriotism of the ruling alliance as a whole, is a rightist and subservient attitude.

⁹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), August 11, 1975, pp. 8–10. This report was issued consequent on the re-establishment of the Communist Party of Egypt which had dissolved itself in 1965.

The Tasks in the Coming Stage:

Our party sets itself the following tasks in the coming stage:

1. To disclose and show up capitulationist and conciliatory trends and to call on the revolutionary and nationalist forces to adopt a unified combatant attitude, at both the local and Arab levels, against American imperialist schemes and solutions.

2. To show up and combat the prevailing trend towards Egypt relinquishing her responsibility as a national vanguard in the Arab national liberation movement, to play a positive and effective role in unifying the Arab progressive forces, and to struggle to improve and strengthen Egypt's relations with the progressive and nationalist Arab countries that are opposed to American imperialism and its plans for the area (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria and Democratic Yemen).

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Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria discussing his meeting with Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon and the changed relations with Jordan⁹⁹

Damascus, August 2, 1975

Q. Your Excellency, what was the outcome of the talks you had today with Mr. Rashid Karami?

A. Any discussions between us and the Lebanese authorities are bound to be profitable. The talks between us and Mr. Rashid Karami were on matters of interest to the two countries in general. Of course their point of departure was concern for the interests of Lebanon and our common interests, especially in so far as they dealt with the stability of Lebanon about which we are extremely concerned, for this is of interest to Lebanon, to us and to all Arab citizens.

We in Syria cannot be mere spectators of the events that are taking place in Lebanon because in one way or another we are concerned with them. This has been the basis of our conduct throughout the incidents that have been taking place in Lebanon.

Q. Did you discuss coordination at all levels with Lebanon?

A. Of course, we dealt with coordination in many fields, and we are ready to respond in all fields—we are ready to respond in any way that can be of service to Lebanon. We stressed this to Mr. Rashid Karami.

Q. Mr. President, what progress do you think has been made towards reaching an Egyptian-Israeli agreement at the present stage?

A. The only information I have on this subject is what you have given us in your press.

Q. In the light of the review you conducted together with Mr. Rashid Karami do you anticipate, or rather does Mr. Rashid Karami anticipate, further incidents in Lebanon?

A. We hope, as should every Arab who has Arab interests at heart, that there will be no repetition of the events in Lebanon, and we do not want to anticipate such a repetition.

Q. The question of the Palestinians in Lebanon is a basic question. Was this subject discussed in the light of the agreements between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese government?

A. I believe that this matter is not a subject for discussion in Lebanon; consequently it was not a subject for discussion between me and the Lebanese prime minister.

Q. Your Excellency, what do you think are the reasons for what has been happening in Lebanon recently? Are they purely internal reasons unrelated to the Middle East question and the Palestine problem?

A. This is not the moment to analyse the events and their causes. But the events in Lebanon cannot be purely Lebanese—they must be the consequence of the Arab situation and of all the international factors related to our principal cause, the cause of Palestine.

I therefore say that what has happened certainly has Lebanese causes, but that it also has Arab and international causes, because it is connected with our principal cause in one way or another.

Q. Your Excellency, do you not think that the time has come to conclude a defence treaty between Syria and Lebanon?

A. We are a single people and linked together by something stronger than treaties. Syria is concerned with the defence of Lebanon and

⁹⁹ Interview given to a group of Lebanese journalists; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 3, 1975, p. 6.

Lebanon is concerned with the defence of Syria, whether or not this is written on a piece of paper.

Q. Could it be said that Mr. Rashid Karami's visit to Damascus differs from those paid by previous prime ministers? Is it very important? And has it had very important results?

A. As you know, the situation in Lebanon in recent months has been exceptional, therefore it is exceptionally important. Consequently the prime minister's visit is exceptionally important.

Q. As regards coordination with Jordan, Mr. President, do you think that it will lead to a military union between Syria and Lebanon?

A. As we stated in the communiqué issued about my visit to Jordan,¹⁰⁰ we and our brothers in Jordan want things to develop, with the passage of time, into something more than a military union. We say that we hope things will develop into a comprehensive union.

Our brothers in Jordan say that this is not a union but restoring things to normal—in this they are more precise than we are—their expression is more accurate than the ones we use.

Q. What about the Palestine resistance in relation to this coordination and union?

A. Union is a hope and a goal and nothing stands in its way—it is a sacred goal above every other. Union, any union, between two Arab regions, is in the interest of every Palestinian, every Syrian and every Arab. Union is not restricted by any conditions.

Q. The Jordanian ambassador in Beirut gave an interview in which he said that you are restoring relations between Jordan and the Palestine resistance. Is this true?

A. As everyone knows, our relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization are good and are based on confidence. This is obvious. Similarly our relations with our brothers in Jordan are good.

We have not made efforts to bring Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization together. But whether the confidence that exists between us and the Organization, on the one hand, and that between us and Jordan on the other, can

be a factor in bringing the two parties together is another matter. We believe that the mutual confidence between us and the Organization is in the interests of all, including Jordan, and that the mutual confidence between us and Jordan is also in the interests of all, including the Liberation Organization.

Q. Your Excellency, do you think that the situation in Lebanon has settled down for good, and have the external causes been removed?

A. I hope that the situation in Lebanon has settled down for good, but I think that we should make efforts to ensure that things have stabilized once and for all. We must examine the factors that from time to time lead to instability and try to eliminate them.

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Declaration of the twelfth National Conference of the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria (excerpts)¹⁰¹

Damascus, August 2, 1975

In the Political Field

The conference discussed the political report submitted by the National Command and conducted a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Arab homeland and the circumstances of the national struggle in the light of the general goals of the Arab revolutionary movement and of general principles and strategy. As a result of the discussion the conference resolved that the interim goal of the struggle of the Arab nation is as follows:

1. The total liberation of all the Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 aggression and refusal to renounce or cede any part of them.

2. Commitment to the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination in their own territory.

The conference also discussed the basic principles of action and struggle for the achievement of the interim goal, and defined them as follows:

1. The battle with the Zionist enemy is an all-

¹⁰⁰ Doc. 258 above.

¹⁰¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 5, 1975, p. 6.

Arab battle. This means that it must be accorded its true dimensions in all fields.

2. To pursue policies that will lead to the political and economic isolation of the Zionist enemy and put a stop to the political and economic support it receives from anywhere in the world.

3. To combat and frustrate imperialist conspiracies in the area and to resist their schemes directed against the Arab nation.

4. To take action by all available means to thwart attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and the issue of the total liberation of Arab territories through partial solutions and settlements and through partial steps taken in isolation.

5. To mobilize all forces for the confrontation of the Zionist enemy and to concentrate on the principal battle and to avoid marginal battles.

6. To base our various policies on national interests and with a view to being of service to the interim goal of Arab struggle.

7. To continue building the internal front in the Syrian Arab region and to strengthen its intrinsic military and economic capabilities to ensure that it can hold out and devote itself to achieving the interim goal.

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In the Field of the Palestine Problem

The conference analysed the present situation that has arisen from the increased strength of the forces of the Palestine revolution and their victories at various levels, from the increased strength of the nationalist forces struggling against the Zionist enemy and its racist policy based on expansion and aggression, from world public opinion's withdrawal of its support for the Zionist policy of obstinate continuation in the occupation of Arab territories, and from the increased strength of the international forces that support Arab rights and the Palestinian Arab people in their legitimate struggle to recover their usurped national rights. In this field the conference resolved to stress the need for resolute action to prevent the Palestine problem being turned into a problem of eliminating the traces of the 1967 aggression, by rejecting peace and recognition of the Zionist entity and by refusing to relinquish Arab territories in any circumstances whatever. The conference also affirmed its commitment to support the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland and for self-determination in their own

territory, and to efforts to give due prominence to the Palestinian identity and to support the right of the Palestinian Arab people to establish an independent national authority in the territory that is liberated so that it may continue the struggle to liberate the whole of Palestinian soil. This is to be done by supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people, and supporting its right to meet its responsibilities at the political and military levels. Action must also be taken to reinforce the unity of the different sections of the resistance movement with a view to reinforcing the Palestinian struggle to achieve the national goals. In this context also the conference expresses its special appreciation of the initiative taken by Comrade Hafiz Asad, the general secretary of the party, in calling for the establishment of military and political unity between the Syrian and Palestinian commands,¹⁰² and called for continued efforts to devise the best and most appropriate formulas for the achievement of this unity so that it may be a step forward at the level of united action and a bulwark against schemes aimed at the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

In the Field of Arab Policy

The conference devoted great attention to defining the concept of Arab solidarity and to analysing the idea of Arab unity as being one of the principal and most distinctive objectives of the national struggle. There were valuable theoretical discussions of the problem of Arab unity and its progressive nature, because it is the most important objective of the Arab national liberation movement. Its importance is due to the fact that it puts an end to the fragmentation created by colonialism and perpetuated by world imperialism. It also achieves national liberation in as much as the establishment of unity guarantees the elimination of colonialist domination and imperialist influence. Finally, it enables the socialist struggle to take great steps forward in as much as it is the toiling masses who are mainly interested in the establishment of unity and are qualified to lead the struggle for it. One of the most important features of the discussions in this field was the clear, detailed and meticulous speech made to the members of the conference by Comrade Hafiz Asad, the general secretary of the party.

¹⁰² Doc. 236 above.

As a result of the discussion it was unanimously agreed that the policy of Arab solidarity pursued by the Syrian Arab region since the Corrective Movement must continue. It was unanimously agreed that our party now has a greater responsibility than ever before for ensuring that the Arab masses continue to realize that Arab unity must be their goal. The party must also make every effort to improve the measures taken to achieve unity and to disclose the scope of the struggle for unity. In this way it will be possible to devise practical and advanced formulas for the achievement of every possible unionist step that can increase the energies of the toiling masses in their unremitting struggle to advance further towards unity, to realize further socialist achievements and to establish the single Arab socialist state in the whole of the Arab homeland from the Ocean to the Gulf.

The following were the most important resolutions adopted by the conference in this field:

1. To improve the measures taken to achieve unity and to struggle to take every possible step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

2. To give the Union of Arab Republics greater significance by taking more effective measures towards unity and by efforts to eliminate the negative aspects and excesses that have made their appearance since it was established.

3. In dealing with relations with the Arab regions to concentrate on strengthening Arab solidarity and to make every effort to place the military, economic and political resources of the Arab nation at the disposal of the battle.

4. To achieve effective Arab coordination to ensure the political, military and economic isolation of the enemy and to employ all available means to realize this slogan.

5. To make every effort to achieve effective military coordination leading to a unified military command and ensuring the best possible use of forces on the confrontation fronts, the development of Arab military forces and the enhancement of their capabilities and effectiveness.

6. To make every effort to achieve Arab economic integration, to increase the efforts made in this field and to take such measures and undertake such activities and contacts as will lead to the employment of surplus Arab wealth in the field of the overall development of the Arab homeland.

In the Field of International Policy

The conference expressed its respect and admiration for the great success achieved by the policy of our party under the leadership of Comrade Hafiz Asad, the general secretary of the party, and stressed the need for the continued pursuit of this wise policy which derives from the interests of both Syria and the Arab nation, and for continued effective efforts at the level of the United Nations to isolate the enemy and to disclose its aggressive and expansionist character. The conference stressed the importance of:

1. Continuing to strengthen and develop co-operation with the socialist countries, in particular the USSR, in all fields.

2. Developing relations and strengthening co-operation with the non-aligned countries, the African countries, the Islamic countries, the Latin American countries and the countries of the European community, with a view to gaining greater support for the Arab struggle to achieve the interim goal for the Arab nation.

3. Continuing to pursue the policy of solidarity with all national liberation movements in all parts of the world.

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Press interview statement by Political Bureau member Abu al-Abbas of the PFLP-General Command outlining the work of the Rejection Front¹⁰³

Early August, 1975

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Q. What is the Rejection Front's programme for the coming stage?

A. The Rejection Front was established in response to the Arab and Palestinian institutions that agreed to join in the imperialist game of imposing a capitulationist solution which would keep an Israeli entity in existence and arrange things in the area in the interests of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

The Rejection Front was formed of four militant

¹⁰³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), August 8, 1975, pp. 12-13.

Palestinian organizations—the Popular Front-General Command, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Struggle Front and the Arab Liberation Front. The Front has its organizational, political, military and mass programmes. It has a single command and common organizations constructed on a fully democratic basis and on the basis of participation by the masses. In this way it is different from the Liberation Organization in which undemocratic relations are the rule, there is domination by a single organization, there is no effective participation and no unity at the level of the masses

So far the Rejection Front has carried out a series of basic tasks at various levels. The Rejection Front's joint information service and the committees for mass and military action have succeeded in establishing the Front's existence through tangible actions, winning the confidence of the masses and efforts to lead them to a higher degree of awareness.

As for programmes, the central task that the Palestinian Rejection Front is trying to perform is that of forming an Arab Rejection Front at the all-Arab level, in the light of our belief in the common goals and destiny of Palestinian and Arab revolutionaries and our conviction that in the face of the union of all the forces of reaction and the surrenderist regimes, all revolutionary forces in all parts of the Arab homeland must come together to frustrate the schemes of imperialism. There is also a mass programme covering action to make the masses aware of the danger to their cause of surrenderist trends, and to mobilize and organize them through effective mass action.

The programmes also cover action, through committees for military action, which supervise the preparation and training of the masses and raise the standard of their combat capability to confront their enemies. During the recent incidents also the Rejection Front has played a prominent role in defending and joining with the Lebanese popular movement in combatting the Phalangist and Lebanese reaction, and in carrying out operations inside the occupied homeland and escalating military action inside the Zionist entity. At the level of information activity, the Rejection Front from time to time publishes periodical pamphlets to explain to the masses what is happening and the attempts of the defeatist commands to mislead them and to push through a settlement

under bogus nationalist slogans, such as the slogan of the national authority. The Rejection Front is also making every effort to build strong relations with all revolutionary forces throughout the world, in as much as the conclusion of a political settlement would mean that the conflict in the area would be shelved so that the forces of imperialism would be able to turn their attention to destroying freedom movements in other parts of the world.

True unity is built through unremitting common action. This is what the Rejection Front is doing. Every day its circumstances are improving, its institutions are coming nearer to completion and it is acquiring greater and more profound experience.

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Resolution of the government of Jordan on Israel's decision to divide the Mosque of Abraham in Hebron (excerpt)¹⁰⁴

Amman, August 6, 1975

The Council of Ministers resolves the following:

1. To condemn the decision of the Israeli authorities to divide and Judaize the Mosque of Abraham, to reject all attempts made by them to implement this decision and to support the heroic attitude of the people of the town of Hebron in rejecting and refusing to accept this decision.

2. To call on the permanent Jordanian delegate to the United Nations to submit an urgent memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Israeli measures and the Jordanian government's attitude to them, and to request the Secretary-General to distribute the memorandum to the member states of the Security Council.

3. To contact the General Secretariat of the Conference of Islamic States immediately and to request it to call an emergency meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic States to discuss the recent Israeli aggression against the Mosque of Abraham and to adopt a unified Islamic-Arab attitude to this aggression.

4. Also to contact the General Secretariat of

¹⁰⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 7, 1975, pp. 1, 10.

the Arab League and to request it to make the necessary contacts with the Arab countries to support the Jordanian requests for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic States.

5. To request the Ministry of Waqfs and Muslim Holy Places to contact all Muslim bodies in the world to explain to them the dimensions of the Israeli aggression against the Mosque of Abraham and to organize joint Islamic efforts to check this aggression.

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Statement by the Islamic Council for Jerusalem condemning Israel's decision to divide the Mosque of Abraham in Hebron¹⁰⁵
Jerusalem, August 6, 1975

Having studied the implications of the new measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities with regard to the Mosque of Abraham, in the evening of Monday, Rajab 27, 1395 AH (August 4, 1975 AD), the Islamic Committee of Jerusalem informed the Qadi of Hebron and the Chief Custodian of these measures by virtue of which a large part of the Mosque of Abraham has been effectively turned into a synagogue.

The Islamic Council which, since the start of the occupation, has proclaimed that the Mosque of Abraham is an Islamic mosque, has made it known to the occupation authorities and the whole world that the threat to the mosque is becoming daily graver and has rejected any non-Muslim presence in it, believes that these measures are a further step towards profaning it and turning it into a synagogue. In rejecting these measures it calls on the whole of humanity to protect this place which is holy to all Muslims in all parts of the world. It also declares that Friday, August 15, 1975 will be Mosque of Abraham Day, and calls on mosque preachers throughout the world, and popular bodies and organizations to do all they can to explain what is happening in this holy mosque, so that people may be aware of how it is being treated. The Committee firmly believes that Almighty God will not abandon His house.

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Statements by President Sadat of Egypt stressing his desire for a Middle East peace¹⁰⁶

Mersa Matruh, August 10, 1975

Q. What are your views on future chances for peace in the Middle East?

A. I am always concerned to discuss everything with you Americans openly and freely. You ask me about the future. What worries me now is peace. Without peace, we cannot begin our vast reconstruction programmes which we have planned for our country and which have now begun. We have made a start and, in present day terms, we are planning for the year 2000. We have brought together several planning experts from the USA and Western Europe who are working in the Suez Canal region. These people are helping our entire country because a move, a radical jump must be made. We have suffered a great deal in the last ten years, seven of which were black years, as we normally call [the period after] the 67 war. We have to repair everything. This is because during these years the basic structure of the country collapsed and we have to start from the foundations. As I have mentioned, we brought together a group of American and Western European planners representing firms with long experience. They have in fact finished their plans for the Canal region and are commencing plans for this place here. In this region, we have a coastline whose waters and beauty spots you may have glimpsed. This region extends from Alexandria to Sallum, a distance of about five hundred kilometers, where planners are preparing in accordance with the most modern planning concepts in the world. But as I said, my basic preoccupation is peace. The air base or airport where you landed is a pilot training school. After the 1967 war, it became clear that each aircraft must be in a hangar below ground. Each one of these hangars costs more than 120,000 pounds and we have hundreds of them, not just in Mersa Matruh, but all over the country, because we want to protect our homeland. But what is the use of all this construction if every-

¹⁰⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 8, 1975, pp. 1, 7.

¹⁰⁶ Made in response to questions from a 29 member delegation from the US Congress which had arrived in Egypt on August 8; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 11, 1975, pp. 1, 6.

thing becomes threatened in one instant? This is why peace is now my basic preoccupation.

I know that peace will be a long process because there is a very ancient legacy between the Israelis and ourselves. In the last 27 years a state of war has existed between us. Hence all we ask for is peace and thereafter everything will become rosy and prosperous because we have the potential and we have untapped sources of energy, below our soil and in our deserts. I discussed our economic problems with President Ford when we met in Salzburg. We need cash liquidity to float our economy: one and a half billion sterling—not dollars.

From a historical viewpoint, Egypt is the key to the region. There are also other factors that have to do with geography, civilization and size of population. We constitute more than one third of the total population of the Arab world and in fact are soon to become one half of the total. We realize fully that we have suffered much in the past and have thus lagged behind life in the present century. But whatever my difficulties, be they economic, political or whatever, all I want is peace and the future thereafter will be very bright. I can now state that after years and years of confrontation between our two countries, we have arrived at a state of friendship. I must say I was impressed by President Ford when I met him in Salzburg. He is a really frank and honest man. I think a new era began in our relations when I first met Dr. Kissinger in November, 1973. This is why I must end by telling you that peace is my preoccupation and is the key to everything.

Ninety-nine percent of your interests are with the Arabs and not with the Israelis. Despite this, I am not asking you to abandon Israel or your special relationship with it. In sum, all I ask is that you tell the Israelis that the time has come for them to choose the road to peace because their own position is confused. We are living through one of these psychological moments. If they choose the road to peace, peace will be achieved. But if they put their faith in the military supplies they receive and persist in their attitude of superiority and arrogance as they did after 1967, all of this will be useless. Despite everything, however, I shall proceed with reconstruction because reconstruction plans have already been laid down. As an answer to the collapse of Dr. Kissinger's mission in March because of the Israeli attitude, I reopened the Suez Canal and brought

a million refugees back to the three Canal cities. They are right now living within range of the guns you gave to Israel. But I am not afraid of peace. It is the Israelis who fear peace.

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Q. What are your views on the means to implement Security Council Resolution 242?

A. That resolution, for example, condemns in its preamble the occupation of territories belonging to others by force. We have interpreted this to mean that Israel must withdraw from our territories which it occupied after the 1967 war. They on the other hand interpreted it as meaning, not 'the lands occupied' but 'lands occupied' after the 1967 war. In other words, they struck out the definite article. There is another matter which I think has become clear to you. For 27 years, Israel has filled the whole world with its propaganda to the effect that they seek peace whereas it is the Arabs who always refuse peace. This was true in the last seven years, because we Arabs became accustomed to say no to everything. Israel exploited this and filled the whole world, especially the USA, with its propanganda to the effect that they were working for peace whereas the Arabs were not. Well, in 1971, on February 4 to be exact, and for the first time in 22 years, I declared my willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel.¹⁰⁷ At that time, Golda Meir was in power. Rogers visited me and told me that Golda Meir had asked the US ambassador in Tel Aviv to transmit a message to Rogers and to President Nixon to the effect that if she returned the Arab lands occupied in 1967 and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians she would challenge any Arab leader to declare in public that they were willing to arrive at a peace treaty. I made that public announcement in 1971. Rogers visited me afterwards and, before he left, he told me that he wanted nothing further from me. The pressure began and Golda Meir attacked him in the Knesset.

We have reached a turning point and you are now visiting the region. Israel must either choose the road to peace or will continue on its present confused course, holding on to its theories of sovereignty, force and the imposition of conditions upon the Arabs. There is a wide gap between the two sides. Peace moves have already begun with the reopening of the Suez Canal and the return of

¹⁰⁷ Doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

the refugees who had been within range of Israel's guns in the Sinai. And yet, I had no fears at all and am prepared to go further along this path. The peace process will be long and difficult but if they were to choose the road to peace, we shall achieve peace. They maintain, for instance, that if we do not recognize Israel and exchange diplomatic and commercial relations, there will be no peace. This is their logic. But my logic is that after 27 years of war, hatred, violence and bloodshed, we cannot establish normal relations and economic ties with Israel in a month or two or three. I say, let us try to transform this state of war which has now lasted twenty years. Let us end all this officially with guarantees for both sides, for both Israel and us. Thereafter, things will change of their own accord. I believe our future generations will take care of this. There is another important difference between us. They are occupying our lands and using this as a means to exert pressure and impose their conditions. I am trying to tell them that the road to peace lies through withdrawal and that we must set up a schedule for this withdrawal. They must come to realize that they have to withdraw. But instead they negotiate over every inch of our territories. Look what they did to Kissinger last March.

Q. There is anxiety in Israel and they ask about what Egypt will offer in return for withdrawal.

A. We too are anxious. We too want guarantees as much as Israel does. But we are the party whose lands are occupied; therefore we must be practical. As I said before, it is up to them to follow the road to peace but they have not done so up till now. They are hesitant and thoroughly confused, perhaps as a result of anxiety and the 1973 war. But why do we not ask the two superpowers or the Security Council or any other power in the world to give these guarantees? You cannot ask me what I will offer so long as my lands remain occupied. Rather, you must ask Israel to give back our lands. We can then proceed to Geneva with guarantees from the two superpowers or the Security Council or the big five. The Israelis always base their propaganda on what Egypt will offer. What more can I offer than an official ending to the state of war? If this state of war is officially ended, there will be a temporary peace and a better climate for taking further steps. If we agree that they are

anxious, we are even more anxious than they because they began wars three times while we began the fourth. They called the third a preemptive war or something of that sort. But things should be settled on a reciprocal basis and it is not always up to Egypt or the Arabs to act. Before anything else, they must withdraw from our territories. Otherwise, it would mean that when we sit at the conference table in Geneva with them still in occupation of our territory, they would possess the right of veto. I would like you to know all of this before you ask what I can offer Israel. I have proved all this in fact to the whole world.

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Press interview statements by Maronite Patriarch Khreish of Lebanon reviewing the causes of the crisis in Lebanon¹⁰⁸

Bkirki, mid-August, 1975

Q. Soon after you received the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Yasir Arafat, and the head of the Phalangist Party, Sheikh Pierre Gemayyel, it was reported that you were going to try to achieve a reconciliation between the two parties in particular and between all the various parties connected with the events in general.

A. Yes, that is so. We are trying to achieve a reconciliation, not only between Mr. Yasir Arafat and Sheikh Pierre Gemayyel, but between all the Lebanese. There are also others trying to do the same thing. What is important is that this reconciliation, which is so much in the interests of the country, should be achieved. Whether it is achieved through us or through others is not important, in our view—what is important is that a reconciliation should be achieved and that passions should be quieted.

Ever since the fighting first broke out we have been trying to bring Arafat and Gemayyel together, and we nearly succeeded, but things moved so fast that it proved impossible. Had we been able to arrange such a meeting we could have saved

¹⁰⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), August 13, 1975, pp. 3, 10.

the country from many of the disasters that have befallen it.

We are still making unremitting efforts to ensure that the reconciliation covers all parties, and, as I said, there are other groups trying to achieve the same objective. What is important is that these efforts should be successful; it makes no difference whether it is done by us or by others.

Q. You are doubtless aware of the views that are being expressed and the current dialogues on the incidents that are taking place and how some people are suggesting that there should be a new National Pact, that the constitution should be amended, and so on, with a view to establishing a modern state constructed on strong and firm foundations. What is your Beatitude's attitude to these proposals?

A. We have said, and we still say, that the Pact was concluded to strengthen confidence, because confidence is what matters. So we cannot change the Pact before we find a substitute for it that will increase and strengthen this confidence. Neither you nor I can change this Pact; that is up to the whole people. All groups must meet and agree on a substitute before there can be any talk about changing it.

In the convention of Patriarchs and Archbishops we spent a long time studying this matter very profoundly.

I want to read to you one of the most important passages in the statement on the National Pact. It says:

In any case, the National Pact, which some people ignore, while others say that it has lost its *raison d'être*, was concluded in response to the need to inspire mutual confidence between the various groups of citizens, to take the place of the confidence that each group had reposed in either East or West.

For all its defects the principle of distributing posts on a confessional basis in accordance with the text of the Constitution, was intended to provide such confidence while at the same time ensuring the required level of competence. To ignore this Pact and to abandon this principle without reaching a formula that provides this confidence to the full would lead to disunity and undermine the foundations of the country, whereas the Lebanese formula is still a model for all countries in which there is a multiplicity of faiths, and the people of Palestine themselves hope to achieve something like it in their usurped homeland.

This confidence can never be firmly established in men's

hearts, it can never prevail in all regions, especially those in which minorities live among a majority, unless many sacrifices are made for it, and these must be accepted by all citizens if they are to rise to the moral level required for the survival of the country.

Q. [About fear of a fourth round]:

A. Certainly things have greatly improved and I hope that there will be no more rounds. In any case I cannot see that the Lebanese will go in for any more such rounds, for they did great harm to the country and everyone who lives in it, and did no good at all, because problems in this country are not solved by force. Force no longer solves any issue or problem: the only course open to us is dialogue and debate, and it is now the duty of all to establish stability. If there is to be peace and quiet and if things are to return to normal there must be constructive and positive dialogue governed by action and conscience, in which all opinions and points of view are examined.

Q. If you were asked to make proposals suitable for discussion on a new formula for coexistence in Lebanon, what would you say?

A. I cannot answer this question at present; I should first have to hear all views and choose those that were best and most in the interest of the people and the country.

In my view, if since independence things had gone in accordance with the principles that were laid down there would have been no need for for any change or alteration.

In any case it is not possible to think about an alternative to the present state of affairs until all points of view have been heard and discussed objectively, impartially and frankly.

Q. Do you think that the recent incidents were really motivated by confessionalism, or that they merely assumed a confessional character?

A. Quite certainly the aim was to cause confessional strife but, thank God, those who had this in mind did not achieve their ends. Unfortunately the people have certain innate feelings, and there are people who have tried to exploit them. In the past there have never been attacks on churches such as have taken place recently, nor have people been condemned on the basis of their identity cards. These are things that we must face up to and put an end to so as not to encourage civil strife and those who provoke it.

We in this country are poor things, and we have to "follow a course that is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword" if we are not to fall into the abyss. My son, there are 1500 complicated problems in this country and they accumulated and all exploded at once!

Q. What part did deprivation play in the incidents? And is it true, as some people say, that deprivation sparked off the incidents?

A. Deprivation was not the only cause. There are many problems that sparked off the troubles, and deprivation was exploited to make the problems more acute. I do not think that it was deprivation which sparked things off, because it is not restricted to one confessional group only, but it was used to spark off the troubles.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)¹⁰⁹

Damascus, August 12, 1975

At the invitation of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, accompanied by an official delegation, visited Damascus from August 10-11, 1975.

In the course of the talks, which were conducted in an atmosphere of fraternal affection, the two sides reviewed bilateral relations between their countries, the situation in the area and the Arab and international situations:

1. In the field of bilateral relations the two sides stressed the importance of strengthening and developing these relations in view of the fraternal bonds that link the two countries in various fields.

2. In the field of the situation in the area the two sides reviewed the explosive situation in the area in all its aspects, and they were in agreement on the impossibility of peace being achieved so long as Israel continues to refuse to withdraw

completely from all occupied Arab territories and to recognize the national rights of the people of Palestine. The two sides therefore affirmed that the goal of the struggle of the Arab nation is to achieve total withdrawal from all Arab territories, first and foremost from the city of Jerusalem, and to safeguard the national rights of the people of Palestine. The two sides also affirmed that withdrawal from occupied Arab territories must be unconditional and that the establishment of peace is linked to the recovery in full of the national rights of the people of Palestine.

There was also complete agreement that the nature of the Zionist presence is such that the Arab nation must be on its guard and make further preparations in all fields. There was also complete agreement on the importance of action to isolate the Israeli enemy in international fields.

His Royal Highness commended the efforts made by the Syrian Arab Region, under the leadership of President Hafiz Asad, in the field of building up the armed forces and preparing for the battle. He also stressed the importance of the Arab nation supporting the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian armed forces, which constitute the line of confrontation and of the defence of the Arab nation in the Eastern Arab homeland.

3. In the field of the Arab situation the two sides, having studied all aspects of the Arab situation, stressed the importance of strengthening Arab solidarity and of removing all obstacles that impede the march of the Arab nation in its confrontation with the Zionist enemy, and the need to take action to mobilize Arab energies for the battle of destiny.

4. In the international field the two sides, having reviewed the international situation in all its aspects, developments, and special features, agreed that action should be taken to strengthen Arab relations in international fields with a view to serving the Arab struggle for the achievement of the interim goal of the Arab nation. The two sides also stressed the importance of strengthening relations with the non-aligned countries and the third world countries in general.

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 13, 1975, pp. 1, 2.

Resolutions and recommendations of the Central Committee of the PLO¹¹⁰

August 17, 1975

The Central Committee of P.L.O. while re-assessing all the suspicious American steps taken against the aspirations and interests of our Arab Nation, and against the basic national and historical rights of the Palestinian people, views with a great concern the grave danger involved in these American-imperialist conspiratory steps aimed at directing a death blow to the Palestinian Revolution and liquidating our just Palestinian Cause, and dividing and tearing apart the Arab front through projects and settlements now discussed in the Arab political arena, especially those concerning an alleged political agreement over Sinai.

Out of our deepest concern for the unity of collective action and joint moves in accordance with the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference at Algiers¹¹¹ and Ar-Rabat,¹¹² the Central Committee authorises the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. to:

1. Follow up and watch closely the developments of these events and steps.
2. Get in contact with all Arab and international bodies concerned to encounter these steps.
3. Take the necessary steps sufficient to foil this liquidatory American plot against our Palestinian Cause.
4. Call on all Palestinian and Arab mass organizations and bodies to start mobilising our masses' potentialities in order to encounter and foil the dangerous American moves.

Besides, the Central Committee made several recommendations concerning Palestinian action in the next approaching stage. Most important of these recommendations are:

1. The P.L.O. Executive Committee is asked to make quick and concentrated contacts with all national and progressive forces on all levels all over the Arab World in order to specifically define the Arab position against the suggested American solution in the area.

2. The Executive Committee is asked to complete Syrian-Palestinian negotiations as quickly as possible in order to create the Syrian-Palestinian political and military joint leadership with the aim of coordinating the Syrian and Palestinian position and attitude toward all political matters and developments.

3. The Central Committee realises the need for and necessity of a top-level Palestinian meeting with the aim of strengthening national unity among the different detachments of the Palestinian Resistance Movement within the framework of the P.L.O. and on the basis of the resolution of the Palestine National Council and the ten-point Schedule.

4. The Committee expressed the need for and necessity of a quick and concentrated action on all levels aiming at implementing the resolutions of the Rabat Arab Summit Meeting concerning the presence of the Palestinian Revolution and the P.L.O., political as well as military, in Jordan.

As for the formation and convening of the National Council, the Central Committee made the following recommendations:

1. The Central Committee agreed that the National Council be convened for its 13th session on October 15, 1975 in Cairo.

2. The Central Committee agreed to create a broad basis of the National Council membership by admitting new members representing all gatherings and groups of the Palestinian people, especially and first and foremost, our people in the Occupied Territories, in addition to increasing the number of members allotted for Resistance detachments and mass organisations. The members of the fifth National Council are expected to reach 270 members.

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Declaration issued by the Political Bureau of the Phalangist Party of Lebanon (excerpts)¹¹³

The Cedars, August 17, 1975

The Political Bureau of the Lebanese Phalangist Party held a series of meetings at the St. Bernard Hotel, The Cedars, from August 15–18, 1975. In

¹¹⁰ English text, *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VII, 9 (September, 1975), pp. 70–72.

¹¹¹ Docs. 331–333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹¹² Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹¹³ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 18, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1–2 (Autumn 1975–Winter 1976), pp. 290–291.

the course of these meetings, which were chaired by the head of the party, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, they passed in review the present stage of the country's history, discussed a number of reports on the general situation, current events and problems, and issued the following declaration at the end of the meetings:

8. The Party affirms its support for Lebanon's Arab commitments such as the resolutions of the summit conferences, the Arab League Council and the Joint Arab Defence Council, and all other bodies deriving therefrom.

9. The Party repeats what it has been stating for many years at its conferences, in its statements and resolutions, and in the memoranda and statements of the head of the party, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, that the cause of the people of Palestine is the most just cause of our time and that we support this people in their legitimate struggle to recover their national rights and, first and foremost, their right to self-determination in their liberated territory.

10. The Party also affirms its commitment to all the agreements concluded between the Lebanese state and the Palestine Liberation Organization which, in conformity with the resolution of the Rabat Summit Conference,¹¹⁴ we regard as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We expect that it will conduct itself on this basis in the Lebanon arena as elsewhere, especially as regards the implementation of its obligations and adherence to its agreements with the state and to the annexes to those agreements.

The extent of the Liberation Organization's ability to do this is the practical criterion and proof of the extent to which it is truly representative.

11. The Party feels obliged to place on record a grave and significant phenomenon. This is that there are internal and external parties and groups which, though in conflict with each other in all other arenas, are in the Lebanese arena unified in seeking the same goal: the destruction of the democratic parliamentary system chosen by Lebanon. They make use of bogus slogans to obtain support and to exploit the sympathy of the masses, and this being the case, it is clear that the destruction of the Lebanese regime is an

interim goal to which they give priority and that if it proves impossible for them to achieve, they will once again turn against each other and settle accounts with each other.

The Phalangists therefore warn the Lebanese people against these groups and call on them to frustrate their schemes and conspiracies. They also call on the Palestine Liberation Organization not to allow itself to be exploited, for such exploitation involves a double danger both to Lebanon and to their cause, as it leads to the resources of the Palestinian struggle being wasted through involvement in conflicts whose only benefit is to the common enemy.

12. On these matters and others, the Political Bureau took detailed decisions which will be discussed with the Party's friends and allies, and will, at the proper time, be submitted to official and national authorities and published for the benefit of public opinion.

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Interim programme of the Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces of Lebanon (excerpt)¹¹⁵

Beirut, August 18, 1975

Lebanon faces a general crisis at this stage in its development. The sequence of events following the death of Maaruf Saad and then the Ayn al-Rummana massacre of April 13, 1975 provides glaring proof of the fact that this crisis has reached a state of gravity where radical treatment not so much of the visible symptoms as of the elements that underlie it is an urgent necessity.

At the national level the danger of the isolationist policy which seeks to sever Lebanon from the Arab world, withdrawing her completely from the all-out [Arab] national struggle against the Zionist enemy and its allies, is clearer than ever before. Lebanon has for many years been paying the price of following this policy: in loss of her sovereignty due to constant Israeli aggression, in periodical crises in her relations with her Arab

¹¹⁵ Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), August 19, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 283-284. The Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces of Lebanon were led by Kamal Junblat of the Progressive Socialist Party.

¹¹⁴ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

brothers and in the domestic fighting sparked off by repeated attempts to stand in the way of the Palestinian revolution.

The many negative and destructive consequences of this isolationist policy have brought about widespread popular demands for a stronger Arab nationalist option to form the basis of Lebanon's official participation in the all-out [Arab] nationalist confrontation with Israel, and for an official acceptance of the Palestinian revolution not, at best, as a *fait accompli*, but as an Arab force that is fighting not only to liberate its territory and to defend itself, but also in defence of Lebanon. Another widespread popular demand is that the incipient Lebanese armed popular resistance to the Zionist enemy on the southern frontier should be supported and that, with this end in view, a policy should be adopted ensuring that the south be developed and that its inhabitants be provided with all that is necessary to enable them to hold out.

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Press interview statements by Oil Minister Yamani of Saudi Arabia discussing the feasibility of using Arab financial resources against Israel¹¹⁶

Mid-August, 1975

Q. Arab oil was used as an effective weapon during the October war, yielding the results we are all aware of, and in consequence giving the oil producing countries added financial and moral power. In this context, would your Excellency wish to comment on a) the relationship between Arab oil power and financial power, b) how it will be possible to use Arab financial power as a weapon side by side with the oil weapon, and c) whether the role of oil will remain as it was or change?

A. In the first place I am not prepared to accept the proposition that the present financial capability of the oil producing countries resulted from the use of the oil weapon. The oil price increases that occurred in October 1973 and January 1974

were an inevitable consequence of declining supply and rising demand. I am also of the view that the present financial capability of the oil producing countries is in its own right a weapon which we can call the money weapon. However, the methods of its application will vary from those of the oil weapon. It will be some time before this financial capability is developed into a serviceable weapon.

I believe that the financial weapon cannot be wielded with the same measure of success as the oil weapon unless certain changes take place in the international monetary system and Arab financial organizations are established through which we can exercise greater influence in international financial matters. And just as the oil weapon was ineffective in 1967 because it was not ready for use, so the money weapon will be ineffective if we use it prematurely. Ownership by a state of an advanced aircraft or a new type of missile is not in itself enough. You need the expertise required to operate a new weapon and if this is lacking the weapon cannot be employed effectively. Of course Arab financial power is growing, and by the early eighties it should be of some consequence, giving the Arabs sufficient leverage in the field of international finance to curtail Zionist ascendancy in the West. Following the use of the oil weapon in the October war, certain changes occurred in international energy strategy, with the creation of the International Energy Agency by the US and the conclusion of agreements for sharing oil between the major industrial powers in the event that oil supplies to one or more of them are cut back. This, in my opinion, does not mean that the oil weapon has lost its effectiveness. Rather it means that the method of using it, if we are obliged to use it once again, will have to be different, and that it will be just as effective as in the past.

Q. It is reported that Israel has succeeded in producing heavy water, which is a step towards the development of nuclear weapons, and that its purpose in doing so is to discourage the western powers that depend on Arab oil from moderating their support for Israel. What is your view on this?

A. The development of nuclear weapons by Israel will no doubt affect the military balance of power in the area. In such an eventuality I believe that the Arab states will also acquire a

¹¹⁶ Arabic text, *al-Musawwar* (Cairo), August 22, 1975; excerpted from the partial English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVIII, 45 (August 29, 1975), pp. iii-iv.

nuclear capability to restore the military balance. Furthermore, I do not believe that Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons will affect its relations with those countries that need our oil.

Q. According to certain estimates the Arabs will control two-thirds of world financial reserves by 1985. It is also said that Zionism is planning to co-exist with Arab wealth because they realize that money power may overshadow political power if properly employed. What is your comment on this?

A. One of the main objectives of the Zionist movement in seeking to establish a national home in Palestine was to employ Arab wealth to their advantage by gaining economic control over Arab territories. The day that Israel can be certain that the barriers between it and the Arab states will be lifted, it will be ready to make big concessions towards a settlement with the Arabs. If we fall for this ploy it will be a big mistake and we will not be forgiven by future Arab generations.

Therefore whatever the size of Arab fiscal reserves in future, and there is no doubt that they will be large, we must protect ourselves against economic infiltration by the Zionists and ensure that Arab financial power remains in Arab hands to serve Arab interests and Arab interests alone.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of King Hussein of Jordan (excerpts)¹¹⁷

Damascus, August 22, 1975

In response to the invitation of President Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, H.M. King Hussein ibn Talal, King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, paid a visit to the Syrian Arab Republic in the period August 18-22, 1975.

The two great leaders studied the situation of the Arab homeland in depth. They reached total

agreement concerning the need for action that would strengthen that Arab solidarity which was displayed in the October war of liberation and which gave rise to the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences.¹¹⁸ They stressed the need to persevere in the efforts to implement these resolutions in all spheres.

The two leaders affirmed the crucial importance of the endeavour to transcend marginal issues and clear the way for the principal battle. They also highlighted the special importance to be attached to mobilizing the resources of the Arab nation and pressing them into the service of the battle against the Zionist enemy. They were convinced that building up the Arab nation's own military power as a whole and the military potential of the confrontation forces in particular is the sure guarantee of victory, the restoration of [usurped] rights and the total liberation of the land. The two leaders take as their point of departure a truth which has been borne out by developments, namely that there is no substitute for military strength and military preparations to confront the enemy's manoeuvres and obstinacy.

In the course of their analysis of the situation in the region and the current circumstances, the two leaders affirmed that the Zionist enemy's manoeuvres relating to total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and his refusal to recognize the national rights of the people of Palestine make the situation more explosive. They affirmed their conviction that peace hinges on the two following principles: total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the national rights of the people of Palestine.

Any attempt by the enemy to evade these truths, such as the attempt to fragment the various fronts and consequently to split up the question in order to obliterate the principal issue, that of Palestine, will only make the situation more critical.

Furthermore the two leaders were of the opinion that the point of departure for [future] action should be the integral nature of the problem, which primarily necessitates further cooperation between the two countries and the other Arab countries as well. It also requires support for the Palestine Liberation Organization so that it can discharge its responsibilities to Palestine and the Arab nation. This stems from the conviction of the two leaders that it is crucial for the Palestin-

¹¹⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 23, 1975.

¹¹⁸ Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

ian personality to emerge, a conviction they have already affirmed at the Rabat summit conference.

The two leaders reviewed the international situation and affirmed their faith in the right of all people to freedom, independence and progress. They agreed to persevere in the efforts to aid and support the causes of friendly peoples, particularly the peoples of the Third World. They also agreed to foster and develop Afro-Asian cooperation, to consolidate the front of non-aligned countries and to establish relations with other nations of the world which would serve the cause of the Arab nation's struggle for its objectives.

In conformity with the unity of their destiny and objective and as an expression of their commitment to a steadfast stance that meets the challenge of the crucial and fateful struggle that the Arab nation is undergoing in defence of its land, honour, existence, security and destiny, in the face of the forces of imperialist dominance and Zionist racism;

Taking their point of departure from a truth embodied in Arab history, which is that the unity of the nation, and the possibilities and the political, military and economic potential that this gives rise to are the decisive response to the challenges of imperialism and Zionism and the path for regaining our dignity, liberating our land and restoring our rights;

Towards the realization of the hoped-for national objective, and in response to the expectations of the one people of the two sister states, and in implementation of the national policy laid down by the two leaders Asad and Hussein, and as an expression of the faith of the two countries in their inevitable unity, and out of the need to restore the normal state of affairs to what it was before the divisions brought about by foreign colonialism;

In view of the preceding, agreement has been reached on the following:

1. The formation of a supreme political command composed of President Hafiz al-Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and King Hussein Bin Talal, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which shall bear the name of the Supreme Syrian-Jordanian Command Council;

2. The Supreme Command Council shall issue decisions, directives and instructions relating to the recommendations and proposals submitted by the Higher Ministerial Council;

3. The Supreme Command Council shall issue decisions, directives and instructions on all questions and matters that shall come before it for review, particularly relating to the following issues:

—Coordinating the policy of the two countries in various Arab and international fields, unifying their position on the various issues before it, and drawing up plans for coordination aimed at a unified foreign policy for the two countries;

—Discussing the issues of peace or war and the adoption of joint and coordinated decisions and positions;

—Drawing up plans for coordination and integration of the armed forces of the two countries;

—Laying down the basis for and adopting the necessary joint measures for safeguarding the national and regional security of each of the two countries and the relations between them;

—Drawing up an economic policy aimed at integrating and uniting the economies of the two countries; this is to be achieved through the coordination of economic and social development plans, the establishment of joint firms and economic institutions, unifying the market of the two countries and the establishment of a unified tariff policy;

—Drawing up an educational policy designed to foster national sentiment, and improve the standard of education which would lead to a scientific renaissance of service to the Arab nations' goal, which is establishing a developed society;

—Drawing up a policy for coordinating and integrating information in the service of the Arab nation's goal;

4. The Supreme Command Council shall meet once every three months or whenever the need arises;

5. Coordination and cooperation is to be established between professional and popular organizations in the two countries, such as in women's organizations, labour, students' and youth organizations, and professional associations.

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Message of the Assembly of the Antiochene Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church regarding the modern mission of Lebanon (excerpt)¹¹⁹

Dhour al-Shweir, August 23, 1975

In fashioning the new Lebanon we shall not forget that we are with all the Arabs, on the march towards Jerusalem, that we are from the Word which came forth from Jerusalem. From it we come and on the good deeds of its saints we exist. Jerusalem is a symbol of our calling to the eternal. It sustains our longing for Paradise and is the teacher of peaceableness; its prayers rise unceasingly. For this reason Zionist control over Jerusalem has torn the city from its roots as the city of God and the family of heaven. The Arabs, by their two religions, are alone capable of grasping this significance and giving it a material form.

Jerusalem has polarized Lebanon because the Holy City is built upon the sacred spirit. Hence our hope is that all Lebanese will insist upon the Arab character of Jerusalem. We made it clear at Lahore¹²⁰ and at the ecclesiastical gatherings abroad that we are calling for making Jerusalem a Palestinian city, and that we are not content with that protectorate over the Holy Place mentioned by the authors of international treaties during the time Palestine was controlled by foreigners. The Palestinian struggle has proven to the world that Jerusalem is the heart of the new and resurrected Palestine.

If we sincerely adopt this noble Palestine as our own, then all the sacrifices in its behalf become as nothing. Perhaps the most important mission Lebanon has today arises from the mobilization of all its forces in commitment to a cause which is the key to all our problems.

We firmly believe that a Palestine returned to its original inhabitants will enable the Arabs to recognize in the Christians among them the potential of love, of goodness, and of intellect. Our Orthodox Church feels that it is a radical part

of this Eastern Arab cause and has not hesitated to embrace it. Accordingly, one of the roles of our Church may be to help other Christians to see that the East is their birthplace and their refuge, and that a return to its clear theological, liturgical, and cultural sources represents a renewal of the spiritual forces of all of us and a unique point of departure for a deeply rooted Christian unity. In the measure that Christians form themselves anew without displaying arrogance, they will impose the authority of the spirit and the people will become equals. No one will be the subject of another or under his protection, but all of us will be in the keeping of the one God who loves all mankind.

Fear is not on one side only but love breaks through the walls of fear. The bearers of the Gospel message are always enterprising and have no fear of those who kill the body. They do not stand back to wait for full freedom in this region or that of the Arab World, because Christians not only understand freedom but they teach it and they defend it along with the free men of every creed. We are confident that free men are not a minority in this neighborhood.

We commend you to the kindness and goodness of God. "We rejoice when you are strong" (II Cor. 13:9) and therefore "strive for perfection, and be comforted. Have the same concern and live in peace. And may the God of love and peace be with you." (II Cor. 13:11)

Appealing to your filiation in the Lord,
THE FATHERS OF THE HOLY ANTIOCHENE ASSEMBLY

¹¹⁹ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 24, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 62-63.

¹²⁰ Doc. 216 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

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Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to members of the US Congress regretting the opposition to the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan¹²¹

Amman, August 25, 1975

THE ROYAL PALACE,
*Amman, Jordan August 25, 1975.*Hon. Congressman PAUL FINDLEY,
The Capitol, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN:

I write to you in your capacity as a representative of the great American people. In all of my years at the helm of Jordan I have been a long time believer in the fundamental principles and ideals which your forefathers adopted to create the greatest and strongest nation of all times. As true friends of America, my country and my people were, for two decades, the only supporters the United States had in the Arab World. We have always been openly proud of our friendship and voiced it with courage. We felt that we shared with you the belief in the basic right of peoples to freedom, Justice, dignity and a better life.

My country has continuously adopted a moderate non-aggressive policy which we hope we will be enabled to continue to pursue. We have contributed greatly to maintaining stability and moderation in our area, and served the cause of peace in the Middle East in every possible way. We depended on your friendship and support in our various endeavours to prevent the polarization of the Middle East conflict between the super-powers. We cooperated very closely with your government, at considerable cost to my country and its people, in our common search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Yet now, my country, its government, people and armed forces, find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma. Can we preserve the friendship which existed between the United States and ourselves and which we cherished so much, or are we going to be left with no other alternative than to seek another course?

What brought matters to this sad cross-road is the opposition in some Congressional quarters,

which we sincerely believe to be unwarranted, to the sale of fourteen batteries of Advanced Hawk missiles to Jordan. I hope you will bear with me as we review some of the facts.

Jordan is the only state in the area without an air-defence system of any kind. The fourteen Hawk batteries are the minimum requirement for our legitimate self-defence, as was established by the American Military Delegations which visited Jordan for the purpose of studying our air-defence requirements. The system we agreed with your government on is a very modest one compared to what our neighbours have, and, we feel, will in no way affect the balance of power in the Middle East, which is overwhelmingly in Israel's favour. The Hawks will be used to defend the area of our capital and a few of our major fixed installations.

We in Jordan have always looked to the United States for military equipment, and relied on you as our friends who generously helped us whenever possible, and within the limits of our ability, to purchase arms for our legitimate self-defence. We have had to be strong to survive, since weakness invites aggression. We do feel threatened, and the record of Israel's expansion since its creation in 1948 justifies those fears.

Perhaps not everyone knows that our capital city of Amman is within range of the American built Israeli heavy artillery, and that all our vital points are at the mercy of American built Israeli aircraft, which are free to violate, as they continuously do, our airspace as they please.

This situation, and the recent opposition by some congressional quarters to the sale of the Hawks to Jordan has distressed, dismayed and worried me to the point that I felt it necessary to write to you and infringe on your valuable time.

The matter is in your hands now. If your decision to provide Jordan with the urgently needed fourteen batteries of Advanced Hawk missiles is a positive one, then no one will be more pleased or satisfied than I, your old and traditional friend.

But if your decision is a negative one, I regret to inform you that I have no other choice but to seek the best comparable system, which is available only in the Soviet Union. It would be a tragic decision on your part if you chose to push your friend and ally to adopt such a course—

¹²¹ Distributed on September 2, 1975, with a covering note by Jordan's ambassador to the US, Abdallah Salah; text as inserted by Representative Findley (Rep.) in the *Congressional Record* (daily), September 5, 1975, p. H 8395.

one which I am duty-bound to follow with the greatest of sorrow. As a friend, allow me to say that such a development will not only affect your interests in the Middle East, but will also incur irreparable damage to the United States credibility and reliability, not only in the Arab World, but perhaps throughout the world. It would indeed be tragic to have anything occur which would cast doubt upon your role as a peace-maker in the area.

Finally, it is common knowledge that the United States has granted Israel billions of dollars worth of arms over the years, especially since the 1973 war, and is now about to consider an additional Israeli request for more billions of your tax payers money. We understand this is to be spent on some of the most sophisticated and offensive weapons in the U.S. Arsenal, such as the F. 15 Eagle class of aircraft, and the Lance ground to ground missile. As a result the United States might well be accused of adopting a policy of double-standards, and not the even-handed constructive policy which is needed if you are to play an effective role in establishing peace in the Middle East.

Please forgive my candor, but I write as a true friend who is doing his utmost to preserve our traditional ties and close association.

I hope you will kindly accept my warm regards and personal best wishes.

Yours sincerely,
KING HUSSEIN.

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Press interview statements by Greek Orthodox Patriarch Elias IV of Antioch and all the East welcoming the Palestinian presence in Lebanon¹²²

Dhour al-Shweir, late August, 1975

Q. Your Beatitude, according to one view the conflicts that break out in Lebanon from time to time are due to the fact that Lebanon's identity is not clear, meaning that insufficient efforts have been made to make Lebanon's Arab identity clear, and that some people reject such an

identity. What do you think, and can there really be a non-Arab Lebanon?

A. Firstly I cannot conceive of a Lebanon outside the Arab area—before anything else Lebanon is Arab, and those who would like to give her any other form are wrong.

The present conflict I attribute to sectarian differences which are deeply rooted in the minds of us Lebanese. This is because of outside influence, for the West has frequently stirred up religious rancour to divide peoples from each other and to cause differences between their members. I believe that Lebanon should be the state of the Lebanese, of the Arab Lebanese, and interact more strongly with the world, for she has the intellectual and practical resources that enable her to play her role.

Q. Some of those who have formed militias are using the presence of the Palestine resistance in Lebanese territory as their pretext. Is this sound reasoning?

A. The presence of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon is a source of great pride to us; it is also a source of pride to us that the resistance should be using Lebanon as a base for the liberation of Jerusalem. I regard this as a great source of pride. If the Palestinians return, as I believe they will, and obtain their rights, history will record that Lebanon made the greatest contribution to the freedom of the Arabs, and Arab civilization. The Lebanese must sacrifice everything for this goal.

Q. The Eastern Orthodox Church's attitude to Arab and national issues is different from that of the Western Church. Why is this?

A. Because we regard ourselves as the root and all of you as the branches. We are Ghassanids. We are the root that must give. I have very deep roots in this land and I cannot be detached from it. I do not come from outside, I belong here. We have a very long history in this land, much longer than the West. Our Church is a national church; we belong to no one else—we belong to God only, and no one can draw us away from God.

¹²² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), September 1, 1975, pp. 2, 3, 5.

Communiqué issued by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria deploring the Egypt-Israel interim agreement (excerpts)¹²³

Damascus, September 3, 1975

The National Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party has followed with great concern the discussions between the Egyptian government and the enemy Zionist authorities which led to an agreement being initialled by the two parties on the first of September.¹²⁴

On studying the agreement and its annexes and the dangerous consequences that it entails, which pose a threat to the Palestinian cause and the struggle against the Zionist enemy, it is the opinion of the National Command that the agreement is a serious setback to the Arab struggle for the following reasons:

1. The agreement has led to the neutralization of the Egyptian front as a result of the Egyptian commitment not to resort to the use of force and to confine itself to negotiations as the sole means for the pursuit of the struggle against the enemy. Meanwhile the greater part of Sinai is still under the yoke of occupation, the occupation of other lands continues and recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people is being denied.

2. The agreement has led to the actual as well as the contractual termination of the state of belligerency, as the first paragraph stipulates that "The conflict between [the two parties] shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means," and as it lifts the military blockade and allows the passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal.

3. The agreement makes no mention of the other Arab territories and of the cause of the Palestinian people, thereby ignoring the integral nature of the Arab cause and the dangers attending one-sided actions. We have long warned against the dangers of such a course.

4. The agreement has reinforced the long-standing, declared Israeli policy that the conflict with the Arabs should be solved through bilateral negotiations to the exclusion of other means,

which naturally obliterates the Palestinian cause and transforms the conflict into a dispute over boundaries.

5. The agreement has established, on Egyptian soil, border lines [that make] the enemy secure from Egypt, due to the commitment not to resort to the use of force or to mount military or paramilitary operations against the enemy, and also due to the American presence in Sinai. This allows the enemy a better chance to bring his military, economic and political forces to bear on the other fronts.

6. The agreement has led to an American presence in the area, bringing in the United States as a direct party to the conflict, whereas the Arabs had been channelling their efforts towards getting the United States out of the conflict.

7. The substance as well as the text of the agreement conflict with the resolutions of the Khartoum, Algiers and Rabat summit conferences, which laid down the following points as fundamental policy lines:

a) The rejection of negotiating, making peace with or recognizing the enemy.

b) The integral nature of the cause and the rejection of any attempt to fragment it.

c) No encroachment on the Palestinian cause, commitment to the total liberation of the occupied Arab territories and restoration of their national rights to the Palestinian people.

d) Full and effective coordination between the Arab states in all fields of confrontation with the enemy.

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In view of the preceding, the National Command of the Baath Party defines the position of the Baath Party and its revolution in the Syrian Arab Republic as follows:

1. It condemns the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and rejects that policy which entails fragmenting and obliterating the problem, robbing the Arab struggle of its substance and conceding real gains to the enemy. It rejects that policy which endeavours to give to the Arab-Zionist conflict a new dimension which conflicts with the integral nature of the problem, the Palestinian cause and the other Arab territories.

¹²³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 4, 1975.

¹²⁴ Doc. 148 above.

4. It calls on the Arab leadership to rise to their responsibilities in defence of the Arab summit conference resolutions and to work towards their implementation....

5. It calls on the confrontation forces in Palestine and Jordan to overcome all their differences to enable them to stand up to the new situation which constitutes a dangerous turning point in the history of the Palestine problem.

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Speech by President Sadat presenting the interim agreement with Israel (excerpts)¹²⁵

Cairo, September 4, 1975

After strenuous effort we succeeded in concluding a second disengagement of forces agreement on the Egyptian front in Sinai. I say after strenuous effort because this second disengagement treaty required months of arduous negotiations amidst constant manoeuvres and attempts at evasion and postponement. Many people wagered that this second disengagement would never take place, or that if it did take place it would be at the fundamental price of a separate peace agreement... or at least at the cost of the termination of the state of belligerency.

A political battle was fought over every word and every letter in this agreement. However, I had ground for optimism, for reasons that I have explained over and over again but which some people simply fail to grasp. The October War has altered the situation altogether; after that war the Arab negotiator's position was radically changed. For a quarter of a century, whether here in the Middle East, at the United Nations or in other international circles, the Arab negotiator used to operate from a position which allowed him to do no more than plead and entreat, submit legal memoranda or start proceedings. All that

he ever got were resolutions on paper which were worthless when it came to implementation. Following the glorious October War, the Arab negotiator rose to a position of equality with the other negotiators and our policy became to work for documents which would be implemented, not documents that were mere paper. We have been stacking those up by the hundred for a quarter of a century.

The cause of the Palestinian people and the need to bring about a full disengagement of forces on the Syrian front were two questions that were with us at each step, at each meeting or discussion that took place throughout the period that it took to achieve the second Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The discussions on Sinai were never divorced from our concern with the other occupied Arab territories, even during the final hours and at the time of the signing of the agreement. When President Ford got in touch with me by telephone, I once again told him that the threat of war could only be averted at this stage if two conditions were satisfied: the first being a disengagement of forces on the Syrian front and the other that America begin a dialogue with the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization. That shall be our next objective which, God willing, we shall also attain. Had Sinai been all that we were after, we could have gotten far more than we have to date. Our political strategy since the October 1973 war has been to keep the momentum going in all aspects of the cause.

The tragedy begins—and I purposely call it a tragedy because Israel's primary objective at this stage is to divide Arab ranks, undermining the Arab front from within, and we are unfortunately handing her what she wants on a silver platter—the tragedy begins with the Soviet Union informing our Syrian brothers that it will not attend the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in Geneva today. The news is announced by an official source in Damascus; up to this point the matter would have concerned only the Soviet Union which is free to do what it wants. It turns out, however, that during his meeting with the Soviet ambassador, the Syrian foreign minister handed

¹²⁵ Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 5, 1975; excerpted from the partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 269-273. The text of the agreement is doc. 148 above.

him the communiqué issued by the national and regional commands of the Syrian Baath Party¹²⁶ . . . declaring that the agreement constitutes a serious defeat for the Arab struggle. Furthermore, an official spokesman in Damascus declared that the Syrian government intends to send a delegate of ministerial rank to the various Arab capitals and to give the Arab heads of state a letter from the Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, explaining the Syrian point of view towards the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Then, at eleven o'clock today, anti-Egyptian demonstrations took place in Damascus, and the demonstrators shouted slogans against the disengagement agreement. . . . Then a communiqué was issued by the National Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party in Iraq, one paragraph of which says that while the Egyptian regime has publicly and frankly declared its willingness to conclude a peace treaty with the enemy—did we ever say that?—the head of the Syrian regime has affirmed the same thing to American officials and to the American press. They are trying to say that we are openly laying our cards on the table but that the Syrian president is doing the same thing in a veiled way. . . . With the permission of our brothers in Iraq and in the entire Arab nation, I would like to say that had we wanted to conclude a peace treaty, we would not have lacked the courage required to face our nation and say so. I should like everyone to know that I was offered total withdrawal from Sinai in return for the termination of the state of belligerency; however, I stuck with Syria and with the Palestinian cause. Another offer I received was that instead of the withdrawal being only forty or fifty kilometres, to a line behind the passes, the new line could be from El-'Arish to Ras Muhammad, giving me more than two-thirds of Sinai, again in return for the termination of the state of belligerency. I refused this offer, not out of fear of anyone but out of faith in Egypt, faith in its moral commitments and its principles. I have not replied to our brothers in Iraq, for their actions are aimed at President Hafez al-Assad and they are only using me as a way to get at him. I shall not reply to them. However, I am saddened and pained by our brothers in Damascus—and I say it for the whole Arab nation to hear—for we are comrades-at-arms.

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Declaration issued by a joint meeting of the Arab Socialist Union's Central Committee and the National Assembly of Egypt welcoming the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹²⁷

Cairo, September 4, 1975

The joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and the National Assembly held on September 4, 1975, having heard the statement¹²⁸ by President Muhammad Anwar Sadat on the disengagement agreement on the Sinai front signed on September 1, and on future steps, and having studied this agreement, hereby declares:

The joint meeting regards the said agreement as a step towards a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, without being a final peace agreement or terminating the state of war. This is affirmed by the agreement itself, for its Article 8 says: "This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement." For a final peace agreement can only be reached after the implementation of all parts of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and the implementation of United Nations resolutions and recommendations stipulating the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they occupied in 1967 and recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine.

The agreement makes no mention of the termination of the state of war, which will continue to govern relations between Egypt and Israel, especially as regards ships flying the Israeli flag and military cargoes not being allowed to pass through the Suez Canal.

2. This agreement was concluded in implementation of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, which called on the parties concerned to make an immediate start on implementing all parts of resolution 242 and also stipulated that negotiations between the parties concerned should start immediately, under appropriate supervision, with a view to establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

3. This agreement, which is a step towards a

¹²⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 5, 1975. The text of the agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹²⁸ Doc. 293 above.

¹²⁶ Doc. 292 above.

just and permanent peace in the Middle East, is one of the consequences of the October victory, for it is logical that, having fought a war from a position of strength we should offer the opportunity of establishing a just and permanent peace.

4. If this agreement is a necessary evil from the Israeli point of view, as the President pointed out, it is insufficient from the Arab point of view. However, Egypt has approved it to prove to the world her desire for a just peace, and this makes it incumbent on the world, and on the great powers in particular, to assist in the achievement of such a just peace.

Moreover, it is America's commitment to the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, a peace which—as the United States itself admits in the "Statement of the Principles of Relations and Cooperation" issued after the meeting between Presidents Sadat and Nixon on June 14, 1974¹²⁹—takes into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; it is this American commitment that encourages Egypt to take this step towards the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

In this connection the meeting assures the United States that the only alternative to a resumption of fighting leading to the recovery of the rights of the Arab nation is that this American commitment to the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East should be implemented.

5. This agreement, which provides for the recovery of the Abu Rudeis oilfields and Israel's withdrawal from the Straits, is an important military and political strategic step which, as far as Egypt is concerned, could open the door to a comprehensive settlement of the whole of the Middle East problem at the Geneva conference and in other international fields.

The meeting stresses that the disengagement of forces on the Egyptian front must be followed by a similar agreement on the Golan front. It also stresses the need for an early comprehensive settlement to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories they occupied in 1967, and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine, and it will never accept any delay or procrastination in this field.

6. Egypt is signing this agreement from the position of strength ensured her by the October

war and in defence of the legitimate Arab rights that now enjoy extensive world support.

The meeting stresses that the fundamental guarantee of the achievement of the final goal, which is a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, lies in Egypt's persistent pursuit of her basic policy, which is her commitment to the liberation of Arab territory and the recovery of the rights of the people of Palestine. It also lies in Egypt's having a clear view of things and her possessing her own independent will. For only an independent Egypt, which has got hold of her national will and was victorious in the October war, can decide when to fight and when to negotiate.

7. Egypt, which concluded this agreement as a step towards a just peace, will not hesitate to make every effort to ensure the realization of her historic commitment, from which she will never withdraw, to a comprehensive and just settlement of the whole of the Middle East problem, and she affirms that the beginning and the end of any comprehensive settlement of this problem lies in recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine, which is the core of the problem.

Our generation in Egypt, which has borne burdens beyond its strength, is still prepared to bear further burdens, in the knowledge that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict of more than one generation, and that the October war was but one link in the chain of that conflict.

Struggling Egypt, which is totally committed to the Arab nation, and has concluded this agreement from the conviction that it is a step towards a just and permanent peace, affirms her commitment to the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat Arab summits.¹³⁰ She also stresses the importance of Arab solidarity as being an irreplaceable weapon for the recovery of the rights of the Arab nation, and she will do her utmost to support that solidarity.

Egypt is also anxious that Egyptian-Palestinian dialogue should continue, from her belief that the Palestinian people alone are entitled to decide their own destiny and that the Palestine Liberation Organization, as representing the Palestinian people, is alone entitled to express their wishes.

The struggling Palestinian people, who are the crux of the whole Arab problem, will never be alone in the field. All that Egypt has endured

¹²⁹ Doc. 121 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹³⁰ Docs. 331–333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

since 1948 has been for their sake and she is ever ready to endure yet more for their sake, so that they may recover their rights and establish an independent Palestinian entity.

The joint meeting of the Central Committee and the National Assembly, seeing, as it does, this agreement as a step towards a comprehensive settlement of the whole Middle East problem, regards it as one of the consequences of the terrible and glorious battle so courageously fought by the intrepid armed forces of Egypt and Syria, through which Egypt and the Arab nation achieved the victory of October. The meeting likewise affirms that these intrepid armed forces will ever remain, as they have always been, the first and last guarantee of the recovery of the rights of the Arab nation; they will ever be the sword and buckler of the Arab nation; it is they who negotiate and they who fight.

The joint meeting of the Central Committee and the National Assembly, having studied the agreement in the light of the foregoing, in affirming its approval of the agreement as being a step towards a just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, assures the leader who took the decision to make war at a time when many hesitated to take such a decision, the leader who did not hesitate to announce a peace initiative when the October war proclaimed the possibility of such peace, the leader who, in all he does, proclaims his commitment to the interests of the Arab nation, the leader who both fought the war and negotiated from a position of strength, the leader in whom, from their knowledge of him and the experiences they have shared with him, the Egyptian people have placed the fullest confidence, the meeting assures that leader, president Muhammad Anwar Sadat, of its absolute confidence in his national leadership and his wise policy and promises before God and in the name of the Egyptian people to stand by him until all Arab territory is liberated and the Palestinian people recover their legitimate rights.

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Declaration by the Central Committee of Fatah condemning the Egypt-Israel interim agreement (excerpt)¹³¹

September 5, 1975

We were the first to reject this agreement and to warn of the consequences of signing it because it involves concessions never before made by any political leadership in the Arab homeland since the start of the Arab-Zionist conflict. For the agreement includes the following:

1. It shelves the issue of the Arab-Zionist conflict in return for a piece of Egyptian territory, while the rest of the occupied Arab territories and our people in occupied Palestine are still groaning under Israeli occupation.

2. It fragments the issue and thus divides Arab ranks which were unified by the glorious October war.

3. It leaves the Palestine resistance to fight alone in the field, bearing all the burdens of the battle. It also creates a split between the comrades of the one battle in Syria and Egypt and paves the way for the Zionist enemy to continue his aggression against steadfast South Lebanon.

4. It legalizes American intervention with Arab approval, making the occupation of Arab territory a double one, both Israeli and American, which is extremely dangerous.

5. The agreement constitutes recognition of the Zionist enemy and is a start in dealing with him on the basis of the *fait accompli* involved in the agreement.

Arab and Palestinian masses;

We are not here to put on record an attitude to the agreement. We have long declared and struggled for a unified Arab attitude to confront it. What the Fatah command is studying, through its moves at the Arab level and its contacts at the international level, is how to confront the consequences of this agreement. Attitudes that amount to no more than words and purely formal rejection are not our methods: we prefer practical measures which are implemented without fail so that the whole Arab nation and our friends through-

¹³¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), September 7, 1975, pp. 4-5.

out the world may know our unambiguous attitude and our practical measures. We therefore declare:

1. That we are very proud of the people of Egypt and her great army for all the sacrifices they have made on behalf of Palestine and her people and we are confident that the Egyptian people are able to understand our attitude and that they know how dangerous this agreement is to the future of Arab struggle, to the Palestine cause and to the Palestinian people.

2. Our condemnation of this agreement and of any previous or subsequent agreement with the enemy which infringes the rights of our people, our revolution and our cause.

3. Our struggle will continue, with force and violence. The clock of history cannot be put back. Through our revolution we have achieved gains for our people at the Arab and international levels, and we have established the existence of this people through its victories at the international, Arab and Palestinian levels. We shall not allow any quarter to bargain over the rights of our people, to speak in their name or to deputize for them at any level.

4. We call on all popular, nationalist and progressive Arab forces to stand sincerely and earnestly by the Palestinian people and their armed revolution in confrontation of the consequences of this agreement, to protect the revolution from all its enemies and those who are lying in wait for it, and to confront the schemes of American imperialism in the area.

5. We call on all the Arab countries to respect the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences¹³² and to declare a clear and unambiguous attitude to the schemes of American imperialism and Zionism which conflict with these resolutions.

6. The forces of liberation and progress throughout the world are called on to rally round the Palestine revolution and defend its revolutionary achievements at the international and Arab levels. They are called on to translate their attitudes into material and moral support for this revolution which is the vanguard of struggle against America and her schemes in the Arab area.

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Press interview statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO outlining courses of action in response to the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹³³

Beirut, early September, 1975

Q. In your speech at Unesco Hall in Beirut you defied Kissinger and his old and new friends, saying that their conspiracy would not succeed and that the peace would be a Palestinian, not an American one. Has the Palestine revolution decided on ways and means of thwarting this conspiracy?

A. There can be no doubt that the American conspiracy is seeking to make this area a sphere of American influence and of domination by American monopolies in particular, and by world imperialism in general. In its pursuit of these ends the conspiracy has had certain successes in one place or another, and has been betting on the situation here being quiet, which would be to the advantage of its scheming and plotting. Therefore the Palestine revolution believes that the steps that Kissinger is taking in his shuttle diplomacy to implement this policy, to realize these ambitions and to achieve certain gains, are being taken in the hope of compensating in our area for what America has lost in South East Asia, in Saigon, Phnom Penh and elsewhere, and for her losses in the heart of the European continent, in Portugal and other areas where American policy is retreating before the pressure, will and strength of the peoples and the masses, the movement of history and democratic, nationalist and progressive forces. In the light of this we say to Kissinger and to all his friends, both old and new, that this Arab nation is not up for international auction nor for auction to the international monopoly trusts, and and that sooner or later this policy will be smashed on the rock of the endurance of our Arab nation and the will of its honourable and free men. We say that they will have to pay just as high a price for their present involvement, in the form of the presence of military technicians or technical soldiers in civilian clothes, as they did in Saigon

¹³² Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹³³ Interview granted to *al-Akhbar* (Beirut); excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 6, 1975, 1st bulletin, pp. 1-6.

and Phnom Penh. Everyone knows that they say that the people of the Arab nation are like camels that live in the desert, but let me remind them of the character of the camel: it is very patient, but if it is roused, woe betide its enemies! Therefore the Palestine revolution, as being the principal vanguard force in this clash, in this struggle to defend the Arab nation, believes that it has fundamental duties and immense responsibilities which it must bear in mind in confronting all these dangers that face the Arab nation in general and the Palestine revolution in particular. Therefore its activity, as far as I can tell you, is concentrated on moves on several axes, the Palestinian and Arab axes and the axis of friendly foreign countries, and there is concentration on popular and official contacts and moves. There is also concentration on military action inside the occupied territory and on the activation of mass action in all directions.

Q. The new Egyptian-Israeli agreement¹³⁴ has now been concluded and, according to reports, it is not restricted to military aspects, but also covers extremely important political aspects. What is your estimate of this agreement and of the present stage confronting the Palestine revolution and Arab struggle in general?

A. As I said, it is a very grave and serious matter. I should have liked this question to be asked rather later, because the PLO's Central Committee has been called to meet at an early date, as has the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution, to go into all these matters in detail, now that all the information related to them is available. It is not a matter of outbidding on our part: we have declared, with the courage of revolutionaries, that we do not oppose the recovery of an inch of Arab territory on condition that it does not infringe the established rights of the Palestinian people or prejudice the cause of the Arab conflict with Zionism and imperialism. Therefore these two urgent meetings are to deal with the matters you referred to in your question—especially as the agreement was signed by a politician, the head of the Zionist state. This definitely gives it a political aspect, although certain Arab media have said that it is a military agreement. As I said at the beginning of this interview, there are many details about this subject—

and because of their importance to all Arabs, not only Palestinians, I prefer not to anticipate events before these two meetings, although I am fully aware of the seriousness and gravity of the situation.

Q. After the recent meeting of the Central Committee certain newspapers published unofficial reports of the possibility of a reconciliation with Jordan. What is the truth about this? And in this context, what happened to the four-power meeting decided on at the Rabat summit?

A. Unfortunately attempts are being made to sidetrack the resolutions of the Rabat summit and to push King Hussein—this is in accordance with the American plan—to recover his position in the Palestinian field. We in the PLO have been trying and are still trying to hold the four-power conference recommended by the Rabat summit conference for the implementation of the Palestine resolutions and to enable the PLO to perform its political, military and popular duties, especially the commando presence in the areas on the frontiers with the occupied territories, including Jordan. But it has been established that secret attempts are still being made, by more than one party, which have prevented this four-power conference being held. Although we adopted a resolution on this point at the last Central Committee meeting, the statements of the Jordanian authorities are still inflexible and refuse to implement the resolutions of the Rabat conference.

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Press statement by General Secretary Habash of the PFLP calling on the PLO to change course in the light of the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹³⁵

Beirut, September 9, 1975

The recent Egyptian-Israeli-American agreement has served to crystallize the following facts more clearly than ever:

1. Any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at this stage will have to be based on the acceptance

¹³⁵ Made as introduction to a press conference; Arabic text *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 10, 1975; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 273-274. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹³⁴ Doc. 148 above.

of resolution 242 and negotiations will have to be conducted on that basis. In view of the prevalent balance of forces, there can only emerge an imperialist, Zionist, reactionary and treasonable settlement which will contribute to the consolidation of Israel's existence and open the gates to the return of American imperialist hegemony to the region. Such a settlement will undermine all the achievements and struggle of the Arab masses, and strengthen the foothold of reactionary and capitulationist regimes in the region. All this has become palpably evident, needing no further elaboration or discussion.

2. There is no possibility at this stage that a "transitional nationalist settlement" can emerge from the settlements that are currently being protected, whether within the Geneva Conference or outside it.

Those who adhered to the viewpoint that it was possible to pull off a transitional settlement with a nationalist character in the present context are hereby called upon to revise their presuppositions responsibly, in the light of what experience has tangibly demonstrated over the past two years.

We in the Popular Front hereby declare, before Palestinian, Arab and world public opinion, our full and complete and true readiness to respond to any act of revision carried out in good faith which will result in crystallizing the course of revolutionary action before the masses. The Popular Front, as part of the Palestinian Rejection Front, declares that it shall strive with all the power and resources at its command, to deal with the question of Palestinian national unity in a responsible manner, now that events have created the appropriate atmosphere and defined the proper content of such a unity.

Now that things are clear and there is no room left for illusions, we call on the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to part decisively, once and for all, from the course of the projected settlements and to adopt a new course. That course should be to struggle to foil the settlement, to continue with the revolution and unite Palestinian forces around a new political programme relying on the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian masses, on Arab nationalist and progressive alliances, complete disengagement from the reactionary Egyptian-

Saudi Arabian axis and the escalation of armed struggle against the Zionist enemy. Such a course should aim at the uninterrupted liberation of all the land of Palestine, while relying on the closest possible alliance with the socialist camp.

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Statement by the PFLP—General Command rejecting the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹³⁶

Early September, 1975

Struggling masses,

The social and political concessions made by Sadat's regime to satisfy the United States of America are a major setback to the advance of the Arab nationalist movement and another link in the chain of moves in the service of the imperialist policy aimed at extinguishing the Palestine resistance and restoring feudalism and capitalism to Egypt, as a prelude to an all-out imperialist attack on all the achievements of the Arab workers and peasants and to restoring indirect colonialist control over all Arab institutions. This partial agreement also involves national concessions at the expense of the masses of the Arab people in general, since Sadat's regime has now once and for all left the arena of the conflict with imperialism for that of conflict with our armed revolution and the national liberation movement as a whole.

¹³⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), September 12, 1975, p. 8. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

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Communiqué issued by a meeting of the Executive and Central Committees of the PLO denouncing the Egypt-Israel interim agreement (excerpts)¹³⁷

Damascus, September 10, 1975

The Executive Committee and the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization held constant meetings over the past week to study the Egyptian-Israeli-American agreement. During these meetings, the declared Arab and international positions towards the agreement were reviewed, along with the reactions of the Palestinian and Arab masses which reflected the total aversion and unconditional condemnation of that agreement, which conflicts directly with the will of the Arab masses and with the national interest.

It is abundantly clear that the agreement is in no way merely a military step within the context of a so-called disengagement of forces. It is in fact a political agreement that freezes the state of war with the Zionist enemy on one front and lifts the military and economic blockade against him, thereby opening the door to dealings with him. The agreement is a severe blow to the dignity of Egypt, its people and its army. The agreement is, furthermore, injurious to the dignity of the entire Arab nation. It contributes in practice to the isolation of the Arab Republic of Egypt from the arena of the Arab-Zionist conflict, despite the fact that the better part of the Arab land in Sinai, as well as the Golan Heights and the whole of the land of Palestine, still bear the oppressive yoke of Zionist occupation, and despite the fact that the American-Zionist enemy still rejects the principle of total withdrawal and turns a completely blind eye to the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The agreement clearly and blatantly conflicts with the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat conferences¹³⁸ and various other Arab resolutions. This agreement also conflicts with national responsibilities that necessitate a confrontation and a defeat of the Zionist-imperialist enemy of the

Arab world as a prerequisite to the fulfilment of the national liberation, political unity and social progress of the entire Arab region. In consenting to an American presence in Sinai and attempting to cut down Arab armed forces, the agreement further poses a real threat to the sovereignty of the Arab nation and to the future of the national struggle. By consenting to end the state of belligerency and lift the military and economic blockade against the enemy, implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the enemy's existence and allowing the passage of his goods through the Suez Canal, the agreement is clearly injurious to the Palestinian cause and to the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Militarily and politically, the agreement has led to an imbalance of forces in favour of the enemy by attempting to extricate Egypt from the struggle.

From the minute it was signed the agreement caused a clear split in Arab solidarity; it was designed to undermine the Arab response to the Israeli challenge. In addition, we see the agreement as a frantic American-Zionist endeavour to wipe out the military and political achievements of the Palestinian struggle resulting from the glorious October War and many years of struggle and endurance which caused considerable sacrifice and a long list of martyrs.

In the light of the above, we hereby register our rejection and condemnation of that agreement, which is in radical conflict with the wishes and dignity of the Arab masses and with their national sovereignty. With the deepest regret, we take note of the fact that it contravenes the brotherhood at arms between the great army of Arab Egypt and the other Arab armies, particularly the intrepid Syrian army and the fighting forces of the Palestinian revolution.

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The agreement that emerged was a partial and one-sided solution that ignores the Palestine problem which is the heart of the national cause; it ignores the national character of the Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy and it also constitutes an abandoning of the national soil and national sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Egypt itself.

In view of all these things, the Palestine Liberation Organization places all the nationalist Arab governments, forces and masses before their na-

¹³⁷ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 11, 1975; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 274-275. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹³⁸ Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

tional responsibilities. It calls on them to declare a clear stand against the agreement, condemning and denouncing it through all available means, and to take immediate action on all levels to counter the American moves which led to this agreement. The Organization calls for the mobilization of all military, political and economic potential of the Arab nation within a united national front which will take immediate action to support the steadfast forces confronting the enemy and to oppose the American-Zionist solution. The Organization calls on all Arab forces, particularly the governments of Iraq, Libya and Algeria, to place all their resources and potential in the service of direct confrontation with the enemy, alongside Syria and the Palestinian revolution.

We call on all popular Arab forces in Egypt, particularly the nationalist forces, to shoulder their full responsibilities by responding to this conspiratorial agreement, condemning it and nullifying it and all its anti-nationalist consequences.

We call today on all branches of the Palestinian revolution and all nationalist Palestinian forces to join ranks, strengthen their solidarity and to move forward seriously towards the consolidation of their national unity. This is a basic requisite if we are to counter the plans to liquidate us, protect our national cause and guarantee the continuation and escalation of the national struggle in all its forms.

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Statement issued by the Ministry of Information of Egypt announcing measures regarding the "Voice of Palestine" radio in Cairo¹³⁹

Cairo, September 11, 1975

Certain elements have tried to exploit the "Voice of Palestine" broadcasts from Cairo, which Egypt had placed at the disposal of the Palestine cause. They were aiming to make this service deviate from its objectives and make it party to the

trumped-up propaganda campaign against Egypt organized by elements whose interests dictate the freezing of the Palestine cause and of the situation in the area in a manner inconsistent with the pan-Arab interest.

The Egyptian authorities wish to make it clear that Egypt, out of its Arab and national commitments to the Palestine cause and in line with its constant Arab strategy according to which it has devoted all its military, political, economic and diplomatic capabilities to the service of this cause, had placed its information facilities at the disposal of that cause. This is known to all Arabs from the contemporary history of Egyptian information support for all Arab liberation movements throughout the Arab homeland.

Egypt has since 1965 provided the PLO with a special frequency for the broadcasting of the "Voice of Palestine," the aims of which had been established as serving the Palestine cause and making contact with the struggling Palestinian people inside the occupied territory. In response to the attempts to distort the aims of this service and to use it as a means of dividing the Arab ranks and harming the fraternal Egyptian and Palestinian peoples, and in adherence to their commitment to the Palestine cause, the Egyptian authorities have taken the steps needed to ensure that the voice of the free Palestinian will sustain its volume, honesty and effectiveness.

All the Egyptian information media will continue to make every effort to advance the Palestine cause within the framework of Egypt's historical Arab commitments to its nation and until the entire Arab territory and the rights of the fraternal Palestinian people are restored.

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Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria commenting on the Egypt-Israel interim agreement and the possibility of negotiations between Syria and Israel¹⁴⁰

Damascus, mid-September, 1975

Q. Why do you think the Sinai agreement between Israel and Egypt will jeopardize peace in the area?

¹³⁹ Broadcast on Cairo radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5006/A/5; reprinted by permission.

¹⁴⁰ Partial text of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (New York—international edition), September, 22, 1975, p. 30. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

A. Because the agreement is a step backward from peace, and it will precipitate the next crisis. It ignores the nature of the conflict by attempting to divide the problem into separate compartments. Egypt's agreement to end the state of belligerency and allow Israeli goods through the Canal should have been conceded only in return for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and the achievement of Palestinian rights. The billions you are giving Israel for a few miles of Arab land will only encourage Israeli arrogance and intransigence. The U.S. has become a direct party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is not in the Arab interest and certainly not in the U.S. interest.

Q. After talking with Henry Kissinger how do you read U.S. intentions in the coming months?

A. Your Administration would like to anesthetize the situation and concentrate on next year's elections. You want tranquillity and the status quo. They are mutually exclusive objectives.

Q. But isn't a general anesthetic possible for a while?
A. No, impossible.

Q. When you spoke with Kissinger how did he rate the chances of another Israeli pullback on the Golan Heights?

A. He didn't. He gave us no assessment at all. There was no precise talk, only vague generalities.

Q. Does he think Israel-Syrian negotiations are possible?

A. Yes, he does, but we did not reach any agreement with him.

Q. Egypt says negotiations for a new Golan agreement will start within one month and that all parties know this. Israel says this is not so and that there is no commitment to do anything beyond Sinai. Who's right?

A. There is no agreement with anybody to start any negotiations.

Q. What do you feel is the minimum basis for another Golan agreement?

A. Our attitude is now under review. The results will not be like your "reassessment" of your Mideastern policy that didn't reach any conclusions. Our reassessment will be conclusive.

Q. For Israel, what would be a more effective defense line than the one it now holds in Syria?

A. If Israel insists on topographical considerations, it has, behind the 1967 lines, on the other

side of the lake, still higher mountains and a great number of hills which people, including some Israelis, consider a more secure line.

Q. If there is a complete military withdrawal from all of the Golan Heights, would you be willing to consider a U.S.-supervised early-warning system as in Sinai?

A. We see no justification for such an arrangement. It wouldn't be in anyone's interest. Given the topography, binoculars would be sufficient.

Q. Is there any way the Golan Heights could be demilitarized?

A. Only if equal areas are demilitarized on both sides of the line.

Q. If hostilities resumed on the Lebanese, Jordanian and Syrian fronts after the Sinai pullback, what could Egypt do?

A. I cannot answer for the Egyptian leadership.

Q. But hasn't Egypt taken itself out of the military equation?

A. In Egypt, they say no. Time will tell.

Q. Can Syria and Jordan fight without Egypt?

A. Yes, it's possible and that's why we are organizing ourselves in a way that will make a common defense credible. Don't overlook the possibility that we ourselves may conclude that the time is propitious for the resumption of hostilities to liberate our land.

Q. Is it true that one of the consequences of the Sinai agreement is that the Palestinian commandos are now free to launch raids into Israel from Syrian territory.

A. It is our conviction that they have a right to conduct their battles from any part of the Arab homeland. And that includes Syria.

Q. What happens to the U.N. peace-keeping mandate when it expires at the end of November? What are your conditions for another extension?

A. So far we haven't even considered the question.

Q. Previously, at an Arab summit, Egypt promised to coordinate its policy on Israel with yours. Did the Egyptian Government do so on the Sinai agreement?

A. There was no exchange of opinion, no common position on the agreement. In other words, no coordination.

Q. Secretary of State Kissinger said recently that he does not anticipate any opposition from the Soviet Union on

the Sinai accord. Does that prediction jibe with your information?

A. Russia does not approve the agreement and I don't know on what Kissinger bases his assumption. I think it's erroneous. We see eye to eye with the Soviets on our problem. U.S. policies, unfortunately, are not on the same wave length. Russia favors complete withdrawal and Palestinian national rights. The U.S. position is not the same although U.S. interests in the Arab world are larger. For 27 years America has acted against its own interests in the Middle East. It is very sad to see how you are dissipating what we thought to be, in the light of repeated U.S. assurances, a genuinely evenhanded policy.

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Press interview statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO reviewing the situation of the Palestine revolution after the signing of the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹⁴¹

Mid-September, 1975

Q. What are the immediate effects on the Palestine revolution of the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel?

A. Of course we are all of us concerned for Egypt, the people of Egypt and the strength of Egypt, and we all appreciate the sacrifices made by that great people. But all the same we must say frankly what we think about the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement on Sinai, because it will have direct and indirect effects on the Palestine revolution, the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab conflict with American imperialism. For it is an entirely political agreement whose provisions include clear and unmistakable infringements of the resolutions of the Rabat, Algiers and Khartoum summit conferences. This being the case it has a negative effect on our bitter struggle with world Zionism, international imperialism and American ambitions, both old and new, in the Arab area, where America dreams of recovering her control over this part of the world whose oil reserves account for 80 per cent

of the whole world's reserves. Not to mention its strategic situation and the other raw materials that exist in the Arab area, which, in places, are still untouched. This agreement mentions the ending of the struggle with the Zionist enemy and stresses that the unresolved problems can only be solved by peaceful means (force not to be used between them or in the Middle East). This is a serious matter, for it raises difficulties, to the extent of depriving future generations of their chances of fighting and winning, which neither this nor any other generation has any right to do. For if our generation is unable to achieve all that is required of it at the national and historical levels it has no right to close the doors in the face of future generations. The repeated Israeli land and sea raids, carried out with American planes and other American armaments, on our camps and on South Lebanon, and against the Palestinian revolutionary presence, are an unmistakable proof that although the fighting has been stopped and military measures have been frozen on one front, the enemy is operating with renewed strength on the other front, and has concentrated all his American-Israeli military weight against the Palestine revolution, as is happening every day both inside and outside the occupied territory.

From the point of view of the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian people, when it comes to explaining it, there is much to be criticized in the recent agreement; but we of the Palestine revolution have always taken our stand on the united Arab attitude which was smashed by Kissinger's step-by-step policy in the sight and hearing of the Arab masses. This policy also succeeded in disuniting the united Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian attitude which, after the October war, constituted the main axis of confrontation in the Arab-Zionist conflict and the mainstay of solidarity and Arab unity in the service of the Arab nation. In this context the Palestine revolution and the Arab nation have an immense responsibility for confronting this American imperialist scheme which thinks it can sidetrack the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian people.

In my position as commander-in-chief of the forces of the Palestine revolution and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I say that the Palestinians are the unmistakable and eternal fact in this area. For, when it started operations at the beginning

¹⁴¹ Made to *al-Watan* (Kuwait); excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 15, 1975, supplement, pp. 1-6. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

of 1965, the Palestine resistance succeeded in dispelling the darkness that surrounded this conflict and the challenge that confronts the Arab nation. It arose as the embodiment of the desire of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and the revolution will continue because of this desire and will win total victory through its steadfastness.

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Q. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ismail Fahmi, said in an interview that Abu Ammar knew about the recent Sinai agreement, and that he personally had informed him of the points of the agreement. What is your comment on this?

A. In the course of a meeting during my recent visit to Saudi Arabia Mr. Ashraf Marwan did acquaint me with some of the points of what he called the Egyptian demands as regards the agreement that Kissinger was trying to reach. For example, he told me that the agreement was not political, so that when it was published I was surprised to find that it was a political one, as is shown by its published provisions and the fact that it was signed by politicians. He also told me that this agreement did not prejudice Palestinian interests or the revolution. I and my comrades who attended the meeting made a point of recording this verbal message, and in my turn I took a verbal message to President Sadat in which I spoke of the Palestinian feeling of isolation and of all the moves that are being made in the area—both the Palestinian military stand of confronting Israel on its own both inside and outside the occupied territory, and the American political moves aimed at isolating the Palestinian people and liquidating the Palestine revolution; I also mentioned other subjects. I asked him: Does what you have told me require approval? He said: We are not asking anyone's approval. All the same I said: I have reservations about what you have told me. Here the Palestinian leadership must take a stand on a historical point. It is that Palestine is not the property of this generation; it is the property of past generations who lie buried in its soil and of future generations yet unborn. If Kissinger has succeeded in obtaining approval of these points in return for a few miles, how much will he ask for the recovery of Jerusalem?

Now that the Palestine resistance has succeeded in holding out and that the Syrian attitude has reinforced, consolidated and strengthened Pales-

tinian and Arab endurance, then there is the attitude adopted by our friends the Soviets to this agreement, and the attitudes of the other Arab countries, which have started to express their views frankly, on this agreement at the official and popular levels, the latest being the statement issued by Algeria. There are also many friends in the world, so that the Palestinian people and revolutionaries do not feel that they are alone as they confront the challenge of Zionism and American imperialism, but that they are supported by the Arab masses and their popular forces from the Atlantic to the Gulf and by their friends and allies throughout the world.

Q. Do you think that circumstances are now favourable for the proclamation of a provisional revolutionary government for the Palestinian people?

A. As I have said before, this is a matter for the Palestinian leadership to decide when it feels that such a step can be of service to the advance of our armed struggle. It can only be taken after consultation through our executive and legislative institutions and revolutionary bases and after consultation with our friends and brothers.

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Statement by the National Assembly of Syria condemning the Egypt-Israel interim agreement (excerpt)¹⁴²

Damascus, September 23, 1975

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Having studied the agreement signed by the Egyptian government with Israel in a serious and responsible manner, the members of the National Assembly of the Syrian Arab Republic declare their condemnation of that agreement and affirm that it is one of the gravest setbacks that have ever confronted Arab struggle, for the following reasons:

1. The Egyptian government has agreed to end armed struggle against the Zionist enemy. The agreement explicitly states this. According to Articles 1 and 2, the Egyptian government commits

¹⁴² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 24, 1975, p. 3. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

itself to negotiation as being the only way to establish peace. It also undertakes not to resort to force, to maintain the ceasefire on land, on sea and in the air, and to refrain from military or paramilitary activities.

By this the Egyptian government has relieved the people of Egypt and her armed forces of their obligation to liberate Arab territory, although not only a large part of Sinai but also the Golan, the West Bank and Jerusalem are still occupied, and although Zionism and imperialism persist in utterly disregarding the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and making light of relevant United Nations resolutions, and in particular resolution 3236.

2. The agreement has ended the state of war between Egypt and Israel, as is explicitly stated in Article 2.

3. The agreement has thus demolished the resolutions of the Khartoum, Algiers and Rabat summit conferences¹⁴³ and disregards Arab unanimity, ignoring the situation on the other Arab fronts. What is more, the subsidiary agreements between the United States and Israel provide Israel with military facilities, stipulating that she be supplied with such fantastic amounts of arms and American military aid as are hardly appropriate for a party that signs an agreement undertaking not to use force.

4. The Egyptian government has adopted the course of individual action, for none of the articles of the agreement refer to the other occupied Arab territories.

Nor does it refer to the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. On the contrary it gives Israel a better chance to direct the whole of her military effort and all her economic resources against the other fronts, and this is what colonialism has always tried to achieve.

5. By this agreement the Egyptian government has infringed the Arab boycott of Israel, since its article 7 allows Israeli cargoes to pass to and fro through the Suez Canal.

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Television interview statements by Prince Saud al-Faisal, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia¹⁴⁴

New York, late September, 1975

Evans: Mr. Minister, Israel seems to have made an effort to show good faith in trying to move toward a political settlement by agreeing to a withdrawal from part of the Sinai. Why shouldn't your country, sir, as the leader of the moderate Arab world, now state unequivocally that you are willing to recognize the sovereignty and the existence of Israel as a Middle East state?

Saud: The issue here certainly is not the recognition by Saudi Arabia of the sovereignty of Israel. I think the issue involved here is the willingness of Israel to live within the area and with the people of the area.

Certainly the original problem is not between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It is between Israel and the Palestinians. That is the original aggression that has happened and that created the basic problem.

Evans: But, sir, wouldn't a statement such as I suggest from your government have an important bearing on the way the Israelis look at their future in terms of the Arab States? Doesn't one Arab country have to say unequivocally "Yes, we recognize that this is a permanent Middle Eastern state"?

Saud: I don't think so, Mr. Evans. I think the statement has to come from Israel that it recognizes the Palestinians and it recognizes what it has caused the Palestinians over the years.

Evans: Do you think, sir, this second movement from the Sinai by Israel since the '73 War is going to lead to a similar reconciliation on the Golan Heights and the West Bank; isn't that the present political movement in the Middle East?

Saud: All indications, at least on Israel's part don't indicate this. They are building more settlements in the Golan, on the West Bank also it is doing that, is arming itself to the teeth. I don't see that this is leading to that.

¹⁴³ Docs. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*, docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*, and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

¹⁴⁴ Interview conducted by Rowland Evans, Michael J. Berlin, Harry B. Ellis and Bill Monroe and broadcast on NBC's "Meet the Press" on September 28, 1975; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by NBC.

Ellis: Mr. Minister, at the time the latest Sinai accord was signed, did Saudi Arabia and beyond that, do you think that the government of President Sadat of Egypt knew about the potential sale of Pershing missiles to Israel?

Saud: I don't know what President Sadat knew. I know that Saudi Arabia didn't know about that.

Ellis: Do you regard this secret memorandum¹⁴⁵ which calls for the consideration of the sale of these missiles as damaging to the steps toward peace already made?

Saud: Certainly it increases the level of danger for war in the area. Arming Israel has never been an incentive towards peace; on the contrary, it has increased its expansionist efforts.

Ellis: Then I might follow up by asking, to rephrase Mr. Evans' question: Under any circumstances would Saudi Arabia fully recognize Israel?

Saud: I must say this again, that the reconciliation is not between Saudi Arabia and Israel; it is between Israel and the Palestinians. It is between Israel and Syria. It is between Israel and Egypt. That is the primary consideration. If it withdraws from Arab lands, if it recognizes the Palestinians and accepts their aspirations to a homeland, that is what would bring normality to the relationship of Israel and the surrounding states.

Berlin: Mr. Foreign Minister, you seem to feel that the moves that are being made lately are not leading toward a peace agreement as you would like to see it take place but, rather, toward a new intransigence on the part of Israel. Do you still remain confident then that the process that the Secretary of State of the United States has instituted is in the Arab interests or are you beginning to doubt this?

Saud: The theory behind step-by-step is that every step will lead to a more important step, will make the next step easier. We have the assurance of the Secretary of State and of the President, indeed, that the United States is going to work hard to reach a peaceful settlement in the area, and this is, of course, reassuring in itself.

The basic element really is what Israel is willing to do, and from what Israel has been doing, I don't think this reassures us that there will be further steps towards peace.

As I have said before, in the Golan they are still building settlements; they are assuring everybody

in the Golan and the West Bank that they will not remove those settlements from there. The arms that they are asking of the United States, are these indications towards peace? I don't think so.

Berlin: But, Mr. Minister, you seem to be of two minds here. One is you are grateful for the American assurances and yet you see the effect on Israel as not being in the direction that you desire.

Several other Arab governments have accused the United States of splitting Arab unity by, in a sense, retiring Egypt from a potential military confrontation with Israel for the present time.

Are you too beginning to fear that this will have a negative effect, or are you confident and still willing to put your trust in the American process?

Saud: I don't think that Arab unity could be broken through outside forces. I think they do believe in their common destiny in this, and they agree in the final analysis to the basic issues involved.

What I have said was that the assurances from the President and from the Secretary of State were that the United States is working hard to achieve a peaceful settlement based on justice in the area, but I don't see this same guarantee from the Israelis.

Berlin: But you still keep your faith in the American process; you think that is the best way to proceed?

Saud: I think that this is what the President and the Secretary of State have said, that this is the road they are going to proceed on.

I don't see that the influence of the United States on Israel can take two ways. It can make it more intransigent or it can make it accept a settlement based on justice. This is, I think, up to the Americans to decide.

Monroe: Mr. Minister, isn't the attitude of Saudi Arabia relevant to the atmosphere that might lead to peace in the Middle East? Since your government has recognized that the latest Sinai agreement does have some importance, is a step forward—although you feel it might not go far enough—wouldn't it be helpful if you would relax from the point of view of your country some of the attitudes of hostility toward Israel? For example, the use of the economic boycott?

Saud: How can people relax their attitudes if on the other side there is no relaxation, Mr. Monroe? What indications do we have from Israel now? They are arming themselves to the teeth. They are purchasing weapons that have atomic capa-

¹⁴⁵ Doc. 149 above.

bility. They are introducing push-button war into the Middle East.

How can we relax our outlook toward Israel? It is they who have to live within the area; it is they who have come to the area. They should relax their attitude, and their relaxation is to accept the Palestinians.

Monroe: Is it fair to say there are no indications that Israel is moving toward peace when your government has recognized that the Sinai agreement does have some importance and the Israelis have given up some security position or will give up under that agreement some security positions in the Sinai desert as well as the oil fields?

Saud: What security positions are they giving up?

They are asking for equipment that goes 450 miles and they gave up several miles only. It is the attitude of the Israelis, I think, in the final analysis, that has to be evaluated here, not the attitude of Saudi Arabia.

Monroe: You are telling us that there will be no gesture to end the present Saudi Arabian hostility of suspicion toward the Israelis?

Saud: We don't see any gesture from the Israelis to change their attitude toward the Palestinians.

Evans: Mr. Minister, I want to raise a hobgoblin and ask you to examine it and tell us what would be the result if it happens, that the Congress does not approve the dispatch of 200 American technicians to "No Man's Land" between the Egyptians and the Israelis in the new Sinai agreement? What happens if Congress, which has now been talking about this issue for almost one month and has not even reported out a bill, a concurrent resolution in either house, fails to act within another month?

Saud: The details of the agreement, at least in the impressions we received after it, is that Israel would not sign the agreement unless the United States lives up to its commitment. I assume that what would happen is that they wouldn't sign the agreement.

Evans: And if they don't sign the agreement, what happens to the agreement itself, to the whole Middle East situation, if that should occur?

Saud: I really don't know.

Monroe: Would you speculate?

Saud: There is in my mind confusion about what the agreement is, which parts of it are the real commitments, which parts of it are not commit-

ments but promises. But what I know is what the Israelis have said. They have said that if the Americans are not there, they would not sign the agreement. I assume this is what would happen.

Evans: You don't question that the Israelis signed the agreement in good faith on the assumption that Congress would approve of these 200 technicians?

Saud: Do I question that?

Evans: Yes, sir.

Saud: No, I don't. They have said that they would only sign the agreement if Congress agrees to the American commitment.

Evans: Do you expect Congress to go along with the agreement?

Saud: I don't know. I think you should ask that question of Congress.

Ellis: Mr. Minister, I believe the Arab position is that should another Arab-Israeli war break out, there might very well be another oil embargo of the West, certainly of the United States.

The Shah of Iran has indicated to American officials that in that case Iran would not join the boycott and Iran would continue to let its oil flow to Israel.

As a fellow member of OPEC, would Saudi Arabia consider this an unfriendly act on the part of Iran?

Saud: I did not hear the words of the Shah exactly as you reported. He said that he wouldn't join in an Arab boycott; that is all he said. I don't know that he stated he would continue the flow of Iranian oil to Israel, but in any case, it is something that he has to decide.

The Iranian position towards the Arabs, I think has been very friendly; it has been strong and appreciated support to the Arab case.

Ellis: Certainly the Arabs realize that as Israel gives up the oil fields in Sinai it will resume heavier deliveries of Iranian oil. That must be understood by the Arabs.

Saud: No, I don't understand that. I understand by giving that they are guaranteed their oil by the United States. That is what I understand.

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Political programme adopted by the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (excerpts)¹⁴⁶

October, 1975

II. The Palestinian revolution: its nature, its tasks, its dynamics

A. THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF OUR REVOLUTION:

The Palestinian revolution is in its present historical phase a national-democratic revolution. Its strategic task is to achieve a radical democratic solution to the national question of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinian national question is essentially the problem of the national fragmentation, and of the uprooting from their homeland, to which the Palestinian people have been subjected—as a result of: 1) the Zionist settler-colonial invasion which led to the eviction and destitution of most Palestinians outside their homes, to their replacement by Jewish settlers, and to the establishment of the State of Israel as an exclusive Jewish state which defines itself as the country of world Jewry on the land of Palestine; and 2) Hashemite annexationist policy to which the rest of Palestine and the majority of the Palestinian people have been subjected.

This national fragmentation of the Palestinian people has led to the forced dissolution of their national existence and creates an obstacle to their national and social development. It has also led to an acute national contradiction between Zionism and its political embodiment (Israel) and the Palestinian people, on the one hand, and between Hashemite reaction and all the patriotic classes of the Palestinian people, on the other.

The future of the socialist development of Palestine, country and people, depends on the achievement of a radical solution to this national conflict by removing its root cause: the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their national rights, primarily at the hands of the Zionist state but also at the hands of Hashemite reaction. Until this solu-

tion has been achieved, the Palestinian revolution will retain its national-democratic character.

B. TOWARDS A RADICAL SOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION:

The radical solution to the problem of the Palestinian people's national fragmentation and uprooting lies in guaranteeing their right to self-determination in freedom over their entire national territory. This goal requires the achievement of national independence for the Palestinian people and the annulment of Hashemite annexationist policy. It also requires the struggle for the establishment of a unified democratic state in Palestine, opposed to Zionism and imperialism, where Arabs and Jews co-exist within a framework of complete national equality, far from any oppression or discrimination based on nationality, race, or religion. It further requires a state which is linked by integral relations to the countries of the Arab world. To arrive at this solution requires a struggle for the realization of a series of concrete political steps that guarantee the abolition of Zionism and all its political expressions. These steps consist of:

1. Forcing, by practical measures, the recognition of the independent national existence of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination in freedom within the framework of an independent national state.
2. The recognition of the right of all Palestinian Arab refugees to return to their original abode and their homeland, and to the repossession of their property.
3. The abolition of the Zionist Law of Return, the limitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the dismantlement of all Zionist institutions; military, political, economic, and social.
4. The abolition of all forms of national, racial, and religious discrimination and the provision of political and constitutional guarantees for co-existence and equality within the framework of a unified democratic state.

The realization of this radical solution to our national question requires a comprehensive mobilization of all the forces of our national revolution, its allies, and its strategic resources. This will make it possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the material forces of Zionism and the allies of imperialism. This comprehensive mobilization can only be achieved given the following conditions:

1. On the local level; A full mobilization of

¹⁴⁶ Excerpted from the English translation issued by the DFLP; Part I "The development of the Palestinian national question" has been omitted. The programme was made public in February 1976.

the revolutionary potential of the Palestinian people by the provision of a stable base on their homeland, in the areas where the majority of the people live and the emergence of a revolutionary proletarian leadership for the Palestinian national movement. A leadership which is capable of achieving an organized and complete democratic mobilization of the popular masses.

2. On the Arab level; An unequivocal victory of the national-democratic revolution in a number of Arab countries, which makes possible the establishment of popular democratic regimes that will immediately fulfill the minimal requirements for a radical change in the Arab-Israeli balance of forces. This will be achieved by arming the people, by giving the masses their democratic liberties, by completely liquidating imperialism's influence and interests and by consolidating the alliance with socialist countries and all the forces of world revolution.

3. On the international level; An unequivocal change in the balance of power that puts the initiative in the hands of the forces of world revolution and paralyzes the aggressive capacity of the imperialist powers.

C. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES:

The Palestinian revolution faces, at the strategic level, a major enemy represented by Zionism and its political expression, the State of Israel. Zionism is a reactionary racist movement which is firmly tied to world imperialism and which constitutes a negation of the national existence of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. Zionism proposes a false and reactionary solution to the Jewish question, placing it in a chauvinist and settler-colonialist framework at the expense of the Palestinian people's national existence and their inalienable national rights. The total defeat of Zionism constitutes the major strategic task of our national-democratic revolution.

The constant and principal ally of Zionism is world imperialism. The Zionist project grew and developed under the aegis of British colonialism, and it now maintains its racist and settler-colonial institutions thanks to the wide-ranging support of American imperialism. World imperialism finds in the Zionist presence an important pillar for imposing its domination in the Middle East and an instrument of aggression to weaken and repress the Arab national liberation move-

ment. The struggle against imperialism, the ally and supporter of Zionism, constitutes a strategic and enduring task for our Palestinian revolution. The abolition of Zionism over Palestinian land necessarily means the liberation of Palestine from the orbit of world imperialism.

Side by side with Zionism, Hashemite reaction plays a complementary role in the dissolution of the independent national existence of the Palestinian people. Hashemite reaction draws its reason of being from the specific task it accomplishes in the service of imperialist strategy in the area. The essence of this task resides in the policy of forced annexation which is directed towards usurping the right to represent the Palestinian people, claiming sovereignty over the latter's national territory, suppressing its national struggle and subjugating it to regional discrimination and oppression. Thus Hashemite reaction constitutes one of the major forces antagonistic to the revolution. Abolishing the Hashemite policy of forced annexation, and forcing in practice the recognition of the national independence of the Palestinian people are then among the enduring strategic tasks of our Palestinian revolution. In order for the Palestinian people in Jordan to achieve their full right of return to their homeland, free and sovereign, the struggle against the policy of annexation and regional discrimination must develop into a common struggle with all the Jordanian patriotic forces for a national democratic regime. The establishment of a national democratic regime radically solves the problems of the national democratic revolution in Jordan, leading to national liberation, democracy, and social progress as well as constituting the principal and decisive guarantee for the right of the Palestinian people to independence and regional equality. The establishment of such a regime also provides the solid foundation for the renewal of a unity between Jordan and liberated Palestine, on the basis of democracy, equality, and free voluntary choice. It thus paves the way for a decisive victory in the struggle against Zionism.

D. THE CLASS FORCES PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF REVOLUTION:

The principal motor force of our revolution is the national movement of the Palestinian people in which all its patriotic classes are united. With respect to our people's various groups and social

strata in scattered places of exile, the reality of decimation and national uprooting is affecting with damaging consequences their interests, just as it hinders the fulfillment of their aspirations to return and to be part of a coherent national existence. In Jordan, all classes are suffering from the policy of annexation and regional discrimination which comes to suppress their national aspirations and their immediate democratic and class interests. In the occupied territories, all the patriotic classes suffer from the reality of national plunder and from the settler-colonial and terroristic policy of the occupation authorities. With the exception of a handful of enemy agents and collaborators with Hashemite reaction, made up of feudal notables, self-seeking capitalists, and corrupt officials, all our people's national classes (workers, peasants, destitute refugees, the small bourgeoisie, the middle national bourgeoisie, and some enlightened groups of big capitalists) have a complete interest in the recovery of the right to return, to national independence and to self-determination in their homeland. All these classes participate in the struggle against Zionism, imperialism, and Hashemite annexation, but they participate in varying degrees of determination, consistency, and quality of leadership.

The bitter experiences that our people have suffered have underlined the fact that the traditional leaderships, comprised of members of the big national bourgeoisie and big land-owners, cannot lead the national struggle to victory in spite of their participation in it. This is due to their conservative nature, to their ties with imperialism and the reactionary ruling classes in the Arab countries, and to their faltering stand at times when the occupation authorities and Hashemite reaction exert pressures on their immediate class interests.

The middle national bourgeoisie and its various political expressions play at present an important role in the leadership of the national movement, both inside and outside the occupied territories. However, in the age of the decline of capitalism and of the victory of socialism on a world scale, this class lacks open vistas for further historical development and is incapable of providing the national-democratic revolution with a firm class leadership unto the end. Rather, its inclination for compromise and hesitation vis-a-vis the opponents of revolution is gaining ground due to its

lack of confidence in the abundant revolutionary potential and initiative of the popular masses. As a result, this class is incapable of fulfilling the requirements for a widespread and organized democratic mobilization of the masses. To let this class control the leadership of the national alliance in spite of its active participation in the national struggle exposes the revolution to catastrophes and setbacks.

The small bourgeoisie and its various sectors play a vital and effective role in the national struggle against the occupation and against Hashemite reaction. This class constitutes the active majority within the base of the present national alliance and under a firm class leadership, it can become one of the principal forces that activate and sustain the national-democratic revolution. It lacks however the qualities of discipline, internal unity and cohesion that would enable it to become a class vanguard for the revolution and to lead it to victory. The inclination for adventurism, extremism, frightened and desperate retreats and spasmodic protests against oppression and destitution prevail within the ranks of this class. As a result of its wavering middle position among the other classes, it also fails to form a sound view of the relative strength of the different class forces and to define accordingly an adequate program of struggle that would enable it to mobilize the masses on a wide scale under its leadership. It instead replaces such a view with extreme verbal slogans, with a preaching of despair putting the people and the revolution at a dead-end, and with the attempt to rely on its own forces as a substitute to a wide mobilization of the masses.

The working class, in its democratic revolutionary alliance with poor peasants, destitute refugees, and all other laboring people, is the only class qualified to lead the national-democratic revolution to a decisive victory over its opponents. The open vistas for the historic development of the working class; its increasingly stronger social position in the midst of the people, particularly inside the occupied territories; its qualities of discipline, cohesion and internal unity; its radical interest in liberation, independence, return and the realization of all the tasks of the national-democratic revolution; and its capacity to comprehend the interests of the people as a whole and to correctly assess the balance of forces between it and its opponents. All these qualities

make the working class the most revolutionary and the best equipped to provide a class vanguard that would firmly lead the national-democratic revolution towards a victorious end. The struggle to organize the working class, to bolster its political weight and to enable it to fulfill its objective strategic role as a vanguard to the national-democratic revolution, is a basic requirement for the eventual triumph of the revolution.

The achievement of a radical democratic solution to the Palestinian question is, in the final analysis, in the interest of all the workers among the Jewish settlers in occupied Palestine. But the material and moral advantages that Zionism offers them at the expense of the destitution and exploitation of the Palestinian people, with the resulting penetration of Zionist ideology and sense of national superiority among them, hinders their awareness of this truth and constitutes a serious weakness of the democratic forces, opposed to Zionism or opposed to expansionism, inside Israel. The escalation of the Palestinian and Arab struggle against Zionism and its expansionist ambitions, the defeats inflicted on Israel by this struggle, and the resulting economic, social, and security crises will necessarily expose the illusory nature of the solution proposed by the Zionist project and the transient quality of the advantages it extends at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs. It will also further the conviction that the only road to peace is co-existence within one democratic state. This will provide the objective basis for a common struggle for the abolition of Zionism and will increase the influence of the anti-Zionist forces in Israel, whereby they may become an important strategic resource to our national revolution.

E. THE FORCES ALLIED TO THE REVOLUTION:

1. *On the Arab level:*

The Palestinian revolution is an integral part of the Arab revolution which, in its present national-democratic phase, is struggling for national liberation and unity for all the peoples and countries of the Arab world. Success in inflicting a decisive defeat on the Zionist-imperialist alliance, with its military, technological, and civic superiority, is beyond the Palestinian people's own potential. It necessarily requires a comprehensive mobilization of the human and material resources of all the Arab peoples. The realization of this compre-

hensive mobilization is contingent on fully completing the national-democratic tasks now confronting the Arab revolution as a whole. The progress and eventual victory of the Arab mass struggle against imperialism, reaction, and backwardness and towards unity is therefore a necessary condition for defeating Zionism and for the achievement of a radical democratic solution to our national question. Such a development of the struggle of the Arab masses requires radical and more revolutionary changes in the class make-up of the leadership of the Arab liberation movement. It is therefore in the strategic interest of the Palestinian revolution that it be an organic part of the Arab national liberation movement, which in turn dictates participation in the latter's struggle for a radical solution to the problems of national-democratic liberation and unity at the Arab level.

2. *On the International level:*

The Palestinian revolution is presently evolving in a historical era characterized by the increasing downfall of imperialism and the world capitalist order and by the victory of socialism on a world scale. This reality stresses the historical contradiction between the Zionist enterprise, on the one hand, and the nature of this era and present direction of progress, on the other; just as it builds up confidence in the eventual defeat of this racist and settler-colonial project.

The Zionist movement and its actual embodiment, the expansionist and racist State of Israel, have formed and still form an enduring ally of imperialism and reaction, both regionally and internationally. The State of Israel is participating in the obstruction of the world-wide movement of national liberation and the socialist revolution. This is what makes the struggle against the Zionist project a common international task for all the forces of socialism, national liberation, and democracy in our contemporary world.

On the basis of proletarian internationalism, and of the unity of all the workers and oppressed peoples of the world, the Democratic Front commits itself to work for the consolidation of the alliance between the Palestinian revolution and all the other forces of world revolution. This springs from the Democratic Front's basic belief in the

realistic and historical necessity for such an alliance for building a wide confrontation front against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction on a world level.

III. The transitional program:

The eventual realization of all the strategic tasks of our national democratic revolution dictates, for the present, the following immediate tasks: to unify our Palestinian people, to protect and strengthen the unity of their national identity, to mobilize their resources in order to step up the struggle against the Israeli occupation, and to strengthen their alliance with the Arab movement of national liberation and with the progressive and socialist forces in the world.

The balance of forces in the present phase of the struggle, including all the local, Arab, and international elements, requires the formulation of a concrete transitional program that takes into account the geographical distribution of the Palestinian people, the corresponding variation in its class make-up and the differences in the conditions for carrying on the struggle among its various regional concentrations. This program aims at mobilizing all the regional concentrations of our people on the basis of their respective immediate and concrete interests. It also aims at drawing up a policy that will allow for an uninterrupted change in the current balance of forces and will provide the conditions for a decisive revolutionary victory.

The Transitional National Program for the revolution and the people, based on the right of our people to return, to self-determination, and to independence in a national state established on all Palestinian lands from which the Israeli occupation has been forced to withdraw, is the program that will allow for the maximum mobilization and national unity of our people, and will strengthen the common struggle with our natural allies, both on the Arab level and internationally.

This Program is defined on the basis of the different tasks and transitional programs of action to be taken up by the various regional concentrations of our Palestinian people, given that they should all contribute to the unified strategy in the struggle against Zionism, imperialism, and Hashemite annexation.

A. THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP

The struggle to put an end to Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, to wrest the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and to achieve self-determination within the framework of an independent national state—presently constitutes the central pivot of this Transitional Program.

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The Democratic Front struggles in the occupied territories to mobilize, organize, and lead the masses—using all available forms of mass, political, syndical, and armed struggle—in order:

1. To resist all measures taken by the occupation authorities for the seizure and purchase of land, to return confiscated lands to their legitimate owners, and to evacuate Zionist settlements from these lands.
2. To protect the national economy from steps taken to absorb and destroy it and from exorbitant taxation, and to preserve national economic projects, crafts, and agriculture.
3. To organize the struggle of the working class against exploitation and discrimination, and to guarantee its right to have independent syndical organizations.
4. To protect civil liberties, and to fight against the policy of intimidation, detention, expulsion, and collective punishment.
5. To guarantee the right of women, students, teachers, youth, and other groups in the population, to establish their own independent mass and professional organizations.
6. To protect the national culture and heritage, educational programs, and places of worship, from all Zionist policies of suppression, degradation and falsification.

The Democratic Front works towards connecting all the above struggles with the task of unifying the various patriotic classes and forces. Such a unity is to be within the framework of a Palestinian national front for the common fight to expel and put an end to Israeli occupation, and to guarantee the recognition in practice of the Palestinian people's right to return to their homeland and to self-determination. This right is to be exercised in the framework of a fully independent national Palestinian state, under the leadership of the PLO in its quality of sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thus

guaranteeing the establishment of a national authority in which all patriotic classes may be represented under a democratic system.

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C. COUNTRIES OF REFUGE

In addition to the occupied territories and to Jordan, a large part of the Palestinian masses are distributed in the surrounding Arab countries and inside the land occupied in 1948. The organization and mobilization of these masses is an essential requirement for the achievement of the highest level in building up the national potential of the Palestinian people against the enemy. It is also an essential requirement for strengthening the unity of the Palestinian people and their national cohesiveness.

The immediate tasks faced by the Palestinian revolution in the Arab countries hosting large concentrations of Palestinians (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, etc) generally consist of:

1. Preserving and bringing out the independent national status of the Palestinian people by building professional, political, cultural, military (the militia) and mass organizations which promote this status and help to defend it.

2. Guaranteeing the Palestinian people's right to pursue their struggle against the Zionist enemy, through their freedom to enroll in the ranks of the Resistance and their freedom to organize, to be armed, and to engage in political, informational and military activities.

3. Defending the rights and pressing interests of the Palestinian masses, at the forefront of which are the right to equal opportunities with other citizens, the right to work on the basis of "equal pay for equal work," the right to travel and to move, and the right to have self-administration in the camps.

4. Strengthening the relations of solidarity and building an alliance of struggle with the Arab national movements in these countries of refuge.

D. THE LAND OCCUPIED IN 1948

In the territory occupied in 1948, the masses of the Palestinian people confront immediate tasks that can be summed up in the following: the preservation of their independent national identity, the defense of their direct democratic and national rights, the battle against Zionist attempts at dilution and absorption, and the struggle against the

measures of eviction, uprooting and land-appropriation. These come in addition to the task of organized participation in the national movement of the Palestinian people and the task of resistance to all policies of Zionist occupation and expansion.

E. THE ISSUES OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE P.L.O.

All the various and distinct tasks of struggle, mentioned above, feed into the unified current of the Palestinian national movement against occupation, Zionism, imperialism, and Hashemite annexation. They all contribute to the restoration and consolidation of the independent national existence of the Palestinian people. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presently constitutes the actual political realization of this independent existence and the unifying framework for the entire Palestinian national movement. The Democratic Front is struggling on all levels to consolidate the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and as the sole expression of its national consensus. The Democratic Front is also struggling: to promote the unity of all the revolutionary and patriotic forces within the framework of the PLO; to democratically reform the political, military, and administrative institutions of the PLO; to strengthen the common front structure of the PLO on the basis of democracy, equality, and unity of the political program of national struggle; and to end unilateral actions, patronage, and domination from one group or another—all this in order that the PLO may become a genuine framework for a united front of national liberation.

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Declaration issued by a meeting of the leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon¹⁴⁷

Beirut, October 4, 1975

Through divine Providence which watches over Lebanon and its sons, the leaders of the religious communities of Lebanon were able to hold the first of their meetings. There were two sessions,

¹⁴⁷ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 5, 1975; English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975)*; *Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 66–68.

the first at Bkerke, in the morning, the second at the Islamic Dar al-Fatwa, in the afternoon.

They studied carefully together the terrible tragedies which overwhelm the country and the dangers which threaten its unity and independence and the welfare of its inhabitants and expose the integrity of the Arab lands and the Palestinian cause to serious menace.

They noted that the tragedies were beginning to take on a more confessional character, that criminal attacks were being perpetrated against the innocent, and that mosques and churches as well as men of religion were objects of attack. All this in the name of religion which, by its very nature, rejects such acts. Hence the very being of Lebanon and the distinctive character of its civilization are being threatened.

After serious scrutiny of the situation, they resolved to carry on with these joint meetings in the centers of other Lebanese religious communities. For this purpose they set up a schedule and formed a follow-up committee. At the end of the first day they published the following declaration:

1. The assembled affirm that God, who is their origin and end, has brought them together, both Muslims and Christians. In His Justice, mercy and grace, they possess what constitutes their unity as long as they conduct themselves in the way of God and live in a spirit of cooperation and mutual compassion, adhering to lofty spiritual values and recognising the dignity of man, in the best interest of Lebanon.

2. They affirm that what has befallen Lebanon in the form of violence and what violence brings in its wake: murder, sniping, kidnapping, robbery, forced exodus, the burning of homes and shops and the desecration of mosques and churches—all are actions which Islam and Christianity condemn.

3. They proclaim their belief that what is most outstanding in Lebanon, the very cause of its existence and distinction is the presence on its soil of a remarkable co-existence, unique in the world. They believe that this distinctive attribute is a deposition in trust which God and the faithful have placed in their hands. For this reason they are committed to this unity and refuse anything which would lead to its rupture. In a very special way, they reject partition in every sense of the word, including the psychological partition which has almost engulfed the country. They believe that

a rupture of this formula is a condemnation of Muslims as well as of Christians. Just as it is very particularly in contradiction with the vocation of Arab Christians so it is harmful for the future of a world which is advancing towards unity.

4. They affirm that security is a vital necessity which cannot for an instant be dispensed with. It is the necessary preliminary for any realization of the desired reforms. For this reason, they demand that the state make utmost use of measures founded on law in view of the maintenance of the integrity of the country and its citizens. In the same way they affirm that for the realization of these reforms the National Committee for Dialogue should remain in permanent session in order to produce results which would be rapid and practical.

5. They warn the Lebanese in general and those living on the territory of Lebanon of the consequences of this state of decline in the country and the calamity which it entails for national unity, for the independence of Lebanon and the integrity of its territory as well as the dangers that spring from it with regard to the Palestinian question and the Arab cause in general.

6. They call the attention of all citizens to the fact that their language in their relations with one another should not be anything but a rational dialogue which will lead to rapid action on the level of political change, contribute to the evolution of Lebanon and its advance in political, social, economic and educational fields, the realisation of justice and equity towards the underprivileged and the regions they inhabit, as well as the realisation of full equality among the citizens in their rights and duties. All this should be set in motion by the enactment of laws, statutes and decrees suitable for such a realisation, within the framework of a clear working plan to which the state will adhere, considering it as one of the tasks which must be given absolute priority.

7. They emphasise their concern for national sovereignty over all Lebanese territory and the reign of law for all. In the same way they affirm their support of the Palestinian cause and the necessity of adhering to the agreements concluded between the Lebanese and our Palestinian brothers.

8. They call for a rational and committed campaign of information, in churches, mosques and other places of worship which would bring to the mind of our citizens the foundation and principles of religion. They urgently request news-

papers and the various information media to conform to these foundations and principles and to avoid all provocation in this critical period, in a spirit of attachment to Lebanon and to the well being of the nation and its citizens.

9. They ask that all those who have suffered loss as a result of events be reimbursed, and that lawful and efficacious means be employed to guarantee this reimbursement.

10. They appeal to all citizens and to educational institutions (mindful of the importance of education and its influence on the stability of nations) to use all the means in their power to educate our children in the spirit of brotherhood, concord and cooperation far from fear and malice, from hatred and lack of mutual confidence.

11. They invite all to return to God from whom they have become estranged by life in a society which ignores the teachings of religion and acts as if it could dispense with God. They ask all believers to turn to God in humble prayer, to ask him to lessen the days of trial and to give us once more the grace of tranquility and peace, to envelop in his grace and pardon the innocent victims and to instill patience and consolation in the hearts of their parents and relatives.

12. At the close of the meeting held in Dar al-Fatwa the religious leaders took the opportunity of offering their good wishes to the heads of the Muslim communities and all Lebanese and Arabs for the feast of al-Fitr, asking God that he make it an occasion of prosperity and peace for all.

The follow-up committee, composed of Imam Musa al-Sadr, Bishop George Khudr, Bishop Nasrallah Safir, and Husain al-Qawatli, General Director for *Ifta* affairs, was charged with bringing this declaration to the presidency of the Republic, the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, the presidency of the Council of Ministers, and the National Committee for Dialogue.

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Sermon of Mufti Khalid of Lebanon regarding the situation in Lebanon (excerpt)¹⁴⁸

Beirut, October 5, 1975

Moreover, Brethren, everyone must realise that this ordeal is purely internal. With God's help and thanks to their ready intelligence and to a serious dialogue, the Lebanese will find a solution.

The crisis has no connection with anyone else far or near, whether they be our brother Arabs or others more distant, and therefore there is no reason to consider bringing the question up before the Arab League or before foreign states within the United Nations. The Palestine Revolution grasped this truth and stood aside, witnessing our pain with still greater pain, binding our wounds while its own bled. Just as Syria also grasped this truth and did not mediate as a consequence, except in answer to the demand and insistence of Lebanon. It thus bore our troubles as well as its own, devoting days and nights to us; it left its heart with us before giving us over to the National Committee for Dialogue.

Lebanon which comes forth today from this trial and its tragedies will surely remember, with deep appreciation and gratitude, the intelligent and noble role of both Syria and the Palestine Resistance and of all those of our brothers who have striven with us, the vanguard confronting Israel.

We know that there are still struggles among Arab states and on the international plane, which pivot on proposals for settlement and liquidation. We call upon God to give unity to the Arabs and guide their leaders on the road of honor to victory over their enemies, that Arab Palestinian rights which have been usurped may be recovered. May he inspire the Arabs to help Lebanon to remain far from those struggles and continue to be able to play its constructive role within Lebanon in the interest of Arabs and Arabism everywhere.

¹⁴⁸ Made on Id al-Fitr celebrating the end of the month of fasting, Ramadan; *al-Hayat* (Beirut), October 5, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 73-74.

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Speech by President Asad of Syria criticizing the Egypt-Israel interim agreement (excerpts)¹⁴⁹

Damascus, October 6, 1975

Here I want to draw attention to two facts: the first is that it was cooperation between Egypt and Syria in recent years that brought about the October war.

The second fact is that the confidence that has existed in recent years, since 1970, between myself and President Anwar Sadat, and the repercussions of this confidence on cooperation between the two regions—this confidence and its repercussions also allowed the October war to be fought.

Regardless of our present situation, it was this confidence that has existed between President Anwar Sadat and myself in recent years that brought about the October war.

There is so much heated argument going on that it is no wonder that people are asking what it is all about.

Why have all these subjects been raised?

Why are they talking about the years before the war? About the preparations for the war? About the ceasefire? About what followed the ceasefire?

It may be necessary to talk about all this, but it should be at the right time and for the right reasons.

Is there now any disagreement on who was responsible for the ceasefire?

Naturally on this occasion I want to thank President Anwar Sadat for speaking about the ceasefire and explaining in his speech how the ceasefire came about and how he decided on the ceasefire.

On this occasion too I have no objection to their publishing in Egypt the secrets about the war that they have divulged, if they think it a good thing.

I have no objection, but I do have one thing to ask. It is that, if they are to publish anything, they should publish both our views and theirs on all problems and issues.

Our present disagreement is not about the ceasefire, or the attitude of the USSR, or how preparations for the war were made or the course of war itself. We disagree only about the Sinai agreement.

Why are we against the Sinai agreement? We have said why in our various statements, and we want answers to the questions we have set out in our various statements.

1. This agreement breaks Arab consensus. This agreement infringes the resolutions of the Arab summits in Algiers and Rabat.¹⁵⁰ It is therefore an infringement of Arab solidarity, which we all insist on, and anyone who departs from the summit conference resolutions, which are the essence of Arab solidarity, also infringes Arab solidarity.

Why this infringement of Arab solidarity? Why this departure from the resolutions of the Rabat and Algiers summits?

2. The agreement allows Israeli goods to pass through the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal is an Egyptian Arab waterway run by Egyptian Arabs: it is not under occupation.

How can we allow Israel to send her goods through an Egyptian Arab canal when she is occupying all Palestine and evicting its inhabitants as in the Golan, Jerusalem, and ninety per cent of Sinai?

This is the question we want answered.

This matter does not concern Syria alone. It concerns Arab Syria, Arab Egypt, Arab Jordan, the Arab Maghreb; it concerns all Arabs in all Arab regions.

Supposing we asked the Americans who made this agreement: Had they been in a state of war with the USSR, with the USSR occupying part of the territory of the United States, would America have allowed Soviet goods to pass through its territory? Certainly not.

I wish our brothers in Egypt would ask the Americans with whom they are on such good terms—I wish they would ask the United States this question, so that our Arab masses could know what the answer of the United States would be.

3. The agreement marks out the way to a solution by using peaceful means only. All international agreements, and universal custom, allow those whose territory has been occupied the right

¹⁴⁹ Made on the second anniversary of the October war; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 7, 1975, pp. 3, 7. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹⁵⁰ Docs. 331–333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

to use all available means to liberate their territory. How can we waive a basic and natural right allowed us by international law and universal custom and by human struggle throughout the course of history, when these agreements and customs are the consequence of man's struggle and sacrifices throughout the course of history.

How can we, and why should we, waive one of our basic natural rights, when we—Egypt—when we, the Arab people of Egypt, the Arab army of Egypt [*sic*], who have made such sacrifices, have struggled so proudly for our homeland, for our nation, for our Arab homeland, for our Arab nation. We in Egypt, the great Egyptian people, have struggled and made sacrifices throughout the course of history, for the Arab nation, and in the struggle have always been aware of the fact of being an integral part of the Arab nation.

This is proved and affirmed by certain passages in the minutes of the Egyptian National Assembly before 1952, which have been published, and many of our brothers here present have doubtless read them.

Why should we waive one of our basic rights?

4. This agreement has no time limit. One of its articles says that it shall remain in force until it is replaced by another agreement. This text is not invalidated by any other clause in the agreement. This agreement remains in force and until it is replaced by another it amounts to an agreement in perpetuity.

5. We in this area, especially since the October war, and our brothers in Egypt in particular, our brothers the Egyptian officials in particular, have always said that we must fight against polarization, and we agree with them. But the opposite of what we have striven for has come about within the framework of the struggle against polarization.

We have stationed the American experts between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and waived the right to get rid of them whenever we want to; according to the agreement these experts can only be withdrawn in one of two cases. The first is that both Egypt and Israel should ask for their withdrawal, the second is that the United States should decide to withdraw them.

This also means that to the Israeli occupation of our territories we have added another occupation, another occupation, especially when we take into account the fact—that is well known to the

Arab nation and as our brothers in Egypt have said—the fact that the United States is not a neutral country, so far at any rate, it has not been a neutral country. But even if it were a neutral country, even if it were a friendly country, could we waive our right to sovereignty over our territory, the right to expel any foreigner from our territory whenever we want?

This is also a basic right. In the agreement Egypt waives the right to have these experts withdrawn, to expel these experts whenever she likes.

Naturally I do not want to touch on every aspect of all the clauses—basic and important aspects which concern us Arabs—but let me point out that the presence of the experts means, among other things, that the Egyptian front is frozen. As long as Egypt does not have the right to expel these experts, they constitute a strong and solid barrier separating the Egyptian army from the Israeli army.

The last thing to be disclosed just recently was those secret documents¹⁵¹ which amount to a major tragedy. How could they agree to them in Egypt, and here we must ask the question: Why did they say that there were no secret documents?

Why did they tell the whole Arab nation that there were no secret documents? The secret documents have been revealed by the American Congress, and what they contain amounts to a tragedy when we think that any Arab should have agreed to the contents of these secret documents.

It is these matters that we disagree about, it is these clauses that we disagree about.

Once again I say: We should make sure that the Arab citizen remains in a position to judge, to decide, to know exactly what the disengagement is about.

As I just said, I am confident and I affirm that the Arab citizen is still in that position, and knows all he should know.

Brothers, the enemy's strategy, as every Arab says, has always been based on splitting our fronts and fragmenting our cause, and it was against this background that the Sinai agreement was concluded. And now, in continuation of this course, and to meet the requirements of this policy, they are trying to isolate the Palestine issue too. Therefore Syria is supposed to have talks with a

¹⁵¹ Docs. 149–152 above.

view to another individual move that will lead to the Palestine issue being isolated. You have heard rumours that Syria is about to negotiate, is about to disengage, or to agree to another disengagement of forces. But we, in the light of the unity of our cause and of the fact that the Palestine issue is the principal issue, we shall never allow Israel's strategy to succeed, we shall never allow anyone to isolate the Palestine cause. For it is our cause; we have fought for it in the past, we fought for it in October, and our struggle in this country revolves around this cause, as does the struggle of the whole Arab nation.

The enemy's strategy is quite clear. Can we allow ourselves to be drawn into the service of that strategy, with the result that our march utterly loses its direction? No, never.

The rumours you are hearing will never come to anything.

In the past when there was a disengagement on the Syrian front, it was a purely military one—any Arab can read the provision at any time, it has been published everywhere.¹⁵² This disengagement was the consequence of a long war that lasted nearly three months, and from a technical point of view it really was a disengagement of military forces.

The present agreement is called a disengagement of forces, but what it contains is political; it means that any agreement we reach with Israel through talks will be a political one.

Here we must call a halt, we must take a firm stand. The road that lies ahead of us is clear. This is the enemy's strategy and it must not succeed. The Palestine cause will never be isolated, the Palestine cause is our cause. We shall have no more talks on disengagement of forces unless the talks cover both the Syrian and Palestinian fronts.

However, we must make everything quite clear for if we leave things like this people will soon be writing that what is meant by these words is that Syria intends to negotiate on the West Bank, or that Jordan, in cooperation with Syria, intends to negotiate on the Palestinian front on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But I say that if there are talks on new moves on the Syrian front, they must be accompanied by similar moves on the Palestinian front, and through the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Of course, brothers, I know in advance that Israel will reject this out of hand and, as has once again been made clear in the secret documents, the US will also reject it, because Israel's basic intention is to obliterate the Palestine cause, and she has so far not recognized the Palestinian people or their rights. On the contrary, everyone can recall that at one time one of their leaders said quite clearly and definitely that the people of Palestine do not exist.

This was the case before the October war. But no one can blame us or ask us, pleading the "importance of peace," to implement Israel's strategy.

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Declaration by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria condemning the Egypt-Israel interim agreement and calling for a united front against Israel (excerpts)¹⁵³

Damascus, October 6, 1975

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Directly after the ceasefire the Baath Party and its revolution in the Syrian Arab Region warned against the dangers involved in individual solutions and settlements to the future of the cause and to the march of Arab struggle in general and the Palestine cause in particular. They drew attention to the perils of slipping into individual or partial solutions on any of the fronts of confrontation with the enemy, however great the geographical or political inducements. This is because a solution that is not based on united action on all fronts and does not take into account the fact that the conflict is an all-Arab one and that the situation must be seen as a whole, deals a mortal blow to the Arab will which was the motive force and the meaning of the October war. It robs that war of all positive significance and thus destroys the Arab solidarity which was created by the war and became the mainstay of the victories won in it. Finally, such a solution infringes all the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in particular the seventh, which affirmed and

¹⁵³ Made on the 2nd anniversary of the October war; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 6, 1975, p. 2. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹⁵² Doc. 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

insisted on a comprehensive solution of the issue.¹⁵⁴ Therefore any Arab country that agrees to such a solution is not only infringing the will of the Arabs; it is withdrawing from the Arab world to live in isolation within its own narrow regional limits.

Masses of our Arab people,

The tide of Arab struggle has been rising steadily and there has been a great upsurge of mass confidence following the victories of the October war. Then, on the first day of last month, while our people were preparing to celebrate the second anniversary of that glorious war, this treasonable agreement was concluded between the Egyptian regime and the enemy. The conclusion of this agreement has stemmed this rising tide and curbed Arab struggle, and thus discredited these celebrations. It has degraded the Arab cause from being a matter of life and death to the status of a dispute over frontiers, thereby robbing Arab struggle of its revolutionary significance and distorting both the struggle itself and the principal axis on which it has been deployed: the Palestine cause and the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The agreement also ignores the fundamentals of this struggle and, what is even graver, condemns the October war of liberation which, as the only and fundamental course of struggle against the enemy, was the most conspicuous landmark in our contemporary struggle against Zionism and American imperialism.

The agreement ignores the most important fact about the Arab-Zionist conflict—that it is a struggle for existence between Arab nationalism and its escalating liberation movement and the ideology of world Zionism and its policy of coercion and aggression. It has turned this struggle into a mere marginal dispute that can be solved through the essence of settler Zionism, which is the imposition of an alien and hybrid entity on our homeland as a *fait accompli*.

Masses of our people,

The Baath Party condemns the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, insisting that both the problem and its solution are indivisible, and rejects all attempts to give the Arab-Zionist conflict new dimensions which are incompatible with the indivisibility of

the territory, the people and the rights which are at issue. Furthermore, in the execution of its national responsibilities, the Baath Party affirms that the battle with the Zionist enemy and the forces of imperialism will continue at all levels as long as the enemy occupies a single inch of Arab territory and as long as he refuses to recognize the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, as established by the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of that people.

The Party therefore calls on the Arab nation and its popular masses to ensure a higher level of solidarity, preparedness and military political and economic mobilization for the confrontation of the enemy, and to provide all the resources that are required to redress the balance of forces which the agreement has upset in the enemy's favour, and to keep the spirit of October alive in the heart of the Arab nation.

In this context what is urgently required, if the strategic requirements of the coming inevitable battle with the enemy are to be met, and if the balance, upset by the retreat and flight of the Egyptian regime, is to be redressed, is that an objective counterweight to compensate for the lost of Egyptian weight and effectiveness in the zone of confrontation should be found, and that all forces in all areas of confrontation in both the Eastern and Western parts of the Arab world should be called on to contribute all their military and financial resources to the first and most important sector in this zone. Moreover, the forces of direct confrontation in Palestine (the PLO), Jordan, Lebanon and Syria must be called on to surmount all their secondary differences and come together in some new form of unity or front so as to reinforce this trend and to augment our resources for the clash with the enemy. This is just as urgent a necessity for all Arab regions and forces in all positions of confrontation.

At the international level it must be stressed that the Arab cause can be promoted by strengthening the front of our friends throughout the world and ensuring that they provide greater material and moral support to that cause, especially as revolutionary Syria today stands on the front line in the confrontation of the Zionist and imperialist tide.

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria analysing the Egypt-Israel interim agreement and the related US undertakings to Israel¹⁵⁵

Damascus, early October, 1975

When Kissinger left the area on his way back to New York after the signing of the Sinai agreement on September 1, he met a number of American Senators and told them that there were secret agreements in addition to the agreement that had been published. The next day an Egyptian denial was published to the effect that there was no secret agreement apart from what had been published. In the course of time the American administration leaked the secret agreements¹⁵⁶ to certain American papers with the following ends in view:

1. To stress that there were secret agreements and that they were linked to the published agreement.

2. The American administration wants to turn the undertakings given under the secret agreements into international agreements. This is why it leaked these agreements and brought the matter up for discussion in Congress, to pave the way for turning an undertaking by the American administration into an undertaking by the American state with the approval of Congress. It was also encouraged to do so by the fact that the legal adviser of the State Department declared in a statement that these undertakings were tantamount to an international agreement. The Legal Committee of Congress also affirmed this. So, as I have said, the aim was to turn the letters addressed to the American administration into international undertakings binding on the American administration.

In fact some of these annexes have been published and some have not, because when he was asked to disclose all the secret agreements the American Secretary of State asked the members of Congress to be satisfied with what had already been published, so as not to embarrass President Sadat in front of the Arabs. It is to be noted that these secret agreements between the Egyptian government and

Israel and America are not the first of their kind. There have been a number of agreements that were not published with the first disengagement agreement. They are as follows:

1. An undertaking by the Egyptian government to open the Suez Canal to shipping.

2. Permission for Israeli cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal. This is the gist of the secret agreement published by Congress, which contains the following words:

The US government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the agreement before Egypt fulfils its undertaking under the January 1974 disengagement agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

3. An undertaking by the Egyptian government to take steps to raise the oil embargo on America.

4. Other political undertakings relative to the Liberation Organization and the political campaign against Israel.

In fact these annexes constitute an American guarantee of the implementation of the Sinai agreement because, firstly, these secret annexes turn the American undertaking to support Israel, mentioned in statements or communiqués, into a legal undertaking by which the United States undertakes a whole series of obligations relative to economic, military and political matters. This refutes the argument of those who thought it would be possible to make a distinction between American and Israeli policy, for these secret annexes link American to Israeli policy, not the opposite. For example, in the economic field, the United States undertakes to provide the following economic aid:

1. Financial aid.

2. Oil, related to oil and energy, including an undertaking to ensure supplies of oil and an undertaking to ensure that the supplies arrive.

3. Aid in building up an oil reserve by building storage tanks capable of meeting Israel's requirements for a year, although the maximum known oil reserve in all countries of the world is for six months only.

There are also military undertakings. The United States has undertaken to meet fully and on a continuous long-term basis Israel's requirements of military war material, arms and equipment, especially extremely complicated strategic armaments, such as Pershing missiles, with a range of 750 kilometers, and F-16 planes, with which

¹⁵⁵ Made to *Tishrin* (Damascus); translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 9, 1975, p. 3. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

¹⁵⁶ Docs. 149-152 above.

the American army has not yet been supplied. The United States has also undertaken to establish a bridge to supply Israel with arms and equipment in case of emergency. The value of American commitments over the next five years totals fifteen billion dollars. This has led certain Congressmen to say that if the United States had to pay this for withdrawal from not more than five per cent of the total area of Sinai, what is it going to have to pay for total withdrawal?

Then there are political undertakings, for the series of undertakings in the secret annexes are in fact a guarantee of Israel's security. For the United States undertakes to consult with Israel in the case of any Egyptian infringement of any article of the agreement and to take corrective action without defining what is to be understood as an infringement; it is sufficient that Israel should allege that some infringement has taken place for the United States to accept it and to be obliged to take some kind of action against Egypt.

On the strength of the secret annexes the United States also undertakes to prevent the Security Council from adopting any resolution that prejudices or modifies the agreement. Thus the United States has undertaken to use the veto to prevent the international community, as represented by the Security Council, intervening to rectify any wrong done to the Arabs. Thus by this agreement the United States is siding with Israel against the international organizations.

The United States has also undertaken not to participate in any action or proposals regarded by Israel as prejudicial to her interests and to take action to impede the efforts of others in this direction. This is a new guarantee undertaken by the United States to ensure the political and economic protection of Israel vis-à-vis any international move to penalize her for not implementing United Nations resolutions.

This agreement makes Israel an indirect member of NATO. By virtue of the annexes the United States undertakes to guarantee the security of Israel against any threats to Israel, if these threats come from a great power, and of course American intervention will inevitably lead to the involvement of NATO which is led by America. Therefore this American commitment confronts the world with the possibility of a world war if Israel's security is endangered. The United States has never before made such an undertaking to the closest

of its allies.

The Egyptian government has no right to intervene in any conflict that breaks out between Israel and any other Arab country. This contradicts the Egyptian government's assertion that should an agreement be signed with the enemy it would insist on a clause providing for the abrogation of the agreement in the event of a conflict arising between Israel and any of the Arab countries.

Of course Egyptian officials may say that this is an American undertaking and that they have nothing to do with it. To this the answer could be that the United States, which was the broker of the agreement and the guarantor of its implementation, interprets the disputed clauses. The publication of these annexes immediately after the agreement was concluded was to stress the link between the agreement and the annexes. In a press conference three weeks ago the American Secretary of State admitted this when he said that Israel would not have signed the agreement with Egypt but for the undertakings to Israel entered into by the American government.¹⁵⁷

This provision invalidates the Egyptian government's commitment under the Joint Arab Defence Treaty and shows that the Egyptian government has withdrawn from the arena of the conflict with the Israeli enemy; this is confirmed in the Sinai agreement.

There is another important point. It is that, under the agreement, the United States is committed to the Israeli view of the rights of the Palestinian people. This is stated in paragraph 13, which says:

"The US government shares the Israeli position that . . . negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement."

This contradicts all the United Nations resolutions, particularly those adopted at its twenty-ninth session last year. It is also incompatible with the claims of certain Egyptian officials as regards alleged undertakings received by them from the American side on recognition of the Liberation Organization and safeguarding the rights of the Palestinian people.

The annexes also give Israel freedom of sea

¹⁵⁷ See transcript Kissinger's September 17 press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIII, 1893 (October 6, 1975), pp. 509 ff.

and air navigation from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Straits of Bab al-Mandab. This confirms the second paragraph of the Sinai agreement which says that the two parties undertake to raise the military blockade of each other. This strategic advantage granted Israel by the annexes and the agreement is incompatible with the sovereign rights of all the coastal states of the Red Sea, in particular the two Yemens, not to mention Morocco. It may well be asked: the Egyptian government may believe that it has the right to do what it likes in Sinai, in as much as that is a purely Egyptian affair, but how can it take action prejudicial to the sovereignty of other Arab states?

The first secret annex makes it clear that the United States, the Egyptian government and Israel have all committed themselves to things related not only to the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict but also to the totality of that conflict. Thus Israel has received two payments under the Sinai agreement. The first has been paid by the Arab nation, in the form of the consequences of the agreement and the annexes. The second has been paid by the American people, in the form of the undertakings in which the American government has become involved. If the Egyptian government does not approve of these annexes, which the American Secretary of State regards as being part of the agreement, as do Israel and Congress, the government of Egypt should lose no time in abrogating the Sinai agreement. Certain Egyptian officials have protested against Israel being supplied with Pershing missiles but what, it may be asked, is this protest worth if it is not accompanied by a tangible reply in the form at least of abrogation of the agreement.

It has been clear since the end of the war that America and Israel have been doing their best to sabotage the consequences of the October war, the most important of which was the change in world public opinion which has made it a force capable of obliging Israel to implement the United Nations resolutions. The Israelis were aware that, were the Geneva conference to be convened in the light of the consequences of the October war, this would lead to Israel being obliged to commit herself to withdrawing from all the occupied Arab territories and to recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people. Hence the American-Israeli manoeuvre to prevent the conference being held in circumstances favourable to the Arabs, while

the United States resorted to its notorious step by step policy to fragment the Arab position step by step and, also step by step, to create a situation favourable to Israel in the military, political and economic fields. This is affirmed by the second annex to the secret agreement, the first paragraph of which says:

"The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the US and Israel."

This passage means that America is committed in advance to the Israeli attitude. It also means that the Geneva conference is to be an Israeli conference.

Here we may ask: Is it now possible that the President of the United States should accept such a conference? And in the light of this provision can the Arabs agree to participate in a conference decided on by the United States and Israel?

In the second paragraph of the annex the United States undertakes not to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization, in confirmation of the Israeli concept of the rights of the Palestinian people contained in the first annex. Is it possible to believe that those who continue to ignore the Palestinian people and their legitimate representatives have any intention of making peace? The United States also sabotages the Geneva conference when, in the second paragraph, it undertakes to take action to ensure that the essential negotiations are held on a bilateral basis outside the framework of the conference. This means in the first place that the conference is rendered meaningless because it no longer has any tasks to perform; it also involves the adoption of the Israeli theory of bilateral negotiations in accordance with which Israel gets what she wants by dealing with the Arab countries one at a time and in isolation. For Israel's strategy in political action is the same as her strategy in war. In war her policy is based on dealing with the fronts one at a time, and she does the same in political action. By adopting this method she has achieved major gains, which are so prominent in the Sinai agreement and its annexes.

In the pursuit of its policy the United States has undertaken to vote against every United Nations initiative to change the terms of reference of the Geneva conference or to amend Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This means that the United States will oppose the develop-

ment that has emerged in the international organizations' and the international community's recognition of the Palestinian identity and of the importance of the position occupied by the Palestinian people in the achievement of peace. In doing this the United States is trying to efface and isolate the Palestine cause and to turn the conflict between Israel and the Arabs from a national conflict into a conflict over frontiers.

From the above it can be concluded that:

1. The Sinai agreement and its annexes have resulted in the Egyptian government withdrawing from the arena of the current conflict with the Zionist enemy and that, by virtue of this agreement and its annexes, the United States has guaranteed that it should withdraw.

2. The Zionist-American alliance, that used to be based on mutual interests, has been turned into an American commitment to a very long-term guarantee of Israel's security and her military and economic requirements and of political support for her. Henceforth it will be quite impossible to maintain that there is any chance of a fundamental change taking place in the American attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. These annexes give Israel huge quantities of extremely complicated arms to make the Arabs feel so submissive that they abandon the very idea of the possibility of using force in the conflict or of employing available economic resources against her.

From time to time the Egyptian authorities have declared that the agreement is a victory for the Arab cause. It may be asked where this victory lies. In the enormous quantities of aid that the United States has undertaken to supply to Israel for so many years? Or in the raising of the blockade imposed on her from the Straits of Gibraltar to Bab al-Mandab? Or in these American undertakings to defend Israel's security, to protect her politically and to subscribe to her ideas on the Palestine issues?

And what relation does the agreement and its secret and published annexes bear to the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences?¹⁵⁸

The Rabat resolutions comprised the following: coordination of Arab action to isolate Israel in

the political, military, economic and all other fields. Is this compatible with what the second paragraph of the agreement says about the undertaking on the military blockade and with what the annexes say about allowing Israel freedom of navigation by sea and in the air from Gibraltar to Bab al-Mandab? Is it in harmony with what the above paragraph says about allowing Israeli cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal? Is it a victory for the Arab cause that the United States should commit itself to supplying Israel with this vast aid?

We always want the Egyptian army to be strong, and I agree with General Gamasi when he says that the Egyptian army is strong and capable of performing its tasks. I am sure that General Gamasi must be saying to the Arabs that the Egyptian army is not in favour of this agreement and that what senior Egyptian officials are saying about Egypt being unable to fight a war and that it has not replaced the armaments it lost is untrue. General Gamasi has wanted the Egyptian army to have its own attitude to this agreement, and I am sure he wants to say: We are in favour of a policy of armed confrontation, we are ready, but it is not up to us. These words cannot be interpreted in any other way, because in view of the strength of the Egyptian army and its readiness to perform such tasks as may be entrusted to it it is impossible to explain the acceptance of the Sinai agreement and its annexes.

Yes, Egypt can abrogate this agreement but only before it is implemented. Once it has been implemented this agreement will be in force by virtue of Article 9 of the agreement which reads:

"This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement."

Thus the Egyptian government has fettered itself and future generations with commitments of the utmost gravity.

In this context it must be pointed out that the Israeli and American legal advisers have drafted the clauses so precisely and clearly and in such a way that there is no room for alternative interpretation and to ensure that specific and unambiguous obligations are imposed on Egypt and specific and unambiguous obligations are imposed on the American people.

¹⁵⁸ Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt analysing the Egypt-Israel interim agreement¹⁵⁹

Cairo, early October 1975

Q. What is Egypt's position regarding US guarantees to Israel?

A. Egypt does not accept in any way that relations between the USA and Israel imply any political or legal position which binds the will of the Arabs. This is an obvious point and well established by international law, because no state is held responsible for any commitments arising from an agreement to which that state was not a party. As for so-called US guarantees to Israel, these are part of the US-Israeli relationship. Egypt has nothing to do with it and knows nothing of its contents. In any case, it rejects its consequences and results and would request the US to bear the consequences of any action that may harm Arab national interests, whether or not such action springs from these guarantees. Egypt does not exclude the possibility of Israeli blackmail against the USA, past, present or future. In my view, the moral of all this is that there is great and palpable reason for more Arab solidarity and unity of ranks. The response to these American guarantees to Israel should take the form of political, practical and material guarantees that other big powers can offer to the Arab countries so that a balance may be created and escalation from one side would not be met by laxity from the other. Laxity in détente does not mean that only the Soviet side would be committed to it so that the gap between Israel and the Arab world, especially the confrontation states, would remain large, despite the existence of treaties of friendship and cordial relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab world and despite the fact that the Soviet Union persists in its principled adherence in support of legitimate Arab rights. In the end, it is clear that these rights can only be recovered either by a peaceful solution based upon clear Arab power vis-à-vis the Israeli side or by resort to force, which must be at least equal, if not superior, to the force that Israel can field against us.

Q. Are there any American commitments to Egypt regarding the achievement of a lasting solution to the problem and recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and how are these goals to be accomplished?

A. If we examine with care the pledges we have received from the United States at the highest levels, we would find that they include the following:

1. A US commitment to work in all seriousness to achieve a new disengagement agreement on the Syrian front.

2. A pledge that Israel will not be the first to launch any attack on Syria.

3. A pledge that the US would actively seek a comprehensive settlement that brings a lasting and just peace, a settlement moreover, which, according to the text of the US pledge, must take into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the region, including the people of Palestine. If we analyse this last pledge, we find that its significance lies in two aspects. First, the USA has for the first time given an official and written pledge concerning a peaceful solution. Second, the text of the pledge means US recognition of the people of Palestine on a footing of equality with the other peoples of the region. This means that even from the American viewpoint, Israel cannot claim for itself a status that it denies to the Palestinian people.

Q. In addition to US pledges to both Israel and Egypt, the campaign mounted by the "rejectionists" against all agreements claims that the new agreement does not include all that was really agreed upon and that there are secret pledges to which Egypt has committed herself.

A. Egypt has not made any secret pledge or commitment. I challenge anyone to produce these mythical pledges and I have already publicized this challenge but no one has yet answered it. The reason is simple: Egypt was not party to any secret pledges or clauses. Egyptian policy as established by President Sadat is based upon presenting the full facts to the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, without our being anyone's clients and without using any double standards so that what is said to the outside world differs from what is said at home for local consumption.

¹⁵⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 11, 1975. The agreement is doc. 148 above.

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Memorandum from the PLO Executive Committee to Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon reaffirming the PLO's concern for the sovereignty of Lebanon¹⁶⁰

Beirut, October 17, 1975

The distressing events that have shaken Lebanon in recent months and exacted so heavy a toll from both Lebanese and Palestinians must be dealt with in the greatest earnestness and responsibility in order to stop the bloodshed, guarantee this country's stability and maintain and strengthen the fraternal relations between Lebanese and Palestinians.

Faced with the present situation, in which the sincere efforts exerted have brought the acts of violence to an end, and given our desire to share in the efforts to uphold the security of this country and of its people, the Palestine Liberation Organization wishes to stress the following points which it regards as being always essential for the maintenance of Lebanese-Palestinian fraternal relations and for ensuring the solutions of the problems that beset them:

1. Our people who have been forced by Zionist occupation and the conspiracies of world imperialism to take refuge outside their homeland and who, for more than a quarter of a century, have resisted all proposals to settle and absorb them are today more determined than ever to return to their homeland and to reject any country as a substitute for the occupied Palestinian homeland.

2. Our people reject any nationality or political identity that may be offered as a substitute for their Palestinian nationality and identity and they reject any attempt to assimilate, incorporate or absorb them in Arab countries. This is especially the case in view of the victories won by the revolution at various military and political levels in Arab and international fields and this attitude applies in particular to those of our people who have been obliged by circumstances to take refuge in Lebanon.

3. We reaffirm our concern for the security, stability, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, for its territorial integrity and the unity of

its people, with all that this involves in the way of the state's right to exercise its authority over all parts of Lebanon.

4. We reaffirm our concern for the agreements concluded between the Lebanese state and the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the formula that governs Lebanese-Palestinian relations and the basis for resolving any problems or complications in which these relations may be involved.

This concern of ours requires that we discuss problems related to Lebanese-Palestinian relations only with the Lebanese state and only within the framework of its legitimate institutions.

This necessarily requires that all parties respect this method of procedure, abide by the principles that govern our joint relations and lose no time in declaring that such is the case.

5. In all circumstances the commitment of all parties to rule out the use of force as a means of dealing with Lebanese-Palestinian relations will ensure an atmosphere favourable to the strengthening of these relations. Such a commitment will also ensure that the energies of our people are directed against the common enemy within the framework of the all-out conflict in which the Arab nation is engaged.

The Palestine Liberation Organization expresses its confidence that the Lebanese people are capable of surmounting the ordeal and the miseries it has brought in its train, and capable of starting afresh in accordance with the principles they themselves deem fitting to ensure their progress, well-being and prosperity. The Palestine Liberation Organization will make every effort in its power to assist in achieving this.

With the greatest esteem and respect and best wishes,

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

¹⁶⁰ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 15, 1975; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), p. 292. The memorandum was presented on October 14, 1975.

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Communiqué issued after an emergency meeting of the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers held to consider the situation in Lebanon and the need for joint Arab action¹⁶¹

Cairo, October 16, 1975

The Council of Arab Foreign Ministers examined the present situation in Lebanon with the greatest concern and observed the need for joint Arab action to help the sister country surmount the crisis and avert the dangers arising from it.

The Council heard the exposés of the Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations and studied Israeli statements threatening aggression against Lebanon.

While thanking the government of the State of Kuwait for calling this meeting, the Council expresses its profound distress at the succession of incidents in Lebanon. It reaffirms total Arab solidarity with her and calls on all parties in Lebanon to exercise wisdom and restraint and to place the spirit of patriotism and nationalism above all other considerations so that the normal state of affairs may be rapidly restored in Lebanon and that her spiritual and human values may once more exert their influence.

The Council affirms the concern of all the Arab countries for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of her territory and people, expressing its appreciation of the efforts Lebanon has always made to support Arab causes and, first and foremost, the cause of Palestine.

The Council supports the measures that the Lebanese government has taken and is indefatigably following up in order to bring the parties together and reconcile viewpoints, with the aim of putting an end to the crisis and restoring permanent peace and stability to Lebanon. The Council also expresses appreciation of the efforts that have been made by the Arab countries to aid and support Lebanon. It calls on them to continue these constructive efforts, collectively and individually, and hopes that each of them will do all in its power to consolidate Lebanon's stability and national unity. The Council calls on the

member states to provide material aid to replace the losses sustained by Lebanon in the recent incidents.

It also affirms that all the Arab states are committed to resisting with all their resources any Israeli attempt to exploit the situation directly or indirectly. It regards any aggression against Lebanon as an aggression against all the Arab states, to be resisted jointly in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Arab Defence Treaty and the Charter of the League.

It was decided that the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers should follow up the development of events in Lebanon and that the Secretary-General should maintain close contact with the Lebanese government in order to keep the member states informed of new developments as they occur and call any Arab meeting at whatever level Lebanon may consider necessary or useful.

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Speech by President Sadat made at the opening of a new session of the National Assembly (excerpt)¹⁶²

Cairo, October 18, 1975

As regards the Arab scene and its complex problems, the foundations of our policy are, here too, clear—clear and constant. This is because our policy is not extemporaneous or temperamental but the result of a profound study of the conditions of the Egyptian people and our Arab nation, of their national struggle and of the contemporary international scene. Our primary objective, which determines all our Arab and international moves, is the liberation of all occupied Arab lands and the restoration of the rights of the people of Palestine in order that they may freely determine their own destiny. In this respect, there are no Arab territories that are less dear to us than our own. Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron and Mount Hermon are no less dear to us than Qantara and Arish. Therefore, our policy is positive and flexible without losing sight of its ultimate objective. We

¹⁶¹ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 17, 1975; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 293. Syria, Libya and the PLO did not attend the meeting.

¹⁶² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1975, p. 3.

shall lose no opportunity to liberate any portion of Arab lands wherever they may be, or to apply pressure for a new Israeli withdrawal. Every sane man knows that complete withdrawal will not take place all at once. The important thing, however, is to keep the pressure up and keep moving and withdrawals will continue to occur. This is what brings practical results, not radio broadcasts. This is our duty and that of every Arab party to the conflict. Hence, when we negotiated the interim agreement¹⁶³ we were not talking about Egypt alone, or else we would have obtained much more. Rather, we had Syria and Palestine in mind also and we obtained guarantees from President Ford, not his own personal word but that of the American government, that a similar agreement would take place on the Syrian front and that a step would be taken towards recognizing the rights of the people of Palestine.

Those who opposed us have often missed their mark. It became clear that we had prepared the road for others to follow. Lately our opponents are saying that there are secret clauses. We challenged them all to prove that we are committed to any secret clause so they are now speaking about American commitments to Israel. Are these the secret clauses binding us? Who can claim that he knows everything that takes place between the USA and Israel? What is obvious is that Israel, since the beginning, has got everything it wants from America without any need for any disengagement. American weapons that were not available to Israel before the war arrived in Israel and on the battlefield in the midst of war. This is a factor that we keep constantly in our calculations. But I take this opportunity to record our anxiety and our objection to any escalation in US arms shipments to Israel. This does not fit the role that America is now playing in the region. Escalation from one side will be met by escalation from our side and the consequent dangers are obvious to all.

My brothers and sisters,

Every improvement in the Arab position over the past two years has been the result of the glorious October war. Since the October war was the first Arab victory against Israel, despite the fact that the decision was taken amidst a mood of total despair, I am surprised when I hear people talk-

ing about it as if it were the ultimate that the Arab nation can do. No, we have not put our weapons aside nor have we signed any final agreement. The efforts we are making, with the help of our Arab brethren, to increase our military strength are known to everyone, because we know that without constantly preparing for war we cannot arrive at a peace which may be termed just.

We know the circumstances of the Palestinian people as well as those of the PLO. I have often warned against the infiltration of the ranks of the Palestinians by other Arab sides as a way of putting pressure on the leadership. A resolution to this effect was adopted at the Rabat conference but was not implemented.¹⁶⁴ Such interference is still affecting the position of the Palestinians, making them lose time and opportunities in a problem which the world has rightly called the "problem of lost opportunities." Nevertheless, our commitment to Palestine remains, despite everything. Indeed, we have based our calculations on the fact that 1976 is the year of Palestine. We have played the major role in canvassing international support for it, and in the entry of the PLO into many international organizations. We shall continue the struggle by use of various means until the Palestinian people have achieved their legitimate aspirations.

I cannot let the present occasion pass without referring to what has happened and is now happening in that sister country that is dear to us: Lebanon. I do not find it either proper or useful to say anything that may sound like interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs. But these events—in addition to threatening the very existence of Lebanon—threaten to plunge the entire region into an unknown future, and unknown conspiracies. A huge gap has opened for Israel to exploit: politically, militarily and in the field of propaganda, especially with the Palestinian presence there. Their responsibilities in Lebanon are not merely Lebanese but also Arab. This is why I would hope that all parties to the conflict there would deal with difficulties and conflicts in a spirit of frankness and rationality. I would hope that they would tackle the problem of needed reforms by a political rather than a military struggle. The disaster in Lebanon may become greater than the

¹⁶³ Doc. 148 above.

¹⁶⁴ Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

Palestinian disaster of 1948. There is still time to quench the fires of civil war, stamp out sabotage and follow the road of political activity in order to develop the affairs of Lebanon according to the wishes of its inhabitants. Our Arab region, including Lebanon, has never practiced anything but religious toleration and has been the birth-place of all religions. The fighting in Lebanon, while it sometimes appears to be sectarian, cannot in essence be so. Lebanon has, for hundreds of years, known sectarian coexistence and intermingling. We want for it only what its founders wanted, namely that it should not be either a base or a point of access for imperialism, but an example of peaceful coexistence among sects and creeds and an Arab window on the world, Arab in form and Arab in heart also. Therefore I would just like to make an appeal which all can understand: Hands off Lebanon.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt explaining his announcement of 1976 as the "year of Palestine" and discussing the situation in Lebanon¹⁶⁵

Cairo, October 19, 1975

Q. Pardon me, Mr. President, but in your speech to the National Assembly,¹⁶⁶ what did you mean by saying that 1976 will be the year of Palestine? What do you expect to happen that year? Will the USA recognize the PLO for instance? Or will a Palestinian government be formed? Or were you merely alluding to the Geneva conference? Do you believe that the holding of the US presidential elections in 1976 will adversely affect the Middle East problem by stagnating it or postponing its solution?

A. This is precisely why my view was based on the need to maintain the initiative and constantly to activate our cause, irrespective of the attitudes of the great powers. Thus, for example, Nixon's resignation in 1974 delayed us one whole year, during which a second agreement was to have taken

place on both the Egyptian as well as Syrian fronts in September or October or at the very latest in November of 1974. But Nixon's resignation changed all this completely. The new president had to take his time to study the situation. Later we met in Salzburg in 1975¹⁶⁷ and he began his work as president. We were delayed one year but we maintained the initiative and the problem did not stagnate. There were continuous contacts between us and the Americans and the Soviets. We began to assess the situation. Should we convene the Geneva conference at once or should we try to accomplish another move on the road to Geneva, as President Ford suggested to me in Salzburg? All these steps were considered, which meant that there was constant activity.

What do I mean when I say that 1976 will be the year of Palestine? There is, unfortunately, an old established Arab defect which I utterly reject. Every Arab leader is called upon to stand behind a microphone and to relate at length his strategies and his moves and should not brand other people simply as traitors, or say that others have forsaken the struggle or that Egypt has left the battle, etc. All of this is said simply and naively as a sort of political blackmail. We should not any longer sink to this level after having reached maturity in October, 1973. The Arabs then reached the age of maturity. Again, playing around with the issue of Arab solidarity is unfortunate. Arab solidarity is not my own exclusive preserve nor is it the preserve of the Baath Party nor of any individual Arab. It is our common preserve and no one side, willingly or otherwise, can arrest or speed up the process of solidarity. We have gone beyond emotional outbursts. We have gone beyond verbal harangues and political outbidding. We waged a war and proved to the whole world that we are the sixth among rising nations.

When I say that 1976 will be the year of Palestine, I mean that the natural progression of events after disengagement agreements with Egypt and on the Golan dictates that we reach the stage of a final settlement. There will be no more steps and no more disengagement agreements. The last such agreement will be one about frontiers, and a final settlement can only take place with Palestinian participation because they are the core of the problem.

¹⁶⁵ Interview granted to *al-Qabas* (Kuwait); translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 23, 1975, p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Doc. 314 above.

¹⁶⁷ See doc. 112 above.

You asked me about American pledges and about President Ford's pledges to me. These are that a final settlement must include the Palestinians on a footing of equality with us as a basic party to the conflict. This is what I mean by saying that 1976 will be the year of Palestine. Tomorrow, of course, you will begin to hear comments. Damascus will egg the Palestinians on, for reasons that the Palestinians themselves, indeed the whole Arab nation, know well. I warned Yasir Arafat about this matter in Riyadh, in the presence of President Boumedienne. I told him that the cause of Palestine was the root of all causes and should rise above all inter-Arab factional disputes. These the Palestinians must not engage in because their cause is far more important. Unfortunately, the Palestinians have fallen under a mandate, even if they themselves do not recognize it as such and make comments upon my remarks and upon the year 1976. In addition, the Soviet Union is annoyed because I did not ask their permission either for the first or the second disengagement agreement. So the Soviets incite the Syrians and Palestinians. We shall witness yet more playacting on the Arab stage as we witnessed before the first disengagement agreement when the Geneva conference convened for the first time and then at the time of the second agreement, before the abortive as well as the successful agreement.

Q. Pardon me, Mr. President, but you alluded to a very important issue when you said that 1976 will be the year of Palestine. If the Palestinians, for reasons that have to do with them only, were not able to take a decision to participate as a basic and independent party in any efforts being made towards a peaceful settlement, what will happen then? Will the Arab lands remain under occupation? Will the efforts for peace come to a halt?

A. As a result of what we won in the October war, the problem must be constantly activated. It must not be allowed to rest at all. There is one commitment which all parties must abide by in making their moves and that is that no final settlement can be achieved without Palestinian participation. Why? Because the Palestine problem is itself the Arab-Israeli conflict. We must continue to move. But as for the final settlement, we must wait until God's decree is fulfilled and our Palestinian brothers reach agreement among themselves and form a provisional government.

Had they listened to my advice there years ago, the whole world would have recognized them by October 6, 1973, and the problem would have taken a different turn. And yet, as a result of October 6, they entered the UN for the first time and the problem of Palestine itself changed from a humanitarian refugee problem to one of liberation and of an Arab land, recognized as such by the entire world as when they entered the UN and when Arafat addressed the world body.

Q. Therefore, one must await the decision of the Palestinians. But how long do we need to wait? Are we prepared to wait even if it takes ten years?

A. I do not believe it will take that long, because our Palestinian brothers must realize that one can no longer afford to lose time over the issue so that it becomes the problem of lost opportunities. I do not believe they will delay that long and I maintain that if the Soviet Union and the Syrian Baath Party were to leave the Palestinians to decide for themselves, they would soon arrive at the appropriate decision.

Q. What did you mean by saying that the disaster in Lebanon may become worse than the Palestinian disaster? Do we conclude that a part of Lebanese territory is in danger of being lost and for whose benefit?

A. When I said that the disaster in Lebanon will be worse than the 1948 Palestine disaster, I meant exactly that. What is happening in Lebanon today is the result of schemes which have surprised all of us. Who is gaining from all this? Who is gaining from the murders, the mutilation, the plunder, the arson? Who is benefitting from it? The problem in Lebanon has two aspects. One has to do with the Lebanese themselves and the other has to do with the Lebanese and the Palestine resistance. While in Riyadh last April and in the presence of both King Khalid and President Asad, I warned of what was happening and said in these very words: "There is fire under the ashes." At that time, the fighting had stopped. I told them that this did not at all mean that the problem had ended, that there was fire under the ashes and that we would face a very grave situation in Lebanon if we did not solve the problem in a radical fashion. I had reached agreement here with Mahmud Riyad that, if our Arab brothers would agree to it, he would go to Lebanon and arrange for President Franjieh to meet with

Yasir Arafat without anyone else taking part. The two of them could then reach final agreement in a manner that would preserve Lebanon's sovereignty and security as well as the security of all other parties and the presence of the Palestine resistance.

When you in Kuwait called for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers, what did Damascus have to say on the subject and what did the Soviet Union tell the Palestinians? It was said that Egypt, the USA and the imperialists had called for that meeting. Syria did not attend, nor did the PLO. They claimed that the issue to be discussed was the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The distortion of truth had gone that far in the Arab world! Unfortunately, many people, and all the parties in Lebanon know better but no one dares to speak the truth. I still maintain that a disaster in Lebanon would be worse than the 1948 Palestinian disaster. Israel, the USA and the Soviet Union will all intervene and God knows who else. As events are developing now, they seem to be going out of our power so that we can no longer exercise any control.

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Memorandum of the PFLP attacking Israel's planned West Bank local elections (excerpt)¹⁶⁸

Mid-October, 1975

III. The plan for autonomous civil administration.

This project was adopted by Shimon Peres, the enemy's minister of defence, when he took up his post, and was advocated by Yigal Allon, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The plan provides for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be granted "autonomous civil administration" in various fields, within the framework of the occupied territories being divided up into regions, to be called "cantons," each canton running most of the affairs of its daily life more or less independently, while the central government of Israel retains overall responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and security.

The occupation authorities think that holding municipal elections is the most effective way of ensuring the implementation of the autonomous administration project and creating an alternative Palestinian identity.

In this context we wish to emphasize the following points:

1. The central point in the plan of the enemy's ministry of defence is the implementation of the autonomous administration project in the occupied areas. This system will gradually be developed into a representative institution with considerable political significance, with a view to the eventual creation of a compliant Palestinian alternative which will cooperate with the enemy to the utmost limits within the perspective and the horizons he desires, as a strategic alternative to the armed resistance movement.

2. The municipal elections, which are to be held in two stages—the first in October and the second in March 1976—are the loophole through which the enemy hopes to arrive at the creation of a subservient Palestinian identity. A new stage, that of the implementation of the enemy's plan, has now started, and will be seen in its true colours now that the treasonable Sinai agreement has been concluded and that an appearance of bogus legality has been given to the steps the enemy intends to take within the framework of his plans to Judaize the occupied areas and to rule them through subservient Palestinian administrations. We believe that it is essential to expose the link between the municipal elections and the capitulationist plan and the imperialist projects for a settlement, for it is a vital part of the plan.

3. The municipal elections to be held in the occupied territory will not be traditional elections held in accordance with the customary liberal formula. This time they will be political elections and will have much more serious consequences for the future of the cause and the struggle of our people both inside and outside the occupied territories; the national forces that have a common interest in foiling the vicious Zionist plan have taken no steps to devise a counterplan to foil it, a plan that should be based on observing the enemy's moves and achievements in this field and, before that, on the awareness and patriotism of our masses in the occupied territory and on a series of energetic information measures designed to deter individuals from cooperating with the

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), October 25, 1975, pp. 6–8.

enemy and to warn them against the consequences of doing so.

4. The occupation authorities have amended the electoral law to allow women to practice their "electoral rights." The idea is to give the impression that suffrage is universal and to make the elections appear democratic and innocent, and thereby to conceal their basic political goal.

5. Our decisive revolutionary attitude is absolute rejection and firm condemnation of both the autonomous administration project and of the municipal elections. These are to be held within the framework of the Zionist occupation, in the context of a political settlement and with a view to implementing the expansionist plan of our enemy. The aim of this plan is to destroy the revolutionary Palestinian identity, to distort the image of armed resistance and to eliminate the Palestinian rifle which is the true and legitimate representative of the struggle of our masses both inside and outside the occupied territories, with the object of obliterating the entity of the Palestinian people and their real representatives.

There can be absolutely no question of accepting the principle of elections being held under Israeli military rule, and to accept the elections at this stage, when capitulationist solutions have reached the point where the Sinai agreement has been concluded, is to accept the occupation and the enemy's project for Arab-Israeli coexistence. This is something our masses can never accept, for nationalists cannot accept half-solutions or bargaining over the future of Palestinian territory and the Palestinian people.

Therefore a revolutionary attitude based on this realistic and objective view of the situation requires the following: There must be an unrelenting and intensified assault on both the autonomous administration project and the municipal elections; all who cooperate with the occupation authorities in either of these projects must be attacked and exposed by all possible means, and all subservient elements who behave in this way must be physically liquidated if they do not withdraw from their position and stop implementing the Zionist schemes directed against our people and our homeland.

Communiqué issued after a meeting of the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution¹⁶⁹

Damascus, October 23, 1975

At the invitation of the National Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, a meeting was held in Damascus on October 22-23, 1975, of the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution to discuss the current events in Lebanon in the context of the overall Arab situation and of the grave and dangerous developments at this stage in the life of the Arab nation. The opening session was attended, in addition to the various parties that make up the front's General Secretariat, by a number of representatives of Arab national and progressive parties invited to Damascus for the occasion. During the sessions held by the Front's Secretariat, the participants reviewed the facts of the situation in Lebanon and noted with grave anxiety the determination of reactionary and imperialist forces to carry through their conspiracy against the nationalist future of that sister Arab state. These isolationist and reactionary forces, basically hostile to Lebanon's Arabism and progress, began their conspiracy in the context of a scheme designed to deal a blow at the Palestinians and the national movement as well as the Arab character of Lebanon and its democratic development. To this end, the isolationist and reactionary forces expended all their energies in plunging Lebanon into a vortex of armed conflict which has so far lasted seven months. These forces, insisting on the pursuit of this policy of liquidation in spite of all the efforts of the national movement and their repeated attempts to facilitate a political and democratic solution of the Lebanese crisis, are now working to bring the crisis to an even more dangerous turning point. They are proposing schemes of partition aimed at creating a small, sectarian and racist state on Lebanon's soil and modelled on Israel. They are not merely satisfied with propagating their schemes of partition but are working every day to impose a sort of Cypriot solution on the country in order to create material facts that serve the interests of the scheme to

¹⁶⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), October 26, 1975, p. 11.

partition the land. The General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution has noted the close link between the events in Lebanon and the schemes against its Arab character, its unity, the future of its people and the Palestinian presence in it on the one hand and developments on the Arab scene which recently became increasingly more ominous following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai agreement¹⁷⁰ and the "step by step" diplomacy on the other. This latter was planned and executed by Kissinger. The revival of isolationist, reactionary and sectarian schemes in Lebanon at this particular point in time is a matter which cannot be divorced from the grave state of instability that afflicts the Arab scene. The conspiratorial forces in Lebanon found that this climate was ideal for escalating their efforts to strike at the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement. This is because the Sinai agreement in effect has frozen the Egyptian front, gravely affected the state of war with the enemy and the Palestine problem which is the basis of the Arab-Zionist conflict, ignored the requirements of the united Arab struggle, and defied the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences regarding the liberation of all occupied Arab lands and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The Sinai agreement, in addition to all its negative consequences, has adversely affected Arab national solidarity in the face of the Zionist onslaught and its US allies and has led to grave instability. The isolationist and reactionary forces thus found the moment opportune to escalate their conspiracies. If this state of instability continues without adopting the required national policies and measures, it would encourage all the enemies of the Arab nation and of all national liberation movements throughout the Arab world. It is also evident that a main objective of the Zionist-US scheme that seeks to exploit Arab differences by prolonging its assault from one phase to the next is to strike at Syria's nationalist stand against schemes that call for surrender. In the light of all these facts, the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution resolves the following:

1. To condemn the isolationist and reactionary move in Lebanon which has been the main cause

of the bloody events in that sister Arab state and to condemn its conspiratorial attack on Lebanon's Arab character, its unity and its progress together with all its Cypriot-like partition schemes as well as the creation of sectarian entities on Lebanese soil.

2. To support the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in the face of all dangers and to support the Lebanese national movement which is struggling with all its energies to protect the Palestine revolution.

3. To call upon all the Arab peoples, governments, institutions and parties to express their total solidarity with the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese national movement and to actualize this by furnishing effective material aid as well as political and practical help by organizing mass demonstrations and meetings and campaigns of support in the Arab countries under the banner of solidarity with the Palestinian people in Lebanon and with the struggle of the Lebanese national movement.

4. To urge upon all political forces, rulers and officials in Lebanon the necessity of arriving at a democratic solution founded upon justice and equality and representing a radical political solution to the current crisis.

5. To call upon all Arab peoples and states to put aside their secondary, party and regional differences and to suppress all unimportant conflicts for the sake of a united front against the Zionist-US conspiracy against the Arab nation.

6. To confront the negative consequences of the Sinai agreement and condemn the secret agreements attached thereto, especially those concluded between Israel and the USA¹⁷¹; to affirm our belief that the Egyptian people and army will remain faithful to its national commitment and its place in the Arab struggle and future destiny; to call upon all national forces and regimes to shoulder seriously the responsibilities of a total national battle in a manner that would restore all occupied Arab lands unconditionally and recover the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to return to their homeland and to determine their national political destiny on the whole of their national territory.

7. To call for a popular Arab congress representing the movement of the Arab masses together

¹⁷⁰ Doc. 148 above.

¹⁷¹ Docs. 149-150 above.

with political and social forces in order to reassess Arab policy on the national level in the light of new circumstances and to debate the general Arab situation and what is required to confront the US-Zionist attack upon the Arab world, in the framework of an overall strategy of struggle which would frustrate this attack and all its projects and schemes.

The General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution extends its thanks to the national command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party for affording the opportunity for this meeting in Damascus. It greatly appreciates the efforts expended for its success. It welcomes the policy of the sister Arab state and appreciates its sincere efforts to help the struggling people of Lebanon to overcome the present crisis, for the sake of Lebanon's security and popular and territorial unity, and appreciates its constant support for the Palestine revolution. It salutes Syria's steadfast resistance to US schemes and projects and calls for support for this policy in various ways, based upon the objectives of the Arab national struggle for liberation and the return to Palestine.

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Statement by President Bakr of Iraq warning against attempts to split Arab national unity¹⁷²

Baghdad, October 29, 1975

When we reject the solutions now being proposed for the Palestine problem, which are based on resolutions 242 and 338, it is not because we are unrealistic or because we do not believe in peace or in peaceful solutions; it is because we are realistic and we want peace.

We believe that to be truly realistic is to believe in peoples' capacity for liberation and progress however great the resources of the colonialists and the aggressors. We believe that peace can never be genuine and firmly established unless

it is built on justice and unless all rights are restored to all concerned.

In July we called for the establishment of a northern front of ourselves and Syria and suggested that Iraqi armed forces should be stationed in Syrian territory, on condition that the Syrian government unambiguously declared its rejection of resolutions 242 and 338 and pursued the course of struggle which regards the occupied Syrian territory in the Golan as part of a whole and its liberation as a step along the road to the liberation of Palestine and all the usurped Arab territories.

We hereby reaffirm this programme and call on the parties concerned to adhere to it in letter and in spirit. In doing this we have no intention, as we have so often stressed, of embarrassing anyone or of proposing impossible solutions. Our proposal is based on the fact that the experiences of the Arab nation since the last Zionist aggression in 1967 have provided tangible proof that following the course of the so-called peaceful settlement, based on the above resolutions, can only lead, as it has in fact led, to the restoration of imperialist influence in the area, to the strengthening of the forces of reaction and to the predominance of tendencies to indifference and capitulation. In our view if these consequences are to be properly resisted it is no good resisting the branch and not the root, or criticizing the results without radical examination of the causes.

Therefore we are being realistic and acting in the light of experience when we affirm that any formula for national action that cannot be clearly seen by the Arab masses to be really based on rejection of the said resolutions cannot achieve any significant results in resisting the imperialist-Zionist plan and the theory and practice of back-sliding elements.

While cordially welcoming any serious initiative in this direction we warn that any partial or specious initiative taken for temporary or tactical purposes can never achieve any serious national objective. We therefore cannot accept it and if it is taken we shall reveal all its implications to the masses.

We also emphatically warn that the efforts made by some quarters in their endeavour to escape from awkward situations may well result in their drifting into tactics that have nothing to do with the national strategy, which must be based

¹⁷² Made in a speech delivered on President Bakr's behalf by Izzat Mustafa, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, at a rally to celebrate the 1100th anniversary of the philosopher al-Farabi; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 30, 1975, p. 7.

on the unity of nationalist Arab forces and on long-term armed struggle in a variety of forms to defeat imperialist-Zionist aggression.

This nation has had sufficient experience with failure in the last eight years since the June 1967 aggression. The whole of Palestine and the greater part of Sinai and the Golan are still under Zionist occupation. It has seen enough of the tactical moves and political manoeuvres arising from the pressure of temporary circumstances. And what has made matters worse is that, instead of the available time being used to advance along the road towards the liberation of the occupied territories, the imperialist-Zionist forces and the forces of Arab backsliding are trying to split the Arab front and to exhaust its forces. The destruction and barbarous massacres that are now taking place in Lebanon are among the consequences of suspect solutions and imperialist schemes.

World Zionism, which established its entity in Palestine on a confessional fascist basis, is now trying by all ways and means to destroy the national unity of Lebanon and to préjudice the democratic course proposed by the Arabs for the solution of the Palestine problem and to reduce the support the Arabs and the cause of Palestine in particular have won in international public opinion, especially in Western Europe.

Imperialism and Zionism and their local agents are trying to maintain that the events in Lebanon show it is impossible for Muslim and Christian Arabs to live together, to justify the continued existence of the confessional fascist Zionist entity. We warn against this evil scheme which is clearly linked to and is one of the consequences of the so-called peaceful settlements.

We emphatically warn against this scheme and declare to the world that what is happening in Lebanon is a conspiracy that has been concocted in the Arab homeland. Since ancient times confessions and religions have coexisted fraternally and peaceably and this can continue if the Arabs succeed in defeating these imperialist-Zionist schemes and following the sound course of struggle we have referred to.

Responsible forces in the Arab homeland must today take a historic stand, a stand worthy of this nation and its mighty heritage. They must conduct an earnest and honest reappraisal of the mistaken policies that have been pursued in the past.

We are confident that if we do this we shall have set our feet in the right path and that we shall achieve the legitimate goals we seek, however long it takes and however great the effort and sacrifice required.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt made before the UN General Assembly (excerpt)¹⁷³

New York, October 29, 1975

There is also, no doubt, the factor of how much or how far any of those parties may be willing to co-operate with us in solving our problems, foremost among which is the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the rights of the Palestinian people in particular. We also see in this a yardstick of their friendship and understanding, and for the establishment of the mutuality of interests. For our cause is a just one and we are asking only for our rights.

As for the situation in the Arab world and its complex problems, the bases of our policy here again are clear and continuous. They are not the result of emotional reaction or improvisation, but rather the outcome of a profound study of the circumstances of the Egyptian people, as well as the Arab nation, of our national struggle and the present-day world realities. Our first objective, which influences all our Arab or international actions, is the liberation of all occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people so that they can exercise their responsibility and their right to self-determination. In this respect we do not hold any part of Arab territory to be less dear to us than occupied Egyptian territory. Jerusalem, Nablus, Al-Khalil, Jebel El-Sheikh, Ghaza are no less dear to me than Egyptian Kantara or Al-Arish. With this understanding, our policy, therefore is a positive one, as well as a flexible one, but one which holds the final objective to be unchangeable. Therefore, our policy is not to let go of any opportunity to

¹⁷³ Made in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, UN doc. A/PV. 2388.

liberate any part of Arab territory wherever it may be.

You will remember that last March 1975 Egypt reacted positively to the United States efforts towards reaching a second disengagement agreement, which would strengthen the cease-fire and lessen the risks of a conflagration in the region. Those efforts were, however, thwarted because of Israel's intransigence and its inability to accept the challenges of peace.

Notwithstanding this, Egypt did not lose its enthusiasm for peace nor its belief in it. For us, peace is a strategic objective, a genuine commitment. Therefore, I subsequently took the decision to reopen the Suez Canal as an expression of our peaceful intentions, and of our keenness to facilitate international trade and commerce, and to alleviate the difficulties of many of our friends. We also proceeded to reconstruct a major part of the Suez Canal cities, destroyed by the Israeli aggression, and to repatriate, to those reconstructed areas, the inhabitants who had left them out of fear for their security.

Closely related to the above, I find no hesitation or difficulty. As a matter of fact we in Egypt and in the Arab world are committed to tell you frankly and realistically that present-day circumstances in our region provide a unique opportunity for peace which has never presented itself since the beginning of this Middle East conflict. Therefore, it is your duty, even your primary responsibility, not to miss this opportunity, through the United Nations and the different forums related to it, such as the Geneva Conference, with a view to pushing matters towards a peaceful settlement and capitalizing upon what I have already termed a march towards a just peace. Otherwise there will be no alternative for safeguarding our sacred rights, either in relation to liberation of the occupied territories or in relation to regaining the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent State—no alternative but the resort to the other means approved by the Charter of the United Nations itself.

Therefore, I find it incumbent upon me to speak to you frankly, and in the same spirit which you found in me when I took the decisions for peace. As you are aware, I took a historic decision to begin the battle on 6 October 1973. It was not a decision to wage war for the sake of war, but the objective was to blaze the trail towards peace

anew, so that the world should be made aware that the Arab nation could never accept an occupation or even accept the curbing of the Palestinian people's rights or their deprivation of those rights. It was imperative, therefore, to take this historic decision so that events should resume their normal course and the wheel should begin to turn towards peace.

You know very well that for seven long years Egypt had resorted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council and had undertaken intensive direct diplomatic contacts and won many resolutions in complete support of the Arab rights. All this, however, still lacked the spark which your resolutions needed in order to enter into the implementation stage. Nevertheless, I should like to reiterate our full commitment to proceed according to the provisions of the Charter, after consultations with you and with your support towards a just and lasting peace. When I advocate the foregoing and invite you to understand this reality, I need not repeat that the latest move in the Middle East is only limited in scope and effect. It is not an intrinsic solution, it was never intended to be. It is merely a move envisaging the establishment of a proper climate for making progress and for the complete and fundamental review of the problem either with regard to the recuperation of the occupied territories or with regard to regaining the Palestinians' rights.

With this understanding, I hope you will remember this frank discussion with you today, and that what is requested of you, you who represent the international community in the full sense of the word, is that you should not miss this opportunity without assiduously and seriously trying to reach a comprehensive and just solution of all those problems. Thus, you can put on record that after 28 years of United Nations continuous preoccupation with the Palestinian people's problem, the United Nations was able to apply the principles and the provisions of the Charter in relation to the rights of the peoples to self-determination, as well as the respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Member States and the inviolability of their territories; and that it was possible to repel the aggressor and deter aggression, as well as to re-establish the constructive authority of the United Nations, to implement the law, the Charter which you have accepted as a beacon light for international relations.

Consequently, I have no doubt that you agree with me that there will be no peace in the region without a political settlement of the Palestine problem. It is inconceivable—nay, utterly unacceptable—that the Palestinian people should remain homeless and dispersed. They must regain their entity and establish their independent State so that this ancient people could contribute constructively to the development and progress of our international community.

All this reminds me anew, as I am drawing near the end of my statement, that on 16 October 1973 and even while our armed forces had the upper hand—after having overcome the largest natural barrier and destroyed the strongest man-made military fortifications, such as the Bar Lev line—I called for the convening of a peace conference.¹⁷⁴ I had never at any moment forgotten the cause of peace. This is my nature. However, if our people and the Arab nation were to find that this peace was being misinterpreted as capitulation, it would then be imperative to perform our sacred duty to liberate our territories and to restore our just rights by the means stipulated in your Charter, especially in Article 51.

I believe you were not surprised, therefore, when you found that Egypt was one of the first parties to welcome the Geneva Peace Conference. Egypt participated in that Conference even before the completion of its preparations in such a way as to safeguard the realization of its objectives.

Now that disengagement has been realized on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, and there is a second disengagement on the Egyptian front, and an expectation that that will be followed by another disengagement on the Syrian front—and we should have preferred, and still prefer, that there should have been a disengagement also on the Palestinian front; in the light of all the foregoing, I believe that it is high time and even imperative that the Geneva Conference should resume its meetings, with the participation of all the parties concerned in the Palestinian question.

Consequently, I hereby officially request both the Secretary-General and the two super-Powers—the Soviet Union and the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Conference—to begin immediately their consultations with all the interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization,

so that the Geneva Conference can be resumed in the very near future and that its meetings should continue uninterruptedly to deal with the whole problem in all its aspects in order to reach a just and lasting peace.

As you know, I could have addressed my request directly to the Secretary-General and the two super-Powers, but I address my request officially from this rostrum because I am fully convinced that there is no separation between Geneva and the United Nations but that, rather, there is a close organic link between the two. For, beside the fact that this Organization has been, and still is, dealing with the Palestine question for 28 years, any outcome of the Geneva Conference will be the result of your efforts, either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. Furthermore, you will have to approve and guarantee it according to the provisions of the Charter. The United Nations, therefore, is the source and the origin. Hence it is inevitable that we should resort to you if the Geneva Conference should fail or meet with obstructions.

Therefore, you should closely follow the proceedings at Geneva, and the Security Council and the General Assembly should shoulder their responsibilities either in relation to the momentum towards peace or with regard to the clear expression of your commitment to the Charter and its provisions. Other expressions of your responsibility are the constant participation of the United Nations through the Secretary-General or his representatives, or through the United Nations forces or through international guarantees of the peaceful settlement. All of the foregoing is indivisible; it emanates from you and reverts to you.

In connexion with the aforementioned official request to convene the Geneva Conference, I invite the General Assembly at this thirtieth session to take an effective step on the road towards a just peace by adopting a resolution on the necessity for the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization—the legitimate representative of the Palestine people—at the Geneva Peace Conference on an equal footing with the other parties participating in it. Accordingly, I have instructed the Egyptian delegation to present a draft resolution along these lines, in co-operation with all States which share our view that the key to the solution of the Middle East problem lies in a just solution of the Palestine question. It is

¹⁷⁴ Doc. 292 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

inconceivable that the Geneva Conference will succeed or make any progress towards peace without the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people, already recognized as such by the Arab nation at the highest level. I consider this to be in absolute conformity with and a logical sequence to your resolution 3237 (XXIX), which you adopted on 22 November of last year, inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly as an observer.

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Press conference statements by General Secretary Muhsin of Saiqa linking the crisis in Lebanon to the Egypt-Israel interim agreement and reviewing the Palestinian role in the fighting¹⁷⁵

Early November, 1975

Q. Is there a direct link between the incidents in Lebanon and the Sinai agreement?

A. What is happening in Lebanon is closely and directly linked to what is happening in Sinai: there can be no doubt that, but for the Sinai agreement, the situation would not have exploded in Lebanon. The proof is that the incidents in Lebanon certainly started to escalate with the stepping up of Kissinger's visits to the Middle East. The intention was that the incidents should act as cover for the agreement, and so that the Arab and Palestinian masses should be unable to express their rejection of the agreement. They were also intended to distract the attention of Syria and the PLO from the steps that were being taken towards the conclusion of the Sinai agreement.

Furthermore, there are local fascist forces in Lebanon who believed that the signing of the agreement was their chance to win a victory over the Palestine revolution and the progressive and nationalist forces, and to achieve gains at their expense. They believed that the explosion of the quarrel between Egypt and Syria had placed Syria in an awkward situation. Thus the reactionary and fascist forces in Lebanon felt that Syria

was, for the time being, unable to intervene and support the forces friendly to her in Lebanon.

Q. Have the forces of the Palestine revolution taken part in the fighting in Lebanon in any way?

A. In fact the clashes that have taken place in the last few months have been mainly between Lebanese forces—the progressive forces confronting reactionary forces and the nationalist forces confronting the subservient forces. And sometimes there have been clashes of a confessional nature.

Of course one of the parties has close relations with the resistance, and there is complete sympathy between the revolution and the nationalist party, while there is hostility between the revolution and the reactionary and subservient forces. No sections of the revolution have taken part in these clashes, nor have they thrown their main strength into these engagements. This does not mean, however, that they have not given some assistance to their supporters when they have been defending themselves against attacks.

Q. Do you think that the resistance can rely on Syria's help, should the Lebanese army or any outside force attack the revolution?

A. I have several reasons for believing that the Syrian army will not intervene:

1. The resistance in Lebanon is capable of defending itself. So far it has not mobilized all its forces against the Phalangist Party, which knows that if we did we could stop the fighting in our favour in a matter of hours.

The problem is that we do not want to make the situation explode; we always prefer that all parties should keep their morale, as this makes it easier to reach a political solution acceptable to all. On the other hand, we fear that if the situation exploded this would be of service to the plans of those who advocate partition and the plans of Israel, which is calling for the creation of independent religious entities in the area.

2. We are confident that Syria cannot allow any force to liquidate the resistance or the Palestinian presence, for she is entirely committed to us—in addition to material and moral commitment there is a legal commitment because of the political and military unity between the Palestine resistance and the revolution in Syria. Therefore I do not believe that the Lebanese army can attack the resistance and try to liquidate it, although there

¹⁷⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Talai* (Damascus), November 4, 1975, p. 4.

are certain quarters that would like to push the Lebanese army into such a situation. But it will certainly not be easy to involve the Lebanese army in this game, and we on our part are trying to make it impossible for these quarters to do this by making sure that elements of the revolution do not come into conflict with the Lebanese army.

The battle now is one of real confrontation between the Israeli-Egyptian-American scheme that is being implemented in the Lebanese arena and the Arab nationalist forces. Ostensibly the fighting is between different confessional groups, but in fact the conflict has a political content that transcends the frontiers of Lebanon, and our enemies have induced the fascist groups in Lebanon to spark off the fighting so as to put us on the defensive, instead of being on the offensive against America and the agreement.

The firm attitude of Syria in particular, and the endurance of the nationalist forces in Lebanon, have helped us to confront the scheme successfully. Sadat and Kissinger are hard pressed and afraid that if Syria maintains this attitude and the Palestinians continue to hold out, their schemes will fail completely.

This means that all parties, and Israel and America in particular, must recognize the identity of the Palestinian people, their national rights, and the PLO as their legitimate representative.

Without such recognition there can be no peace and no solution of the problem in the Arab area.

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Speech by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi made before the UN General Assembly (excerpt)¹⁷⁶

New York, November 3, 1975

Last year we returned to our people in exile and in occupied Palestine with a sense of optimism. We were encouraged by a perceptible change in the position of the United Nations regarding the

Palestine question. The Assembly's warm and friendly reception of our delegation, led by Chairman Yasser Arafat, the great interest expressed by the majority of the delegations in the course of the debate on the Palestine question,¹⁷⁷ and the earnest desire of Member States to reach a just solution guaranteeing the national rights of our people and establishing an enduring peace in the region—all these factors heartened us and enhanced our hopes for a brighter and a better future.

General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 reaffirmed the national rights of our people in Palestine, including their right to return to their homes and property, their right to self-determination without external interference and their right to independence and sovereignty. That was followed by resolution 3237 (XXIX), according us full observer status at the United Nations. Both resolutions recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Moreover, they recognized that the Palestinian people is a party that cannot be ignored in finding a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They recognized the right of our people to restore their rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. These two resolutions demonstrated that the United Nations had understanding for the Palestinian cause, and they embodied a firm stand that avoided any misinterpretation of the root causes of the war in the Middle East. They were an answer to all the imperialist and Zionist efforts to thwart the recognition of our people and their rights and to the desperate attempts to ignore the root of the Middle East crisis—that is, the Palestinian cause.

With optimism and hope we returned, supported by the great majority of the Member States of the United Nations—friendly States which strove with us to widen the substance of the two resolutions. They have opened before us new horizons which have allowed for the consolidation of our international status, the broadening of the international recognition accorded to us, and the expansion of the support for our cause.

Every international conference that has been convened since last year's General Assembly session has reaffirmed its support for our people

¹⁷⁶ Made in Arabic during the debate on the question of Palestine; excerpted from the English translation, UN doc. A/PV. 2390, pp. 8–31.

¹⁷⁷ For excerpts of the debate see docs. 9–19 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

and their national struggle, while at the same time condemning the position of our Zionist enemy and its imperialist ally, the United States.

For its part, the Palestine Liberation Organization has actively participated in all the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, contributing positively to the activities of these conferences and specialized agencies, in accordance with its belief in international co-operation and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and in application of the Declaration of Human Rights.

In that connexion we should like to make special reference to some changes that have started to take place, albeit slowly, in European policies vis-à-vis the Palestine question. Slowly but surely some European countries have begun to take into account the legitimate national aspirations of the Palestinian people to establish their independent national authority and to solve the problems resulting from their dispersion and exile. We should like to make particular mention of France's leading role in this sphere. France has truly set an example for other European States to follow in its pursuit of a more objective and just policy.

With optimism and hope we returned to our struggling people—struggling and standing firm—bearing for the first time an international resolution embodying the principles of a solution which guarantees peace and justice simultaneously. After a long political struggle, we have not yet been able to combine these two elements, peace and justice; yet one cannot exist without the other.

Unfortunately, the joint forces of repression, imperialism and Zionism and those who have collaborated with those forces, using all the means of manipulation and terrorism, have collaborated to shake this international solidarity. Jointly they have challenged the international will and waged their ruthless campaign, planning and scheming in the hope of restoring the initiative to their own hands. In order to regain their power to dictate a solution, they have defied all principles and ignored all facts and resolutions, in the hope of obstructing the unrelenting struggle of our people. All this they have done at a time when the majority of the Member States of this Assembly and all the peoples of the world have expressed support for our struggle and recognized the legitimacy of our rights.

It is indeed tragic when a super-Power like the United States of America, possessing enormous

resources of information and intelligence gathering, continues to insist on ignoring the essence of the crisis in the Middle East. Moreover, the United States is unreservedly committed to pursuing the policy drawn up by Israel to fragment the issue and score false victories through deceit and dissension. The United States has continued to seek distorted solutions, deluging Israel with more arms and drowning the region in further problems and complications.

We declare once more to this Assembly that there can be no peace in the region without justice and no justice without the full recognition and ultimate attainment of the national rights of our people. We declare also that no international conference has the right to discuss the Palestine problem in isolation from the Palestine Liberation Organization or in its absence; for the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Similarly, we declare that we reject any resolution which ignores the inalienable rights of our people. We declare that we refuse to participate in any conference whose frame of reference is based upon such an unacceptable resolution. We welcome, at the same time, any international effort which takes United Nations General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) as its basis.

In the light of our experience since 1948 we reject all attempts which seek partial solutions to our problem. Whether they emanate from this Assembly or from outside it, we repudiate these fragmentary approaches to what has come to be wrongly called the Middle East crisis and what we rightly call the Palestine question. We wish to emphasize our denunciation of all measures which ignore the totality and indivisibility of the Palestine question—such as a disengagement of forces here, a partial solution there, a stage-by-stage settlement on this front or that, the discussion of the problem of Jerusalem, the review of the fate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the West Bank, the Gaza strip. To treat these as separate items, as subjects unrelated to one another, will only lead to further complications, inevitably precipitating tensions and causing war in the area, as the experience from 1948 to this very day has shown.

Had the United States attitude to the Palestine cause and the Middle East crisis been expressed

in a more political effort or based on a point of view emanating from a special concept of policy makers in the United States, the crisis, although very great, would have been contained within the framework of right and wrong and would have been in line with American political efforts. But the danger is that the United States Government is trying with all the capacity of a super-Power to impose its views by force, mobilizing for their implementation all its political, economic and military influence and adding to this the other efforts carried out by behind-the-scenes forces such as manoeuvres, plots, tensions and disturbances.

The recent tension in our part of the world and the resulting bloodshed in Lebanon are tragic examples of the consequences of United States policy in the Middle East. While it pretends to advocate peace in the area, the United States actually serves the Zionist policy of aggression by sustaining the Israeli entity through the infusion of billions of dollars and sophisticated military equipment; these gifts given free to Israel enable Israel to impose its racist policy on the whole area.

However, all this does not mean that the United States policy in the area founded on the use of force is the policy that will achieve success or that is fated to survive. Our Palestinian people who successfully overcame the manoeuvres of the past will by their heroic struggle, and with international solidarity, meet the challenges of the present and the future.

The events taking place in Lebanon test the credibility of our strategic slogan and vision, our vision for the establishment of a democratic non-sectarian State with a unified society. The enemies of our revolution, both inside and outside our area, are under the illusion that they can undermine our Palestinian presence in Lebanon—a presence caused by Zionist usurpation of our homeland and imposed upon us by the conditions of exile. Our enemies tried to destroy us by drawing us into a fight which would preclude our combating the step-by-step policy. However, this painful experience has strengthened the bonds uniting our people with the Lebanese people. Today in Lebanon secularism is overcoming confessionism. This is most cogently evidenced by the statement of the confessional leaders, who exposed and rejected the schemes to divide Lebanon, and declared their unwavering adherence

to the principle of democratic life within the framework of equality, fraternity and national unity.

The step-by-step policy inspired by the United States is bound to backfire, just as the Zionist and imperialist policies in Lebanon have backfired. The proposals of the United States cannot but end in failure, for they are designed not to promote world peace and enhance global security, but rather to mask the intensification of the conflict and create an illusion which will disguise the tensions and create conditions for the outbreak of war in the area.

We seize this opportunity to emphasize, in the name of our people and in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization, our deep and complete concern for the independence, sovereignty and unity of brotherly Lebanon. We wish to reiterate with absolute clarity that our struggle, the struggle of the Palestinian people, is for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a democratic State in our sacred territory—our national territory. We will never accept a homeland other than Palestine.

It is significant to note the anxieties of the people of the United States themselves—the American people—with regard to Mr. Kissinger's policy in the Middle East. More than one responsible politician and commentator in the United States has reasonably questioned whether what Kissinger calls a "step-by-step policy" can actually lead towards peace.

They have been joined by other voices heard throughout the world asking this question: If Mr. Kissinger needed the October War, followed by two years of negotiations supplemented by billions of dollars and then enormous quantities of sophisticated weaponry—if Mr. Kissinger needed all this time and all this money—merely to achieve a partial withdrawal encompassing no more than 13 per cent of the Sinai peninsula, then how much more will he require in the way of time, money, weapons and wars to accomplish the total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories? We need not ask what his policy would require to deal with the essence, the very core, of the question, namely, the national inalienable rights of the people of Palestine.

The least that can be said of Kissinger's policy is that it lacks credibility. Beyond this, the falsehood of its stated aims was clearly revealed in the publication of some of the secret under-

takings attached to the Sinai Agreement, some of which have been revealed while others are still secret. Those commitments made by the United States vis-à-vis Israel are a definite affront to the resolutions of the United Nations which uphold the rights of the Palestinian people, its right to self-determination and independence and which recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

If anyone can find another explanation of the organic and total link between Washington's policy and that of Tel Aviv, we should like to hear it. The United States commitment to Israel not to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization is unassailable evidence that despite all the wars in the Arab region and despite the danger of renewal and escalation of war, the United States and Israel persevere in their policy of oppression, aggression, usurpation and denying the Palestinian people their basic national and human rights.

The United States of America and its forward base in our area, Israel, are determined to let the olive branch which we held in our hands last year when we came here to the General Assembly fall. As their collusion continues we can only state, proudly and confidently, that our revolt against that collusion will continue. We hold our freedom-fighter's gun and will carry on our struggle until justice and victory are won. Only then will peace prevail.

Our people's history is crowded with bitter memories. Every day, every week, every month, every year, we commemorate a conspiracy or a crime against our patient and struggling peoples.

Invariably we have been the victim and Zionism the victimizer. Whatever Zionism failed to accomplish alone, it achieved in collaboration with imperialism.

The second of November 1917 is chronicled as one of our saddest days, for on that day, the historic unholy alliance, the suspect alliance, between Zionism and imperialism was forged. On that day, Balfour day, a promise was given by those who did not own the land to those who had no right to it.

All here are familiar with that doomed promise, that permanent shameful blot on the history of mankind; therefore we shall not dwell on its origins or details. We wish only to refer to the fact that this bleak date has been struck from our Pal-

estinian calendar and replaced by the day on which 70 friendly States, States which respect the United Nations and its principles, stood together boldly to condemn Zionism as an oppressive, racist, backward and dangerous ideology. Fifty-eight years had to elapse before it could be proved that justice prevails. This condemnation confirmed that the democratic State in Palestine is the only true vision.

The bold and glorious stand you have taken condemning the ideal of conquest and racial discrimination cannot be considered a victory for the people of Palestine alone, but rather as a victory for all the democratic and peace-loving forces in the world. We have always been aware of the dimensions of the Zionist ideology. We feel that in the course of our struggle for our liberation we have contributed positively and effectively to the liberation of all peoples enduring Zionist domination and subject to the pressures and manipulation of its instruments and agencies. This has been one of our motive forces. Thus we advance the liberation of the Jewish individual whose suffering Zionism has continuously exploited to justify its more aggressive, dangerous and racist plans, which menace society and retard the freedom of all peoples.

It is no wonder that the former Chief of Israeli Intelligence and present Ambassador of the Zionist entity to the United Nations stood before you resorting to threat and deceit in a hopeless attempt to respond to the draft resolution condemning Zionism. He accused the draft resolution of being anti-Semitic and threatened its supporters by saying that Israel would never forget that those who voted in favour were voting against the Jewish faith.

The Zionists should be the last to raise the subject of anti-Semitism and anti-Semites, for in essence Zionism is only another face of anti-Semitism. Zionism, like anti-Semitism, alleges that no Jew, irrespective of his country, belongs to the nation in which he lives. It calls on each Jew to leave his country and society in order to colonize the country of another people and to replace it by the use of force and terror. In this perspective, Zionism and anti-Semitism coincide, consolidating a common racist ideology and position, and paving the way for their perpetuation and the propagation of their racist message.

Anti-Semitism and Zionism are two bodies

with a single spirit, the same evil spirit. It is a spirit of division and discrimination; it contradicts and contravenes all spiritual and materialist ideologies which call for brotherly human coexistence based on equality and tolerance in a society in which the only distinction among citizens is based on a citizen's contribution to his society and to his fellows.

The deliberate attempts by the Zionists to confuse Judaism as a religious faith with Zionism as a backward, racist ideology is clear evidence of the Zionists' manipulation of the Jewish faith, which, in our view, is greatly to be respected and honoured.

The leaders of Israel have not only abused the Jewish faith; they have extended their mandate to the adherents of that faith, arrogating to themselves the role of official spokesmen for all Jews in both religious and secular matters.

The denunciation of Zionism is an additional manifestation of the progress the United Nations has made in its awareness of the racist ideas and ideologies which threaten contemporary humanity. It is at the same time a courageous stand which has exposed the historical allies of this ideology, namely imperialism and colonialism.

It is no wonder, then, that the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Patrick Moynihan, whose views and diagnosis of the problems confronting black Americans, especially his advocacy of "benign neglect", have been characterized as racist, should rally to the support of his Zionist ally and vehemently attack the resolution that condemns Zionism, by threatening the United Nations and warning it of the consequences of its adopting such resolutions. It would have been better for him to conform to the traditions of the people of the United States and to appeal to others to act in obedience to the basic principles of liberty, secularism and democracy on which American society has been built.

The world has finally recognized the nature of Israel as revealed in its criminal and aggressive policies against our Palestinian people and the Arab nation and in its persistent violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and its threat to world peace and security. All these have been fully exposed. During the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the world was able to combat Israel's aggressive usurpation with resolutions which, for the first time in 25

years, penetrated to the very core of the problem. The world is no longer at a loss in its search for an escape from the maze of repercussions of the Middle East problem; the world need no longer be sidetracked by partial solutions.

Faced with a resolution adopted by the Third Committee of the United Nations condemning its racist ideology, Israel today, as in the past, flouts international will and belittles United Nations resolutions. Furthermore, in the official and unofficial declarations of its spokesmen, Israel accuses the General Assembly of decadence and degeneracy.

This long series of Israeli violations of United Nations resolutions; this chain of Israeli challenges to all United Nations principles, to its Charter and to all the values of justice, goodness and peace which constitute our human heritage; Israel's confirmation, through its daily practices, of its disrespect for all resolutions condemning its policy, irrespective of their source—all require that the General Assembly of this international Organization take effective and operational measures to deter Israel, to contain the Zionist danger and to put an end to it. Only such measures will spare humanity from the evils which may befall it as a result of this arrogance, this stubbornness, this intransigence, and will allow the United Nations to continue to operate in full consciousness of its responsibilities concerning international peace and security.

Our Palestinian people, which is struggling on all fronts for attainment of their national aspirations and which adheres to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and all its human and just values; the Palestinian people, which rejects anything that may deprive a people or an individual of its national rights, and which joins its voice with those of all peoples that believe in justice and liberty and freedom—our people looks to this thirtieth session with great hope that the General Assembly of the United Nations will adopt a deterrent resolution that will impose sanctions on Israel and will also reconsider Israel's membership in the United Nations and the setting-up of a special committee to combat Zionism, to follow its activities and to put an end to its crimes, just as fascism and Nazism were fought and continue to be fought along with all other beliefs which contravene human rights.

After the long year that has elapsed since our

meeting at the twenty-ninth session, we would have wanted matters in our Arab area to continue along the path that the Assembly traced out and decided upon here for the consolidation of right and justice. One look at the real state of affairs in the Arab area will prove to anyone who really wants to see and hear the truth that we are closer to war than to peace.

All the solutions offered by the United States and all its efforts have only increased the danger of the situation and complicated pending matters. And what the Zionist enemy is doing in our occupied territories—what it calls new truths or facts; its Judaization of our villages and towns and the building of settlements on the West Bank, in Gaza, Golan and Sinai; all the changes of our national heritage; its usurpation of the Ibrahimi mosque and our sacred places in Jerusalem and Hebron; its actions against the Palestinian refugees—all must increase the Assembly's awareness of its responsibilities and of the consequences of this continued effort against us, the least dangerous of which would be a regional war. Now more than at any other time, the United Nations is called upon to justify its existence and to assume its responsibility in order to forestall the increased escalation of tension in the area, for this is a dangerous region in which wars and conflicts can break out.

The Palestinian people, still with great determination struggling and fighting on all fronts to achieve their national aims and aspirations, now announces that the United States is beginning to introduce nuclear armaments to the area through its ally Israel; and is concluding arms deals involving sophisticated weaponry, which is being sent to the Zionist entity in the name of the Kissinger peace solutions. Billions of dollars taken from the toiling United States taxpayers, dollars which would have been better spent to raise their own standard of living and to alleviate their domestic problems—have, instead, been diverted to the financing of Israel's wars.

All of this, we say, does not terrorize us, nor does it intimidate our valiant Arab nation. On the contrary, it sharpens our determination to continue our just struggle along the path blazed by those who have already won victory over the enemies of the peoples of the world.

We are not alone in our militant struggle against Zionism and imperialism. Our friend the Soviet

Union, for instance, maintains a responsible and constructive stand in opposition to Israeli aggression; the Soviet Union has consistently endorsed the rights of our Palestinian people and the struggle of our Arab nation for freedom and progress. Moreover, peace-loving and honest people throughout the world have expressed their solidarity with us and their deep conviction of the inevitability of our victory and the ultimate defeat of Zionism and imperialism.

We declare clearly and explicitly before you our unfaltering adherence to the goal of establishing a national authority in order to found a secular democratic State in all of Palestine, where all of us—Moslems, Christians and Jews—can dwell together in brotherhood, equality and openness to the world, and live free from any fear of anxiety, in fulfilment of our future advanced and progressive aspirations for the future.

We reaffirm our rejection of all the deceitful alternative solutions now proposed. The Palestinians' only homeland is Palestine. Their sole aim is to liberate this homeland and to live in it in peace.

It is imperative to reiterate here that other than the Palestine Liberation Organization, the official voice and legitimate representative of the Palestine people, there exists no party which can speak for our Palestinian people.

Our Palestinian people must be provided with the objective conditions for the exercise of its legitimate right to self-determination and its right to establish an independent State on its national soil.

The message of Chairman Arafat which this Assembly welcomed last year contained a plea not to let the olive branch fall from his hand. His concluding statement may have escaped the notice of some of you. He said:

"War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born." (2282nd meeting, p. 51)

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Address by President Sadat of Egypt made to a joint session of the US Congress¹⁷⁸**Washington, November 5, 1975**

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of Congress,

I would like, first, to thank you for extending this invitation to me, thus affording me a unique opportunity to meet with you all in a pleasant continuation of the conversations I have had with a good many of you who visited Egypt. I have always found these talks stimulating, informative and rewarding. I believe, in all sincerity, that there is no substitute for direct person-to-person contacts that go deep into the heart of all the problems which invoke our common concern and capture our imagination. There is no better way to reach a profound insight of the complexity of the world we live in and grasp the immense problems we face today and are likely to encounter in the future. In the process, our opinions might differ and our views might occasionally diverge. Indeed, our culture emphasizes diversity and multiplicity as a means of reaching consensus and compatibility. What is required is not identity of viewpoints, but a genuine acceptance of each other's right to hold different opinions and entertain different ideas.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, we are faced, together with all other nations, with one of the greatest challenges of our time, namely the task of convincing this generation, and those to follow, that we can finally build a viable international system capable of meeting the demands of tomorrow and solving the problems of the coming age. It is a foregone conclusion that old techniques are no longer working and that it is not possible any longer to encounter new problems with old ideas, and worn-out solutions. The legacy of the past should be utilized, not as an inhibiting factor, but rather as an inspiring revelation. We ought not to demoralize the dreamer or stifle the revolutionary. It is true that the magnitude and entanglement of the problems of today have a tendency to overwhelm us in our endeavor to sail to the shore of security and fulfillment. However, we should never allow visionary thinking to be replaced

by the urgency of alleviating short-term problems.

To attain that, it is an absolute must to establish a new world order, where the arbiter among nations is not sheer power or might, but allegiance to legitimacy and compliance with the rule of law. A new international economic system has to be devised to remedy the grave injustices of the past and pave the way for a more equitable definition of rights and duties. The developing countries are increasingly witnessing an upsurge of the feeling that the time has come for them to have a better standard of living, much more akin to that of the peoples of the industrialized countries. These hopes must be realized so long as we are seeking the closeness of men from all corners of the world, whose basic regard is the belief in peace, justice and the universal brotherhood of man.

I am stating all this here, before you, because I believe that this country has a special responsibility in the process of making the necessary adjustment and facilitating the transformation to the new international structure. I believe also that the United States has no alternative but to accept the challenge and bear its responsibility with vision and determination. This Nation, like all other nations throughout the history of man, shall be judged, not by the power it exercises or the wealth it accumulates, but by the values it upholds and the principles it honors. Fortunately, your history is impregnated with shining examples of genuine devotion to higher values and norms. Abraham Lincoln chose to describe this Nation as "one conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." Woodrow Wilson stated, in an address to Congress, that "only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end, and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own." John F. Kennedy urged all sides, "to join in creating a new endeavor . . . not a new balance of power, but a new world of law where the strong are just, and the weak secure and the peace preserved."

Long before that, your first President, George Washington, in his prophetic farewell address, urged all citizens "to observe good faith and justice towards all nations" and warned against both "inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others," noting that "a passionate attachment, among other evils, facilitates the illusion of an imaginary common

¹⁷⁸ *Congressional Record* (daily), November 5, 1975, pp. H 10642-10644.

interest in cases where no real common interest exists."

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I did not come here seeking aid or soliciting promises and commitments. Rather, I came to extend to you and all Americans a hand of friendship and understanding. I am not addressing you as an ally, but as a true friend, who is most willing to support you when you are right, and equally ready to draw your attention when we believe you are wrong. I will not attempt to lure you with the illusion that our interests are identical with yours. In fact they often converge but at times diverge, which is only natural. But in all dealings with you, we proceed with a view to strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two nations. Our strict adherence to the principles of non-alignment guides us in our sincere drive to improve our relations with different nations.

There is no limit as to how far we can go in improving our relations and strengthening our ties. We have always admired many things in America and looked forward to the day when we work together towards a better understanding. We spare no effort in this endeavor. You have been responsive and cooperative. Lately, more promising signs have surfaced in the form of a higher degree of understanding of the situation and a better assessment of your national interests.

Our bilateral relations are developing along lines which we accept and endorse, namely those of equal footing, respect for each other's independent will, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and mutual cooperation. We propose to work, together with you, towards enlarging the area of cooperation on a sound basis in order that it may encompass more and more activities, both on the official and non-official levels. We would like to see more contacts between our two peoples among parliamentarians, professionals, journalists, writers, artists, businessmen, technicians and academicians.

Perhaps it has been established now, beyond doubt, that we are not ready to compromise our independence or mortgage our will to any power under any circumstances. Our relations with a given nation are not conducted to the detriment of those we maintain with other countries. We should always bear in mind that Egypt is the oldest nation-state that has enjoyed an uninterrupted

existence within the same boundaries for over 7,000 years. You certainly can appreciate the impact and reflection of this phenomenon on our political behavior among nations today.

We are doing all we can in order to develop our country socially and economically in every possible field. We are embarking on an ambitious but essential plan for overall development and socio-economic transformation. We are trying to secure a job for every man and woman, a hospital room for every sick person, a seat in the classroom for every child. We are trying to make life easier for toiling farmers and workers. We are determined to achieve all that, while striving, at the same time, to catch up with the latest advances in technology and science. We are earmarking more funds for investment, simultaneously with the reimbursement of our accumulated debts. We are committed to improve the quality of life in Egypt. Throughout this process, we rely first and foremost on our own people, our own resources and, above all, on our hope in the future. We welcome any unconditional help from friendly nations in whatever form. We thank those who are willing to help (and may I identify you with all gratitude in this respect) and we understand the position of those who are not, for one reason or another.

Perhaps you are aware of the fact that we share the little we have with other nations. Egyptian aid is given without hesitation to sister African and Asian countries hit by disasters. We are building roads, schools, hospitals in remote places, in the belief that whatever is good for these people is good for the Egyptian people.

Our engineers, doctors, teachers, and technicians are contributing to the improvement of life in almost every State in the region. Some have questioned the setting of our priorities and the wisdom of spreading our resources in such a manner. But we think that human progress is indivisible and that every nation should share in the cost and fruit alike.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, many of your friends around the world expect American policy to be based on justice and fairness, supporting the oppressed and the deprived. Similarly, we believe it is important that the United States apply the same standards in dealing with other peoples as those you strove for when you launched your revolution. The United States has to be

counted among the supporters of any revolution that seeks the freedom and dignity of man. Consequently, is there any logical reason why the United States should treat the Palestinian problem differently? You are well aware that the Palestinians have suffered occasionally from excesses, lack of discipline and abuse. They feel, not without justification to be sure, that the Palestinian people have long been neglected by the international community. It was only a few years ago that their legitimate struggle caught the imagination, and hence gained the sympathy, of the world. Nations began, after being aware of the plight of the Palestinians, to recognize their right to self-determination and statehood. Even when nations had their reservations as to certain aspects of the Palestinian resistance, that did not hinder them from lending it their understanding and support. Of almost all nations, the United States remains as the sole dissenter in the long over-due trend of establishing contacts with the Palestinians. Contacts bring understanding. Understanding helps develop solutions.

In this connection I must say, with all fairness, that I have seen certain promising signs in the past few weeks with some of you, Senators and Congressmen, both individually and in committees and subcommittees, demonstrating a keen interest in the cause of the Palestinians and exploring ways and means of solving their problem and putting an end to their predicament. Still, much remains to be done and the aggrieved cannot be expected to wait long. Therefore, I urge you, in the most emphatic term, to lend the Palestinian people your understanding and support. Help them to overcome despair and frustration. The continuation of neglect and defiance is but an open invitation to violence, negativism and extremism. With your understanding and support, moderation would reign and reason would prevail. Above all, a sympathetic stand on the part of the United States towards the aspirations of the Palestinians and their right to establish their own state shall contribute greatly to a speedy solution of the problem. I trust that what I have been reiterating for years has become crystal clear today: namely, that the Palestinian question is the heart and core of the entire dispute. Once solved, all other outstanding issues can be solved, thus realizing the hopes of many of us who are striving to make peace a living reality.

You know that we Arabs have no problem whatsoever coexisting with others of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. Our history is a testimony to the fact that we have never harbored any ill-feeling towards any people. Nor have we known doctrines of racial or religious discriminations as did other nations. The teachings of Islam and the tenets of our culture make it incumbent upon us to respect all peoples and deal with all nations as equals for we believe that Islam is a continuation of the process of human submission to the Divine will since the inception of mankind. We are commanded in our Holy Book to say that "we believe in God, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob and the tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus and that to all prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between one and another of them and we bow to God in Islam."

To us peace is not only a cherished ideal, but also an imperative commandment to which we are committed. Our way of expressing our reverence to the prophets is to pray to God to bestow peace on their souls. Is it any wonder that the Arab nation should be dedicated to the cause of peace, a cause that is inherent in its faith and profoundly interwoven into the fabric of its culture? Recent events have proven, beyond any doubt, that our desire to establish peace is our paramount consideration and overriding concern. We took the steps we did in the belief that we are paving the road to peace, even if this entails taking some risks. But let me remind you that a very important factor behind our attitude is the constructive and more impartial role we expect the United States to play.

Enough has been mentioned about American commitments to this party or that. But the real commitment that is required of the United States is one to peace and justice. We are not asking your country to abandon anyone or turn friends into enemies. We simply expect the United States not to condone expansion or tolerate aggression. We often hear about the binding force of commitments, which often contradict one another. However, the only guarantee for a commitment to hold is that it be based on principles, not expediency and on objectively ascertainable criteria. We expect the United States to cooperate with us in our drive to set in motion the process of an overall settlement that tackles all aspects

of the Middle East conflict. We expect it to refrain from spurring the arms race in the area, for this would certainly lead to the renewal of armed conflict.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, ever since I knew President Ford, first through correspondence and then after meeting him in person, I have found him a man of vision, deep understanding and compassion. He has been a man of integrity who always kept his word. He is given to candor and honesty. In short, he is the kind of statesman to like and trust. His commitment to peace is paramount and genuine.

In the past ten days, I have had the opportunity to visit many parts of your great country. I was struck by the warmth, the hospitality and the genuineness of the American people's desire for peace and progress, not only for themselves, but for the world. Truly, you and we have much in common and I am encouraged that we can continue to work together to achieve the great objectives we have set for ourselves. I take this opportunity to convey, to the American people, through their representatives, my thanks and my best wishes for happiness and prosperity.

I am mindful of the fact that I paid this visit on the eve of the Bicentennial anniversary of the American revolution. On behalf of the people and government of Egypt, I extend to every American our warm congratulations on this great occasion in your history. Out of the throes of revolution... out of the fight against oppression and injustice... out of a firm conviction in the rights of man, you have created a youthful country that turned out to be the super power of today and a country capable of advancing the cause of human progress.

Again, may I thank you for availing me of this opportunity. As you see, I have spoken to you in all sincerity in the belief that we should never miss any opportunity of building bridges of real friendship and genuine understanding between nations... until the day comes when they beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks.

Thank you.

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Memorandum of the Standing Conference of the Superior-Generals of the Monastic Orders of Lebanon submitted to the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies (excerpt)¹⁷⁹

Beirut, November 6, 1975

[The demands appeared in the Islamic Council's document of October 2, 1974].

As for the demand for "cooperation and coordination with the Palestinian resistance with a view to ensuring it of support and protection in all fields," and the recent demand that "the parties' militias should be dissolved so as to avoid provocations and exposing the country's safety to danger," it is to be observed that the two demands are closely connected, as becomes clear when they are examined and compared.

As regards the former claim it is to be observed first and foremost that the National Pact between the confessions established as an indisputable principle Lebanon's sovereignty vis-à-vis both West and East. This sovereignty, which is here used in the sense it bears in international law and as affirmed in Article I of the Constitution, requires that the state of Lebanon should be neutral in the full sense of the word. From this point of view the presence and activity in Lebanon of the Palestinian resistance was not one of the elements in the balance established by the National Pact of 1943; it arose long after the Pact and it is not wrong to say that had it been an element in the Pact when it was drawn up in 1943, the Pact would have been quite different and perhaps would never have been concluded.

Inasmuch as the Islamic party's demand for "cooperation and coordination with the Palestinian resistance with a view to ensuring it of support and protection in all fields" is not mentioned in the Pact, let us examine its repercussions as far as the other party is concerned.

This demand really implies:

—Unreserved acceptance of the limitation of external and internal sovereignty of the Lebanese state in the interest of the political and military

¹⁷⁹ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 7, 1975; excerpted from the partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 1-2 (Autumn 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 295-297.

activities of the Palestinian resistance;

—Furthermore it implies an unconditional commitment to this activity as regards everything that the resistance sees as serving its interests.

The words “unreserved” and “unconditional” are here used deliberately, because the words “cooperation” and “coordination” used in this demand are used ambiguously to conceal the fact of another intention which is sufficiently disclosed by the constant attitude of the Islamic party to the Pact.

An objective examination of this attitude shows that the Islamic party has always agreed to the following:

1. That the Lebanese state's right to internal and external sovereignty must only be mentioned if accompanied by the phrase “the rights of the Palestinian resistance,” as if these rights constitute a legal and definitive restriction of Lebanese national sovereignty.

2. That on the pretext that its cause is sacred the resistance should choose its elements, in very considerable numbers, from the ranks of the Lebanese. These are armed, in the territory of their state, by an institution that is alien to that state, and led by non-Lebanese authorities in operations which are generally directed against the forces of that state.

3. That operations by elements of the resistance in Israeli territory, from bases in Lebanese territory, should continue uncontrolled, in spite of the disastrous consequences of these operations (retaliation against the inhabitants of South Lebanon... who leave their homes; destruction; futile and costly clashes with the Lebanese army and the financial burdens arising therefrom; replacement of the authority of the state by Palestinian authority; the tragic social problems caused by the people of the South leaving their homes for other areas, such as Mount Lebanon, Beirut etc.).

4. That elements of the resistance breaking Lebanese laws should defy the Lebanese authorities (the machinery of justice, the security forces) whose task it is to prevent their infringement.

5. That the resistance should in practice enjoy territorial immunity and that its members should enjoy immunity from the law.

6. That the resistance should have its own political police whereas the Lebanese state has never had such a police force.

7. That these elements should have the right and the liberty to supply themselves with all sorts of arms without any control, and to distribute them even to Lebanese groups. And that its spokesmen should state that the resistance does not need permission from any authority for it to engage in its activities in Israeli territory from bases in Lebanese territory, thereby establishing a *de facto* dual Lebanese-Palestinian control over sovereign Lebanon.

8. That the resistance should interfere in Lebanese politics, in alliance with such groups as it believes can be of advantage to it, and openly try to bring them to power by calling on them to cause disturbances even such as involve the use of arms, using external pressure on the Lebanese state through certain Arab countries when it seems to be in its interest to extract from the Lebanese authorities such privileges as have not been extracted before. The resistance also believes itself entitled to call openly on the Lebanese to deny their political system, impeding the normal course of the constitutional and administrative institutions (the army, for example) by openly appealing to one or other of the Arab countries, which then pours in its money to direct the information media (and the press in particular) as it wishes, and, indeed, to mould them and to undermine their national role, so as to suppress the expression of any opinion favourable to Lebanon in its own interest, providing a base and a refuge for international terrorism which can only be injurious to Lebanon.

The last chance of reviving the unique pioneer formula for coexistence and harmony lies in revivifying the National Pact in its true form and in abiding by it in spirit and in letter. However for this formula to be effective, certain requirements must be met. They are:

1. That all Lebanese should declare their loyalty to Lebanon as a definitive and permanent international entity equally independent of both East and West. However this declaration must be given tangible expression through:

a) Lebanon's permanent international neutrality being ensured;

b) The freedom enjoyed by the press, parties and political organizations being reconsidered in the light of the right and duty of the state to ensure

that it is not destroyed from within;

c) Non-Lebanese, whatever their origin, being forbidden to own land in Lebanon;

d) The number of foreigners residing in Lebanon being restricted and controlled.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Central Council of the Palestinian Rejection Front concerning the situation in Lebanon (excerpts)¹⁸⁰

November 14, 1975

From November 12–14 the Central Council of the Palestinian Rejection Front met in ordinary session in the course of which it reviewed the political situation in the Arab area, with particular emphasis on the events in Lebanon, regarding what is going on in the Lebanese arena as a cover for the implementation of the capitulationist plan for a political settlement.

In the Lebanese Arena:

1. What is happening in Lebanon is linked to the process of the capitulationist settlement. The parties acting in collusion with imperialism and its tools in the area are implementing part of the conspiracy in Lebanon. At this stage the aim is to make the Lebanese masses ineffective by disuniting them, to cut down the role played by the resistance movement, and to sever the link between the two, in preparation for the liquidation of both movements to ensure the full implementation of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy. There are also other causes related to interests connected with the internal situation.

2. The treacherous acts of reprisal and the daily fabrication of incidents by the rightist forces and parties will continue, under the supervision of the CIA and its local agents. For they are part of the conspiracy, and if they stop for a time that too will be part of the conspiracy.

3. The efforts that have been made and are

still being made to achieve a tribal truce between certain parties of the nationalist movement and the fascist right in Lebanon are intended to serve the interest of the forces involved in the conspiracy; their aim is to gain time so that these forces can prepare themselves for the next round, which imperialism and its agents are so anxious to implement.

4. The official leadership of the Liberation Organization is doing everything in its power to bring about such a truce and is dealing with the matter in the same way as was followed to achieve the tribal truce which was part of the conspiracy in Jordan. The statements issued by certain resistance authorities benefit only the rightist parties.

5. The Palestinian Rejection Front, which has been prominent at both the military and political levels during the incidents, affirms that it is not a substitute for the nationalist movement and that it will continue to stand by the masses who have taken such a heroic stand during the incidents and so resolutely resisted the conspiracy, and it is determined not to enter into any agreement with the isolationist forces.

6. The roots of the present crisis in Lebanon lie in the conflict between the movement of the masses and the authorities along with the rightist forces. The crisis has become so acute because of the conspiracy connected with the settlement and its promotion in the area. The crisis therefore has a specific horizon which is determined by the change that has taken place in the balance of forces in favour of the imperialist and reactionary parties, which are trying to deprive the resistance movement and the nationalist movement of their ability to influence the course of events in the Arab homeland.

Therefore the process of attrition will continue so that the hostile forces may achieve their aim of deflecting the resistance movement from its basic goal of resisting the settlement conspiracy. In this way they hope to push through the capitulationist plans which are being implemented gradually and carefully; there have been the signing of the Sinai agreement, then the subsequent statements by Numairi, and then Sadat's recent tour, all of which show that capitulationist regimes are prepared to make further concessions to the enemy.

The Council believes that by continuing the

¹⁸⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), November 21, 1975, pp. 8–9. The Rejection Front consists of the PFLP, the PFLP-General Command, the Popular Struggle Front and the ALF.

process of attrition the authorities and the rightist forces are trying to achieve the objective that the state is bent on, so that it and its institutions may recover their prestige. This is in addition to their aim of serving the settlement plan by robbing the Palestinian armed resistance of its revolutionary legitimacy.

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Statement by Executive Committee member Qaddumi of the PLO affirming his wish to see Jews return to their Arab countries of origin¹⁸¹

Beirut, November 24, 1975

In the light of our unequivocal belief in the right of every man to return to his homeland, the Palestine Liberation Organization calls on all Jews who have left Arab countries to return to the countries they emigrated from and to enjoy their full rights there. Just as it is the right of the Palestinians to return to the lands they were expelled from and to exercise their full national rights there.

Believing in this unalterable fact, the Palestine Liberation Organization affirms and is completely confident that all the Arab states are ready to receive every Jew who returns to them, whatever the circumstances in which he left, and the Organization will make every effort to affirm this fact and to ensure that it is realized.

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Statement by Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon to the Chamber of Deputies on the crisis in Lebanon (excerpts)¹⁸²

Beirut, November 25, 1975

As for partition—and here permit me to be frank—what is happening in the country, to judge

by the reality we are experiencing, indicates that there is a dispute which does have a confessional aspect because things have developed in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975. I have said and I repeat that a large number of Lebanese have passed away and a larger number have taken their place. What I mean by this is that in new circumstances the view of new generations differs from that of the past. We in our democracy should develop with the situation and respond to the aspirations of the people of this country. But this has not happened at all, and it may well be that the deadlock in which we find ourselves is to blame for the gulf that exists between the people on one hand and the government on the other.

In this connection I want to set aside the Palestinian issue because I believe that we Lebanese must agree among ourselves first, as this is the solution that will enable the state to face up to its responsibilities and, in the light of the agreements concluded with the Palestinian resistance, to ensure the implementation of and adherence to these agreements. This is what the Palestinian side declared when it submitted its memorandum¹⁸³ expressing its will and intention to abide by these agreements. This makes the authorities' work easier, but on condition that the Lebanese agree among themselves that this massacre should stop, and that the authorities should devote themselves to getting things done, explaining them and restoring them to normal.

Here I must reply in advance to questions about the army, for many people are asking why the army is not being used. I have told you and I repeat that the army in this all-out fighting is composed of members of this people, and in present circumstances and in the situation in which the army finds itself as a result of what has happened in the past, it can no longer be used. I am not disclosing a secret when I say that the army is also deficient in numbers. Requests have been received for the use of some of its forces, but in the present situation we could not make use of it as we wished. I also say that this army, which is the last card in the state's hand, cannot be wasted

¹⁸¹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 24, 1975, p. 8.

¹⁸² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 26, 1975, pp. 2, 3.

¹⁸³ Doc. 312 above.

on an operation whose outcome is uncertain. In the present situation in Lebanon the army could not settle things if it were sent in, nor could this lead to the desired results.

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Decision adopted by the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq to guarantee the rights of Jews wishing to return to Iraq from Israel¹⁸⁴

Baghdad, November 26, 1975

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph A of Article 42 of the temporary Constitution and proceeding from the Iraqi Government's belief in the rights of man and Iraq's commitment to the principles and rights stipulated by the UN Charter and the World Declaration of Human Rights, the RCC decided the following at its session today:

1. Iraqi Jews who have left Iraq since 1948 have the right to return to Iraq.
2. Iraqi Jews returning to Iraq in accordance with this law will enjoy all legitimate rights of Iraqi citizens in accordance with the law.
3. The Iraqi Government will guarantee to all returning Jews the constitutional rights of Iraqi citizens, including equality and secure livelihood without discrimination.
4. This decision will be published in the Official Gazette and the Ministers will implement it. (Signed) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, RCC Chairman.

¹⁸⁴ Broadcast on Baghdad radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5071/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

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Declaration of the Beirut Islamic Association of Maqasid Graduates regarding the causes of the Lebanese conflict (excerpt)¹⁸⁵

Beirut, November 26, 1975

Let no one retort that the Lebanese formula which collapsed formed a challenge to the Israeli formula. An answer of this type should be rejected out of hand because it was this Lebanese formula that ruined Lebanon, based as it was on privilege and inequality. Moreover, it was the example which gave Zionism the excuse to set up the racist state of Israel. This is why Israel is anxious to keep the present Lebanese formula and opposes any change in it, as a threat.

Another cause of tension which must be removed, in addition to confessionalism, is the difference of opinion concerning the Arabism of Lebanon. The Arabism of Lebanon must be established once for all and in a direct, official way so that it be remote from any difference and above all discussion. In addition to its being a national attribute, the Arabism of Lebanon forms one of Lebanon's great resources and a stout support of its economy, because if Lebanon claims independence from the Arabs on the allegation that it is not Arab, the Arabs will do the same to Lebanon, cut off its life lines and boycott it.

It is the same for Lebanon's international neutrality which takes it out of the Arab ranks lined up against Israel and imposes on it, according to the logic of legal neutrality, conciliation with Israel. Is this what is sought?

The sovereignty of Lebanon is a presupposition allowing no argument or discussion. It is above every consideration.

It is the Lebanese government's lack of necessary esteem for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the government's neglect of its duties in this line, even with regard to its citizens, that has made the Israelis savor attacking us and encroaching on our sovereignty. It was this neglect that encouraged them to enter Beirut forcibly and kill

¹⁸⁵ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 27, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1976), pp. 82-83.

the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance in the sight and hearing of the authorities. This forced the Resistance to arm itself for legal self defense, which is, of course, its right.

The presence of the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, its movements and its relations with the Lebanese government are subject to well known pacts agreed on and accepted by all the parties concerned including the parties who have a myopic view of sovereignty. These pacts preserved the sovereignty of Lebanon as much as they preserved the right of the Resistance to legal self defense.

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Working paper on reform for Lebanon issued by the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council—section on Lebanese-Palestinian relations¹⁸⁶

November 27, 1975

4. The problem of the absence of government authority in the south, as well as the search for lost sovereignty in various districts of Lebanon have been the reason behind everyone being armed and the hate campaigns, and consequently, one of the principal causes of the outburst. This problem has been a natural result of the bad policy adopted by the authorities, who relinquished sovereignty in the south and left large areas of Lebanon in a vacuum of power and open to the enemy.

5. Lebanese-Palestinian relations and their development have been clearly defined in a memorandum of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Lebanese authorities.¹⁸⁷ This memorandum is a guaranty for dealing with crises arising from the lack of clarity in these relations. Consequently, to clarify the dimensions of this relationship and to avoid any ambiguity in this matter, the Council calls upon the government to lose no time in forming special committees for the pur-

pose of studying the various aspects of this matter and the ways of dealing with it.

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Statement issued by the government of Saudi Arabia stressing its support for the unity of Lebanon and cooperation with the Palestine resistance (excerpts)¹⁸⁸

Riyad, November 29, 1975

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia feels extreme pain and deep sorrow about the events that have befallen fraternal Lebanon. The Kingdom views with extreme anxiety the possible outcome of the continuation of these events. The Kingdom within the framework of the Arab League tried to spare Lebanon the tragedy that befell it. . . . The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is anxious about Lebanon's unity, people and territory. If the internal conditions in Lebanon, as seen by the people of Lebanon, need reforms then it is the Kingdom's concern that this should take place in a fraternal spirit and in the shadow of Lebanon's unity remote from fighting between brothers and any interference from others.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that national unity in Lebanon is the primary mainstay of its security, stability and sovereignty. A responsible dialogue between the Lebanese parties concerned is the only method by which Lebanon will be able to overcome the crisis and the bloody events. . . .

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appeals to all parties concerned in Lebanon to end the bloodshed and resort to a responsible dialogue. . . . It hopes that the maturity of the people of Lebanon and the wisdom of their leaders will be able to put an end to this terrible tragedy and that understanding and co-operation between the leaders of Lebanon and the leaders of the Palestine Resistance will be able to contribute to the liberation of the usurped Arab territories and regain the violated Holy Places.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia always tries to help fraternal Lebanon to maintain its Arab

¹⁸⁶ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 28, 1975; excerpted from the English translation, *CEMAM Reports, III (1975): Religion, State and Ideology* (Beirut: Dar el Mashreq, 1976), pp. 87-88.

¹⁸⁷ Doc. 312 above.

¹⁸⁸ Broadcast on Riyad radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5073/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

nature, play its Arab role and built its Arab future. God grants success.

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Message from Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon to the people calling for national reconciliation (excerpt)¹⁸⁹

Beirut, November 29, 1975

It must be admitted that there are certain problems that the Lebanese cannot solve by themselves; they are related to the restoration of public order and putting an end to the fighting. Therefore as national reconciliation starts there must be talks with the Palestinians with a view to ensuring, without prejudice to the rights that have been agreed on, scrupulous respect for all the principles and formulas they have subscribed to.

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Reply of Lebanon's Islamic Council to the memorandum of the Lebanese Monastic Orders regarding the Lebanese crisis (excerpts)¹⁹⁰

Beirut, November 30, 1975

On November 7, the Permanent Conference of Superior-Generals of the Lebanese Monastic Orders and the Maronite League published a memorandum issued by the Lebanese Research Committee on its attitude to the Lebanese situation.¹⁹¹

2. *Analysis of the Islamic demands.* The Monastic Orders' memorandum, in dealing with some of

the Islamic national demands, sees imaginary underlying links between them. Such links are purely fanciful, assume that the Muslims have suspicious intentions, and are not permissible. It is fanciful and absolutely unwarrantable to link together demands that the Palestinian resistance be supported, that the party militias be dissolved and that the tragedy of the naturalization laws be brought to an end (demands appearing in the Islamic Council's document of October 2, 1974) and to maintain therefrom that they are evidence of a unilateral violation of the Pact by the Muslims.

In fact each of these demands is connected with a respective current problem in Lebanon that has to be dealt with, and if there is any link between them it is that they all derive from a realization of the public interest.

It is quite inadmissible to link the demand for support for the Palestinian resistance with the demand for the dissolution of the party militias, nor can we understand how either of these demands can be a violation of the Pact. In fact "support for and coordination with the Palestinian resistance in all fields" is an Arab national duty which does not conflict with Lebanese sovereignty when it is performed with the state's consent, and in coordination and agreement with it. Moreover, the Palestine problem, which involves the liberation of the Holy Land, is not an Islamic issue but an Arab one. It is related to the holy places of Christians and Muslims alike and should, indeed, be of greater concern to Christians than to Muslims because Palestine was the cradle of Christianity.

Nor is it true that we unreservedly accept the restriction of sovereignty in favour of the Palestinian resistance. Some reliable and capable Ministers of the Interior have succeeded in controlling the situation in accordance with the Cairo Agreement, and when confidence in the state's intentions is strong, the ruler is in a position to control any violation of the agreements.

The drafters of the memorandum call attention to what they describe as the Muslim attitude, saying that it gives precedence to the resistance's interests at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. To this we reply that we are amazed when they maintain that the Lebanese state's right to sovereignty can only be mentioned in conjunction with the rights of the Palestinian resistance, as if they

¹⁸⁹ Broadcast on Lebanese radio and television; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), November 30, 1975, p. 8. The statement was drafted by the Lebanese cabinet with the agreement of President Frangieh. It was preceded by a short statement by the President, in which no reference was made to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

¹⁹⁰ Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), December 1, 1975; excerpted from the partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), pp. 261-264.

¹⁹¹ Doc. 323 above.

constituted a definitive and legal restriction on Lebanese sovereignty.

That the resistance, under the justification that it is fighting for a sacred cause, takes considerable numbers of Lebanese and arms them: this, if true, is not surprising, for the just cause of Palestine has rallied free men throughout the world. There are, in the ranks of the resistance, elements from all the Arab countries, and even foreigners from Europe, America, Asia and Africa.

If the presence of the resistance in Lebanese territory gives the Lebanese a better opportunity than others to join its ranks, this is something natural and spontaneous; it has not been deliberately planned by anyone. The accusation that these elements have been given arms is irrelevant because it is natural for the resistance to arm those who join them. To say that the operations are mostly against the forces of the state is the greatest slander and injustice because the whole world is witnessing the explosion of Palestinian struggle in the occupied territory itself. Nor is it permissible to select certain incidents or infringements and to maintain that they are the general rule. We have, in fact, always been opposed to such improper activities and every effort must be made to eliminate them.

3. It is claimed that there is no control over the operations in the occupied territory which set out from Lebanese territory, despite the consequences of these operations. This is not the case. If incidents of this kind do take place, it is inevitable in Lebanon, which is adjacent to the most thickly-populated part of the occupied territories and nearest to the targets. Perhaps, this is one of Lebanon's real contributions to the Palestinian cause and the sacrifice involved in it is small indeed when compared with those made by the other countries, especially the confrontation countries.

4. It is said that resistance elements defy the Lebanese authorities. We are unequivocally opposed to this but it is not permissible to blame all for the offence of a few.

5. [The memorandum complains] that the resistance has its own political police. This is one of its organizations and cadres that are carrying

out their responsibilities in preparation for rule after its return, if God wills. Nor should we forget that this organization has served Palestinian-Lebanese interests and been of service to Lebanon's security and sovereignty on many occasions.

6. [It is stated] that the resistance has the power to provide itself with arms and to distribute them without control. This is a principle guaranteed in the agreements concluded with the resistance and any violation of these agreements can be rectified by discussion. The Islamic community is anxious to be of assistance in assuring control over such matters. It has for a long time cooperated in this field and its cooperation increases with the disappearance of the Muslims' feeling of being deprived and cheated. This is a psychological fact understood by objective and impartial observers...

7. Similarly, it is not true that the Islamic community has ever approved of interference by the resistance in Lebanese politics. It is not up to us to explain the attitudes of Arab countries that the memorandum complains of and the justifications thereof. That is the task of the Lebanese government which has been on the best of terms with the Arab states, who gave Lebanon the task of speaking on their behalf at the United Nations. However, from our belief in the sovereignty of our country and from what we know of the resistance's leadership, we can affirm that it is only too glad when it can devote itself to its struggle and its revolution without being involved in any Lebanese affairs. As for sympathy between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, that is a matter of sentiments and ideology and is by no means an Islamic responsibility.

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Statement issued by the government of Egypt regarding the situation in Lebanon (excerpts)¹⁹²

Cairo, December 1, 1975

Since the start of the Lebanese crisis Egypt has consciously adopted a positive attitude based on parallel non-contradictory considerations. These are:

¹⁹² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), December 2, 1975, p. 6.

2. To keep the current conflict in the Lebanese arena separate from and to reject all attempts at involvement of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon in the conflict. This temporary Palestinian presence should be above confessional or party disputes and the current divisions in the Lebanese arena. No non-Lebanese quarter can be permitted to exploit this presence for the achievement of its own ambitions.

There are two sides to the conflict in Lebanon, the Lebanese internal situation and the Lebanese-Palestinian situation. There is also Arab and foreign intervention with objectives other than those mentioned above.

Egypt therefore stands aside from all that has happened. It regards it as part of an operation in which there have been miscalculation and misconduct of many aspects and on the part of a variety of elements, not only inside Lebanon, but also outside it, at the Arab and foreign levels.

Egypt is looking to the future in the sense that what interests her at present, and what inevitably interests the Arab nation, is to look at the future of Lebanon. Egypt believes that the solution lies in political factors and elements that can form a framework of a settlement leading to the maintenance of national unity of the Lebanese entity and of the role of Lebanon as an independent sovereign Arab people.

1. Egypt demands that the carrying of arms in Lebanese towns be controlled.

2. Egypt insists that dialogue rather than arms be employed in Lebanon, which formerly was a model to others in its ability to settle things by dialogue.

3. Egypt condemns the irresponsible acts of Phalangist elements.

4. Egypt equally condemns the Syrian organization Saiqa and its open or secret activities against Muslims and Christians alike.

5. Egypt is utterly opposed to partition and regards those who advocate it as traitors.

6. Egypt regards any attempt to internationalize the conflict in Lebanon as treason.

Parallel with and linked to this is the fact that the only solution is that the Lebanese should agree among themselves and with the Palestinians. Admittedly there is a situation which causes dif-

ficulties for certain quarters in Lebanon, but the problem must be solved by the Lebanese and Palestinian parties. There is the 1969 Cairo Agreement¹⁹³ to regulate the situation and, if it is respected, it can restore things to normal.

Warning must be given against any Arab or foreign intervention of any kind, in any capacity or under any pretext. This is necessary so that the desired results may be achieved in an atmosphere of confidence and calm, all parties bearing in mind that higher Arab interests must be our guiding principles. At the same time, the Lebanese constitutional establishments, each in its own field, must meet their responsibilities and perform their roles constructively.

Admittedly, too, until such time as the Palestinian entity is restored or constituted, running parallel with the Lebanese "formula" there will be a Lebanese-Palestinian "formula". The aim of this "formula" is to protect the resistance, which is just as important as the maintenance of the independence of Lebanon.

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Statement issued by the Phalangist Party of Lebanon after the visit of its leader Gemayyel to Syria (excerpt)¹⁹⁴

Beirut, December 6, 1975

1. The Party transmits its gratitude and esteem to His Excellency President Hafiz Asad and to the government, command and people of Syria for the honour and hospitality shown to the head of the Party and the members of the delegation, which it regards as an expression of His Excellency's fraternal sympathy for Lebanon.

2. The Party regards this visit as completing the process, that began two years ago, of strengthening relations with Syria, reinforcing the links between the authorities of the two countries and establishing Arab cooperation on the widest possible scale.

3. The Party regards this visit as an occasion

¹⁹³ See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the agreement.

¹⁹⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), December 7, 1975, p. 8.

to reaffirm the importance of the generous Syrian initiative taken by Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and General Hikmat Shihabi, Deputy Chief of Staff, as envoys of His Excellency President Hafiz Asad, and the excellent effect it had on Lebanese public opinion and the positive results it led to.

4. The Party stresses that Syrian-Lebanese brotherhood and cooperation between the two states, governments and peoples, are the safety valves of both and a basic guarantee of their common interests and of higher Arab interests, foremost among which is the Palestine cause, which brings all Arab states, governments and people together in unanimity.

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Statement by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO welcoming recent developments in the UN¹⁹⁵

Beirut, December 7, 1975

Important developments have recently taken place at the United Nations, culminating in the Palestine Liberation Organization being invited to attend meetings of the Security Council¹⁹⁶ relative to the brutal Israeli aggression against Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese villages, and also culminating in the Organization being invited to take part in the Security Council debate on the Middle East problem on January 12, 1976.

These developments indicate an awareness of the importance of the central role played by the Palestine Liberation Organization as regards the future of the area as a whole.

At its present session the General Assembly has adopted three important resolutions, two of which affirm the natural trend towards recognizing the crucial role played by the Palestine Liberation Organization in any discussions or negotiations affecting the future of peace in the area, in as much as the PLO is the legitimate representative of all Palestinians and is empowered to speak on their behalf.

This increasing international recognition not only of the representative character of the Organization but also of its central role as regards future developments in the area, greatly increases the chances of a just peace. This is because it amounts to recognition of the basic rights of the Palestinian people, the legitimacy of Palestinian struggle and the right of the Palestinian people to liberation and to the realization of their national and historical rights in the territory of their homeland.

The General Assembly resolution to this effect¹⁹⁷ was the international community's answer to the question posed by Israel's insolent defiance. This explains the hysterical reactions in Israel and, regrettably, in America, to the long-awaited United Nations resolution.

The Israeli-American reaction was intended to nullify this historic resolution. It took the form of an attempt to discredit the resolution by all sorts of lies and distortions; also the United Nations was insulted in all sorts of ways. The reason was that Israel and America thought that by involving the international community in a flood of coordinated hysteria they could make it lose its nerve and, in particular as regards the countries that voted on the resolution, they hoped to make them have second thoughts.

In fact racialism and colonialism have always reacted like this whenever there has been a real threat to their existence and whenever their true character has been exposed.

We believe that the United Nations resolution regarding Zionism as a sort of racialism only demonstrated something that was perfectly obvious. If we, the Palestinian people, were forcibly uprooted from our land, it was because we did not accord with the conditions and norms laid down by the Zionist movement. The Zionist idea is based on the concept of detaching groups that have embraced the Jewish religion from their societies and countries and implanting them in our Palestinian homeland, which the Zionist movement succeeded in colonizing and occupying.

The measures taken by the Zionist authorities

¹⁹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 7, 1975, 1st bulletin, p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ See doc. 12 above.

¹⁹⁷ Arafat is referring to resolution 3379 (XXX) equating Zionism with racism. See doc. 15 above.

under the "Law of Return"¹⁹⁸ and other laws and measures, which make Oriental Jews and non-Jews second and third class citizens, have established once and for all that Zionism is a racist institution.

We in the PLO, appreciating the historical importance of the United Nations resolution, have realized that even those who abstained from voting on it or those who voted against it will realize that the way Zionism has been unmasked by this resolution will not only make the tasks of our struggle easier, but will also help those who have embraced the Jewish religion in all parts of the world to hold out against the intellectual and political intimidation practised by Zionism by appealing to their "feeling of belonging." It will also help those who dare to call any of Zionism's claims or policies in question, to defend themselves against the process of dehumanization which Zionism always inflicts on them.

The humane content of our Palestinian movement lies in our firm belief that human beings are all the same regardless of race, colour or religion.

¹⁹⁸ The Law of Return was passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, and reads as follows (*Laws of the State of Israel*, IV (1949-1950), p. 114):

1. Every Jew has the right to come to the country as an *oleh*.
2.
 - a) *Aliyah* shall be by *oleh's* visa.
 - b) An *oleh's* visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant:
 - 1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or
 - 2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.
3.
 - a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire to settle in Israel may, while still in Israel, receive an *oleh's* certificate.
 - b) The restrictions specified in section 2 b) shall apply also to the grant of an *oleh's* certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as endangering public health on account of an illness contracted after his arrival in Israel.
4. Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the coming into force of this Law, and every Jew who was born in this country, whether before or after the coming into force of the Law, shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an *oleh* under this Law.
5. The Minister of Immigration is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation and also as to the grant of *oleh's* visas and *oleh's* certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years.

This is no less important than the historical attitude we have always adopted to the effect that Judaism, Christianity and Islam have always been an inseparable part of our heritage and our national values.

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Statement by President Bakr of Iraq calling for an end to the crisis in Lebanon¹⁹⁹

Baghdad, December 8, 1975

We say in no uncertain terms that the fighting in Lebanon must be stopped, that there should be a return to peace and stability in the country, that the problems should be solved and that positive dialogue between its sons should be established on sound national basis that links Lebanon's interests and destiny to Arab interests and the Arab destiny. We warn the forces of reaction and isolationism that have implemented an imperialist and Zionist plan directed against all groups in Lebanon and against Arab interests, that they had better realize that is no longer possible that the former situation should continue; the political, economic and social situation in Lebanon must develop in such a way that all groups in the country are ensured of justice and participation on the basis of the higher national interests and firm national unity. We also call on the nationalist and progressive forces in Lebanon, that are struggling against the imperialist-Zionist plan, to exercise the highest degree of wisdom and vigilance and not to allow suspect groups and quarters to exploit any pretext with a view to destroying national unity and implementing their suspect schemes. We also call on them to cooperate and rally round the programme of national unity and social progress.

¹⁹⁹ Made in a speech on the occasion of the nationalization of the remaining foreign-owned share of the Basra Petroleum Co.; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), December 9, 1975, p. 2.

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Radio interview statements by Executive Committee member Qaddumi of the PLO reviewing his visit to the USSR and Italy and welcoming plans to invite Jews to return to their Arab countries of origin²⁰⁰

Beirut, December 10, 1975

Q. Abu Lutf, we all know that the Palestine revolution and its allies, the nationalist and progressive forces, are at present engaged in a fierce struggle to stem the imperialist and reactionary tide in the area, one of the greatest dangers of which is the Sinai agreement. This being the case it was natural that we should strengthen our relations with the anti-imperialist forces, headed by the USSR and the socialist countries. At what level are the relations between us and the USSR at the present stage and what is your appraisal of your recent visit to the USSR?

A. We of the Palestine revolution have made it our rule to strengthen our relations with the socialist camp, and we make unremitting efforts, through continuous dialogue, to develop the viewpoints of our friends in all fields, with the aim of winning support for the Palestine cause, maintaining its gains and promoting its advance. Certainly the friendly USSR is resolute in its support for the Arab cause, and the Palestine cause in particular, and we are well aware of the importance of the USSR and the value of its friendship. We also know that it gives support at all levels to the Arab nation and in particular to the Palestinian people. Therefore our visit was very important, especially at this juncture when so much has been happening—the Sinai agreement, the incidents in Lebanon, and the latest developments in the area. This is why we thought that there must be coordination and that the course we are to follow in the future must be made clearer.

During this visit there was greater frankness, and our demands were discussed in greater detail and more specifically. In fact we got much further as regards the problem for, as I said, we started to discuss the details of what we expect to happen in the near future, especially as regards the con-

spiracies that are being concocted by American imperialism and Zionism with the aim of involving the Palestine revolution in irrelevant side issues. We also raised the question of what is going to happen to the Palestine cause in the future, of maintaining all the gains it has achieved and of creating the atmosphere and the circumstances that will enable it to advance to the stage where it is a real world issue, like the Vietnam problem, that is an object of profound concern to world public opinion at all levels, popular and official, especially in the light of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Then there was the question of the Security Council and what it can achieve for the Palestine cause.

This visit was certainly important because it went into so much detail. We also determined our tasks in the various stages and discussed coordination with a view to maintaining Arab solidarity which is so important to the Palestine cause and the Arab cause. Then there was the question of putting an end to Arab disputes and urging the Arab forces, in particular Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria and Libya, to play a more effective role at this stage, and to put an end to their local disputes, for this is very important. Within the framework of these subjects we examined and discussed the whole field of Palestinian and Arab relations with the friendly USSR, and the discussions had very important and positive results.

Q. After your visit to the USSR, Abu Lutf, you went to a number of socialist countries and to Italy. What exactly happened during your recent visit to Italy?

A. We also went to East Germany which is a friendly country that firmly supports our cause, although it is daily faced with challenges from West Germany, which spreads poisonous propaganda against the Palestinian people and their cause and supports Zionism and Israel. But the friendly state of East Germany combats all this poisonous propaganda in all its media, visible and invisible. This is why we want to make special mention of East Germany; she is our ally in this battle, every day directly combatting this propaganda from West Germany and her criminal acts. West Germany holds conferences in support of Zionism and to condemn United Nations resolutions, while East Germany, our friend and ally in this field, retorts to the provocations of West Germany, which is still hostile to the Palestine cause and

²⁰⁰ Made to radio "Voice of Palestine"; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 10, 1975, 2nd bulletin, pp. 4-7.

supports Israel and Zionism—the Nazi movement of Zionism is still firmly established in West Germany. Hence the great importance of East Germany, with the friendship she offers and the battles she fights daily in support of the Palestinian people and the Palestine cause.

As for our visit to Italy, it was really to initiate dialogues with all the parties there—with the Italian Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrat Party. We had long and profitable dialogues with these parties, because we want to persuade them to adopt a more positive attitude to the Palestine cause, especially since the Zionist raid, because, as I said, European public opinion is still suffering from a complex, a guilt complex, because of Hitler's massacres. We have to explain to them that there is no longer any reason for this guilt complex vis-à-vis the Jews and that they should become aware of the guilt involved in what Zionism, which is a Nazi movement, is doing, threatening peace by its slaughter and massacres of the Palestinian people. We must explain to Italian public opinion, and European public opinion in general, how important this decision is and that it ought to get rid of its guilt complex, for its time is past, and that they should not allow themselves to get a fear complex about a revival of antisemitism, for these groups are now massacring our people.

As I said, we met the General Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party for the first time, and had important talks. He affirmed his support for the Palestinian people and their right to their homeland. We also had important talks with the comrades of the Communist Party, and we know that the Communist Party supports the Palestine cause, its attitude is well known. But there are some questions, in particular that of Zionism, on which its views need to be modified. We had considerable success, but we need further dialogue with all these parties, and especially with the Communist and Socialist Parties, because we want to establish a PLO office in Italy. So there must be dialogue with the major parties in the country, because it is they that will decide if the PLO office is to be opened in Rome. We also had a long talk with some Italian officials, in particular about the Security Council debates and the need for Italy to adopt a positive attitude, even though she abstained from the first vote on full participation, because in their view only members

can participate fully, and the Organization is still only an observer. All the same, they say, we support your cause and right to have a homeland. This is certainly a start and we must concentrate on the European countries in particular for two reasons: to change their attitudes and to put pressure on the United States that is always Israel's first and strongest supporter.

Q. The PLO's Political Department made a very important point when it called on the Jews, and the Arab countries from which Jews have emigrated to occupied Palestine, to return to the Arab countries from which they emigrated to enjoy equal rights with their Arab brothers. Is there any definite programme for this? Iraq has taken a decision to this effect,²⁰¹ and the first Jew arrived in Iraq yesterday.

A. We want to stress an important point—that Palestinian struggle is for the freedom of man so that he may live in brotherhood and on a footing of equality with other men, regardless of religion or creed. Our revolution is a human one, because it takes into account not only Arabs, or Muslims and Christians, but also Jews. When we call for a democratic state in which all can coexist we stress that everyone who has lived in Palestine must live in Palestine along with all the others who used to live with him. There are communities of Jews who for one reason or another were obliged to leave; there were emigration operations carried out by the Zionist movement which made them afraid to live in Arab countries, so that they emigrated to Israel. The PLO has studied this matter, there has been extensive study of this question, especially as these communities of Oriental Jews are subjected to racial discrimination by the western communities and do not have the same rights as the western communities in Israel. Therefore the PLO, which is struggling for the return of the Palestinians to Palestine, must make efforts to ensure that these Jews return to the Arab countries, that they return to their property and enjoy equal rights as ordinary citizens. We have contacted many of the Arab countries, and certainly many of them, such as Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan have taken excellent measures in response to the PLO's call for efforts to ensure that the Jews return to Arab countries.

Similarly, when the Arab summit is held we

²⁰¹ Doc. 327 above.

want to submit to it extensive studies on this subject, which is very important. For since we believe that the Palestinians should return to their possessions and their lands and enjoy their rights in Palestine, we are bound to be in favour of the Jews returning to their possessions in the Arab countries. It is not a matter of a population exchange, because everyone wants to live in his own country among his possessions. It is not a matter of an exchange—if it was it would be easy for a people to be moved from one place to another. But everyone loves his country, and all the Palestinians must return to their lands. This is also a United Nations resolution. And the Jews who want to do so should return to the Arab countries. We, and the Arab countries from which Jews have emigrated, are trying to draw up programmes for their return and to facilitate their return. This applies in particular to the countries that can assist their return, as regards accommodation, travel tickets or finding work for them. I believe that Iraq has made proposals on this matter. This is a positive move, and we shall make efforts in cooperation with international circles with a view to drawing up wide-ranging programmes for the direct or indirect return of these Jews to the Arab countries.

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Communiqué issued by “The Arm of the Arab Revolution” in connection with the attack on OPEC headquarters²⁰²

Vienna, December 21, 1975

[*Radio Vienna announcer:*] We interrupt our programme and relay an important statement. We are switching to one of our studios. The armed group which calls itself “The Arm of the Arab Revolution” and which currently holds as hostages the delegates of the OPEC conference in Vienna, has issued a statement in the French language. At the request of the hostages the statement will be read in the French language.

The Austrian Radio now transmits the complete text of the communiqué issued by the “Arm of the Arab Revolution” on 21st December 1975:

The Arm of the Arab Revolution communiqué:

It is clear to all that the Arab cause, through the Palestine problem and its consequences, is the object of a plot aiming at attaining recognition for the legitimacy of the Zionist presence on our soil and at consolidating division, weakness and dissension within the Arab motherland, in particular in the region around the Arab land of Palestine [another voice here says “expansionist”]. In addition to these moves on the part of the aggressive Zionist state to implement its expansionist plans, it is seeking to obtain Arab Palestinian recognition of its legitimacy. It has not renounced these projects. Quite the contrary; it continues to furnish irrefutable proofs that it considers these projects to be fundamental and vital elements guaranteeing its existence and continuity, either by means of explicit declarations to this effect by all Zionist personalities, no matter of what orientation and no matter of what political party, or by concrete actions reflected in the occupation, the expulsion of inhabitants, the Judaization, feverish actions encouraging Jewish immigration and the installation of new permanent colonies in the West Bank, Gaza and on the Golan. These projects will benefit from the consequences of the dangerous plot of the open alliance between American imperialism and the reactionary capitulationist forces within the Arab motherland. It [the plot] further aims at striking at the Resistance and at Arab solidarity and creating a void, weakness, dispersal and fratricidal wars and at breaking the psychological and militant mobilization of the Arab masses and their forces in the face of aggression.

All this will enhance the chances of carrying out these projects by new methods, which will combine growing armed power with economic and political forces and will thus directly or indirectly bring us under American domination, which the treacherous reactionary and defeatist regimes in the Arab motherland (?regard) with favour. These regimes are beginning to fear the growing strength of the Palestine Resistance, which acts as the vanguard of the overall Arab revolution in the form of armed popular struggles, and they are terror-stricken by the awakening of the unifying and liberating current manifested in the fire of the glorious October war. These regimes have now turned to their American masters and have placed at their feet the larger part of the oil wealth of the Arab people as part of a desperate plan to save them.

²⁰² Broadcast on Vienna radio in French; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5092/A/5-8; reprinted by permission.

The Arab masses are now aware of the formidable consequences of this plot, which is being manifested in the form of [action along] parallel, and basically converging, lines:

1. To strike at Arab solidarity. This was manifested in the October war by encirclement, strangulation, flattering, intimidation and [word indistinct] directed against the progressive Arab regimes headed by Syria.

2. It seeks to strengthen the division among the progressive Arab countries and among Palestinian organizations by means of dubious plans which feed conflict and rivalry among them and bring to nought their historic chance of unifying their efforts in the struggle for the reunification and liberation.

3. It places obstacles in the path of the positive efforts of certain Arab states to create and consolidate a national oil policy which would turn our oil riches into an efficient weapon in our struggle against the Zionist and imperialist plot of exploitation and domination of our resources, will and fate.

4. It seeks to establish holy alliances among the reactionary Arab forces and their allies, headed by the Iranian regime, which is an active agent of imperialism aiming at encircling and striking at the Arab revolutionary forces emerging in the Arab motherland and particularly in Dhufar.

5. The terrible massacre in Lebanon, the short-term objective *a*) of which is to strike at the Palestine Resistance or to reduce, encircle and force it to accept capitulatory solutions at a minimal price and thus to prevent it from effectively acting against the plot: to demolish the great Arab information platform in Lebanon which was intended to denounce and make widely known the scandal and to incite the Arab masses to oppose it. Its long term objective *b*) is: to open up—in order to weaken and exhaust it—the zone surrounding the Zionist state by provoking religious strife and if possible, by establishing theocratic states there which would safeguard the interests of Israel and its expansionist plans both in time of war and of peace.

This plot, which is being hatched and implemented by Zionist, imperialist and reactionary Arab forces alongside the capitulationist regimes directed and incited by the Sadat regime, would not have found a free and easy path if it were not for the absence of a decisive attitude on the part

of the Arab masses—masses which the Arab regimes are trying to lead into a state of despair, exhaustion and indifference.

The Arm of the Arab Revolution, a movement which groups together strugglers from all Arab countries, reflects the conscience of the Arab nation and profoundly understands its destiny and future. It has decided in the name of the Arab people and its revolutionary vanguard to confront the plot, to strike at its bases and to apply revolutionary sanctions against all persons and parties which have participated in it. The movement, while pledging itself vis-à-vis the masses to carry out its historic duty, invites the masses and their militant vanguard parties and organizations to emerge from their silence and inaction and to confront the plot with revolutionary and decisive violence. To remain silent about this plot would be tantamount to complicity and would facilitate its implementation. Everyone must assume his responsibilities at this difficult time, and these responsibilities demand that we emerge from the circle of lies and deceit which is being set up around us not only by the plotting parties in the Arab motherland but also by certain parties of goodfaith but with a disturbed mind, which are tending to replace peace with capitulation, wisdom with defeatism and realism with treachery. This is as clear as the light of day.

All those who work, wittingly or otherwise, to get the Zionist occupation of our lands and imperialist domination of our destiny accepted and consolidated are traitors. Anyone who recognized Israel or accepts negotiating or treating with it on the subject of its aggression is a traitor and merits the punishment of the masses in revolt for their destiny and dignity.

The plot has advanced apace, and one has seen Sadat giving others a scandalous example of capitulation and treason as some Arab and Palestinian parties prepare to follow his example under the cover of outbidding others and of spurious diplomatic victories.

The attempts currently under way to transfer the scene of the signing of the plot by moving the negotiating venue from Geneva to the international [sic] Security Council and exploiting the natural recognition of our people's right to its land will not succeed in the face of the just appreciation and awareness of the Arab masses, which are opposed to these attempts and all the implicated

parties.

The Arm of the Arab Revolution, in carrying out this operation in order to (?prevent the) reactionary and capitulationist Arab regimes from playing along with the plot or passing it over in silence, and in order to arouse the movement of the Arab masses to their grave and urgent missions, addresses itself to the progressive Arab regimes to make them face up to their historic responsibilities so that they may unite their ranks and their efforts against the approaching catastrophe and lead the Arab people along the road of the national struggle in which the battle for unity and liberation will be accomplished.

The minimum programme for national salvation must include the following fundamental clauses:

1. Reaffirmation of respect for the three basic positions of the Arab summit of Khartoum. No negotiations, no treaties and no recognition of the aggressive Zionist state.

2. Denunciation of all compromises and political plans aimed at destroying the formula of refusing capitulation or granting tacit or express legal recognition of the aggression against the whole Arab Palestinian land.

3. In the light of the above, to denounce the treasonous Sinai agreement and the opening of the Suez Canal to Zionist goods and to demand its annulment in order to allow the heroic Egyptian Arab army to follow up its victories of the October war by continuing the total liberation war together with the armies of the north-west front.

4. To denounce the attempts aimed at bringing the Arab states and the Palestine Resistance to the negotiating table at Geneva or any other place with a view to the conclusion of treaties or any other form of capitulation.

5. Formation of a north-west front by Syria, Iraq and the Palestine Resistance on the basis of refusal to compromise and the strengthening of the war for total liberation.

6. Reanimation of the Arab unification march, the realization of which is a fundamental prerequisite of national salvation, by means of a unification initiative among Arab states which complement one another geographically and politically such as Iraq, Syria, the Arabian Gulf States, North and South Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.

7. Proclamation of the principle of sovereignty over our oil and financial wealth by means of the nationalization of the oil monopolies; adoption of a national oil and financial policy which would make it possible for the Arab people to use its resources for its development and progress, to safeguard its national interests and to reinforce its sovereignty by granting assistance to the friendly people of the Third World so as to enable them to emerge from their economic stagnation, with the only condition that priority be given to the financing of the confrontation states and the Palestine Resistance.

8. Proclamation of a clear position with regard to the dramatic conflict currently in progress in Lebanon by condemning and confronting the isolationist religious plot, which is nothing but another of the many aspects of the Zionist, American and reactionary grand plot; effective material and moral support to the national Arab Lebanese forces and the Palestine Resistance which defend the unity of Lebanon and its Arab national allegiance.

All popular and political forces and all governments are invited to take rapid and frank positions with regard to these grave problems which determine the division into a loyal camp and a camp of treason to the national cause.

Finally, while expressing our regret for the embarrassment caused to the peace-loving Austrian people by our operation, we call upon it to understand the grave and noble motives of this action, which a group of strugglers has undertaken in order to demonstrate their awareness of the grave danger which menaces the just cause of their people.

Victory to the Arab nation in its struggle for unity, liberation and justice; death to the conspiracies of its internal and external enemies.

[Signed:]

ARM OF THE ARAB REVOLUTION

Announcer: This will not interfere with the position which the Austrian Government will take in this affair.

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Press conference statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon blaming the "world communist movement" for the Lebanese crisis and insisting that the Christians will refuse to give in²⁰³

Beirut, December 24, 1975

What Lebanon has been faced with for some years is nothing less than a reign of terror aimed at the very heart of the principles upon which and for the sake of which she was established. Part of it has been deliberately planned and part of it is the normal consequence of Lebanon's circumstances and her position in this area. By planned terror I mean the ambitions of the world communist movement in our country. This is a known and recognized fact. . . .

It so happens that Lebanon's sociological structure does not provide communism with an opening through which it can penetrate to achieve its goals. There is no class struggle, in the Marxist sense, in Lebanon, because the economic and social disparities are not prominent and because the multiplicity of religious confessions prevents division along class lines. How is communism to penetrate Lebanese society unless it makes religious differences an alternative to class distinctions?

It also happens that the formula for religious coexistence in Lebanon is still a tender plant, a human experiment that has not yet been completed.

It also happens that the Muslim Lebanese have up to now been influenced by so-called Arab nationalism, in which religion is an essential element and a preponderant factor. They are also influenced by the allurements of unity or Arabism, which they see as an instrument for the unification of the countries and peoples of this area.

Finally it so happens that Lebanon has become the confluence of the tributaries of the Palestinian torrent flowing from the neighbouring countries and that this country, because of its prevailing atmosphere of freedom, has become their temporary homeland and almost their only road to their original usurped land.

Could world communism be expected to stand

idly in the face of all these temptations and openings without exploiting them—or trying to do so—to the greatest possible extent?

And this is what it has done, with all its energies, expertise and resources.

Its first step was to embrace the Palestinian resistance and to try to persuade it that in Lebanon it could only rely on communism, suggesting that anyone who was not a Marxist or at least a fellow-traveller, was either the enemy of the Palestinian revolution or subject to American, Western or imperialist pressures. . . .

While Lebanon was trying in vain to build sound relations with the Palestinian resistance, the communist movement chose a new approach, concentrating on religious differences between the Lebanese—establishing them more firmly in men's hearts and minds and using all the ploys at its command, whose "revolutionary" effectiveness is so well attested.

This is illustrated by the fact that the Lebanese had taken great steps towards building their unity and the mutual confidence which is the flesh and sinews of such unity.

They had started to hold meetings to discuss the system. Sincere attempts were being made on both sides to advance gradually beyond the stage of political confessionalism, with slow but sure steps.

The Council of Ministers had taken up the question of the so-called "Muslim demands," acceded to some of them and started to consider the rest. When it abolished the principle of confessional succession in certain key posts and offices, the Phalangists were the first to support this move and give it their blessing. . . .

This was a few months before the present crisis. What made it necessary to precipitate the explosion on the pretext of changing the system? . . . Is this not a proof that, just as in the case of our relations with the Palestinian resistance, international communism did not want to let us build up our future with our own hands and cure our maladies with love and mutual confidence?

Here too it hastened to rectify its omissions and proceeded to seize on and monopolize the "Muslim demands." It made out that the safeguards given to the Christians in the forties were monopolies of power, responsibility, the future and destiny. It even made use of the Palestine problem to incite the Muslims against the Christians

²⁰³ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), December 25, 1975; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), pp. 265-267.

until it had succeeded in establishing a broad front grouping the Muslims, Palestinians, Marxists and fellow-travellers to combat the Christians of this country, heaping them with abuse and violating all that was most sacred to them on the pretext that they were monopolizing all benefits, blessings and power in the country....

When we recall that the political system in Lebanon is a result of agreement and understanding between the Christians and the Muslims, we see clearly how evil is this determination to change it by violence, and the force of arms.

What is evil about it is that it encourages the conviction among the Christians that the formula for Christian-Islamic coexistence has become impossible thus causing the idea of partition to be firmly established in their hearts and minds as

the only escape hatch and their last card....

To be honest with the Muslims, I tell them frankly that the Christians are now psychologically and intellectually incapable of accepting what they were ready to discuss before this civil strife began. It is no exaggeration to say that the continued pressure on them aimed at extracting certain concessions from them will indubitably destroy their last hopes that the formula for coexistence can be saved and maintained as the only formula possible....

If you ask me what the solution is, I should say that the only way is through restoring calm and stability and rebuilding the confidence that strife has destroyed.

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Appendices

A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1975

Head of State

Muhammad Anwar Sadat

Prime Minister

Abd al-Aziz Higazi

Deputy Prime Minister, Interior

Mamduh Salim

Deputy Prime Minister, Defence

Muhammad Gamasi

Deputy Prime Minister, Waqfs

Abd al-Aziz Kamil

Foreign Affairs

Ismail Fahmi

Communications

Mahmud Riyad

Planning

Ismail Abdallah

Tourism, Civil Aviation

Ibrahim Nagib

Power

Ahmad Sultan

Information

Ahmad Abu al-Magd

Social Affairs

Aishah Ratib

Education

Mustafa Kamal Hilmi

Irrigation

Ahmad Kamil

Health

Fuad Muhy al-Din

Manpower, Public Works

Salah al-Din Gharib

Military Production

Ahmad Kamil Badri

Culture

Yusuf Sibai

Justice

Mustafa Abu Zaid

Agriculture

Mahmud Akhir

Oil

Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal

Industry and Mineral Resources

Mahmud Hasan

Insurance

Muhammad Ibrahim

Supply and Internal Trade

Abd al-Rahman Shadhili

Azhar Affairs

Abd al-Aziz Isa

Higher Education

Ismail Ghanim

Marine Transport

Abd al-Muti Ismail Arabi

Reconstruction, Housing

Uthman Ahmad Uthman

Finance

Hamdi Nashshar

Foreign Trade

Fathi Madbuli

Economic Cooperation

Tahir Amin

State for Presidential Affairs

Abd al-Fattah Abdallah

State for Cabinet Affairs

Yahya Gamal

State for National Assembly Affairs

Albert Barsum Salama

State for Local Government and Popular Organization

Muhammad Hamid Mahmud

State for Sudanese Affairs

Uthman Badran

State for Youth

Abd al-Hamid Hasan

State for Foreign Affairs

Muhammad Anwar

NEW CABINET: APRIL 16

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Defence</i>	Muhammad Gamasi
<i>Manpower</i>	Abd al-Latif Baltiya
<i>Economy</i>	Muhammad Zaki Shafei
<i>Finance</i>	Ahmad Abu Ismail
<i>Irrigation</i>	Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata
<i>Scientific and Technological Research</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Maabur al-Gubayli
<i>Interior</i>	Sayyid Fahmi
<i>Transport</i>	Mahmud Fahmi Abd al-Rahman
<i>Industry</i>	Issa Shahin
<i>Foreign Trade</i>	Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah
<i>Planning</i>	Ibrahim Hilmi Abd al-Rahman
<i>Justice</i>	Adil Yunis
<i>Communications</i>	Muhammad Kamal al-Din Hasanayn
<i>Waqf and Azhar Affairs</i>	Muhammad Hasan Dhahabi
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Agriculture and Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Military Production</i>	Ahmad Kamil Badri
<i>Culture</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Health</i>	Fuad Muhy al-Din
<i>Local Government and Popular Organization</i>	Muhammad Hamid Mahmud
<i>Oil</i>	Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal
<i>Housing and Reconstruction</i>	Uthman Ahmad Uthman
<i>Tourism</i>	Ibrahim Nagib
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Abd al-Rahman Shadhili
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>State for National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Barsum Salama

CHANGES: AUGUST 18

<i>Information</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Rifaat Mahgub

OCTOBER 11

B. Israel's Cabinet in 1975

<i>Head of State</i>	Ephraim Katzir
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Yitzhak Rabin (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Defence</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Education</i>	Aharon Yadlin (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Labour</i>	Moshe Baram (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Interior</i>	Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)
<i>Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Social Welfare</i>	Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)
<i>Housing</i>	Avraham Ofer (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Transport</i>	Gad Yaacobi (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Finance</i>	Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Justice</i>	Haim Zadok (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Yitzhak Rafael (National Religious Party)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Aharon Uzan (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Information</i>	Aharon Yariv (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)

CHANGES: JANUARY 21

Resignation of Aharon Yariv; portfolio of Information abolished.

NOVEMBER 4

<i>Social Welfare</i> (Michael Chasani had died on July 2)	Zevulun Hammer (National Religious Party)
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C. Jordan's Cabinet in 1975*Head of State*

King Hussein ibn Talal

Prime Minister

Zaid Rifai

Defence

Zaid Rifai

Foreign Affairs

Zaid Rifai

Economy

Raja Muashshir

Interior

Tharwat Talhuni

Justice

Naji Tarawna

Development and Reconstruction

Subhi Amin Amr

Communications

Ahmad Shawbaki

Information and Culture

Salah Abu Zaid

Education

Dhuqan Hindawi

Transport

Khalid Hasan

Social Affairs

Sami Ayyub

Tourism

Ghalib Barakat

Supply

Ali Hasan Awda

Agriculture

Marwan Hammud

Religious Affairs

Abd al-Aziz Khayyat

Public Works

Mahmud Hawamda

Health

Trad Qadi

Municipal and Rural Affairs

Muhammad Zabin

Finance

Salim Masada

State for Foreign Affairs

Sadiq Shari

State for Prime Minister's Office

Rakan Jazi

D. Syria's Cabinet in 1975

<i>Head of State</i>	Hafiz Asad
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mahmud Ayyubi (Baath)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Baath)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs</i>	Muhammad Haydar (Baath)
<i>Defence</i>	Mustafa Tlas (Baath)
<i>Interior</i>	Ali Zaza (Baath)
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Qablan (Baath)
<i>Public Works and Water</i>	Abd al-Ghani Qannut (AS)
<i>Education</i>	Shakir Fahham (Baath)
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Hashim (Baath)
<i>Culture and National Guidance</i>	Fawzi Kayyali (ASU)
<i>Tourism</i>	Abdallah Khani (Independent)
<i>Industry</i>	Shutaywi Sayfawi (Baath)
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Imadi (Independent)
<i>Justice</i>	Adib Nahawi (ASU)
<i>Communications</i>	Umar Sibai (Communist)
<i>Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Sattar Sayyid (Independent)
<i>Health</i>	Madani Khiyami (Independent)
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Husayn Kuwaydir (Baath)
<i>Local Administration</i>	Adib Milhim (Baath)
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Fayiz Nasir (Baath)
<i>Housing and Utilities</i>	Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi (SU)
<i>Transport</i>	Numan Zayn (Baath)
<i>Power</i>	Hani Sawwaf (Independent)
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Sharif (Baath)
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Ahmad (Baath)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Mursil Abu Umar (Baath)
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Adnan Mustafa (Baath)
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Subhi Kahhala (Independent)
<i>State for Planning</i>	Nurallah Nurallah (Independent)
<i>State</i>	Anwar Hammada (ASU)
<i>State</i>	Zuhayr Abd al-Samad (Communist)

Abbreviations: ASU: Arab Socialist Union

AS: Arab Socialist

SU: Socialist Unionist (merged with Baath on March 29, 1975)

E. Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee in 1975

Yasir Arafat (Fatah)—Chairman

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)

Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)

Adib Abd Rabbou (DFLP)

Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)

Talal Naji (PFLP-General Command)

Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)

Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)

Abd al-Aziz Wajih (Independent)

Elia Khoury (Independent)

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzir (West Bank)

Abd al-Jawwad Salih (West Bank)

Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

F. Voting on UN General Assembly resolutions, 30th session

Y = Yes N = No A = Abstention NP = Not Present .. = Not Participating

Resolution	3375	3376	3379	3414	3419				3474	3516	3525			
					A	B	C	D			A	B	C	D
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania	NP	Y	Y	..		NP	NP		NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Argentina	Y	Y	A	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia	A	A	N	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Austria	A	A	N	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Bahamas	A	A	N	NP		NP	NP		NP	A	NP	NP	NP	NP
Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	A	A	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	N	N	A	A
Belgium	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Bhutan	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bolivia	A	A	A	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	N	A	A
Botswana	Y	Y	A	NP		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burma	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Canada	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Cape Verde	Y	Y	Y	NP		NP	NP		NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Central African Republic	NP	NP	N	A		NP	NP		NP	A	A	N	A	A
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	Y	A	A	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
China	..	Y	Y	..		NP	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	Y	A	A	A		Y	A		Y	Y	A	Y	A	A
Comoros*	—	—	—	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica	N	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	N	Y	A	N
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dahomey**	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Yemen	Y	Y	Y	NP		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Dominican Republic	A	A	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	NP	NP	NP	NP
Ecuador	Y	A	A	Y		NP	NP		NP	Y	Y	Y	A	A
Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	A	N	N	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Equatorial Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	NP		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	Y	A	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
Fiji	Y	N	N	A		NP	NP		Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Finland	Y	A	N	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A
France	A	A	N	A		Y	Y		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Gabon	Y	A	A	A		NP	NP		Y	A	NP	NP	NP	NP

* Comoros was admitted to the United Nations in November 1975.

** Dahomey changed name to Benin on November 29 1975.

Resolution	3375	3376	3379	3414	3419				3474	3516	3525			
					A	B	C	D			A	B	C	D
Gambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
German Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany, Federal Republic	N	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Ghana	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greece	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	Y	Y	Y	A		Y	A		Y	Y	NP	Y	NP	NP
Guatemala	A	A	A	NP		Y	A		Y	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	NP		NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Guyana	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	Y	N	A	A
Honduras	N	N	N	NP		Y	A		Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
India	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq	..	Y	Y	..		NP*	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ireland	A	A	N	A		Y	Y		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Israel	N	N	N	N		A	N		A	N	N	N	N	N
Italy	A	A	N	A		Y	Y		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Ivory Coast	Y	A	N	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A
Jamaica	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan	A	A	A	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	Y	Y	A	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Laos	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	NP		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	Y	A	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	Y	A	N	N		NP	NP		Y	Y	N	N	NP	N
Libyan Arab Republic	..	Y	Y	..		Y	Y		NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
Luxembourg	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	A	A	N	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	N	N	A*
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	Y	Y	Y	NP		NP	NP		NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	NP*	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
Nepal	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	A	Y	A	A
Netherlands	N	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
New Zealand	A	A	N	A		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Nicaragua	N	N	N	N		Y	N		Y	A	N	N	A	N

* This country later informed the Secretary-General that it had intended to vote in favour.

Resolution	3375	3376	3379	3414	3419				3474	3516	3525			
					A	B	C	D			A	B	C	D
Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP*	Y		Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Norway	A	N	N	N		Y	A		Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Oman	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	Y	Y	N	A		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Papua New Guinea	NP	NP	A	NP		Y	A		Y	A	NP	NP	NP	NP
Paraguay	A	A	A	A		NP	NP		Y	Y	A	N	A	A
Peru	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Portugal	Y	A	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	NP	NP*	Y	Y
Romania	Y	Y	NP	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sao Tome and Principe	Y	Y	Y	NP	..	NP	NP	..	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	Y	A	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	NP	NP	NP	NP	..	NP	NP	..	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Spain	Y	Y	NP	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Surinam	—	—	—	NP	..	NP	NP	..	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Swaziland	A	N	N	A	..	Y	A	..	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Sweden	A	A	N	A	..	Y	A	..	Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Syrian Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Togo	Y	Y	A	A	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	N	N	N	N	..	Y	A	..	Y	A	A	Y	A	A
United Republic of Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Republic of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United States	N	N	N	N	..	Y	N	..	Y	N	N	Y	A	N
Upper Volta	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	A	A	N	A	..	Y	A	..	Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Venezuela	Y	Y	A	A	..	Y	A	..	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A
Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zaire	Y	Y	A	NP	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

* This country later informed the Secretary-General that it had intended to vote in favour.

G. Chronology

January

- 3-4 The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and the PLO's Faruq Qaddumi discuss Palestinian-Jordanian relations at a meeting in Cairo.
- 9-14 Israeli Foreign Minister Allon visits Washington.
- 19 During a truce arranged by UNTSO the inhabitants of the South Lebanese village of Kfar Shuba are evacuated after several weeks of fighting between Palestinians and Israeli forces.

February

- 1-5 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits the Middle East.
- 5-6 The Arab League Defence Council meeting in Cairo pledges aid to Lebanon to increase its defence capacity.
- 10-19 US Secretary of State Kissinger visits the Middle East.
- 26 A strike and demonstrations by fishermen in the Lebanese town of Sidon start a series of clashes and demonstrations throughout Lebanon.

March

- 4 Syria and Jordan agree to increase cooperation and coordination.
- 14 The Lebanese authorities and protesting groups in Sidon reach an agreement which puts an end to the clashes.
- 18 US Secretary of State Kissinger begins a visit to the Middle East.
- 21 Syria proposes a joint Syrian-PLO military command.
- 22 Kissinger announces the failure of his attempt to achieve an Egypt-Israeli interim agreement.
- 25 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia is assassinated.

April

- 1 Egypt requests the US and the USSR to reconvene the Geneva conference.
- 13-21 Clashes between Phalangists and Palestinians lead to fullscale fighting in Beirut and provincial cities in Lebanon.
- 21-23 The heads of state of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria meet in Riyadh.
- 28 A PLO delegation led by Yasir Arafat begins an 8-day visit to Moscow.

May

- 12 Renewed fighting in Beirut.
- 15 Prime Minister Rashid Sulh of Lebanon resigns.
- 23 "Government of military men" formed in Lebanon.
- 28 Fighting in Lebanon dies down as Rashid Karami is nominated Prime Minister.

June

- 1-2 Presidents Sadat of Egypt and Ford of the US meet in Salzburg.
- 5 The Suez Canal is reopened after having been closed since June 1967.
- 11-12 Israeli Prime Minister Rabin visits Washington.
- 12 Jordan and Syria form a joint high commission to coordinate policies.
- 20 Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam visits Washington.
- 24-31 Renewed fighting in Lebanon.
- 30 Prime Minister Rashid Karami announces the formation of a 6-man cabinet.

July

- 12 Israeli Prime Minister Rabin meets US Secretary of State Kissinger in Bonn.
- 12–16 The Islamic foreign ministers meet in Riyadh.
- 28 The OAU begins a 5-day summit conference in Kampala.

August

- 20–31 US Secretary of State Kissinger visits the Middle East.
- 25–30 The non-aligned summit conference meets in Lima.

September

- 1 Egypt and Israel initial a new interim agreement.
- 2 Fighting breaks out in Zahle and Tripoli in Lebanon.
- 16 The fighting in Lebanon spreads to Beirut.

October

- 9 The US Senate approves the US proposal to station US technicians in the Sinai as part of the Egypt-Israel interim agreement.
- 15–16 Arab foreign ministers meet to discuss the continuing fighting in Lebanon.
- 26 Egyptian President Sadat starts an 11-day visit to the US.

November

- 2 Islamic foreign ministers meet in Riyadh.
- 3–10 The UN General Assembly debates the question of Palestine.
- 10 The General Assembly adopts a resolution equating Zionism and racism.

December

- 2 Israel attacks Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
- 6 “Black Saturday” in Beirut sees a wave of indiscriminate killing on the basis of religious identity.
- 9 Local elections in Nazareth lead to victory for the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) and its allies, opening the way for the election of Arab communist Tawfik Zayyad as mayor.
- 21 OPEC oil ministers meeting in Vienna are taken hostage and later released in Algeria.

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